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Trade Barriers

Kazakhstan Wheat Ban Raises Risk of Renewed Trade Spat With Russia

A truck crossing into Kazakhstan through a northern border post can be declared as carrying 18 tonnes of wheat while hauling as much as 40 tonnes. Grain Union analyst Evgeny Karabanov described that gap as part of the country’s problem with undeclared Russian grain. Astana’s answer is a six-month ban on most wheat imports from July 27. The measure may curb grey-market loads and support domestic farmers, but it also risks reopening a trade dispute with Russia and deepening the gap between the Eurasian Economic Union’s promises and daily commerce. Agriculture Minister Aidarbek Saparov’s order covers wheat arriving by road, water, and rail from EAEU members and other countries. Poultry farms, grain processors, licensed elevators, and the state Food Contract Corporation may still import by rail. Wheat imported for poultry farms and grain processors cannot be resold inside Kazakhstan or abroad. Rail transit through Kazakhstan remains exempt. The government says the ban will support local producers and secure sales. Deputy Agriculture Minister Azat Sultanov said Kazakhstan has large carryover stocks that need storage. “The decision was taken to stimulate the domestic market,” he said in June. The order names every foreign supplier, but its commercial impact will fall mainly on Russia. In January, the Grain Union forecast about one million tonnes of wheat imports during the September 2025 to August 2026 marketing year. Karabanov said practically all of that grain would come from Russia. Cheap wheat crosses a long shared border into Kazakhstan’s main grain belt. That can lower costs for millers and poultry farms, but it also undercuts growers before they sell their harvest. The ban shifts that pressure rather than removing it. Baimurat Group CEO Daniyar Kuanshaliyev called the measure a “crude administrative intervention” that could raise raw-material prices. He argued that reduced competition for wheat could leave processors paying more while traders and exporters compete for the same domestic stocks. Karabanov takes a less alarmed view. “We generally oppose various bans and restrictions,” he said, but the rail exemptions should limit the number of businesses harmed. He said the clearest cost could be higher transport charges, since trucks are often cheaper than trains for journeys under 500 kilometres. Kazakhstan imposed a broad wheat ban in 2024 after Russian grain continued entering despite earlier controls. TCA’s reporting on the earlier grain dispute found that more than 1.1 million tonnes had arrived in six months before Astana tightened the rules. Russia then restricted Kazakh grain and other agricultural products, citing phytosanitary concerns. Exporters said the effects spread beyond the stated products. “Trucks loaded with those products are being turned away at the border,” Karabanov told Reuters in October 2024. The cycle continued in 2025. Russia reinstated restrictions on Kazakh wheat, flaxseed, and lentils from April, while allowing sealed rail transit. The Grain Union said Moscow had lifted one set of restrictions the previous day, then introduced a new ban with altered terms. That history does not prove Moscow will retaliate this time. Kazakhstan’s order is country-neutral and preserves supplies...

Fuel Supply

Kyrgyzstan Eases State Fuel Price Controls as Supply Shortages Persist

Kyrgyzstan has partially rolled back its temporary state regulation of motor fuel prices, removing AI-95 gasoline from price controls and abandoning plans to impose maximum retail fuel prices in an effort to stabilize supplies. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the Kyrgyz government introduced temporary state regulation of fuel prices on May 25 amid continued increases in gasoline and diesel prices, driven largely by the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. The government had approved subsidies for imports of gasoline, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum gas through September 30, 2026, while setting benchmark import prices at $860 per ton for AI-92 gasoline, $940 per ton for AI-95 gasoline, $950 per ton for diesel fuel, and $575 per ton for liquefied petroleum gas. Under a new resolution signed on July 7 by Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Kasymaliev, AI-95 gasoline has been removed from the list of socially significant goods subject to temporary state price regulation. The decision effectively cancels the state price controls introduced just two weeks earlier. It follows reports that AI-95 gasoline had disappeared from several filling stations in Bishkek. The July 7 resolution also abolishes the maximum allowable retail fuel prices established under the May 25 decree. According to the government, the changes are intended to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to consumers. The policy adjustment comes as Russia continues to tighten fuel exports. In recent weeks, several Russian regions have imposed restrictions on gasoline sales following reduced refinery output caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on oil-processing facilities. Moscow has already restricted gasoline exports and imposed a temporary ban on jet fuel exports. Kyrgyzstan remains heavily dependent on imported fuel. The country imports approximately 1.2 million tons of petroleum products annually, while domestic refineries meet only about 5% of national demand. Total annual fuel consumption is estimated at 1.6 million tons, with more than 90% supplied by Russia. First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiyev told the 24.kg news agency that the government is actively diversifying fuel imports through negotiations with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, European suppliers, Türkiye, China, Russia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. According to Amangeldiyev, China has confirmed a contract to supply the first 3,000 tons of jet fuel to Kyrgyzstan, while negotiations are underway for an additional 5,000 tons of diesel fuel. The Kyrgyz government has also signed agreements with Belarus covering 3,000 tons of jet fuel and approximately 10,000 tons of diesel fuel. The reversal shows how quickly price controls can collide with supply constraints in a market still heavily dependent on Russian fuel.

South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Energy Security

Central Asia’s Fuel Squeeze Becomes a Winter Energy Security Problem

Central Asia’s fuel squeeze is moving from filling stations into winter planning. Governments are now tracking gasoline and diesel, gas pipelines, coal deliveries, power imports, jet fuel, and emergency repair crews. Seasonal fuel and power stress is familiar across the region, but the current pressure - tied to Russia, the main supplier for several regional fuel flows - has arrived early. Russia’s own fuel crisis has sharpened the risk. Ukrainian drone attacks and repair work have cut refinery output, while export limits have pushed more Russian supplies back into the domestic market. Reuters reported queues, regional restrictions, and gasoline above 100 roubles a liter at some independent stations. President Vladimir Putin acknowledged the strain on June 28. “You are well aware that problems for drivers and for businesses persist,” he said, adding that “the harvest depends on” keeping seasonal fuel schedules for farms. For Central Asia, Russian shortages travel through contracts, rail slots, import prices, and public nerves. Kyrgyzstan is among the most exposed. The country consumes about two million tons of fuels and lubricants each year, and almost 95% comes from Russia, according to Deputy Energy Minister Nasipbek Kerimov. “Due to the lack of adequate oil and gas production, we remain a country dependent on imports,” Kerimov said. Bishkek has asked Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan for help securing supplies. That dependence is now impacting households, farmers, and small transport firms. The cabinet has capped pump prices and set a subsidy mechanism through September 30. Kerimov said importers were seeing offers at several prices, but promised that “there should be no shortage on the domestic market.” Oil traders put AI-92 stocks at 30 to 45 days, while diesel remained available for harvest work. Kyrgyzstan is trying to buy time through domestic refining. The modernized Junda refinery in the Chuy Region has been pressed to raise gasoline output to 24,000 tons a month soon, then 50,000 tons a month by the end of 2026, with finished products directed to the domestic market. Those gains would help, but Russian supply still sets the pace. Uzbekistan has the Bukhara and Fergana oil refineries, the Altyaryk unit of the Fergana refinery, and the Uzbekistan GTL complex, but demand has still moved faster than domestic supply. In January-April 2026, gasoline imports reached 568,700 tons, worth $327.1 million, more than double the same period in 2025. Local refineries produced 417,500 tons over those four months. A shift away from AI-80 gasoline has also pushed drivers toward AI-92 and AI-95. The pressure reached the exchange in late June. AI-92 gasoline climbed to a record 13.919 million soums per ton on June 29, about $1,160, after an 11.8% rise since the start of the month. Jet fuel has become an issue, too. Uzbekistan Airways reduced some Russia flight frequencies in June, citing aviation fuel shortages and higher costs. Tashkent is now preparing for winter in concrete volumes. On July 6, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reviewed measures for the 2026-2027 autumn-winter season. The plan includes replacing 53.7...

Labor Migration

Central Asian Labor Migration Shifts as Russia Loses Some of Its Pull

Russia remains the main destination for many Central Asian labor migrants, but its dominance is weakening. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, tougher Russian migration rules, and rising hostility toward migrants have pushed workers from the region to look elsewhere. South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations are increasingly competing with Russia for Central Asian labor. The result is not a collapse of the old migration model, but a visible diversification of flows as the geography of labor migration from the region expands. Kazakhstan: From Destination Country to Source of Skilled Migrants Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most labor migrants from Central Asia have traveled to Russia in search of work. A shortage of local labor, relatively decent wages, familiarity with the language, and a similar mentality have driven many to seek jobs in major Russian cities. Kazakhstan is an exception. It has not seen mass migration of its own citizens into lower-skilled jobs in Russia such as janitorial or construction work. Kazakhstan’s own economy offers such jobs, unemployment has remained low, and employers continue to report shortages in both manual work and skilled professions. The Bureau of National Statistics put unemployment at 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026. For this reason, Kazakhstan has also long been a destination for migrants from neighboring states, even if Russia has traditionally attracted larger flows. Kazakh citizens working abroad generally aim for higher-paying jobs in sectors requiring qualifications. The government was already tracking this in 2024, when the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported, using Foreign Ministry data, that 137,000 Kazakh citizens were abroad for employment purposes. The largest numbers were in Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UAE, with smaller numbers in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. A later Ministry report showed the same pattern, with Russia still dominant but alternatives clearly visible: of 126,000 Kazakh citizens employed abroad, 102,000 were in Russia, 15,000 in South Korea, and around 2,000 in the United Kingdom and European Union member states. Those leaving include economists, lawyers, technical specialists, teachers, and medical workers. Although outward labor migration remains limited compared with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, it is adding to official concerns about the loss of qualified specialists. Officials believe Kazakhstan’s labor market is vulnerable to external competition, and a large share of those leaving have higher or technical vocational education. Salary gaps and differences in living standards make these destinations attractive. Qatar has recently joined the list of preferred destinations for labor migration. This has been made possible in large part by intergovernmental agreements signed between Qatar and Kazakhstan. Qatar is now actively recruiting Kazakh specialists, particularly in the oil and gas sector. According to Arman Shokparov, co-founder of People Consulting, around 600-700 Kazakh white-collar professionals currently work in Qatar. Nearly half work in the oil and gas sector, mainly in engineering and production roles. This trend does not mean Kazakhstan is only losing workers. It continues to attract immigrants and...

fuel shortages

Russia’s Fuel Crisis Tests Kazakhstan’s Energy Resilience

Kazakhstan is being pulled into a new energy paradox. As Russia's fuel crisis deepens, the country is being discussed as a potential gasoline supplier to its largest neighbor. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is tightening controls at home, building reserves around refinery maintenance, and weighing fuel imports from China to protect its own market. On June 24, Reuters reported that Russia was in talks with Kazakhstan to import about 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline, citing four industry sources. The discussions followed refinery outages and unscheduled repairs in Russia after Ukrainian drone attacks, which had led to shutdowns at several large refineries in central Russia and cut Russian gasoline output by roughly 25% year-on-year by late June. The news was striking because Russia is normally a major exporter of petroleum products. The need to consider gasoline imports, including seaborne imports and emergency market-stabilization measures, underlines the scale of disruption in Russia's refining system. Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov said Astana had not received an official request from Moscow, but the question remains politically and economically sensitive for Kazakhstan: can it afford to send fuel abroad if its own margin of safety is narrowing? Officially, the domestic picture remains stable. Kazakhstan's government said on June 20 that national stocks of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel exceeded 1 million tons, enough to cover current demand. It said supplies were being prioritized for filling stations, agricultural producers, and domestic airlines, and that no shortage of fuels and lubricants had been observed. Yet those assurances sit alongside a more fragile structural reality. Kazakhstan's refining system depends heavily on three large refineries: Atyrau in the west, Pavlodar in the north, and Shymkent in the south. Last year, it was reported that, after modernization, the three plants had a combined annual output of about 17 million metric tons. Such a system can function efficiently when all units are operating normally, but it leaves limited room for simultaneous shocks. One of those shocks is already present. The Atyrau Oil Refinery began scheduled preventive maintenance on June 26 under a timetable approved by the Ministry of Energy. KazMunayGas said the work includes inspections of 20 reactors, 213 storage tanks, 32 columns, and 231 heat exchangers, as well as replacement of more than 335 tons of catalysts. The refinery entered maintenance with 38,000 tons of gasoline, 31,300 tons of diesel, and 6,800 tons of jet fuel. KazMunayGas said national stocks of AI-92 gasoline and diesel covered 34 and 32 days of demand, respectively, and that the phased restart of processing units was scheduled to begin on July 10. Those figures show resilience, but not abundance. Summer brings higher consumption from agriculture, passenger travel, freight, and aviation. For the government, managing this period means monitoring refinery output, shipments, inventories, and preventing fuel from leaving the country through unauthorized channels. After a June 20 meeting, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov ordered tighter border controls; the government said vehicles are restricted from crossing the state border by road more than once per day as part of...