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oil export

Kazakhstan to Boost Oil Exports to Turkey via BTC Pipeline

Kazakhstan plans to increase crude oil exports to Turkey through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced following bilateral talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara. “Currently, 1.4 million tons of Kazakh oil are transported annually to Turkey through the BTC pipeline. We discussed the possibility of expanding volumes and welcomed Turkish Petroleum’s plans to enter the Kazakh market. Kazakhstan is also interested in Turkish companies’ investment potential and expertise in energy diversification and power plant construction. We are ready to implement large-scale joint projects,” Tokayev stated at a joint press conference. Kazakhstan began exporting oil via the BTC pipeline in 2008, initially at just 300,000 tons per year. Expansion has since been limited by the pipeline’s capacity, 50 million tons annually, with Kazakhstan allocated a quota of 1.5 million tons and by the restricted tanker fleet of KazTransOil, the transport subsidiary of the national oil and gas company KazMunayGas (KMG), which ships crude across the Caspian Sea from the port of Aktau. In 2022, President Tokayev prioritized the development of the Trans-Caspian corridor as part of Kazakhstan’s export diversification strategy. That same year, Azerbaijan signaled readiness to raise Kazakhstan’s BTC quota to 2.2 million tons. As a result, shipments surged 5.5-fold to 1.392 million tons in 2023 and surpassed 1.4 million tons in 2024. The government now aims to reach 1.5 million tons in 2025. During the Ankara visit, KMG Chairman Askhat Khasenov met with Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) President Ahmet Türkoğlu to discuss potential cooperation in exploration, transport, and oil and gas sector development. “Currently, KMG and TPAO working groups are assessing prospects for joint initiatives in geological exploration in Kazakhstan,” the press release stated. Khasenov emphasized that strengthening ties with Turkey’s leading energy firms aligns with Kazakhstan’s strategic foreign policy. He expressed confidence that enhanced collaboration with TPAO would boost economic relations between the two countries. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has encountered growing challenges in transporting oil via Russian ports due to new regulations and export bottlenecks.

Oil

New Russian Regulations Halt Kazakhstan’s Black Sea Oil Exports

Kazakhstan has temporarily suspended oil exports via the Black Sea ports of Novorossiysk and Yuzhnaya Ozerovka due to newly enforced Russian regulations. The rules, which took effect on July 21, require foreign vessels entering Russian ports to receive prior approval from the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the port captain. Strategic Ports, Vulnerable Logistics According to Reuters, the new clearance procedures have effectively blocked shipments of Kazakh crude transported through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) system. The disruption could reduce global oil supply by more than 2% (source). Over 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports are shipped through terminals in Novorossiysk and Yuzhnaya Ozerovka. The primary export product is CPC Blend, produced by major Kazakh oil firms, including ventures with significant American corporate participation. The decree by President Vladimir Putin, issued earlier this month, was introduced amid rising maritime threats. In 2025 alone, five tanker explosions have occurred in the region. One of the most serious incidents involved the tanker Koala, which was damaged in February while docked in the Russian port of Ust-Luga. Despite suspicions, none of the targeted tankers were carrying Russian crude sold above the G7 price cap. Tracking data revealed that each vessel had visited ports used for Kazakh oil exports, which are not subject to Western sanctions, according to the Financial Times. The CPC had planned to export 6.5 million tons of CPC Blend in August, maintaining the July level. Of that, 2.2 million tons were shipped via Novorossiysk. Mounting Risks, Limited Alternatives The security of Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure is further threatened by ongoing regional instability. In February, seven Ukrainian drones attacked the CPC’s Krokotinskaya oil pumping station. While there were fears of a 30% drop in throughput, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy denied any disruption, stating that “oil is being received according to schedule”. Financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov, writing on his Telegram channel ArtFinanze, urged restraint but acknowledged the seriousness of the situation: “If attacks on infrastructure continue, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the underwater pipeline system.” He also warned that the involvement of Western firms such as Chevron may not deter further risks: “Contrary to popular belief, the participation of companies such as Chevron will not stop anyone. On the contrary, such infrastructure can be used to put pressure on entire countries”. Currently, nearly all of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transit Russian territory. The CPC handles 80%, while another 13% flows through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, connected to Russia’s Transneft system. The remaining 7% is routed via the Kazakhstan, China pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and railways. Even if capacity on the BTC route is expanded to 3 million tons annually, it would barely compensate for the over 60 million tons currently exported through the CPC system. Despite frequent official calls for diversification since 2022, Kazakhstan’s oil export infrastructure remains acutely vulnerable, highly dependent on transit decisions made by foreign governments.

Oil

Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports to Germany Drop Sharply in June

Kazakhstan’s oil exports to Germany via the Druzhba pipeline fell by 1.4 times in June 2025 compared to May, according to new data from KazTransOil. Supply Targets vs. Delivery Volumes In June, KazTransOil transported 160,000 tonnes of crude oil to Germany through the Russian Transneft pipeline network, down from 230,000 tonnes in May. The shipments were delivered to the Adamova Zastava entry point on the German border. KazTransOil has not yet disclosed its supply plans for July. Despite the recent dip, Kazakhstan plans to export 1.5 million tonnes of oil to Germany in 2025, mirroring the 2024 target. In 2023, the volume reached 993,000 tonnes. Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov stated in May that Astana is in talks with partners to potentially increase the annual supply to 2.2 million tonnes. His predecessor, Almasadam Satkaliyev, had earlier voiced similar intentions, indicating the figure could be raised to 2 million tonnes if demand from Germany rises. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has also expressed readiness to boost exports. Deepening Energy Ties Kazakhstan launched regular oil deliveries to Germany through Druzhba in 2023 as part of its broader strategy to diversify export routes. The first shipment was dispatched in February of that year. KazTransOil received a 2023 quota from Transneft for 1.2 million tonnes of oil, and in August, Karachaganak Petroleum Operating (KPO), operator of the Karachaganak field, announced plans to maintain that volume in 2024. In June 2023, KazMunayGas signed a supply agreement with Rosneft Deutschland GmbH for monthly deliveries of 100,000 tonnes to the PCK Raffinerie in Schwedt, Germany. The contract involved KazMunayGas Trading AG as the seller and Rosneft Deutschland, one of the refinery’s co-owners, as the buyer. Why Use the Druzhba Pipeline? The Druzhba pipeline originates in Samara, Russia, and branches into two routes after Bryansk and Mozyr: the northern branch runs through Belarus to Poland and Germany, while the southern route passes through Ukraine to Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Following Germany’s decision to halt imports of Russian oil in early 2023, capacity became available within the Druzhba system. Kazakhstan capitalized on this opening, with oil shipments technically routed through Russia’s Transneft network under intergovernmental agreements. Germany, in its search for alternatives to Russian crude, has turned to Kazakhstan as a reliable supplier. Technical compatibility with the Druzhba pipeline and Kazakhstan’s neutral foreign policy have made it a strategic energy partner.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports Uninterrupted Despite Caspian Pipeline Consortium Berth Suspensions

Despite the suspension of two out of three offshore berths operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), Kazakhstan’s oil exports are proceeding without disruption, according to the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The ministry stated that there are currently no restrictions on the receipt or shipment of oil through the CPC system. Transshipment is being carried out on schedule via VPU-3, the third remote mooring unit, which has been in operation since 2014. “Shipments are proceeding normally and according to schedule through the VPU-3 offshore mooring device, which remains operational,” the Ministry of Energy announced. Temporary Suspension of VPU-1 and VPU-2 Earlier, CPC announced the temporary suspension of VPU-1 and VPU-2 following an unscheduled inspection conducted by Russia’s Rostransnadzor. The inspections are part of a broader review of marine infrastructure safety across the Azov-Black Sea basin, launched in the wake of an oil product spill in the Kerch Strait in December 2024. Following the inspection, regulatory authorities issued protocols and directives mandating the temporary shutdown of the two berths until the violations identified are addressed. In the meantime, all CPC shipments have been consolidated through VPU-3. Consortium shareholders have been formally notified of the developments. Similar Measures at Transneft Facility The crackdown on safety violations has extended beyond the CPC. The eighth oil-loading berth operated by JSC Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port (NCSP Group), part of Russia’s Transneft, has also been suspended for 90 days. The suspension followed the identification of safety violations related to the handling of hazardous cargo. Transneft has been ordered to correct the deficiencies by June 30. Strategic Significance of CPC The CPC is Kazakhstan’s most critical export route for crude oil, linking the giant Tengiz Field with the Yuzhnaya Ozereyevka Terminal on the Black Sea. The pipeline stretches 1,510 kilometers, including 452 kilometers within Kazakhstan, and has an annual capacity of up to 81.5 million tons. In 2024, Kazakhstan exported 54.9 million tons of oil via CPC, accounting for approximately 80% of the country's total oil exports. Security Concerns: Drone Attacks Raise Alarms Security concerns continue to loom over the CPC infrastructure. In February, the Kropotkinskaya station was targeted by seven drones. While the Ministry of Energy reassured that oil deliveries remained unaffected, the incident heightened concerns about operational stability. Although Russia and Ukraine later agreed not to target CPC facilities, Russia alleges that its air defense systems intercepted another drone attack on March 24, the third such incident in a month. Oil market analyst Olzhas Baidildinov voiced skepticism about the durability of the ceasefire arrangement. “We shouldn’t count on an end to attacks on CPC infrastructure,” Baidildinov said. “There’s unwarranted optimism in Kazakh media and among some experts, especially against the backdrop of record oil output in February-March. A decline in both oil production and exports seems inevitable, along with a drop in KazMunayGas’ dividend income from CPC and budget revenues.” He also warned that irregular operations could damage infrastructure designed for continuous, stable use. “Oil pipelines are engineered for consistent operational...

Oil and Gas

Opinion: Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan: Kazakhstan Asserts Contract Stability Amid Lawsuits Exceeding $170 Billion

Following statements by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the intrigue surrounding the PSA agreements for Kashagan and Karachaganak and the stabilized contract for Tengiz have taken on new dimensions. Previously, in the articles, Breaking Down Kazakhstan’s Claims Against International Oil Consortiums and Is Kazakhstan Preparing to Take on the Oil Consortium “Whales?, TCA examined the ongoing lawsuits filed by the government and the authorized body, PSA LLC, against the North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (NCOC) and Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), noting that the Ministry of Energy and KazMunayGas have not raised any claims against the joint venture Tengizchevroil LLP (TCO). While shares in NCOC and KPO are managed by PSA LLC, those in TCO are controlled by the national company, KazMunayGas. What did President Tokayev say? On January 28, President Tokayev held an expanded government meeting addressing the public and political debate surrounding PSA agreements. "Reforms in the subsoil use sector must continue, no matter what," Tokayev stated. "This is a fundamental position that the government should firmly adhere to. The implementation of production-sharing agreements (PSAs) for major oil fields has allowed Kazakhstan to become a reliable supplier of energy resources to the global market. These projects make a significant contribution to the country’s socioeconomic development. However, large investments require a long-term planning horizon. Therefore, the government must intensify negotiations on extending PSA contracts, possibly on updated and more favorable terms for our country." This statement sparked discussions among experts; who exactly was the president referring to? The major PSAs in Kazakhstan are the Karachaganak and Kashagan projects, with contracts expiring in 2038 and 2041, respectively. In contrast, Tengiz does not operate under a PSA but rather a stabilized contract, which is set to expire much sooner, in 2033. I have repeatedly emphasized the need for an audit of Tengiz before the contract expires and have proposed that it should not be extended. Kazakhstan can independently, or with the involvement of foreign oil service companies, develop this highly profitable field under more advantageous conditions. On January 29, Kazakhstan's Minister of Energy, Almassadam Satkaliyev, provided clarification, confirming that the president's directive was specifically about Tengiz. "The directive was given quite openly within the framework of international agreements and international law to conduct consultations with consortium participants. Given the development timelines, the most relevant project for us is Tengizchevroil, which operates the Tengiz field in partnership with Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Lukoil. We plan to start certain preliminary consultations with them, and once we are ready for negotiations, we will proceed with them. The government will first develop an agenda and a list of its demands. One possible demand is an increase in Kazakhstan’s stake in these projects." So, is Tengiz the primary target? Or is Kazakhstan preparing for a broader offensive on all three fronts? “There are Hardliners in the Government” On February 16, the international industry portal Upstream Online published an extensive article titled Kazakhstan Seeks Shake-Up at Crucial Foreign-Led Oil Projects. The article primarily focuses on the production-sharing agreements (PSAs) for Karachaganak...

Oil

Kazakhstan’s Mini Oil Refineries Urge Government to Lift Export Ban on By-Products

Kazakhstan’s January ban on the export of naphtha, heating oil, and marine fuel should be reconsidered, as it threatens to shut down mini-oil refineries, Muratbek Makhanov, Managing Director of the Oil and Gas Sector and Ecology at the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs (Atameken) has warned. Since January 29, Kazakhstan has imposed an official ban on exporting gasoline, diesel fuel, and certain petroleum products, including to other Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states. The restrictions cover by-products of mini-refineries such as naphtha, used as fuel for tractors, a gasoline additive, or a solvent in paint production, heating oil, and marine fuel. While Kazakhstan operates three major refineries, approximately 30 smaller facilities focus primarily on diesel production, which inevitably results in these by-products. The issue, industry representatives argue, is that these by-products have little domestic demand and are primarily sold for export. “The oil refining process makes it impossible to produce only diesel fuel. Other petroleum products, such as heating oil and naphtha, are unavoidable by-products that now fall under the export ban. Selling them domestically is not viable, which means we may have to suspend production entirely, leading to a diesel fuel shortage,” said Abdymanap Isabayev, a representative of one of Kazakhstan’s mini-refineries. Isabayev proposed maintaining the export ban on diesel fuel while lifting restrictions on by-products. His concerns were echoed by Atameken’s Makhanov. “Restrictions on the export of refined oil by-products, such as naphtha, heating oil, and marine fuel, harm not only the financial stability of mini-refineries but also Kazakhstan’s broader economy. The government must reconsider this ban and allow mini-refineries to export these products,” he said. Makhanov emphasized that selling surplus petroleum products abroad would generate additional export revenues, increasing budget inflows through customs duties, fees, and other charges. Amanbai Sembekuly, another mini-refinery representative, warned that shutting down small processing plants, which primarily refine crude from marginal and unprofitable fields, could also halt oil production at those sites. “This would be a significant loss to the national budget, which is already suffering from lower revenues due to the ban. The export customs duty on our high-sulphur oil products is 2.5 times higher than the duty on diesel fuel, so these restrictions are costing the government money,” Sembekuly said. Kazakhstani naphtha is primarily exported to Turkey, Uzbekistan, Italy, and Greece, where it is refined into diesel fuel. According to industry representatives, similar refining processes could take place within Kazakhstan’s major refineries, but this would require setting up additional processing lines. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Kazakh authorities announced at the end of January the liberalization of domestic oil product prices, abolishing 11 regulations that had controlled wholesale and retail fuel prices since 2014. The move is expected to address fuel shortages, which have worsened due to price disparities that drive fuel exports to neighboring markets.