Tajikistan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 31 - 36 of 50

Central Asia’s Combined ‘Army of Turan’: Could a Hypothesis Become a Reality?

Kazakhstan will host the military exercise, "Birlestik-2024" in July of this year. Notably, this became known from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. The exercises will be jointly held by the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It is a convenient occasion to refresh the topic of the 'Army of Turan', which is periodically raised by experts both in Central Asia and neighboring countries. The Army of Turan is a hypothetical military bloc of Turkic-speaking countries. Its ideas have become relevant in the context of global geopolitical turbulence. I hear the thunder of cannons... Most military analysts consider Azerbaijan to be Turkey's proxy in the South Caucasus. In general, Baku's rapprochement with the capitals of Turkic states (plus Dushanbe) meets Ankara's interests in creating a unified cultural and economic space: Turan. However, does the integration of Turkic states mean that they will eventually be able to create a NATO-style security pact in Central Asia? Such initiatives have resumed with renewed vigor after the end of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, during which Turkey has shown the capability of its weapons. Indeed, in 2022, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan - the only country of the participants to share a land border with the Russian Federation - pondered how to protect itself from further expansion of the northern empire's borders. But in the run-up to the summer of 2024, fears have mostly subsided. Many were sobered by the obvious fact that loud declarations of assistance from strong states at best mean the delivery of obsolete weapons, but no more. At worst, your offender will be censured from high podiums, and you will be sympathized with. For example, Turkey, the most likely to defend Central Asia from outsider aggression, did not risk helping the Palestinians, its brothers in faith, and got away with accusing Israel of fascism. So, the 'Army of Turan' exists in the heads of fantasists and pan-Turkics, but in reality, something ordinary is going on — the arms trade. Let's see what the armies of the Central Asian republics are armed with, excluding Turkmenistan, which has declared neutrality. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan The most troublesome neighbors in the region have not been able to complete their border delimitation process. As a result, quarrels periodically erupt, in which border guards from both sides intervene, staging mini-warfare. The cause of discord is usually the same: water. The Tajik and Kyrgyz militaries gain some combat experience in these micro-quarrels. Despite or based on this experience, Dushanbe relies on agreements with other countries -- Russia, China, India, Iran, and CSTO partners -- for its defense capability. Tajikistan's armed forces number only 9,000 men. They have 38 tanks (T-62 and T-72 modifications), 114 armored vehicles (APCs, BMPs, BRDMs), 40 artillery systems, and several short- and medium-range air defense units. The Air Force has four Czechoslovakian L-39 Albatross, combat trainers. Kyrgyzstan does not have much more power in the number of its troops, at around...

Russia

Central Asia Has a Problem, and It Is Russia

The wave of xenophobia targeting Central Asians in Russia that has followed the terrorist March 22 attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall presents many problems for Central Asia, including concerns about what sort of friend Russia really is. As reports of attacks on Central Asians in Russia multiplied in the last days of March, April saw a flurry of meetings of Central Asian leaders. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Khiva, Uzbekistan on April 4-5. At the same time, the chairman of Turkmenistan’s Halk Maslahaty (People’s Council), former President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov was in Tajikistan meeting with Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov visited Kazakhstan on April 18-19, meanwhile, the same days that Uzbek President Mirziyoyev was in Tajikistan for talks with his counterpart Rahmon. Reports of their meetings focused on praising fraternal ties and signing bilateral agreements. There was no mention of any discussions about the rapidly unfolding dilemma with Russia. The people Russia claims staged the attack that left more than 140 people dead are Tajiks, some of whom acquired Russian citizenship, others who were migrant laborers. There are at least four million migrant laborers from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan working in Russia and some estimates put the number at double that figure, or more. In the wake of the attack, all Central Asians fell under suspicion in Russia. Passengers from Central Asia arriving in Russia were held up at airports for extra document checks, sometimes for more than 24 hours. Russian police raided dormitories and other facilities where Central Asian migrant laborers were known to stay. The first four Tajik suspects apprehended were shown on Russian television. They had clearly been tortured. An FSB member had cut part of the ear off one of the suspects and fellow FSB troops filmed him forcing the severed piece of ear into the mouth of the suspect. Russia was a colonizer of Central Asia and the leaders of the five Central Asian countries are well aware of that history. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, whenever Central Asian and Russian officials meet, they speak of historically friendly ties and valued partnerships. It has often been difficult to make this image credible to Central Asia’s people, particularly after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Some Russian nationalists, including politicians, have spoken about reclaiming “historic Russian land,” usually mentioning part or all of Kazakhstan. Chairman of Russia’s Investigative Committee Aleksandr Bastrykin said in May 2023 that military service in Ukraine should be mandatory for migrant laborers seeking Russian citizenship, and State Duma Deputy Mikhail Matveev backed this call, adding, “Where are our Tajik battalions?“ There are many other such examples since February 2022. Both Russian and Central Asian government officials have downplayed these remarks, saying they are the views of an individual and do not reflect the position of the Russian government. However, In January 2024, Deputy Speaker of Uzbekistan’s lower house of parliament Alisher Qodirov questioned why,...

How India is Becoming a Robust Soft Power in Central Asia

The middle-income trap, a pressing issue that has led to the stagnation of many successful developing economies, demands immediate attention. This trap, which occurs when a middle-income country can no longer compete internationally in standardized, labor-intensive goods due to relatively high wages, is a result of various factors, including countries most successful demographic characteristics. For instance, access to education has reduced birth rates due to an almost 100% literacy rate defined by 12 years of education. In the process, importing cheap manufacturing products has made local products uncompetitive. In such a situation, the country should have planned to upgrade current skill-based education to high-tech skills such as ICT, pharmaceuticals, etc. This shift to high-tech education holds immense potential for developing countries, offering a pathway out of the middle-income trap. Unfortunately, poor investment in developing high-tech education has led to an inadequate supply of a high-skilled workforce. Developed economies, such as the U.S. and a few European countries, are in an advantageous position to overcome such a trap due to their highly effective immigration policy. Developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the Philippines, and almost all Central Asian Republics, meanwhile, suffer. This will be further aggravated if the issue is not addressed urgently. Due to its geographic location and natural resource endowments, Central Asia, a diverse region with a mix of upper-middle and low-income countries, holds significant importance in the global economic landscape. Let's look at a specific case, such as Uzbekistan, a country whose population is growing at 1.3% per annum. Regarding age structure, the 0-14 age group makes up 30.1% of the population, the 15-64 age group 64.6%, and the 65-plus group constitutes just 5.3%. The country has achieved a high literacy rate, with 100% of the population completing 12 years of primary and higher secondary education. However, the country’s GDP per capita is relatively low, at US$ 3,209 (nominal term) and US$ 11,316 (PPP). The country's economy is dominated by the services sector, which contributes 48.4% to the GDP, followed by industry at 33.7%, and agriculture at 17.9%. The poverty line is set at less than US$ 3.2 per day, affecting 10% of the population. The country's labor force is distributed across sectors, with 25.9% in agriculture, 13.2% in industry, and 60.9% in services. The unemployment rate is 5.3%, and underemployment is a significant issue, affecting 20% of the population. The low supply of highly skilled workers challenges further increasing per capita income. The country will likely fall into this middle-income trap because it reaches a certain average income and cannot progress beyond that level. It seems helpful to mention some insights from this perspective. During Soviet times, the growth model of states was determined by their available resources, and Central Asia is rich in abundant resources. However, in most cases, primary resources were taken to other non-resource wealthy states for further value addition. So, the workforce was created in the respective states based on the concerned state's requirements. Workforce migration from one state to another was...

Islamic Extremism in Central Asia: A Threat to Liberal Progress

Afghanistan earned its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” due to the significant toll exacted on foreign powers in their efforts to achieve military success in the country. This challenge was evident in the experiences of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and, most recently, the United States. The persistent and decentralized nature of the country's tribal insurgency made achieving a definitive victory a formidable task. Furthermore, the adherence of groups harbored by the Taliban, such as Al Qaeda, to an extremist religious ideology spread terrorism globally, including in the 9/11 attacks as well as other deadly acts of violence in various parts of the world. While the United States arguably played a constructive role in modernizing Afghanistan, the establishment of democracy and Western values in the country proved to be an insurmountable challenge, even with over $100 billion in foreign aid. With heightened tensions between the Islamic and Western populations reignited in the Levant after the deadly Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the threat of Afghanistan-based extremists redirecting their focus towards the West has intensified. Often overlooked is the fact that Salafists jihadists and other radical groups also pose a challenge to the emerging democracies in Central Asia as these Muslim-majority secular republics are seen as areas to spread their undemocratic and potentially violent influence. In this context, policies that may even inadvertently help promote illiberal religious movements threaten the region’s secular identity and the security of its peoples. We should assess Central Asia’s unique position on religious freedoms but also on jihadist threats For the large part, Western countries come from a privileged position of being able to resist the widespread influence from Islamic extremist movements at home thanks mainly to generations of democratic institution building as well as decent geographic distance to areas that would fall under pan-jihadist aspirations. Consider that there is no apparent threat of jihadists entirely displacing Western democratic institutions or imposing a pan-Islamist state encompassing parts of Western nations; most Western lands do not fall on areas some of these groups want to conquer to create an Islamic Caliphate. On the other hand, many other places, including Central Asia, still risk misconstruing the line between defending individual freedoms and combatting religious extremism. Here, the coexistence of extremist Islamic ideologies and democracy remains somewhat precarious. Islamic radicalism continues to pose a serious challenge to the emerging democracies of the region, where the secular republics are trying to keep a lid on certain hostile ideologies. Militant groups spilling over from Afghanistan and infiltrating post-Soviet countries want to spread jihad to the region and create an Islamic Khaganate stretching from Egypt to China. Pan-Islamist Salafists, such as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda, have a clear goal to overthrow Central Asia’s secular regimes. Moreover, the determination of Salafists jihadists and other groups to spread their illiberal and violent struggle to Central Asia (including from neighboring Afghanistan) has become apparent through their growing presence in the region’s schools and other spheres of public...

The Impact of the Narcotics Trade in Tajikistan

Tajikistan, a Central Asian country, finds itself at the center of a significant narcotics trade route. This landlocked nation borders Afghanistan, a country that as of 2020, accounted for over 80% of global opium production (source). This geographical positioning has led to a profound influence on Tajikistan's social, economic, and political landscape. The narcotics trade has a significant economic impact in Tajikistan, given its strategic location bordering Afghanistan. This illicit trade has both direct and indirect influences on the country's economy. According to Matthew Kahane, the UNDP head in Tajikistan, it has been estimated that the drug trade accounts for 30% to 50% of the country's economy. Furthermore, drug trafficking through Tajikistan was estimated to generate $2.7 billion per year in 2011, potentially surpassing any legitimate source of wealth in the country. However, this income does not contribute to the country's overall economic development. Instead, it fosters corruption, undermines legal economic activities, and concentrates wealth in the hands of drug traffickers and corrupt officials. In addition, the narcotics trade increases the level of crime, corruption and the rich-poor divide. Moreover, Tajikistan's law enforcement agencies receive substantial financial and technical resources from foreign donors to aid them in the fight against drugs. However, the effectiveness of these efforts is questionable given the scale of the narcotics trade. The narcotics trade in Tajikistan has extensive social impacts, affecting various facets of the society ranging from public health to crime rates. One of the most immediate social impacts is the rise in substance abuse, particularly among the youth. In the last ten years, there has been an increase in drug use behavior among the youth in Tajikistan, leading to serious health consequences. Heroin use, in particular, is a significant concern. It not only harms the users but also places a strain on the country's healthcare system, which is ill-equipped to handle the rising number of addicts. The narcotics trade has a significant political impact in Tajikistan. The illicit drug trade has reportedly corrupted parts of Tajikistan's government. The lucrative profits from narcotics have incentivized officials at all levels to tolerate or even engage in drug trafficking. This corruption undermines the legitimacy of public institutions and erodes citizens' trust in their government. The narcotics trade poses a serious security threat. Non-state armed groups often use drug trafficking as a source of funding, which can destabilize the region and exacerbate conflict. In addition, the high levels of crime associated with the drug trade can lead to increased violence and social unrest. The Taliban, a dominant insurgent group in Afghanistan, is implicated in escalating narcotics trafficking in Tajikistan, a situation exacerbated by Afghanistan's instability and corroborated by reports from the UNODC and Eurasianet. Recognizing these challenges, international organizations and governments have developed programs to combat the narcotics trade in Tajikistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has implemented several projects aimed at strengthening border control, improving the criminal justice response to drug trafficking, and promoting regional cooperation. Furthermore, the European Union and the...

The Geopolitical Fallout of Taliban’s Takeover: Neighboring Countries and Their Responses

The swift takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban following the withdrawal of foreign forces (notably the United States) has created a complex geopolitical situation for neighboring countries. These nations had contemplated the prospect of a Taliban resurgence, but the sudden shift in power dynamics forced them to publicly acknowledge their stance towards a Taliban-led Afghanistan. The General Response In general, the consensus among these nations has been an acceptance of the new reality, with many expressing a willingness to engage in dialogue with Afghanistan's new leadership. While the two regional heavyweights, Moscow and Beijing, have both indicated their readiness to negotiate with the Taliban, they harbor concerns about militants from their own countries that are currently in Afghanistan and allied with the Taliban. The safety of foreign citizens still residing in Afghanistan further complicates the situation. Pakistan, a long-standing supporter of the Taliban, openly welcomed the group's recent success. Meanwhile, China, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan choose to concede their lack of influence over Afghan internal politics, instead expressing hope for potential cooperation with the Taliban. Tajikistan's Unique Stance Tajikistan, under the leadership of President Emomali Rahmon, presents a different narrative. Rahmon has been vocal in his opposition to the Taliban government in Afghanistan. This stance is partly due to his history as Tajikistan's leader during the previous Taliban control of Afghanistan and his support for ethnic Tajiks there who have been battling the Taliban. Tajiks constitute approximately 25% of the Afghan population, and their connection to Tajiks in Tajikistan is strong. None of the other neighboring states have this sort of relationship. Rahmon's concern for the Afghan Tajiks has earned him rare public support at home, which could be crucial as he prepares his son, Rustam, to succeed him as president. There appears to be a growing concern among Tajikistan's citizens about the potential illiberal influence of the Taliban. Following the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan, Tajikistan received thousands of refugees, with many more gathering at the border. This influx could indicate a fear of Taliban's rule among the population. There are also reports of Taliban attacks on Tajik communities. The Taliban enforces justice through its strict interpretation of Sharia law, including the implementation of criminal punishments such as public executions. Judges within the Taliban enforce the hierarchy and maintain centralized authority. This system has been criticized by human rights organizations for lacking justice, truth and reparation for crimes under international law as well as for human rights violations. Challenges Ahead Rahmon faces significant challenges in engaging with the Taliban due to the country's history with the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). The IRPT, an Islamic political party far more moderate than the Taliban, was a major opposition group during Tajikistan's 1992-1997 civil war. It later became the second-largest party in Tajikistan, posing a threat to Rahmon's power. In 2015, the Tajik government banned the IRPT, labeling it an extremist group based on claims of a coup attempt. Given this history, it's hard for the Tajik government to establish ties with...