• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10798 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
13 November 2025

Our People > Khusanboy Kotibjonov

Khusanboy Kotibjonov's Avatar

Contributor

Khusanboy Kotibjonov is a Political Science student at New York University and a research assistant at the Wilf Family Department of Politics at NYU whose research focuses on authoritarianism, governance, and post-Soviet republics. A a columnist at Euromaidan Press, his articles have been featured in The Hill, The Kyiv Independent, and Geopolitical Monitor.

Articles

Afghanistan Absent, Not Forgotten – Central Asia’s UNGA Strategy

From September 23–29, 2025, the UN General Assembly’s general debate unfolded without an Afghan delegation addressing those assembled amid the unresolved UN seat issue. Yet Afghanistan was hardly absent. Central Asian presidents used their platform to project a collective stance that stopped short of recognition while rejecting isolation. Their message reflected a regional doctrine of managed engagement: keep the neighbor connected enough to limit collapse, through corridors, energy grids, and humanitarian channels. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan offered the clearest blueprint, urging the international community to “prevent [Afghanistan’s] isolation,” and calling for support to develop transport and energy corridors across Afghan territory. That language aligns with initiatives already underway: a multilateral framework signed in Kabul on July 17 to move the Trans-Afghan railway toward feasibility, and fresh agreements on the 500 kV Surkhan–Pul-i-Khumri line designed to stabilize Afghanistan’s power supply while linking it to a regional grid. Mirziyoyev’s message was a bid to convert geography into risk management. Kazakhstan struck a technocratic note. Kassym-Jomart Tokayev told the Assembly that “inclusive development in Afghanistan” is the basis for long-term regional peace and stability. This phrasing matches Almaty’s UN-backed hub for the Sustainable Development Goals and Astana’s self-image as the region’s administrative center. The goal is to stabilize the weakest link so trade and transit do not fracture. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov used part of his brief UN address to demand that roughly $9 billion in Afghan central-bank assets frozen in Western jurisdictions be returned to “the Afghan people,” and called isolation “unacceptable.” In a remittance-dependent economy like Kyrgyzstan’s, collapse next door risks hunger, displacement, and crime. His remarks were both moral and practical, and marked the sharpest public challenge to Western policy voiced by any Central Asian leader this week. Traditionally, Tajikistan has taken the hardest line on the Taliban. This time, Emomali Rahmon emphasized humanitarian assistance, citing drought-hit regions and areas devastated by the August 31 eastern Afghanistan earthquake, and said Dushanbe supports peace, stability, and socio-economic development next door. The quake killed more than 2,000 people and destroyed thousands of homes across Kunar, Nangarhar, and Laghman just as aid budgets were shrinking. Turkmenistan took a different approach. President Serdar Berdimuhamedov did not mention Afghanistan, instead promoting Ashgabat’s permanent neutrality as a proposed UN agenda item, “Neutrality for Peace and Security,” along with broad transport and energy initiatives. This approach preserved flexibility on projects like TAPI without committing to specifics in New York. What makes these speeches consequential is how closely they mirror work on the ground. The Trans-Afghan railway, long dismissed as only a plan, now has a political framework and a declared security pledge from Kabul. Whether it moves forward depends on both capital and security, but for Tashkent, a southern outlet to Pakistani ports is the difference between landlocked and land-linked. The Surkhan–Pul-i-Khumri line is more conventional and urgent: a 200-kilometer fix to keep the lights on and the revenues flowing. The long-troubled CASA-1000 power corridor is also inching back into view after being paused post-2021, with...

1 month ago

No Kremlin Needed: Peace Breaks Out in Post-Soviet Eurasia

Two decades ago, no border dispute in the former Soviet space was resolved without a Kremlin handshake. Moscow was the central mediator. Not anymore. In March 2025, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed a historic border agreement without Moscow at the table. Not long after, Armenia and Azerbaijan began finalizing a peace treaty of their own. Now there’s talk of the two leaders traveling to the White House to sign the deal. Russia is losing its position as a peace broker in its near abroad. For decades, Russia played the “big brother” and mediator, inserting itself into every conflict with the implicit message: nothing moves without Moscow. Today, we are witnessing a different pattern. Regional actors are no longer passive clients of Russian peace making. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan resolved a decades-long border dispute without outside pressure. Armenia and Azerbaijan, once frozen in a Kremlin-managed stalemate, are building a peace path with Western and regional partners instead. The Armenia–Azerbaijan Case: Peace Without Moscow Once the unchallenged mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Moscow now finds itself watching from the sidelines as Armenia and Azerbaijan step toward a historic peace deal. After the 2020 war and Azerbaijan’s decisive 2023 offensive that reabsorbed Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia was left exposed. Moscow, tied down in Ukraine and facing a credibility crisis, withdrew its peacekeepers from Karabakh in mid-2024. Yerevan, once loyal to Russia and the CSTO, found itself abandoned. The Kremlin neither enforced security guarantees nor deterred Azerbaijani advances. As public trust in Russia collapsed, Armenian leadership pivoted West. This vacuum opened the door for the U.S., and specifically Donald Trump, to step in. Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Abu Dhabi in July, brokered by Emirati and American intermediaries. The Trump administration has since accelerated the process, with reports of a draft treaty offering mutual recognition, demilitarization zones, and the establishment of a strategic corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan on a 100-year lease supervised by the U.S. This creative proposal, unimaginable under Russian mediation, has gained serious traction. If finalized at the White House, the agreement would represent the first U.S.-brokered peace deal in the post-Soviet space, a dramatic break with 30 years of Kremlin-led diplomacy. For the region, it’s a significant development: the Caucasus is no longer Russia’s to manage. Even more visible is Azerbaijan’s shift. Though long pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, Baku now leans heavily toward Turkey, Israel, and the Gulf. Talks are reportedly underway for Baku to join a version of the Abraham Accords, with support from Washington and Riyadh.  The Tajikistan–Kyrgyzstan Case: Local Solutions In March 2025, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed a final border delimitation agreement. It ended three decades of violence, and territorial ambiguity. The signing came without Kremlin mediation, a sharp departure from Cold War-era norms when Moscow acted as both arbiter and enforcer in Central Asia’s internal affairs. The shift didn’t happen overnight. After the bloody clashes of 2021 and 2022, Russia distanced itself from active mediation, with the Kremlin signaling as early as late 2022 that it had no...

3 months ago

Opinion: What Uzbekistan’s FIFA World Cup Breakthrough Tells Us About State-Building

When Uzbekistan's goalkeeper Utkir Yusupov made those crucial saves against the UAE last night, securing his country's first-ever FIFA World Cup qualification, he was putting the finishing touches to a decade-long story about how nations build capacity, and what happens when they finally get it right. Uzbekistan's journey to the 2026 World Cup is not just a sports story. Go deeper, and you'll find something more interesting: a case study in institutional development. The Numbers Don't Lie Consider what Uzbekistan has pulled off in recent years. At Rio 2016, the country won 13 Olympic medals, placing 21st globally. In Tokyo, they obtained three gold medals despite disruptions caused by the pandemic. Uzbekistan achieved its best-ever performance at the Paris Olympics, securing 13 medals (8 gold, 2 silver, and 3 bronze), placing them 13th overall in the medal standings, first among post-Soviet states, and fourth among Asian nations overall. But the real story is the systematic nature of their success. Seven of those 13 Rio medals came in boxing alone, with three golds. At the 2023 World Boxing Championships in Tashkent, Uzbek fighters received five gold medals, the tournament's best overall performance. Boxers also dominated the Paris Olympics, bringing five gold medals to the national team’s account. Uzbekistan’s youth football teams have been even more dominant: AFC U-23 champions in 2018, U-20 Asian Cup winners in 2023, and U-17 continental champions twice since 2012. This is not random. Big tournaments reward institutional capacity, not just individual talent. Success on this scale requires functional sports federations, coherent youth development systems, and the kind of long-term planning that only works when bureaucracies can actually implement policies rather than just announce them. Small Economy, Outsized Results What makes Uzbekistan's breakthrough particularly striking is the economic context. Uzbekistan is not Germany or Japan leveraging massive GDP advantages. Uzbekistan's sports budget doubled to roughly $230 million by 2025, serious money for the country, but pocket change compared to what traditional powers spend. Yet they're outperforming nations with far deeper pockets. Their junior teams dominate youth football rankings. Their boxers routinely defeat athletes from wealthier countries. That efficiency ratio, results per dollar invested, suggests something important is happening at the governance level. The government has built over a hundred new sports facilities while doubling coaches' salaries. President Mirziyoyev's Presidential Olympics program scouts talent across all regions, attracting the best prospects to national training centers. Athletes now receive meaningful incentives: houses, cars, and scholarships. This is a systematic investment with clear metrics and accountability. The Quiet Politics of Athletic Success Sports remain one of the few arenas where state effectiveness can reveal itself without the outsized intrusion of politics. You can't fake your way to consistent Olympic medals or sustained success in FIFA youth competitions. These achievements require multiple sectors - education, healthcare, and urban planning - to function in coordination. Uzbekistan's sporting surge coincides with broader signs of improved state capacity under Mirziyoyev's administration. The infrastructure investments are real. The youth development programs are producing measurable results....

5 months ago