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fuel shortages

Kazakh Refinery Plans Fuel Exports to Russia Amid Petrol Shortages

A small refinery in western Kazakhstan is preparing to process Russian crude and send most of the resulting petrol and diesel back to Russia as Moscow struggles with fuel shortages. The arrangement was confirmed on August 25, the same day that separate incidents occurred at two of Kazakhstan’s three major refineries. On August 19, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said that, given the situation on the fuel market, the government was “keeping its finger on the pulse” and monitoring supplies daily with companies and regional authorities. According to Novak, Russia had already imposed export restrictions and begun importing petroleum products. Several refineries were also expected to return from repairs, increasing domestic supplies. Russia’s Fuel Shortage The pressure on Russia’s fuel market is illustrated by data published by the industry portal InfoTEK. According to its August 24 snapshot, AI-95 petrol, the widely used 95-octane grade, was available at only 5,620 of Russia’s 26,098 operating filling stations, or 22%. Even in Moscow, it could be found at 161 of 786 operating stations, about 20%. Russia has also temporarily relaxed restrictions on lower environmental grades of fuel, including Euro 4, Euro 3 and Euro 2, known in the Russian classification as K4, K3 and K2. Since 2016, only fuel meeting at least the Euro 5 standard had generally been permitted. Russian economist Boris Grozovsky estimates that, given the refining capacity knocked out by Ukrainian strikes and the number of plants undergoing repairs, Russia is currently short of roughly one-third of the petrol needed at peak demand. August is traditionally a high-demand month because of summer travel and agricultural work. “If it were November now, the situation would be a little easier for the Russian government. Russia is trying to bring in petrol from India, Morocco, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but imports also have limitations. The petrol brought in from India turned out to be too expensive,” Grozovsky said. Kazakh Refinery Steps In Speaking at a government briefing on August 25, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov said that the small Condensat refinery in Aksai, West Kazakhstan Region, would process Russian crude, with around 70% of the petrol and diesel it produces sent to Russia. Up to 30% will remain on the Kazakh market, while the refinery also retains the right to export products outside the Eurasian Economic Union. “Under the agreement we currently have, up to 30% of the petroleum products in demand, petrol and diesel, will remain in Kazakhstan, while the rest will be shipped to the Russian Federation,” the minister told reporters. Akkenzhenov said the arrangement reflected Condensat’s location close to the Russian border. The refinery is not connected by pipeline to either country’s main oil network, meaning both crude deliveries and fuel exports depend on rail capacity. Akkenzhenov also stressed that the refinery’s owner is not under sanctions and said the Energy Ministry did not see sanctions risks for the project. He said the arrangement would also bring investment and preserve jobs at a refinery that has struggled financially. Condensat’s Financial Troubles Condensat was established in...

Energy Security

Tajikistan Seeks 2.55 Million Tons of Iranian Oil and Fuel as Russian Supplies Falter

Tajikistan has asked Iran to supply 2.55 million metric tons of crude oil and petroleum products as Dushanbe looks for alternatives to increasingly unreliable Russian fuel supplies. The request includes 2 million tons of crude oil, 300,000 tons of diesel, 150,000 tons of gasoline, and 100,000 tons of aviation fuel, according to Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport. The ministry said the volume would require about 51,000 railway tank cars. The proposal was discussed in Tehran on August 15 during talks between Tajik Transport Minister Azim Ibrohim and Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh. It is not yet a purchase agreement, and Tajikistan has not announced a delivery timetable, price, or supplier. The timing, however, places the proposed trade directly inside a worsening sanctions environment. On August 20, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened economic consequences for countries providing support to Iran, promising “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not announced specific new measures linked to that statement. Significant purchases and transport of Iranian petroleum already carry U.S. sanctions exposure. Executive Order 13846 authorizes sanctions against people and financial institutions involved in significant transactions for the purchase, sale, transport, or marketing of petroleum from Iran. A temporary U.S. authorization covering Iranian crude and petroleum products, issued in June, was revoked on July 7, with its wind-down period ending on July 17. Russia’s Fuel Crunch Reaches Tajikistan Dushanbe’s request to Iran is driven by a more immediate problem: dependence on Russian fuel. In 2025, Tajikistan imported about 1.7 million tons of fuel and lubricants, more than 1.2 million tons of which came from Russia. Tajik officials said in July that Russia supplied 84% of imported petroleum products. That dependence has become more difficult to manage as Ukrainian drone attacks have reduced Russian refinery output and forced Moscow to protect its domestic market. Russian fuel shortages began spilling into Central Asia in early summer. Tajikistan’s fuel imports fell sharply in July, pushing Dushanbe to seek additional supplies from China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iraq, and Iran. Russia still accounted for 72.3% of fuel supplied to Tajikistan in the first half of the year, while talks with Kazakhstan had reached presidential level by the end of July. The pressure was already visible in Dushanbe. In early July, diesel disappeared from some filling stations, while others imposed sales limits. On July 10, Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan had roughly two months of petroleum reserves and was seeking alternative suppliers. The scale of the request is striking. At 2.55 million tons, it exceeds Tajikistan’s total fuel and lubricant imports in 2025, although 2 million tons of the proposed volume is crude oil rather than finished fuel. The Ministry of Transport has asked Iran to help organize dedicated tanker trains and create a “green corridor” giving Tajik fuel cargoes priority on the Iranian rail network. Further transit arrangements would still be needed because Tajikistan and Iran do not share a border. The Refinery Question The large crude component also highlights...

Sanctions

Kyrgyzstan Sanctions Risks Reshape Business

Kyrgyzstan is stepping up action against companies that could expose its banks and wider economy to Western sanctions. On August 18, the authorities moved to forcibly liquidate another 19 legal entities, while major banks are closing the accounts of dozens of clients deemed too risky. Bishkek has not formally joined Western sanctions against Russia, but those restrictions are increasingly determining whom Kyrgyz businesses can work with and which banks they can use to move money. The names of the 19 companies have not yet been disclosed. The authorities stated that they were selected after reviewing around 40 organizations considered to pose heightened sanctions risks. This is not the first such move. In May, the authorities ordered 50 businesses to cease operations after sanctions risks were identified. Their full names were not made public either. First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev said at the time that Western partners provide information about suspicious companies, which Kyrgyz authorities then investigate. He warned that sanctions against Kyrgyzstan itself could disrupt international payments and access to technology. How the Pressure Built Western scrutiny of Kyrgyz companies began well before the current cleanup. In the summer of 2023, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned four companies registered in Kyrgyzstan: RM Design and Development, Progress Lider, GTME Tekhnologii, and Cargoline. Washington said they had supplied Russia with electronics and other restricted goods, while Cargoline had shipped millions of dollars’ worth of foreign-made aviation equipment. The focus later expanded from goods to financial networks. In January 2025, the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Keremet Bank, saying it had coordinated with Russian officials and sanctioned lender Promsvyazbank on a scheme to facilitate cross-border transfers. In practice, U.S. sanctions severely restrict a bank’s ability to deal with American companies or use the U.S. financial system. Within days of Keremet Bank’s designation, Visa restricted cards issued by the bank so that they could be used only through Keremet’s own ATMs and payment terminals. In August 2025, the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on Grinex, Tengricoin, Old Vector, and Capital Bank of Central Asia as part of a crackdown on financial and cryptocurrency networks that London said Russia was using to circumvent Western restrictions. By early 2026, however, the risk was beginning to shift from sanctions against individual Kyrgyz companies and banks to restrictions affecting the country as a whole. During a February meeting with EU Sanctions Envoy David O’Sullivan, Amangeldiev discussed financial monitoring, sanctions risks, and greater transparency in foreign trade rather than Kyrgyzstan adopting EU sanctions itself. Bishkek was effectively trying to show that it could tackle sanctions evasion without joining the EU sanctions regime. The prospect of broader measures was already worrying businesses. Askar Sydykov, head of Kyrgyzstan’s International Business Council, said reports that the EU could use its anti-circumvention mechanism against the country were causing serious concern among businesses and government agencies. Those efforts were not enough to prevent broader action. In April, the EU used its anti-circumvention mechanism against Kyrgyzstan for the first time, prohibiting exports to...

Trade Barriers

Kazakhstan Wheat Ban Raises Risk of Renewed Trade Spat With Russia

A truck crossing into Kazakhstan through a northern border post can be declared as carrying 18 tonnes of wheat while hauling as much as 40 tonnes. Grain Union analyst Evgeny Karabanov described that gap as part of the country’s problem with undeclared Russian grain. Astana’s answer is a six-month ban on most wheat imports from July 27. The measure may curb grey-market loads and support domestic farmers, but it also risks reopening a trade dispute with Russia and deepening the gap between the Eurasian Economic Union’s promises and daily commerce. Agriculture Minister Aidarbek Saparov’s order covers wheat arriving by road, water, and rail from EAEU members and other countries. Poultry farms, grain processors, licensed elevators, and the state Food Contract Corporation may still import by rail. Wheat imported for poultry farms and grain processors cannot be resold inside Kazakhstan or abroad. Rail transit through Kazakhstan remains exempt. The government says the ban will support local producers and secure sales. Deputy Agriculture Minister Azat Sultanov said Kazakhstan has large carryover stocks that need storage. “The decision was taken to stimulate the domestic market,” he said in June. The order names every foreign supplier, but its commercial impact will fall mainly on Russia. In January, the Grain Union forecast about one million tonnes of wheat imports during the September 2025 to August 2026 marketing year. Karabanov said practically all of that grain would come from Russia. Cheap wheat crosses a long shared border into Kazakhstan’s main grain belt. That can lower costs for millers and poultry farms, but it also undercuts growers before they sell their harvest. The ban shifts that pressure rather than removing it. Baimurat Group CEO Daniyar Kuanshaliyev called the measure a “crude administrative intervention” that could raise raw-material prices. He argued that reduced competition for wheat could leave processors paying more while traders and exporters compete for the same domestic stocks. Karabanov takes a less alarmed view. “We generally oppose various bans and restrictions,” he said, but the rail exemptions should limit the number of businesses harmed. He said the clearest cost could be higher transport charges, since trucks are often cheaper than trains for journeys under 500 kilometres. Kazakhstan imposed a broad wheat ban in 2024 after Russian grain continued entering despite earlier controls. TCA’s reporting on the earlier grain dispute found that more than 1.1 million tonnes had arrived in six months before Astana tightened the rules. Russia then restricted Kazakh grain and other agricultural products, citing phytosanitary concerns. Exporters said the effects spread beyond the stated products. “Trucks loaded with those products are being turned away at the border,” Karabanov told Reuters in October 2024. The cycle continued in 2025. Russia reinstated restrictions on Kazakh wheat, flaxseed, and lentils from April, while allowing sealed rail transit. The Grain Union said Moscow had lifted one set of restrictions the previous day, then introduced a new ban with altered terms. That history does not prove Moscow will retaliate this time. Kazakhstan’s order is country-neutral and preserves supplies...

Fuel Supply

Kyrgyzstan Eases State Fuel Price Controls as Supply Shortages Persist

Kyrgyzstan has partially rolled back its temporary state regulation of motor fuel prices, removing AI-95 gasoline from price controls and abandoning plans to impose maximum retail fuel prices in an effort to stabilize supplies. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the Kyrgyz government introduced temporary state regulation of fuel prices on May 25 amid continued increases in gasoline and diesel prices, driven largely by the country’s dependence on imports from Russia. The government had approved subsidies for imports of gasoline, diesel fuel, and liquefied petroleum gas through September 30, 2026, while setting benchmark import prices at $860 per ton for AI-92 gasoline, $940 per ton for AI-95 gasoline, $950 per ton for diesel fuel, and $575 per ton for liquefied petroleum gas. Under a new resolution signed on July 7 by Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Adylbek Kasymaliev, AI-95 gasoline has been removed from the list of socially significant goods subject to temporary state price regulation. The decision effectively cancels the state price controls introduced just two weeks earlier. It follows reports that AI-95 gasoline had disappeared from several filling stations in Bishkek. The July 7 resolution also abolishes the maximum allowable retail fuel prices established under the May 25 decree. According to the government, the changes are intended to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to consumers. The policy adjustment comes as Russia continues to tighten fuel exports. In recent weeks, several Russian regions have imposed restrictions on gasoline sales following reduced refinery output caused by Ukrainian drone strikes on oil-processing facilities. Moscow has already restricted gasoline exports and imposed a temporary ban on jet fuel exports. Kyrgyzstan remains heavily dependent on imported fuel. The country imports approximately 1.2 million tons of petroleum products annually, while domestic refineries meet only about 5% of national demand. Total annual fuel consumption is estimated at 1.6 million tons, with more than 90% supplied by Russia. First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Amangeldiyev told the 24.kg news agency that the government is actively diversifying fuel imports through negotiations with Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, European suppliers, Türkiye, China, Russia, Belarus, and Azerbaijan. According to Amangeldiyev, China has confirmed a contract to supply the first 3,000 tons of jet fuel to Kyrgyzstan, while negotiations are underway for an additional 5,000 tons of diesel fuel. The Kyrgyz government has also signed agreements with Belarus covering 3,000 tons of jet fuel and approximately 10,000 tons of diesel fuel. The reversal shows how quickly price controls can collide with supply constraints in a market still heavily dependent on Russian fuel.

South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...