Amu Darya - The Times Of Central Asia

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Water Security

Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing

Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is...

Eco Expo

Eco Expo Opens in Samarkand as Uzbekistan Pushes Green Investment

Eco Expo Central Asia 2026 opened on June 2 at the Expo Center of Silk Road Samarkand, placing Uzbekistan’s green economy plans before officials, lenders, companies, scientists, and environmental groups already gathered in the city. The exhibition is scheduled to run through June 4 and is being held alongside the Eighth Assembly of the Global Environment Facility, one of the main global forums for environmental finance. The timing gives Uzbekistan a rare week of attention on climate, water, biodiversity, and clean technology. The GEF Assembly runs from May 30 to June 6 in Samarkand. The GEF says its Assembly is its highest governing body, made up of 186 member countries, and meets once every four years. GEF Council meetings are scheduled from May 31 to June 3, before the formal Assembly sessions later in the week. Eco Expo has a more practical focus. Its exhibition sections include protected natural areas, clean technology, green construction, transport, and energy, sustainable agriculture, green finance and green cities, ecotourism, water-saving technologies, environmental education, artificial intelligence in ecology, and the Aral Sea region. The business program includes lectures, seminars, panels, and roundtables for registered visitors. Uzbekistan’s state news agency UzA has said that approximately 10,000 participants from Uzbekistan and abroad are expected. The exhibition will include more than 68 pavilions for environmental products, plus 20 pavilions for startup projects from Central Asian countries. Organizers also plan more than 50 forums, presentations, and discussion platforms on green energy, waste recycling, water resource management, and sustainable development. The exhibition - organized by Uzbekistan’s National Committee on Ecology and Climate Change with Business Congress Management - is designed to turn local environmental plans into fundable projects. Regions and districts across Uzbekistan have prepared proposals for donors and investors, covering climate adaptation, better use of natural resources, and practical steps to make local economies more resilient. For Uzbekistan, the meetings are a chance to move from broad pledges to project lists, budgets, and partners. Farms need more efficient irrigation; cities need cleaner transport and better waste systems; protected areas need long-term funding. The expo brings those needs into one room with development banks, UN agencies, foreign governments, and companies looking for green projects. The GEF meetings bring the process closer to the expo floor. The fund says it has provided more than $26 billion in financing over three decades, and has helped mobilize another $148 billion for country-led environmental projects. In Samarkand, the 71st GEF Council meeting opened ahead of the Assembly and Eco Expo. Its agenda includes biodiversity protection, sustainable infrastructure, renewable energy, energy storage, the GEF-9 programming strategy, and support for vulnerable countries. Uzbekistan already has a working portfolio with the GEF, which includes 13 projects worth $56 million and five more projects worth more than $30 million in the pipeline. The projects cover biodiversity, snow leopard protection, restoration of ecosystems in the Aral Sea region, climate resilience, land management, and waste management. The week arrives as Uzbekistan faces rising climate stress. The World Bank has described...

Water Security

Opinion: Water Without a Guarantor – Central Asia’s Next Security Test

The Fourth High-Level International Conference on the International Decade for Action, “Water for Sustainable Development,“ taking place in Dushanbe on May 25-28, comes at a difficult moment. Central Asia's water problem is no longer only about environmental management; it is moving into the field of regional security. The conference agenda is familiar and necessary: climate, investment, innovation, transboundary cooperation, and the implementation of the Water Action Decade. The harder question is what happens outside the conference hall. Does Central Asia still have a credible way to stop water stress from becoming an interstate crisis? For decades, the region operated in a post-Soviet setting in which Moscow shaped many security calculations, even though it was never a formal water arbiter. That setting has weakened. Russia has not disappeared from Central Asia, and it still retains military, economic, and institutional leverage. But since 2022, its role as the assumed external stabilizer has become less convincing. The result is not a simple vacuum. It is a more awkward reality: a region with many outside actors, but no trusted water-security guarantor. The Old Backdrop Is Weakening Central Asia's water system was built around a Soviet-era division of functions. Upstream republics, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, controlled the mountains, reservoirs, and hydropower potential. Downstream republics, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, depended on seasonal water flows for agriculture, food security, and social stability. The Soviet system managed those tensions through central planning. After independence, cooperation became more fragile. Water, energy, borders, electricity, and agriculture were separated into national strategies. The rivers, however, remained transboundary. For many years, Russia remained the largest external power around which regional security calculations were organized. That did not make Moscow an effective water manager, but it helped shape the political environment. Today, that environment has changed. The CSTO did not prevent the Kyrgyz-Tajik border escalations of recent years. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan eventually reached a border agreement through direct negotiation rather than outside enforcement. That difference is not academic. Water disputes are rarely settled by conferences alone. They need trusted channels for mediation, compensation, and restraint when pressure builds. Central Asia has plenty of statements about cooperation. It has fewer tools for managing coercion when water becomes scarce. Three Pressure Points The region's water-security stress is already visible in three places. The first is Afghanistan's Qosh-Tepa Canal. The canal draws water from the Amu Darya, a river system critical for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Because Afghanistan was not part of the old Soviet water-allocation arrangements, the Taliban government is creating a new upstream reality outside the inherited regional framework. Estimates of the canal's downstream impact vary widely. Some analyses suggest it could divert between 15 and 30% of the Amu Darya's flow, depending on the completion timeline, irrigation efficiency, and water-management practices. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that reduced Amu Darya flows could indirectly affect Kazakhstan if Uzbekistan compensates by drawing more heavily on the Syr Darya. Carnegie has described the Qosh-Tepa as a serious test for regional water cooperation. The second pressure point...

Water Scarcity

Opinion: As Water Runs Short, Uzbekistan Faces New Migration Pressure

In the 21st century, Uzbekistan is no longer just confronting an ecological crisis - it is on the verge of socio-political transformations driven by water. As agricultural lands are being degraded and river flows are decreasing, the country is now facing what experts describe as a “slow-onset disaster”: internal climate migration. The roots of this crisis go back to the tragedy of the Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth-largest lake, which has shrunk to roughly 10% of its original area since the 1960s largely due to Soviet-era irrigation projects. The human toll has been enormous: not only is agriculture in decline, but the lives of the people living in the Aral Sea region have been profoundly altered. Each year, storms lift an estimated 15 million to 75 million tons of sand, dust, and salt from the dried Aral seabed, spreading it across Uzbekistan and the wider region. Now, another challenge is looming - the water supply. In 2018, 79,942 internally displaced people were reported in Uzbekistan. The dwindling water supply and the threat to agro-ecosystems are creating a new generation of climate migrants. The number of climate-related displacements is expected to reach 200,000 in the coming years. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, Uzbekistan’s hydrological lifelines, are under growing strain from climate change, inefficient irrigation, and transboundary water-distribution pressures. Experts warn that the country's water deficit could reach 7 billion cubic meters by 2030, and 15 billion cubic meters by 2050. The World Bank predicts that Uzbekistan's economy could shrink by 10% by 2050 if no meaningful action is taken to adapt to climate change. Now, another new factor threatens to accelerate this trend. The Taliban government in Afghanistan is building the Qosh Tepa Canal, a 285-kilometer irrigation project that will divert water from the Amu Darya River. According to Rieks Bosch, an international expert on natural resources and economics, the canal will divert 20% of the Amu Darya's water, which will exacerbate water shortages in some parts of Uzbekistan and negatively affect agriculture. "In any case, Uzbekistan will definitely suffer," he said. Analyses show that up to 250,000 people could lose their jobs in agriculture as a result of water shortages. The most vulnerable regions - Bukhara, Khorezm, Karakalpakstan, Surkhandarya, and Kashkadarya - are located mainly in rural areas and depend on agriculture and livestock. With almost half of Uzbekistan’s population living outside urban centers, the loss of agricultural viability is not just an economic problem; it is the disruption of a way of life. “Water scarcity, air pollution, biodiversity loss, and a sharp decline in agricultural productivity are constantly increasing,” President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said at COP 28, acknowledging that these problems are “reaching their “critical peak.” Yet policy responses are still lagging behind the pace of environmental change. Uzbekistan’s climate migration problem cannot be solved by managing water resources alone. This requires a new strategic framework – a “Water-Migration-Security” strategy that combines regional cooperation, innovative water-saving technologies in agriculture, and proactive adaptation measures for the communities most at...

Qosh Tepa canal

Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation

Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again. Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation. [caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption] Our Fair Share The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries. In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia. When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades. “We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“ Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north. There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed. So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal. It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies. Turkmenistan did not send a...

Qosh Tepa canal

Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism

In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin. The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda. Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks. One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects. [caption id="attachment_43173" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: TCATCA[/caption] A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management. In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates. The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement. Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources. First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image...