Huge Increase in Gas Supplies to Uzbekistan Sparks Debate Over Russian Influence

In a significant development for energy dynamics in Central Asia, the volume of Russian natural gas transiting through Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan is poised for a substantial increase. By 2026, the annual transfer is set to leap from the current 3 billion cubic meters (bcm) to 11 bcm, as announced by Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliyev earlier this month. The genesis of this increase can be traced back to last year, when Uzbekistan began importing gas from Russia. This came after a pivotal agreement was signed between UzGasTrade and the Russian energy giant, Gazprom, delineating a daily gas supply of up to 9 million cubic meters, or equivalently, 2.8 bcm annually. This initial arrangement set the stage for further negotiations aimed at securing medium and long-term contracts to bolster Uzbekistan’s energy security and support its economic development. To accommodate this increase, substantial upgrades to Uzbekistan's main gas distribution system are underway. An investment of $500 million, sourced from foreign and multilateral loans, has been earmarked for this purpose. These enhancements are crucial to ensure the efficient and reliable delivery of the increased volumes to meet domestic demand. Adding another layer to this energy partnership, Gazprom’s CEO, Alexey Miller disclosed that discussions are ongoing for agreements that would solidify gas supply and transit obligations between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for a duration of 15 years. Expected to be finalized by mid-2024, these agreements would signal a long-term commitment between the participating nations. This significant increase highlights the growing energy needs of Uzbekistan, but experts are divided as to whether it represents or will serve as a catalyst for a strategic and geopolitical alignment with Russia. Posting on Twitter, Dr. Luca Anceschi, Professor of Eurasian Studies at the University of Glasgow, argued that such “regimes have become even more entrenched in their authoritarian ways, [and] getting closer to the Kremlin - and this Kremlin more in particular - is a convenient move to establish an international environment conducive to regime maintenance.” In response, Professor at the National Defense University, Erica Marat cautioned against conflating “sentiments in the society” with the actions of the Uzbek authorities. Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Asel Doolotkeldieva, meanwhile, stated that “economic inter-dependence [will] be the last to wane in changing influences in the region… The argument about the increasing economic role of Russia does not take into account the diversification of Central Asia's other ties: with China, the Gulf States, and Asia.” Still, others have argued that since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow’s influence has diminished, noting that Uzbekistan has “strictly [followed] international sanctions,” adopting a neutral stance. In October 2023, an Uzbek court even arrested a citizen for joining Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Speaking to TCA about the increase in gas supplies and its possible implications, long-standing Central Asia journalist Bruce Pannier of the Davis Center at Harvard stated that “Uzbekistan has turned from a gas exporter to a gas importer in recent years, and its major foreign investors in developing...

Two Years On from Invasion of Ukraine, Attitudes Towards Russia in Central Asia Have Changed

Tomorrow will mark the two year anniversary of the start of Russia's so-called special military operation in Ukraine. In that time, many people in Central Asia have begun to openly call this action an invasion and a war. This is a war between two countries that are close in many respects, two former republics from a large union that the nations of Central Asia were also part of. How and why has the attitude of Central Asians towards Russia and Ukraine changed in the last two years? The attacks on Ukraine were felt immediately in Central Asia, from the first day when migrants suddenly started arriving from the north. These were mostly young people, sometimes in groups, and sometimes with their families. It quickly became clear that this exodus was comprised of people who did not want to fight, and there were many of them. Also from day one, even though there are many ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan, the new migrants were noticeably different from the local Russian faces. Their behavior and mode of dress were not the same as those already residing in Tashkent, Bishkek or Almaty. From the very beginning, there were conflicts although mostly they amounted to little more than drunken brawls that were soon forgotten. In February 2022, the cost of residential rentals skyrocketed following the attack on Ukraine, but prices seem to have since stabilized. Overall, though, most locals treated their new neighbors with understanding. Nobody wants war. Especially since, in the countries of this region, people still remember or at least heard stories about the evacuation of a large number of people from Russia and Ukraine during the Second World War. In those times, many children whose parents died during the occupation of western portions of the USSR by Germany found second families and second homes. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uyghurs, Tatars - many Central Asians who had the opportunity adopted children from war-torn republics of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the most fundamental change is felt in the attitude of Central Asian people towards Russia as something immutable and monumental. Something previously unthinkable transpired: despite all its economic and political power, this huge northern neighbor could also be viewed as vulnerable. The fact that Ukraine is obviously not alone in its war against Russia  does not change this perception. In Central Asia, it is often said that in any negative situation, one must look for positive opportunities, and in a tangential way, the years of restrictions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic served as preparation for the trials brought by the war. A realization had come to pass that it was necessary to prepare oneself to rely solely on domestic resources. The war further complicated a precarious situation as sanctions imposed on Russia also hit Central Asia. First, the financial system went into meltdown, then trade, and then the production sector, much of which was tied to the Russian economy. However, this situation forced Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan to look for new...