U.S.-Kazakh Partnership - The Times Of Central Asia

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U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Kazakhstan Elevates U.S. Ties to Presidential-Level

Kazakhstan’s relationship with the United States is entering a more explicitly strategic phase under Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, marked by a shift in how Astana manages its most consequential external partnerships. As economic ties deepen and geopolitical coordination expands across energy, investment, and Eurasian connectivity, engagement with Washington is increasingly being treated as a presidential priority rather than a routine diplomatic file. In this context, Kazakhstan has formally elevated its engagement with the United States by appointing a presidential representative to steer bilateral negotiations on priority issues. By presidential decree, Ambassador Yerzhan Kazykhan—Kazakhstan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva and a veteran diplomat with prior postings as ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom—has been designated as the President’s Representative for negotiations with Washington. The appointment places key aspects of the U.S. relationship under direct presidential oversight from the Akorda, the presidential office. Kazykhan has previously served as foreign minister and assistant to the president, and has held senior roles within both the Foreign Ministry and the presidential administration. His experience in Washington and in multilateral settings provides institutional continuity as the bilateral agenda broadens to encompass investment, energy security, and regional connectivity, while day-to-day execution remains within established diplomatic channels. Drivers Behind the Elevation of U.S.–Kazakhstan Engagement The decision reflects how rapidly the scope of U.S.–Kazakhstan engagement has expanded and how Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a major investment and strategic connectivity hub. The United States is Kazakhstan’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with hundreds of American companies operating across the economy. Chevron, Kazakhstan’s single largest foreign investor, has invested more than $50 billion over time, anchoring long-term U.S. corporate presence in the country’s energy sector. This investment relationship gained further momentum in 2025. At the C5+1 leaders’ summit in Washington, Kazakhstan and U.S. partners announced nearly $17 billion in new commercial agreements and investment commitments across energy, transport, and industrial cooperation. The package was publicly highlighted by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, underscoring senior-level U.S. political backing for deeper economic engagement with Kazakhstan. Beyond investment, the bilateral agenda has expanded into strategic and geopolitical domains. Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marked a notable political alignment with a U.S.-led diplomatic initiative, extending the framework’s reach beyond its original Middle Eastern focus. Connectivity has become central to U.S. policy thinking. The Middle Corridor is increasingly viewed as an eastward extension of the post-Azerbaijan–Armenia Caucasus transit framework, also called the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’, aimed at reopening and securing east–west routes across the South Caucasus. Extending it through Kazakhstan links Central Asia to Europe while reducing reliance on Russia or Iran. Trade and energy ties reinforce this trajectory. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and a major supplier to the United States, making the U.S. one of its most important export markets for nuclear fuel. As U.S. policy places greater emphasis on secure and diversified supply chains, Kazakhstan’s role in critical energy inputs and transit infrastructure has taken on added strategic...

Nuclear Energy

U.S. and Kazakhstan Expand Civil Nuclear Cooperation With Focus on Small Modular Reactors

The United States and Kazakhstan have expanded cooperation on civil nuclear energy, placing small modular reactors at the center of a new phase in bilateral engagement. In late December 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan announced two initiatives under the U.S. State Department’s Foundational Infrastructure for Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology program, known as FIRST. The measures focus on workforce training and technical evaluation as Kazakhstan prepares to reintroduce nuclear power generation. Kazakhstan is the first country in Central Asia to participate in the FIRST program, which was launched by the U.S. State Department in 2021 to help partner countries prepare regulatory frameworks, workforce capacity, and infrastructure for advanced nuclear technologies. The first initiative provides for the installation of a classroom-based SMR (small modular reactor) simulator at the Kazakhstan Institute of Nuclear Physics in Almaty. The simulator is intended to train specialists in reactor operations, safety systems, and emergency response. On January 6, 2026, the American Nuclear Society reported that the simulator will be supplied by U.S. companies Holtec International and WSC Inc., a simulation technology company that operates as part of the Curtiss-Wright group. The project is designed to build domestic technical capacity prior to licensing or construction decisions. The International Science and Technology Center is supporting implementation in Kazakhstan. The second initiative is a feasibility study examining which U.S.-designed SMRs could be technically and economically suitable for Kazakhstan. According to the American Nuclear Society, the study is being conducted under FIRST, with U.S. engineering firm Sargent & Lundy. The assessment is expected to cover grid integration, siting considerations, cooling requirements, and indicative deployment timelines. The study does not authorize construction or commit Kazakhstan to a specific reactor technology; rather, the feasibility study is intended to produce a shortlist of U.S. SMR designs that could be compatible with Kazakhstan’s grid, geography, and projected electricity demand. These initiatives follow Kazakhstan’s decision to return to nuclear power. On October 6, 2024, voters approved the construction of nuclear power plants in a national referendum. Official results published by the Central Referendum Commission showed 71.12% voting in favor, with turnout at 63.66%. Kazakhstan has not generated nuclear electricity since the BN-350 fast reactor at Aktau was shut down in 1999. Government energy planners have warned that Kazakhstan faces growing electricity shortfalls as early as the mid-2020s, driven by aging coal plants and rising consumption. Kazakhstan’s interest in nuclear energy reflects structural pressures in the power sector. Coal-fired plants still supply most electricity, particularly in northern regions, but much of that capacity is aging. Electricity demand continues to rise alongside industrial output and urban growth, while the government has set targets to reduce emissions intensity. Nuclear power is being positioned as a source of stable, low-carbon baseload generation that can complement renewable energy. Kazakhstan also occupies a central position in the global nuclear fuel market. The country accounts for about 40% of global uranium mine production and holds roughly 14% of identified recoverable uranium resources. Despite that role, the country has relied...

Abraham Accords

Opinion: Abraham Accords Can Help Kazakhstan Reshape Its Energy Future

On 6 November 2025, after speaking with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Kazakhstan would join the Abraham Accords. Astana and Jerusalem have maintained full diplomatic relations since 1992, but Kazakhstan’s entry pushes the Accords beyond the Middle East and North Africa and into the Eurasian heartland. This matters at a time when Washington wants to re-energize the initiative and deepen its C5+1 engagement with the region. Kazakhstan’s decision fits its multi-vector policy. The decision also builds on the country’s role as a key component of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”), which links Chinese production to European markets. Cargo volumes reached about 4.5 million tons in 2024 and are expected to rise to around 5.2 million tons in 2025. A recent report by Boston Consulting Group expects rail freight through the Middle Corridor to quadruple by the decade’s end. The Accords do not change Kazakhstan’s formal status with Israel. The question is, rather, whether they unlock deeper economic cooperation. The Times of Central Asia has already reported on clear opportunities for cooperation in sectors such as water and agricultural efficiency, grid and industrial productivity, and cybersecurity and administrative modernization. In the energy sector, like the others, the Accords give Israeli companies a clearer political and legal framework for working with Kazakhstan’s energy and infrastructure sectors. Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular, could provide project finance as well. Hard Energy, Nuclear Fuel, and Israeli Technology Astana’s principal concern in the energy sector is how to raise net revenue: the goal here is to make the sector more resilient to external pressure without incurring prohibitive capital costs. Israeli firms can address that problem at an operational level. The PrismaFlow sensing system developed by Prisma Photonics is a proven technology that uses existing optical fiber as a sensing system. Thousands of kilometers of pipeline can be monitored in real time for leaks, third-party interference, and attempted theft, without having to install physical sensors along the route. KazTransOil and Prisma Photonics could develop a program through an Abraham Accords framework to overlay this technology on selected trunk network segments and on the systems that deliver crude to export pipelines. Energy-sector cybersecurity is another area where Israeli companies can help Kazakhstan’s hard-energy system. The Israeli firm Radiflow specializes in operational-technology (OT) cybersecurity for oil and gas installations, tailored to pipeline and production environments. Its systems provide continuous network visibility and better anomaly detection. Its risk-based threat management reduces both the likelihood and the cost of cyber incidents that might interrupt flows or force precautionary shutdowns. KazMunayGas, KazTransOil, and their joint ventures could implement a structured audit and remediation program with Radiflow as a strategic partner. The uranium sector presents another opportunity for Kazakhstan–Israel cooperation, potentially a more strategic one. OT security systems can provide monitoring and control layers for uranium mining, in-situ leaching fields, and logistics chains. Kazakhstan accounts for over 40% of the world's uranium...

Abraham Accords

Abraham Accords Frame Kazakhstan–Israel Cooperation to Deliver Tokayev’s Reforms

Kazakhstan’s decision to enter the Abraham Accords is a diplomacy-first move by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. Its aims include: 1) converting symbolic capital into policy traction in Washington, 2) arriving at workable co-financing with Gulf partners, and 3) preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The step does not alter recognition; the two countries have had diplomatic relations for a third of a century, institutionalized through embassies. Cooperation has been steady, if modest. Entering the Abraham Accords now gives these relations a framework that U.S. agencies, funds, and implementers already use. The timing intersects the C5+1 turn from set-piece dialogues to transactions, with new deals announced alongside the Accords move. What the framework unlocks is execution. It compresses attention cycles inside U.S. bureaucracies, normalizes trilateral packaging with Gulf financiers, and clears diligence pathways for banks and development finance institutions. Those effects matter where Israeli capabilities dovetail with Tokayev’s priorities. The premise of Tokayev’s move is straightforward: diplomacy should shorten the distance between declared policy and the implementation of projects that work. Tokayev’s Diplomatic Architecture and the Bilateral Relationship Kazakhstan recognized Israel in 1992 and opened embassies soon after, setting a cautious but uninterrupted channel for official contact. The institutional scaffolding is visible in public sources. Trade volumes have been modest but steady, with 2024 bilateral turnover reported by Kazakhstan’s statistics at roughly $236 million, a figure that is broadly consistent with third-party trackers such as Trading Economics and OEC profiles. Practical frictions have eased as Air Astana initiated direct air links between Almaty and Tel Aviv in 2023. The Accords move aligns that long, incremental relationship with a framework that is transparent to Washington and to Gulf financiers. Reporting on the Washington week underscores the shift from set-piece dialogues to transactions, as the Accords announcement was paired with commerce headlines. Joining the Abraham Accords reorganizes and reframes practical bilateral activities. By placing existing ties under a known diplomatic wrapper, Astana becomes easier to route inside U.S. agencies and funds, and easier to match with Gulf co-financing for projects that fall in line with Tokayev’s domestic reforms and economic development program. The practical test becomes whether the new wrapper accelerates cooperation, where Israel’s comparative advantages can help Kazakhstan meet the goals of that program. Examples of this are precision irrigation and basin telemetry to optimize steppe agriculture, audit-plus-retrofit toolkits that cut grid and industrial losses without new generation, reinforcing the 2060 neutrality track, and civil-service-embedded cyber training with secure data exchange that lifts administrative credibility. The Accords thus function as additive diplomacy, widening Kazakhstan’s access to recognizable cooperation pathways without demanding a shift in alignments. In Washington, the move plugs into an existing rubric that officials already use for interagency routing and external partnerships. Regionally, it complements the C5+1’s turn toward transaction-focused engagement. Domestically, it moves Tokayev’s reform agenda forward. Internationally, it demonstrates continued leadership. The diplomatic wrapper works because Kazakhstan can route cooperation through recognized counterparties and rules. Samruk-Kazyna and core state-owned enterprises (SOEs) represent accountable anchors consistent with OECD-provided guidance on...

TCA Interviews

Universities Join Kazakhstan’s Global Education Vision: An Interview with Minister of Education Sayasat Nurbek

At the invitation of President Trump, on November 5-6, the Presidents of the five Central Asia Republics arrived in Washington, D.C. to celebrate and sign deals on the 10th anniversary of C5+1. They were accompanied by cabinet ministers and business leaders. The Times of Central Asia presents a wide-ranging interview with Kazakhstan's Minister of Education, Sayasat Nurbek. Minister Nurbek sat down with our Washington Correspondent, Javier M. Piedra, to discuss Kazakhstan’s education strategy. The interview offers U.S. academic and technical institutions a glimpse into Minister Nurbek’s educational philosophy and his plans to advance Kazakhstan’s higher education through new partnerships with U.S. universities, AI platforms, and private sector innovators—positioning Kazakhstan as a regional educational hub. Nurbek shared his insights on his understanding of traditional values, the human person, AI’s potential and risks, critical thinking, and building mutually beneficial partnerships in the context of education. (His responses have been edited for length and flow.) TCA: The tenth anniversary of C5+1 was a landmark event, bringing together the Presidents of all five Central Asian nations at the White House. Kazakhstan President Tokayev has tasked you with transforming Kazakhstan into a fully digital nation within three years. In the last two days, you secured six key partnerships with U.S. universities and tech firms across education, testing, mining, and engineering. Minister, with that in mind, how is Central Asia important to the United States? Nurbek: My message to American academic institutions is straightforward. Kazakhstan has a lot to offer, and we are keen on deeper engagement with the outside world. Also, the timing to deepen U.S.-Kazakhstan relations is perfect given that the world is changing. Avenues are open for new relationships and business opportunities. America and Kazakhstan can have a great future as long as we work together to achieve that future. America should not miss this moment in history; the importance of Eurasia and of Central Asia in particular. Besides the education aspects – most important to me – academic and technical partnerships can serve as platforms to maintain U.S. influence, share values, and promote ideas, benefiting both the United States and Kazakhstan as friends in a non-geopolitical sense. TCA: In our earlier conversation, you referenced Sir Halford Mackinder, the early 20th-century British academic who emphasized geography’s role in geopolitics. Can you comment on the sensitivity of mixing education and geopolitics? Nurbek: In The Geographical Pivot of History in 1904, Halford Mackinder argued that control of Eurasia’s central “Heartland,” particularly Eastern Europe and Central Asia, could secure global influence. Mackinder’s theory stressed land power’s dominance over naval power in an increasingly rail-connected world in the early 20th century. Central Asia mattered then and still does today—but why do I mention Mackinder in the context of education? President Tokayev has been clear, especially in the sphere of education, that Kazakhstan seeks great gain, not a “Great Game” – the rivalry between Great Powers for influence and control in Central Asia. In other words, the main way to produce great gains in Kazakhstan and across the...