Caspian Pipeline Consortium - The Times Of Central Asia

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Kazakhstan Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Seeks Oil Export Alternatives After Latest CPC Disruption

A drone incident near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal outside Novorossiysk briefly halted oil loading on September 8, again highlighting Kazakhstan’s dependence on its main export route through Russia. Astana is seeking to expand alternatives, but the difference in volumes remains enormous. According to Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry, the country exported 64.8 million tons of oil through CPC in 2025. The ministry puts shipments via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline at 1.2 million tons annually. Azerbaijan has said it is ready to receive up to 2.2 million tons of Kazakh oil through BTC annually, although KazMunayGas expects shipments of up to 1.6 million tons in 2026. Even this higher figure would be only around 3% of the volume Kazakhstan exported through CPC last year. The Caspian route allows oil from Kazakhstan to bypass Russian territory entirely. Crude is shipped to the port of Aktau, carried by tanker across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, and then transported through the BTC pipeline via Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. However, the logistics are more complicated than direct pipeline transportation. A substantial increase in exports could require additional tanker capacity and improvements to transport infrastructure on both sides of the Caspian. Kazakhstan also exports oil eastward to China. Another alternative is the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, although it feeds crude into Russia’s pipeline system and does not reduce reliance on Russian transit. The latest incident temporarily stopped loading at two single-point moorings, the offshore facilities used to load crude onto tankers. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said inspections of the equipment and vessels found no issues affecting continued loading. It reported no environmental impact. Loading resumed, and CPC imposed no restrictions on accepting crude from Kazakh shippers. CPC operations had already been interrupted several times in 2026 following attacks in the terminal area. The disruptions have added up. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov estimated that incidents affecting CPC in January and July had caused about 3.5 million tons of lost production. He said Kazakhstan would have to lower its 2026 oil production forecast from 98 million tons to around 96 million tons. The problem for Astana is the scale of its dependence. CPC connects Kazakhstan’s largest oilfields to the Black Sea and accounted for approximately 82% of the country’s 78.7 million tons of oil exports in 2025. Even doubling or tripling shipments across the Caspian would leave CPC dominant. Kazakhstan can gradually spread its exports across several routes, but the alternatives cannot currently replace its main export channel. For more on our special coverage, click here.

Oil Refining

After CPC Disruptions, Kazakhstan Wants to Refine More Oil at Home

Kazakhstan wants to more than double its oil refining capacity and sell more petrol and diesel to neighboring countries. The case for reducing its reliance on crude exports has gained urgency. Disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) this year have already forced the country to cut its 2026 oil production forecast by 2 million tonnes. Kazakhstan produced 99.6 million tonnes of oil in 2025 but refined only 18.4 million tonnes. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said at a briefing on August 25 that refining capacity is planned to increase to 40 million tonnes. “We want to bring this ratio, as in other developed countries that are also producers, to one to two or one to three,” Akkenzhenov said. According to him, Kazakhstan eventually expects to supply neighboring countries with motor fuel and expand its export potential. This does not mean abandoning crude oil exports: even after refining capacity reaches 40 million tonnes, a significant share of production will continue to be exported. Astana is instead seeking to shift the balance toward finished products. The oil refining industry development concept runs through 2040. According to the Energy Ministry, Kazakhstan’s refineries processed 18.4 million tonnes of oil in 2025 and produced 15.47 million tonnes of petroleum products. The concept adopted in 2025 envisaged refining rising to 39.2 million tonnes a year by 2040. The government has since accelerated the timetable, targeting 40 million tonnes of annual capacity by 2033. Average refining depth at the country’s three main refineries reached 90% in 2025 and is targeted to rise to 94%. To achieve this, Kazakhstan is preparing to build a fourth major refinery with capacity of up to 10 million tonnes a year. Possible locations include the Mangystau, Atyrau and Turkestan regions, as well as Ulytau, with the authorities expecting to select a site by the end of the year. The new plant could begin operating by 2033, with the Energy Ministry expecting its launch to fully cover domestic demand for jet fuel and allow Kazakhstan to expand exports of K5-standard petroleum products, broadly equivalent to Europe’s Euro 5 standard. Problems with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Kazakhstan’s main route for getting oil to the global market, have strengthened the case for diversifying the way Kazakhstan uses and exports its oil. The pipeline runs through Russia to a Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, meaning disruptions there can quickly affect production in Kazakhstan. On August 25, Akkenzhenov said the country’s oil production forecast for 2026 had been cut from 98 million to 96 million tonnes. He estimated production losses resulting from attacks on CPC infrastructure at around 3.5 million tonnes. The authorities are trying to compensate for part of the lost volumes by rescheduling major maintenance at large oil fields. Astana is also looking for additional routes to global markets. Akkenzhenov identified Baku-Supsa, the pipeline running from Azerbaijan to Georgia’s Black Sea coast, as one option, saying it could carry around 5 million tonnes a year. The route has seen only limited use since 2022, although...

Oil Exports

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Vance Personally Asked Zelensky to Halt CPC-Linked Tanker Strikes, FT Reports

U.S. Vice President JD Vance personally asked Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on July 31 to halt attacks on oil tankers serving the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk, the Financial Times reported on August 12. Citing Ukrainian officials and others familiar with the call, the newspaper said Kyiv had agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or non-Russian vessels unless they were under Ukrainian sanctions or carrying Russian oil or other Russian cargo. Ukraine has not struck tankers near the CPC terminal since the July 31 call. Vance’s intervention came after repeated July attacks had disrupted Kazakhstan’s main oil-export route, halted loading several times, and forced producers to cut output. Washington was also concerned that the attacks were destabilizing oil markets and harming U.S. commercial interests. A U.S. official confirmed to the FT that Washington had warned Kyiv against attacks on non-Russian vessels and CPC infrastructure, describing the pipeline as “a vital conduit of Kazakhstan-origin energy for European markets” and an alternative to Russian energy supplies. The latest incidents before the call came on July 30, when two more tankers were attacked. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at CPC’s SPM-3 mooring, while MARATHI was attacked while awaiting a berth about six nautical miles offshore, forcing CPC to stop loading again. The Vance-Zelensky call took place the following day. Washington had already warned Kyiv about attacks affecting U.S. and Kazakh economic interests. Ukraine’s ambassador to Washington at the time, Olha Stefanishyna, disclosed in February that the State Department had delivered a formal démarche after an earlier strike on Novorossiysk. On July 23, Representative Bill Huizenga, chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, told TCA that Ukraine had an obligation to avoid legitimate allied energy exports and infrastructure, and that further strikes would "not be tolerated." The Wall Street Journal later reported that Chevron CEO Mike Wirth had raised the tanker attacks with Trump administration officials, after which Washington cautioned Ukraine against targeting non-Russian vessels in the Black Sea. By early August, the disruption was showing clearly in export data. Reuters reported on August 7 that CPC loadings in July fell more than 20% behind schedule to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. The reduction amounted to a loss of about 400,000 barrels per day of CPC Blend from international markets in July. Kazakhstan’s oil production fell 14% in July from June. CPC is the dominant route for Kazakhstan’s oil exports and normally handles roughly 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day. The 1,511-kilometer pipeline runs from the Tengiz field through Russia to the Black Sea. Its shareholder structure also gives U.S. companies a substantial direct interest: Chevron owns 15%, while Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company, an ExxonMobil affiliate, owns 7.5%. Responsibility for the individual tanker attacks has remained politically sensitive. Russia has blamed Ukraine. Kyiv has not publicly claimed responsibility for attacks on vessels carrying predominantly Kazakh crude. According to the FT, the July 31 call resulted in a...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Black Sea Risks Elevate Azerbaijan and Turkey in Kazakhstan’s Export Strategy

Bloomberg reported on August 8 that the Turkish authorities were withholding or delaying transit permission for some vessels bound through the Dardanelles for Novorossiysk. Some applicants were reportedly told that permits were not being issued, while others faced additional review. The practice appeared selective: vessels bound for some other Black Sea destinations continued to transit, while some Ukraine-bound vessels were also reportedly affected. On August 9, however, Turkish officials told Reuters that shipping through the Turkish Straits was proceeding smoothly and described the actions as temporary security measures rather than an ongoing restriction. The reported restrictions followed a sharp increase in attacks on commercial shipping around the Black Sea, including Turkish-linked vessels near Novorossiysk. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry expressed concern after attacks on the Turkish-owned Yaşar and Nadezhda and called on Russia and Ukraine to ensure navigational safety. Novorossiysk is especially important for Kazakhstan, because the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal there handles the overwhelming majority of its oil exports. Although the CPC pipeline itself remains operational, the episode showed how quickly traffic serving Kazakhstan’s principal oil-export outlet could face an additional constraint. The events shed light on an export strategy Kazakhstan began developing several years before the current problems. Tokayev’s July 2022 instructions addressed both oil-export diversification through the Trans-Caspian route and alternative transport chains for other cargo. In particular, he called for greater use of Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports and the development of alternative railway routes. Later that year, KazMunayGas (KMG) and SOCAR established a framework for moving Kazakhstani oil from Aktau across the Caspian Sea and onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, initially for up to 1.5 million tons annually. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey also adopted a 2022–2027 roadmap to remove bottlenecks along the Middle Corridor. Kazakhstan continued to develop transport links with Russia and China as it expanded Trans-Caspian routes through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The strategy extended Kazakhstan’s longstanding geopolitical multi-vector policy, which balances relations with partners in multiple directions, into the geoeconomic sphere. Tokayev made the combination explicit in his 2023 State of the Nation address. Relations with Turkey had meanwhile been elevated to an enhanced strategic partnership in May 2022, including transport cooperation and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan deepened their strategic and allied cooperation later that year, likewise emphasizing transport and logistics. Closer ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey widened Kazakhstan’s options without displacing established routes through Russia. The CPC pipeline remains so dominant in Kazakhstan’s oil exports that no other existing route approaches its present scale. Of the 78.7 million tons of oil that Kazakhstan exported in 2025, the Energy Ministry reported the volume moving through the CPC pipeline at 64.8 million tons (the CPC itself reported about 63 million tons), meaning that more than four-fifths of Kazakhstan’s exported oil depended on the CPC system. Kazakhstan moved only about 1.4 million tons through the Aktau–Baku–Ceyhan (ABC) route in 2024, and about 1.3 million tons in 2025. Diversification cannot at present mean replacing CPC. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline gives Kazakhstani oil a westbound egress...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

U.S. Reportedly Secures Ukrainian Pledge to Avoid Strikes on CPC Infrastructure

Turkey has begun restricting some commercial vessels from entering the Black Sea on voyages to Novorossiysk, adding a potential new obstacle to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium amid reports that Ukraine has agreed to spare CPC infrastructure and qualifying non-Russian tankers from attack. Turkey’s Directorate-General of Coastal Safety has told multiple ships bound for Novorossiysk that it is not currently issuing transit permits for those voyages or needs more time to review applications through the Dardanelles. The authorities have not publicly explained the measure. Some vessels were told the restriction also applied to ships heading to Ukraine, while traffic bound for Bulgarian and Turkish ports continued. There is no confirmation that any tanker scheduled to load Kazakh crude at the CPC terminal has been denied passage. The measure nevertheless comes at a difficult point for CPC, where repeated attacks and stoppages have already made some shipowners reluctant to accept voyages to the terminal near Novorossiysk. On August 7, Reuters reported that CPC loadings fell more than 20% behind schedule in July, to around 1.2 million to 1.3 million barrels per day. That removed about 400,000 barrels a day of CPC Blend from the international market. Loadings averaged roughly 1.1 million to 1.2 million barrels per day in the first week of August, while Kazakhstan’s oil production has fallen 14% from June. CPC normally handles around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day and carries more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. Four tankers completed loading after the July 30 attacks, but operations remained intermittent as tanker availability and security concerns continued to limit the recovery. The Turkish restrictions emerged on the same day as a potentially important change in the security picture around CPC. According to an unnamed U.S. government official cited by Bloomberg, Ukraine has agreed not to target CPC infrastructure or qualifying non-Russian vessels bound for the terminal, provided they are not under Ukrainian sanctions, are not carrying Russian cargo, and are not owned by Russian individuals or entities. Ukraine has also established points of contact through which commercial shippers can provide vessel information and seek safe passage. The arrangement follows months of U.S. pressure over the exposure of Kazakhstan-origin crude and Western commercial interests at CPC. During a July 29 call, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev discussed the need for “reliable and uninterrupted” exports of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the system. The commitment could reduce one source of risk for ships serving CPC, but it does not immediately resolve the commercial disruption. Previous attempts by companies to identify vessels that should not be targeted did not prevent all attacks, while war-risk insurance and charter costs have risen sharply. Ankara has become increasingly vocal as attacks spread across the Black Sea. Turkey’s Foreign Ministry said the Turkish-owned civilian vessels Yaşar and Nadezhda were attacked by drones on August 3 after leaving Novorossiysk, injuring crew members including Turkish citizens. It warned that further escalation could have broader consequences, including...