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Labor Migration

Central Asian Labor Migration Shifts as Russia Loses Some of Its Pull

Russia remains the main destination for many Central Asian labor migrants, but its dominance is weakening. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions, tougher Russian migration rules, and rising hostility toward migrants have pushed workers from the region to look elsewhere. South Korea, the Gulf states, the United Kingdom, Poland, Belarus, and other destinations are increasingly competing with Russia for Central Asian labor. The result is not a collapse of the old migration model, but a visible diversification of flows as the geography of labor migration from the region expands. Kazakhstan: From Destination Country to Source of Skilled Migrants Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, most labor migrants from Central Asia have traveled to Russia in search of work. A shortage of local labor, relatively decent wages, familiarity with the language, and a similar mentality have driven many to seek jobs in major Russian cities. Kazakhstan is an exception. It has not seen mass migration of its own citizens into lower-skilled jobs in Russia such as janitorial or construction work. Kazakhstan’s own economy offers such jobs, unemployment has remained low, and employers continue to report shortages in both manual work and skilled professions. The Bureau of National Statistics put unemployment at 4.5% in the first quarter of 2026. For this reason, Kazakhstan has also long been a destination for migrants from neighboring states, even if Russia has traditionally attracted larger flows. Kazakh citizens working abroad generally aim for higher-paying jobs in sectors requiring qualifications. The government was already tracking this in 2024, when the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported, using Foreign Ministry data, that 137,000 Kazakh citizens were abroad for employment purposes. The largest numbers were in Russia, South Korea, Turkey, and the UAE, with smaller numbers in Europe, North America, and elsewhere. A later Ministry report showed the same pattern, with Russia still dominant but alternatives clearly visible: of 126,000 Kazakh citizens employed abroad, 102,000 were in Russia, 15,000 in South Korea, and around 2,000 in the United Kingdom and European Union member states. Those leaving include economists, lawyers, technical specialists, teachers, and medical workers. Although outward labor migration remains limited compared with Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, it is adding to official concerns about the loss of qualified specialists. Officials believe Kazakhstan’s labor market is vulnerable to external competition, and a large share of those leaving have higher or technical vocational education. Salary gaps and differences in living standards make these destinations attractive. Qatar has recently joined the list of preferred destinations for labor migration. This has been made possible in large part by intergovernmental agreements signed between Qatar and Kazakhstan. Qatar is now actively recruiting Kazakh specialists, particularly in the oil and gas sector. According to Arman Shokparov, co-founder of People Consulting, around 600-700 Kazakh white-collar professionals currently work in Qatar. Nearly half work in the oil and gas sector, mainly in engineering and production roles. This trend does not mean Kazakhstan is only losing workers. It continues to attract immigrants and...

fuel shortages

Russia’s Fuel Crisis Tests Kazakhstan’s Energy Resilience

Kazakhstan is being pulled into a new energy paradox. As Russia's fuel crisis deepens, the country is being discussed as a potential gasoline supplier to its largest neighbor. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is tightening controls at home, building reserves around refinery maintenance, and weighing fuel imports from China to protect its own market. On June 24, Reuters reported that Russia was in talks with Kazakhstan to import about 50,000 metric tons of AI-92 gasoline, citing four industry sources. The discussions followed refinery outages and unscheduled repairs in Russia after Ukrainian drone attacks, which had led to shutdowns at several large refineries in central Russia and cut Russian gasoline output by roughly 25% year-on-year by late June. The news was striking because Russia is normally a major exporter of petroleum products. The need to consider gasoline imports, including seaborne imports and emergency market-stabilization measures, underlines the scale of disruption in Russia's refining system. Kazakhstan's Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov said Astana had not received an official request from Moscow, but the question remains politically and economically sensitive for Kazakhstan: can it afford to send fuel abroad if its own margin of safety is narrowing? Officially, the domestic picture remains stable. Kazakhstan's government said on June 20 that national stocks of gasoline, diesel, and aviation fuel exceeded 1 million tons, enough to cover current demand. It said supplies were being prioritized for filling stations, agricultural producers, and domestic airlines, and that no shortage of fuels and lubricants had been observed. Yet those assurances sit alongside a more fragile structural reality. Kazakhstan's refining system depends heavily on three large refineries: Atyrau in the west, Pavlodar in the north, and Shymkent in the south. Last year, it was reported that, after modernization, the three plants had a combined annual output of about 17 million metric tons. Such a system can function efficiently when all units are operating normally, but it leaves limited room for simultaneous shocks. One of those shocks is already present. The Atyrau Oil Refinery began scheduled preventive maintenance on June 26 under a timetable approved by the Ministry of Energy. KazMunayGas said the work includes inspections of 20 reactors, 213 storage tanks, 32 columns, and 231 heat exchangers, as well as replacement of more than 335 tons of catalysts. The refinery entered maintenance with 38,000 tons of gasoline, 31,300 tons of diesel, and 6,800 tons of jet fuel. KazMunayGas said national stocks of AI-92 gasoline and diesel covered 34 and 32 days of demand, respectively, and that the phased restart of processing units was scheduled to begin on July 10. Those figures show resilience, but not abundance. Summer brings higher consumption from agriculture, passenger travel, freight, and aviation. For the government, managing this period means monitoring refinery output, shipments, inventories, and preventing fuel from leaving the country through unauthorized channels. After a June 20 meeting, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov ordered tighter border controls; the government said vehicles are restricted from crossing the state border by road more than once per day as part of...

Tashkent International Investment Forum

Mirziyoyev and Mishustin Reaffirm Strategic Alliance as Russia Says Uzbekistan Projects Top $50 Billion

TASHKENT, June 17, 2026 — President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev received Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Mikhail Mishustin in Tashkent on June 16, as the Russian premier arrived to take part in the Fifth Tashkent International Investment Forum (TIIF). In their meeting, the two leaders reviewed progress on implementing agreements reached at the highest level within the framework of Uzbek-Russian relations and their strategic partnership. Mirziyoyev and Mishustin backed deeper private-sector ties, regional cooperation in oil, gas, mining and agriculture, and expanded cultural and educational exchanges, points also raised in Mishustin's separate meetings with Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov and Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. They expressed satisfaction at a 20% rise in bilateral trade turnover since the start of the year, and noted that major joint projects in energy, metallurgy and other priority sectors are continuing. [caption id="attachment_50632" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Uzbekistan, and Mikhail Mishustin, PM of the Russian Federation. Image: RF website[/caption] Those parallel meetings underscored that the relationship now extends well into the cultural and academic sphere alongside the commercial one. Aripov congratulated Mishustin and “all our Russian friends on Russia Day. I wish the multi-ethnic people of Russia peace, stability, and continued prosperity,” he said. Aripov went on to note that two-way trade has more than tripled over the past decade to surpass $13 billion, with the combined portfolio of joint projects now standing near $47 billion. Mirziyoyeva, in turn, highlighted recent cultural exchanges held around the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, including a Mariinsky Theatre premiere of the opera “Tamerlane” and exhibitions at the Hermitage and the Fabergé Museum, while officials on both sides pointed to the large number of Russian university branches operating in Uzbekistan as evidence of deepening educational ties. Of key significance in the Uzbek-Russian relationship is the construction of Uzbekistan's first integrated nuclear power station, which will be built to a Russian design. Putin and Mirziyoyev marked the launch by video link during the St. Petersburg forum, as concrete was poured at the project site. Russian engineers are also involved in the construction of the country's largest hydropower plants. A joint center for managing drilling operations has been created, and a major project is underway to upgrade the Central Asia-Centre gas pipeline and expand its capacity. [caption id="attachment_50634" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: President.uz[/caption] Mishustin’s TIIF Address Speaking at the TIIF opening ceremony on June 17, Mishustin set the bilateral relationship against the backdrop of a strained global economy. “The global economy is undergoing a profound transformation these days amid growing turbulence and escalating trade wars, the wide application of protectionist measures and unfair competition. Of course, all this means that we, our countries, must work on systemic objectives. The way we address them will define whether we succeed in fostering steady economic development for our countries and improving the quality of life for our people,” he said. Mishustin told the forum that “Russia is among...

Armenia

Pashinyan Victory Points to New Transport Options for Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on June 8 after Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won Armenia’s parliamentary election. The message came through Akorda. Tokayev said the vote, in the preliminary view of most international observers, was open, followed Armenian election law, and allowed citizens to express their will. Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission has released preliminary results from all 2,005 polling stations, giving Civil Contract 727,160 votes, or 49.81%. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc took 23.29%, while former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance took 9.94%. Turnout stood at 59%. Pashinyan is on course to form another government, but doesn’t have the two-thirds strength needed to change the constitution without a referendum. That limits his room for maneuver on a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, since Baku still wants Yerevan to alter constitutional language it sees as a claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. [caption id="attachment_50178" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] A stall in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, selling Nikol Pashinyan paraphernalia. Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Kazakhstan has built a close political track with Armenia over the past two years. In November 2025, Tokayev and Pashinyan elevated ties to a strategic partnership during Pashinyan’s official visit to Kazakhstan. The two sides discussed trade, transport, agriculture, digitalization, education, and culture. Armenian government readouts from the visit also linked Kazakh wheat shipments to regional route openings through the South Caucasus. This is the practical Central Asian stake in Pashinyan’s victory: a durable Armenia-Azerbaijan peace settlement would add another layer to westward routes from the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev told Tokayev in Astana that a shipment of Kazakh grain through Azerbaijan to Armenia was the first such consignment since transit stopped in the late Soviet period. Kazakhstan already uses the Caspian and South Caucasus to reach Turkey and Europe, but that network depends on a limited number of crossings, ports, and rail links. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reopen transport ties, Astana gains another way to reduce chokepoints and strengthen its position. Pashinyan’s victory also sends a political signal. The vote tested whether Russian pressure could set the limits of Armenia’s domestic politics. International observers said the June 7 election offered voters a genuine choice in a well-run process. They also cited pressure from abroad through trade restrictions and security threats aimed at pushing voters toward the opposition. The same assessment warned of uneven campaign opportunities and perceptions of selective justice inside Armenia. However, Pashinyan still won in a “landslide” despite years of public anger over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a split with old security partners, and strong pressure from opposition groups with better ties to Moscow. The two main pro-Russian opposition forces won a combined 31%. The election came against a backdrop of Armenia’s break with Russian security organizations. When Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stayed on the sidelines in the breakaway territory’s dormant airport, Armenia concluded that Moscow would not protect it. In February 2024, Pashinyan said...

EAEU

As Armenia Looks West, Could Uzbekistan Move Closer to the EAEU?

Armenia’s increasingly uncertain future within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to have entered a new phase. On May 29, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement calling on Yerevan to clarify whether it intends to pursue deeper integration with the European Union or remain committed to the Eurasian bloc. The four leaders announced that members of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council would present a report at the next meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in December 2026 outlining the possible consequences of suspending Armenia’s participation in the EAEU treaty framework. “We share the view that the Republic of Armenia should, within the shortest possible timeframe, hold a nationwide referendum on joining the European Union or continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union,” the statement said. Speaking to journalists after the summit in Astana, Russian President Vladimir Putin drew parallels between Armenia’s current trajectory and the developments that preceded the crisis in Ukraine. “I have mentioned this before: the crisis in Ukraine began with attempts to join the EU,” Putin said. He added that significant differences between European and EAEU standards, particularly in agriculture and industry, make simultaneous participation in both integration projects difficult. “Combining the two is practically impossible,” Putin said. “Therefore, we would be forced to curtail much of our economic integration work with Armenia.” The following day, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations amid Yerevan’s growing engagement with the European Union. According to Russian political analyst Arkady Dubnov, the move was a clear diplomatic signal of Moscow’s dissatisfaction with the pro-European course pursued by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government and indicated a downgrading of bilateral relations. Dubnov also argued that Armenia’s representative at the Astana summit, Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan, avoided harsher criticism from Putin partly because of the position taken by Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. “Kazakhstan itself signed an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union in 2020,” Dubnov noted, suggesting that arguments about Armenia’s European integration harming the EAEU are largely political rather than economic in nature. One recent poll appears to reinforce confidence within Armenia’s ruling camp. A survey conducted ahead of parliamentary elections indicates that Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party could secure nearly 65% of decided voters, positioning it for a convincing victory and a substantial parliamentary majority. Against that backdrop, Moscow’s pressure on Yerevan may be less about influencing the outcome of Armenia’s elections than about preparing for a longer-term strategic realignment. Supporters of Pashinyan increasingly associate his political project with closer ties to Europe, a perception reinforced not only by European leaders but also by U.S. President Donald Trump, who recently expressed support for Pashinyan’s re-election campaign. For his part, Pashinyan appears focused on a broader regional recalibration. Speaking via Facebook Live on May 31, he emphasized the importance of normalizing relations with neighboring states. “I am convinced that we will achieve the goal of normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye,” he said. “This means that a balanced and balancing...

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....