Caspian Pipeline Consortium - The Times Of Central Asia

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Oil logistics

Kazakhstan’s Oil Logistics Trap: Higher Prices, Limited Gains

Escalation in the Middle East has pushed oil back above $100 a barrel. For Kazakhstan, whose budget remains heavily dependent on commodity exports, that should have been good news. But a high price matters only if the oil can reach buyers. For the world’s largest landlocked country, that is where the problem begins. European refiners are looking for alternatives to disrupted Saudi supplies, while problems along established routes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea are increasing demand for crude from other regions. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, however, move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium system across Russian territory to a terminal near Novorossiysk. The Middle East crisis is pushing prices and global freight costs higher, while attacks around Russian infrastructure are increasing the risks to Kazakhstan’s main export route. Over the past decade, Kazakhstan has significantly increased its oil exports. According to the Bureau of National Statistics, volumes rose from 63.6 million metric tons in 2015 to a record 76.3 million tons in 2025, an increase of about 20%. Exports grew from 65.2 million tons in 2022 to 71 million in 2024 and 76.3 million tons in 2025. Expansion at the Tengiz field contributed to that growth. Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production reached 99.6 million tons in 2025. The government had planned for about 98 million tons in 2026, but export disruptions have already forced temporary output cuts. Revenue has not risen as steadily as volumes. “In monetary terms, growth over the past decade was considerably stronger, although the trend, as noted above, was also much more volatile. The value of exports increased from $26.8 billion in 2015 to $40 billion in 2025, or by 49.3%. The highest figure during this period was recorded in 2022, at $46.9 billion,” Ranking.kz said in its analysis. Physical volumes and export revenue have often moved in different directions. “This was particularly evident in 2025: Kazakhstan exported 7.4% more oil than a year earlier, but its value fell by 6.8%. The average estimated value of one exported metric ton declined from $604 in 2024 to $524 in 2025,” the analysts calculated. In the first half of 2026, Kazakhstan exported $40.3 billion worth of goods. Crude oil and petroleum products accounted for 46.5% of the total. Export statistics and transportation data measure different things. The Bureau of National Statistics records goods cleared for export, while the Energy Ministry and pipeline companies report volumes pumped, transshipped, and transported. The same cargo can pass through several sections of the system, so those figures cannot simply be added together. In March, Talgat Makuov, acting director of the Energy Ministry’s oil refining and transportation department, said 64.8 million tons of Kazakh oil had moved through CPC in 2025. Another 9.2 million tons went through the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, while 1.1 million tons were shipped through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline toward China. Against those volumes, the Trans-Caspian route remains small. In 2025, 1.26 million tons were shipped across the Caspian toward the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. The plan...

Oil Production

Karachaganak Maintenance to Cut Kazakhstan’s Oil Output by Up to 450,000 Tons

Karachaganak, one of Kazakhstan’s three largest oil and gas fields, entered planned maintenance on September 7, a shutdown expected to reduce the country’s oil and gas condensate output by 400,000–450,000 metric tons before work ends on October 1. The interruption comes in a year when the government has already lowered its national production forecast following repeated disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the main export route for Kazakhstan’s oil. In August, Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said Kazakhstan had lowered its 2026 oil production target from 98 million to 96 million metric tons. He put production losses from attacks on CPC infrastructure in January, June, and July at about 3.5 million metric tons. CPC loadings rebounded by 22% in August after July’s disruptions, reaching around 1.6 million barrels per day (bpd). CPC exports are expected to fall to about 1.5 million bpd in September, partly because of the Karachaganak maintenance. More than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports move through CPC. The July shutdown at the Black Sea terminal showed how quickly an export disruption can force production cuts at fields far inland. On July 22, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21%, while output at Tengiz dropped 56%, from roughly 925,000 to 406,000 bpd. Karachaganak also depends on Russian processing infrastructure. Raw gas from the field is sent to Russia’s Orenburg gas processing plant. In June, Karachaganak reduced production after an incident at the plant sharply curtailed its intake of gas from the field. Karachaganak Petroleum Operating B.V. (KPO), the field’s operator, is expanding its gas reinjection capacity. The process returns some of the produced gas to the reservoir, helping to maintain pressure and sustain oil and gas condensate output. A fifth gas reinjection compressor began operating in 2024. In June 2026, KPO announced that the KEP-1B project, which includes a sixth compressor, had begun reinjecting gas ahead of schedule. The Energy Ministry has said the two compressors would help maintain Karachaganak’s liquid hydrocarbon production at around 11–12 million metric tons a year. Following the expansion of Tengiz, Kazakhstan had expected national oil production to approach 100 million metric tons a year. Its production capacity has increased, but the events of 2026 have exposed the limits of the infrastructure used to move that oil to market. In May, Akkenzhenov said there was no full-scale alternative to CPC. Some oil can be rerouted across the Caspian into the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or east to China, but these routes cannot absorb CPC-scale volumes. CPC can carry up to 72.5 million metric tons a year from Kazakhstan. Whether or not the maintenance reduction was already incorporated into the revised forecast, Kazakhstan has little room for further disruption to the export and processing infrastructure on which its production depends.

Kazakhstan Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Seeks Oil Export Alternatives After Latest CPC Disruption

A drone incident near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal outside Novorossiysk briefly halted oil loading on September 8, again highlighting Kazakhstan’s dependence on its main export route through Russia. Astana is seeking to expand alternatives, but the difference in volumes remains enormous. According to Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry, the country exported 64.8 million tons of oil through CPC in 2025. The ministry puts shipments via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline at 1.2 million tons annually. Azerbaijan has said it is ready to receive up to 2.2 million tons of Kazakh oil through BTC annually, although KazMunayGas expects shipments of up to 1.6 million tons in 2026. Even this higher figure would be only around 3% of the volume Kazakhstan exported through CPC last year. The Caspian route allows oil from Kazakhstan to bypass Russian territory entirely. Crude is shipped to the port of Aktau, carried by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and then transported through the BTC pipeline via Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. However, the logistics are more complicated than direct pipeline transportation. A substantial increase in exports could require additional tanker capacity and improvements to transport infrastructure on both sides of the Caspian. Kazakhstan also exports oil eastward to China. Another alternative is the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, although it feeds crude into Russia’s pipeline system and does not reduce reliance on Russian transit. The latest incident temporarily stopped loading at two single-point moorings, the offshore facilities used to load crude onto tankers. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said inspections of the equipment and vessels found no issues affecting continued loading. It reported no environmental impact. Loading resumed, and CPC imposed no restrictions on accepting crude from Kazakh shippers. CPC operations had already been interrupted several times in 2026 following attacks in the terminal area. The disruptions have added up. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov estimated that incidents affecting CPC in January and July had caused about 3.5 million tons of lost production. He said Kazakhstan would have to lower its 2026 oil production forecast from 98 million tons to around 96 million tons. The problem for Astana is the scale of its dependence. CPC connects Kazakhstan’s largest oilfields to the Black Sea and accounted for approximately 82% of the country’s 78.7 million tons of oil exports in 2025. Even doubling or tripling shipments across the Caspian would leave CPC dominant. Kazakhstan can gradually spread its exports across several routes, but the alternatives cannot currently replace its main export channel. For more on our special coverage, click here.

Oil Refining

After CPC Disruptions, Kazakhstan Wants to Refine More Oil at Home

Kazakhstan wants to more than double its oil refining capacity and sell more petrol and diesel to neighboring countries. The case for reducing its reliance on crude exports has gained urgency. Disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) this year have already forced the country to cut its 2026 oil production forecast by 2 million tonnes. Kazakhstan produced 99.6 million tonnes of oil in 2025 but refined only 18.4 million tonnes. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said at a briefing on August 25 that refining capacity is planned to increase to 40 million tonnes. “We want to bring this ratio, as in other developed countries that are also producers, to one to two or one to three,” Akkenzhenov said. According to him, Kazakhstan eventually expects to supply neighboring countries with motor fuel and expand its export potential. This does not mean abandoning crude oil exports: even after refining capacity reaches 40 million tonnes, a significant share of production will continue to be exported. Astana is instead seeking to shift the balance toward finished products. The oil refining industry development concept runs through 2040. According to the Energy Ministry, Kazakhstan’s refineries processed 18.4 million tonnes of oil in 2025 and produced 15.47 million tonnes of petroleum products. The concept adopted in 2025 envisaged refining rising to 39.2 million tonnes a year by 2040. The government has since accelerated the timetable, targeting 40 million tonnes of annual capacity by 2033. Average refining depth at the country’s three main refineries reached 90% in 2025 and is targeted to rise to 94%. To achieve this, Kazakhstan is preparing to build a fourth major refinery with capacity of up to 10 million tonnes a year. Possible locations include the Mangystau, Atyrau and Turkestan regions, as well as Ulytau, with the authorities expecting to select a site by the end of the year. The new plant could begin operating by 2033, with the Energy Ministry expecting its launch to fully cover domestic demand for jet fuel and allow Kazakhstan to expand exports of K5-standard petroleum products, broadly equivalent to Europe’s Euro 5 standard. Problems with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Kazakhstan’s main route for getting oil to the global market, have strengthened the case for diversifying the way Kazakhstan uses and exports its oil. The pipeline runs through Russia to a Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, meaning disruptions there can quickly affect production in Kazakhstan. On August 25, Akkenzhenov said the country’s oil production forecast for 2026 had been cut from 98 million to 96 million tonnes. He estimated production losses resulting from attacks on CPC infrastructure at around 3.5 million tonnes. The authorities are trying to compensate for part of the lost volumes by rescheduling major maintenance at large oil fields. Astana is also looking for additional routes to global markets. Akkenzhenov identified Baku-Supsa, the pipeline running from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea coast, as one option, saying it could carry around 5 million tonnes a year. The route has seen only limited use since 2022, although...

Oil Exports

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Vance Personally Asked Zelensky to Halt CPC-Linked Tanker Strikes, FT Reports

U.S. Vice President JD Vance personally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 31 to halt attacks on oil tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, the Financial Times reported on August 12. Citing Ukrainian officials and others familiar with the call, the newspaper said Kyiv had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels unless they were under Ukrainian sanctions or carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo. Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since the July 31 call. Vance’s intervention came after repeated July attacks had disrupted Kazakhstan’s main oil-export route, halted loading several times, and forced producers to cut output. Washington was also concerned that the attacks were destabilizing oil markets and harming U.S. commercial interests. A U.S. official confirmed to the FT that Washington had warned Kyiv against attacks on non-Russian vessels and CPC infrastructure, describing the pipeline as “a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets” and an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The latest incidents before the call came on July 30, when two more tankers were attacked. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at CPC’s SPM-3 mooring, while MARATHI was attacked while awaiting a berth about six nautical miles offshore, forcing CPC to stop loading again. The Vance-Zelensky call took place the following day. Washington had already warned Kyiv about attacks affecting U.S. and Kazakh economic interests. Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Olha Stefanishyna, disclosed in February that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after an earlier strike on Novorossiysk. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, told TCA that Ukraine had an obligation to avoid legitimate allied energy exports and infrastructure, and that further strikes would "not be tolerated." The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chevron CEO Mike Wirth had raised the tanker attacks with Trump administration officials, after which Washington cautioned Ukraine against targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. By early August, the disruption was showing clearly in export data. Reuters reported on August 7 that CPC loadings in July fell more than 20% behind schedule to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. The reduction amounted to a loss of about 400,000 barrels per day of CPC Blend from international markets in July. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% in July from June. CPC is the dominant route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports and normally handles roughly 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline runs from the Tengiz field through Russia to the Black Sea. Its shareholder structure also gives U.S. companies a substantial direct interest: Chevron owns 15%, while Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, an ExxonMobil affiliate, owns 7.5%. Responsibility for the individual tanker attacks has remained politically sensitive. Russia has blamed Ukraine. Kyiv has not publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on vessels carrying predominantly Kazakh crude. According to the FT, the July 31 call resulted in a...