• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09156 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 -0.14%
19 February 2025

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 595

Why Kazakhstan’s Tokayev Was Right About Diplomacy in Ukraine

When the history of the war in Ukraine is written, one question demanding extended treatment will be why diplomacy remained sidelined for so long. Conflicts involving major powers and their proxies have in recent decades (think of Korea, Vietnam, and the Balkans) finished mainly not in outright military victories but in negotiated settlements. Now, with reports of U.S. President Donald Trump reaching directly out to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, it is important to reassess why the long-standing insistence on diplomacy by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev was not met with more support.  Tokayev’s early insistence on negotiations was instead met with scepticism. As the war ground on, Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive (planned and mandated by Western advisors) failed while Russia’s entrenchment in the occupied territories continued. The fact that a Trump–Putin call has taken place, bypassing European leaders, underscores the shift of view in Washington. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy approach to the war in Ukraine has been dictated by its unique geopolitical position. As a founding member of both the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Kazakhstan’s economic and security ties to Russia are extensive. At the same time, its leadership has consistently pursued a multivector foreign policy, balancing engagement with China, the European Union, and the United States. Tokayev’s refusal at the June 2022 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum to recognize the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics signalled Kazakhstan’s commitment to sovereignty and neutrality. In November 2022, Kazakhstan began to reduce Moscow’s leverage over its energy sector by sending oil for export via the Caspian Sea, into pipelines in the South Caucasus, bypassing the established route through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium via southern Russia. Had global policymakers taken Tokayev’s warnings more seriously in 2022 and 2023, certain escalations might have been mitigated. Kazakhstan was not alone in advocating for negotiations. Turkey brokered a grain shipment deal in 2022, and the Vatican attempted discreet backchannel diplomacy. However, Kazakhstan’s deep historical and economic ties to Russia gave its perspective unique weight. Kazakhstan’s approach was pragmatic. Western states viewed engagement as legitimizing Russian aggression. From Central Asia, however, the view was that indefinite warfare would destabilize Eurasia and inflict mounting costs on all stakeholders, not least Moscow. The West dismissed calls for diplomacy as naïve or as concessions to Moscow. Western leaders continued to believe military pressure, coupled with economic sanctions, was the only viable means of deterring Russian aggression. This may have been true if the military pressure had been an order of magnitude stronger from the beginning, rather than a slow drip of weapons systems that never had a chance of making a decisive difference. The reluctance of Western leaders to consider early diplomacy was not entirely unfounded. The atrocities committed by Russian forces in Bucha and Mariupol made any engagement politically fraught. Ukraine, emboldened by Western military aid, had every reason to resist diplomatic settlements that would lock in its territorial losses. Smaller states often possess a more acute awareness of the dangers of prolonged...

Kazakh Machine Builders Face Payment Hurdles in Russia Trade

Azat Peruashev, head of the Ak Zhol party's parliamentary faction, which represents Kazakhstani business interests, has appealed to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and National Bank Chairman Timur Suleimenov to address payment difficulties faced by machine-building enterprises exporting to Russia. According to the Majilis deputy, these challenges stem from within Kazakhstan itself. Peruashev explained that machine-building enterprises have approached his party, reporting that Kazakhstani banks are refusing them credit. Additionally, second-tier banks (BVUs) are declining to process payments for companies engaged in business with Russian partners. “These actions by financial institutions are driven by concerns that exported products could be added to U.S. and EU sanctions lists, which, in turn, could expose the banks to secondary sanctions,” Peruashev said. As a result, commercial banks in Kazakhstan have begun demanding that local factories provide guarantees that they will not export products to Russia - under threat of having their credit lines revoked. This is happening despite assurances from David O'Sullivan, the European Union’s sanctions envoy, who recently visited Kazakhstan. O'Sullivan stated that the European Commission would not impose sanctions on goods manufactured in Kazakhstan and exported to Russia. “The EU’s only concern is to prevent the re-export of sanctioned European products through Kazakhstan,” Peruashev said. “However, representatives of Kazakhstan’s largest banks find these assurances unconvincing. In their view, the decisive factor is not whether a product is re-exported or locally manufactured, but whether it appears on a sanctions list. This creates the risk of secondary sanctions, not necessarily from the EU, but from the U.S., including the potential disconnection from the SWIFT international banking system.” According to Ak Zhol, Kazakhstani exports of machine-building products and components to Russia fell by 15% last year. The banks’ refusal to process payments is not based on any official government restrictions. Last summer, seven Kazakh companies faced U.S. secondary sanctions for cooperating with Russian partners. In October, the list expanded to include Kazstanex, a company involved in supplying machine tools and components. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, during his visit to Astana in January, David O'Sullivan stated that the EU had sanctioned two Kazakh companies so far but did not rule out further additions to the list.

Tajikistan Nears Full Transition to Ruble in Trade with Russia, As Bilateral Trade Surges

Tajikistan has nearly completed its transition to ruble payments in trade with Russia, with over 90% of transactions now conducted in Russian currency, according to Firdavs Tolibzoda, head of the National Bank of Tajikistan. This marks a significant shift from 2021, when trade between the two countries was evenly split between the ruble and the U.S. dollar. Tolibzoda highlighted that Tajik banks are working to minimize financial risks by primarily cooperating with Russian banks that are not subject to international sanctions. The shift away from the dollar in Tajik-Russian trade began after Western sanctions were imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Over the past three years, Tajik exchange offices have no longer faced periodic shortages of U.S. currency, a problem that was common before the transition to ruble payments. In 2024, bilateral trade between Tajikistan and Russia is expected to reach $1.98 billion, reflecting a 15.6% increase from 2023. However, trade remains highly imbalanced. Russian imports account for 95.2% of total trade, with Tajikistan purchasing oil products and essential goods, while Tajikistan’s exports to Russia amounted to just $96 million, primarily consisting of vegetables, fruits, and mineral products such as ores and concentrates. Despite Russia’s dominant role as Tajikistan’s largest trading partner, China is rapidly catching up. In 2024, Russia accounted for 22.1% of Tajikistan’s total foreign trade turnover, while China’s share reached 21.8%. Trade with China grew by 30.1% over the past year, almost double the growth rate of trade with Russia, indicating a shifting dynamic in Tajikistan’s economic partnerships.

Uzbek Court Sentences Ten in Attempted Assassination of Allamjonov

On February 12, Uzbekistan's Military Court announced the verdict in the attempted assassination of Komil Allamjonov, sentencing ten individuals to prison. The convicted are Shukhrat Rasulov, Shokhrukh Akhmedov, and Ismail Jahongirov, who received 23-year sentences; Javlan Yunusov - sentenced to 18 years and 6 months; Doniyor Tashkhodjayev received a 7-year sentence; the remaining five defendants were given undisclosed prison terms. Following the verdict, Allamjonov took to Facebook to reflect on the challenges of the past five months and express gratitude that the case had been resolved. “The truth can be twisted or hidden, but it will always find its way to the surface. It is destined to be revealed. A thousand thanks to Allah. Those who flee from people cannot escape the Almighty. There is still much to accomplish and many trials yet to come. May Allah grant us the strength to face them with dignity and a clear conscience. May Allah bless us all with success!” Allamjonov, a former senior official in Uzbekistan’s Presidential Administration, was attacked near his home in Qibray on October 26, 2024. Gunmen opened fire on his car, but he was unharmed. Authorities launched an immediate criminal investigation. By October 27, the first suspect had been detained. A month later, on November 25, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced the arrests of seven people, including Javlan Yunusov, who was extradited from South Korea. Another suspect was later detained in Kazakhstan. In December, Uzbekistan placed two Russian citizens, Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov, on an Interpol international wanted list. Authorities accuse them of involvement in the attack, as well as illegal border crossing, failure to report a crime, and illegal possession of firearms. Reports suggest that Rasayev and Temirkhanov were hired for $1.5 million to assassinate both Allamjonov and Dmitry Li, the director of Uzbekistan’s Agency for Promising Projects. On December 26, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov publicly denied any Chechen involvement in the attack. However, he also made remarks targeting Allamjonov and Li, warning that they would be held accountable for their "aspersions." Some Uzbek politicians condemned Kadyrov's statement, viewing it as interference in Uzbekistan's internal affairs or even as an act of terrorist intimidation.

Uzbekistan to Send 7,000 Workers to Russia Under New Agreements

Uzbekistan and Russia have agreed to establish a new system for regulating labor migration. The decision was reached during a meeting in Moscow between the director of Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, Behzod Musayev, and the head of Russia’s Federal Agency for Labor and Employment, Mikhail Ivankov. A key component of the agreement is the creation of specialized training centers in Uzbekistan to prepare citizens for employment in Russia. These centers will provide essential skills and qualifications to facilitate the transition for Uzbek labor migrants. Additionally, Uzbek workers will now be able to take a required Russian language exam in Tashkent before traveling to Russia. The exam, which is necessary for obtaining a work permit, will be administered at the Tashkent branch of the Sakharov Multifunctional Migration Center. To simplify employment procedures, Uzbekistan has signed agreements with several major Russian companies, including Ant Yapi, Ozon Community, PEK, and SPAR Middle Volga. Under these agreements, 7,000 Uzbek citizens will be provided with official employment in Russia. The Migration Agency has reviewed working conditions and salaries, and candidate selection will take place across Uzbekistan in February. Meanwhile, Russia is tightening immigration regulations, potentially affecting millions of Central Asian migrants. A proposed law from the Russian Ministry of Education would require migrant children to pass a Russian language test. Those who fail must enroll in a three-month language program at their parents’ expense. Families that do not comply may face investigations and administrative penalties. As of September 1, 2024, nearly four million Central Asian migrants were officially residing in Russia. Amid increasing restrictions, challenges for migrant workers continue to mount. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that some Central Asian migrants have signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to participate in the war in Ukraine, primarily for financial reasons. However, economic hardship is not the only factor driving recruitment. Central Asians with Russian citizenship have also faced threats of imprisonment if they refuse to fight. Separately, Ukraine has reported that approximately 30 Central Asian citizens have been taken prisoner since the start of Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Ukrainian Justice Minister Olha Stefanishyna disclosed this information in response to an inquiry from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Novosti Priazovya project. However, their current status remains unclear. According to Ukraine’s Justice Ministry, prisoner nationality is often determined based on personal statements, as many detainees lack documents confirming their citizenship. The ministry emphasized that all prisoners of war, regardless of nationality, are granted the same legal status under both international and national law.

Half a World Away: Central Asian Workers on British Farms

Few countries have more patriotic supermarkets than Britain. Whether it’s a sortie through the sausage section, or browsing the fruit aisle, customers are almost guaranteed to be confronted with the red, white and blue of the Union Jack. In a country not famed for its food, it’s perhaps strange to see the national flag given such prominence. The practice is far less common in continental Europe. Nevertheless, over the past decade there has been a push, propelled by an odd alliance of environmentalists and nationalists, to source homegrown food. Retailers have cottoned onto this and seem glad to leave the customer with the warm, bucolic feeling that they have aided embattled farmers, reduced their carbon footprint, and even helped to correct the country’s balance of payments deficit by buying British. “Supermarkets get more than just the profit margin for the [British] fruit they sell,” says Dr Lydia Medland, a research fellow at Bristol University. “We call it farmwashing: they get publicity, they get kudos; they use this ripe, fresh, local image to sell more products.” There’s only one snag. The people who pick the fruit and vegetables which are then packaged up with British flags, are not exactly local. [caption id="attachment_28497" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] British flags adorn food packaging in the country's supermarkets.Images: Yvonne Mould (left); Elke Morgan (center and right)[/caption] Central Asia and Britain: An Unlikely Match Seasonal workers have been traveling to the island of Britain for over a hundred years. In the nineteenth century, farmers would travel across the Irish Sea to help bring in the harvest. However, in the late 1990s, the number of people arriving on seasonal visas began to rise significantly. This was followed in the 2000s by a spike in workers from Europe, taking advantage of visa-free access to Britain’s labor market under the auspices of the European Union. They served as a pool of flexible, cheap workers for a farming industry that was being increasingly squeezed by the buying power of the country’s major supermarket chains. When Britain voted to leave the EU in 2016, the farming industry panicked at the prospect of losing much of this cut-price labor force. They successfully lobbied the government to relaunch the Seasonal Worker Visa program on a trial basis. Originally designed in the 1940s for European students, the scheme was repackaged to empower private recruitment agencies to hire workers from across the world to work in the fields for six months a year. When the visa debuted in 2018, 2,500 people came. By 2021 – the year that freedom of movement between Britain and the EU officially ended – the government had already raised the quota to 30,000. At the other end of Europe, the collapse in the value of the Russian Ruble since the start of 2023, combined with a crackdown on foreign laborers, has seen a mass exodus of Central Asians from Russia. By October 2024, there were around 30% fewer migrants in the country than there were on the eve of the Covid-19...