Amu Darya - The Times Of Central Asia

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Qosh Tepa canal

Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism

In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin. The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda. Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks. One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects. [caption id="attachment_43173" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: TCATCA[/caption] A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management. In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates. The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement. Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources. First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image...

Northern Aral Sea Rescue Project

Astana Accelerates Northern Aral Sea Recovery Plan

The Kazakh government plans to accelerate the second phase of the project to restore the Northern Aral Sea. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov has instructed the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to secure financing for the second phase of the project by the end of 2026. The goal is to increase the volume of water in the Northern Aral Sea by around 10–11 billion cubic meters over the next four to five years. History of Degradation and Early Restoration Results The Aral Sea, which straddles the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, began to shrink rapidly in the 1960s due to large-scale irrigation projects that diverted water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for cotton cultivation and other agricultural needs. As a result of the sea’s degradation, the Northern Aral Sea separated in 1987 and has since been sustained largely through the construction of the Kokaral Dam. In 2012, the sea and the Syr Darya delta were added to the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance. Since then, Kazakhstan has undertaken systematic efforts to restore the northern part of the former Aral Sea. Unlike earlier efforts to save the Aral Sea as a whole, Kazakhstan’s approach since the mid-2000s has been shaped by a narrower and more pragmatic premise: that partial restoration is environmentally and politically achievable, while attempts to revive the entire basin are not. The construction of the Kokaral Dam marked a turning point, demonstrating that targeted hydraulic interventions could stabilise water levels, reduce salinity, and revive fisheries in the northern basin, provided expectations were kept within achievable limits. The recovery has already enabled the return of small-scale fishing, improved local livelihoods, and reduced dust storms from the exposed seabed around Aralsk. This strategy reflected a deliberate acceptance that restoring the Northern Aral would come at the expense of the southern basin, prioritising long-term ecological viability over symbolic ambitions. Over the past several years, roughly 5 billion cubic meters of water have been redirected into the Northern Aral Sea basin, increasing its total volume to more than 23 billion cubic meters. This exceeds the targets set out in Kazakhstan's Water Resources Management Concept, which had forecast reaching 20.6 billion cubic meters by 2025, with that volume previously expected only by 2029. [caption id="attachment_24691" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Tastubek Bay, Northern Aral Sea; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Infrastructure Plans and International Support With the support of the World Bank, Kazakhstan is considering raising the height of the Kokaral Dam by up to two meters and constructing a new hydraulic facility. These upgrades aim to increase both the volume and quality of water in the Northern Aral Sea, rehabilitate the Syr Darya delta, and reduce salt dispersion from the exposed seabed. The second phase of the initiative targets increasing the sea’s volume to 34 billion cubic meters. Bektenov has directed the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to finalize technical preparations by mid-2026 and secure financing by the end of the year, including through international partnerships. The second phase...

Water Shortages

Kazakhstan Warns of Severe Water Shortages as Syr Darya Levels Drop

Kazakhstan’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, gave a sober warning to the country on January 13 that this year there could be significantly less water for agriculture in the southern parts of the country. Nurzhigitov said that as of January 12, there was 1.9 billion cubic meters (bcm) less water in the reservoirs of southern Kazakhstan than on that date in 2025. The Importance of the Syr-Darya These areas are part of the Syr Darya Basin. The Syr Darya is one of Central Asia’s two large rivers, the other being the Amu Darya to the south, which runs along the Central Asia-Afghan border. Equally alarming for Kazakhstan, Nurzhigitov noted that in the mountains of upstream neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where the Syr Darya originates, officials are also reporting low levels in reservoirs. According to the Kazakh Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, the reservoirs in those two countries are a combined 3.2 bcm lower than last year at this time. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev said in November 2025 that the water level in the massive Toktogul reservoir was less than 11 bcm, nearly 2 bcm lower than in November 2024, and only at about 60% of its 19.5 bcm capacity. Water from the reservoir is released into the Naryn River, which eventually merges with the Syr Darya in Uzbekistan, and flows on further into Kazakhstan. The Toktogul hydropower plant (HPP) depends on that water to supply some 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s domestically-produced electricity, and Ibrayev called on Kyrgyzstan’s citizens to conserve electricity and help the water in Toktogul accumulate before the 2026 agriculture season. Tajikistan’s state power company, Barqi Tojik, also called in November for the country’s citizens to save electricity as the water level at the Nurek HPP’s reservoir was low. The Nurek reservoir uses water from the Vakhsh River that does not flow into the Syr Darya, but the water shortage problems at Nurek are similar throughout Tajikistan, including tributaries that do flow into the Syr Darya. Conservation and New Wells In Kazakhstan, Nurzhigitov said inspections and repairs of irrigation canals were currently underway. He also mentioned that in December, Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Bozumbayev had ordered officials in the Kyzylorda, Turkestan, and Zhambyl provinces to hold meetings with farmers and herders to discuss water conservation. There were also talks with farmers about planting crops that required less water. Water limits would be announced in February, Nurzhigitov said, and in March the Agriculture Ministry would decide how much land to sow for this year’s crops based on expected water supplies during the spring-summer period. Nurzhigitov added that work was being done to increase the use of underground water, which he claimed could amount to some 15.7 bcm of extra water for Kazakhstan annually. Currently, Nurzhigitov said, only some 7-10% of this underground water is being used. Bleak Forecast Kazakhstan gathered a record harvest in 2025, some 27.1 million tons of grain, despite planting less wheat. Given the reduction in precipitation in Central Asia in...

Water resources

Central Asian Countries Agree on 2026 Water Allocations from Amu Darya and Syr Darya

Central Asian states have reached an agreement on water allocations from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for 2026. The decision was made during the 91st meeting of the Interstate Coordination Water Management Commission (ICWC), held in Ashgabat on November 13, 2025, according to Kun.uz. At the meeting, the countries agreed on how water resources will be managed during the 2025–2026 non-growing season, the period when agricultural demand is low. For the Amu Darya, the total allocation from October 2025 to October 2026 is set at approximately 55.4 billion cubic meters, with 15.9 billion cubic meters designated for the cold months from October through April. Under the agreement, Tajikistan will receive 9.8 billion cubic meters, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will each receive 22 billion. A key provision is that roughly 44 billion cubic meters of the Amu Darya’s flow must reach the Kerki hydrological station in Turkmenistan to sustain downstream areas. Additionally, 4.2 billion cubic meters is allocated to support the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya delta, with half to be delivered in winter and early spring. Another 800 million cubic meters will be used for irrigation in Dashoguz, Khorezm, and Karakalpakstan. These allocations are crucial for both communities living in water-scarce regions and for preserving fragile river ecosystems. For the Syr Darya, the total allocation for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Of this, Uzbekistan will receive the majority share, 3.347 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the “Dustlik” canal, Tajikistan 365 million, and Kyrgyzstan 47 million. These figures are based on projected river inflows, reservoir capacities, and the need to maintain ecological flows. The ICWC also approved operational plans for key reservoirs. In Tajikistan, the Nurek Reservoir is expected to enter the non-growing season with 10.5 billion cubic meters and decline to around 9.7 billion by spring. The Tuyamuyun reservoir, located on the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan border, will start with 4.5 billion cubic meters and reduce to 3.4 billion. Both will gradually release water to support irrigation and sustain the Amu Darya’s flow. In the Syr Darya basin, total water volume in the Toktogul, Andijan, and Charvak reservoirs at the beginning of the season is approximately 10.6 billion cubic meters, slightly below average. Tajikistan’s Bahri Tojik reservoir is expected to contain 2.6 billion cubic meters, while Kazakhstan’s Chardara reservoir will hold about 1.65 billion. Collectively, the Syr Darya basin will have around 14.9 billion cubic meters of water at the start of winter, roughly 90% of the long-term seasonal average. The 92nd ICWC meeting is scheduled to take place in Dushanbe, where officials will assess reservoir performance and water usage during the 2025-2026 season. The agenda will also include strategies to strengthen regional water security in the face of escalating climate pressures.

afforestation

Planting Trees to Heal Old Wounds: Can a Desert Forest Save the Aral’s Last Residents?

In the Aralkum Desert, afforestation campaigns have multiplied since the early 2000s. They are meant to slow the sandstorms, temper a rapidly warming climate, and protect the health of those still living in the shadow of the Aral Sea. But the promised results have not appeared yet. The road from Aralsk to Aiteke Bi cuts through a palette of ochre and dust. Trucks drift forward in pale clouds, dragging the desert behind them like a long train. In these villages scattered along the former shoreline of the Aral Sea, the wind never leaves. It is abrasive, restless, and a witness to a vanished water body that once cooled the hottest corner of Kazakhstan. Respiratory diseases now run through family histories, and doctors say they can recognize lungs shaped by ecological collapse. At the polyclinic in Aiteke Bi, patients describe the same symptoms with weary precision: breath shortening too quickly, coughs that never fully recede, a fatigue that never seems to lift. Nuralay, 52, says the storms “get into the house, into the throat, into everything.” She admits she cannot remember a season without irritation in her chest. For Dr. Kuanyshqar Assilov, who has watched the pattern deepen for years, the cause is unmistakable: decades of airborne salts, pesticide residues, and industrial chemicals lifted from the dried seabed of the Aral Sea. [caption id="attachment_39897" align="aligncenter" width="1378"] In Aralsk, sand covers everything[/caption] Marat Narbaev, executive director of the International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS), recounts the disaster’s origins with a mixture of resignation and habit. He traces it back to the 1960s, when Soviet planners diverted the Amu Darya and Syr Darya to feed cotton monocultures. “The cotton was used to make clothing for soldiers and ammunition,” he says. Today, he argues, the basin faces two pressures: “climate change and demographic growth. Fifty million inhabitants… soon seventy.” In this landscape, the promise of restoring the region through afforestation has acquired symbolic weight. Saxaul trees - hardy, grey-green, capable of surviving in brackish soils - are planted by the millions on the exposed seabed. Officially, they are meant to stabilize sand, calm storms, and cool the surface. Unofficially, they carry the hope that life here might once be breathable again. Survivalist tree? On paper, the saxaul is a biological survivalist: roots plunging more than 30 feet deep, the ability to stabilize dunes, lower surface salinity, and grow dense enough within a few years to slow the wind. In Aralkum, a village east of Aralsk, residents praise the planting that lines a dozen houses. “It really worked, the storms became more bearable,” a man says. Then he shrugs: more trees should have been planted. “We asked for the other side of the village, but there’s no funding left.” Nowadays, half of the trees have died, and the rest lie buried beneath the dunes. [caption id="attachment_39896" align="aligncenter" width="1378"] In Aralkum village, half of the surviving trees barely emerge from the sand[/caption] Sometimes, past plantations have almost zero trees left. According to a 2021...

Regional integration

Opinion: The Integration of Afghanistan into Central Asia

Shared rivers and joint water management can shape a new regional partnership Central Asia and Afghanistan sit on the same rivers, yet often behave as if they belong to different regions. Water ties them together more firmly than any border, but the politics of the past have kept Afghanistan outside the regional system. Today, as climate pressures intensify and development accelerates on both sides of the Amu Darya, the case for integrating Afghanistan into Central Asia has never been stronger. And the path to that integration begins with water. The debate around the Qosh Tepa Canal makes this evident. Afghanistan was never part of the agreements that govern the Amu Darya River (Protocol 566 of the Soviet Union and the Almaty 1992 agreement). It did not sign allocation protocols and never joined regional basin institutions. Still, it was expected to follow rules it had no hand in shaping. Now, that old arrangement has reached its limit. The canal will bring new agriculture to the north of Afghanistan, but downstream states depend on the same river. The real question is not whether Afghanistan should develop, but how to shape that development jointly so the river can sustain all sides. Central Asia already has cooperative models that Afghanistan could join. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have shown how two neighbors can jointly manage a transboundary river through their collaboration in hydropower on the Zarafshan. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have signed a similar mechanism with the KambarAta-1 project, which will generate energy and regulate seasonal flows for downstream agriculture. These experiences show that once countries share responsibility for a river, trust can grow and benefits expand. Afghanistan can become part of this regional architecture. The 161-meter-high planned dam on the Kokcha River, set to generate 445 megawatts of electricity, offers a clear entry point. A jointly governed dam on this river would give Afghanistan energy, while downstream states would benefit from its flow in terms of agriculture. When operations are transparent and agreed upon, water becomes a field of cooperation rather than tension. Energy trade adds another layer of opportunity. Central Asia has a long record of exchanging electricity and gas in return for upstream releases. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have done this with Kyrgyzstan for many years through a joint water and energy agreement. The same model can work with Afghanistan. The country needs power, and it can offer coordinated water management in return. A structured energy for water arrangement would give Afghanistan an incentive to cooperate and offer Central Asia predictability. Agriculture is another arena where cooperation promises immediate gains. Uzbekistan’s policies on water-saving technologies offer a strong example. They subsidize drip, sprinkler systems, canal improvement, land levelling, efficient pumps, and even solar-powered irrigation. These investments reduce water losses while increasing yields only if their rebound effect, such as further expansion of agriculture, is controlled. The same approach could be applied in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, including in the area under the Qosh Tepa Canal. With similar financial support and technical guidance, Afghan...