• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10684 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 34

Opinion: As Water Runs Short, Uzbekistan Faces New Migration Pressure

In the 21st century, Uzbekistan is no longer just confronting an ecological crisis - it is on the verge of socio-political transformations driven by water. As agricultural lands are being degraded and river flows are decreasing, the country is now facing what experts describe as a “slow-onset disaster”: internal climate migration. The roots of this crisis go back to the tragedy of the Aral Sea, once the world’s fourth-largest lake, which has shrunk to roughly 10% of its original area since the 1960s largely due to Soviet-era irrigation projects. The human toll has been enormous: not only is agriculture in decline, but the lives of the people living in the Aral Sea region have been profoundly altered. Each year, storms lift an estimated 15 million to 75 million tons of sand, dust, and salt from the dried Aral seabed, spreading it across Uzbekistan and the wider region. Now, another challenge is looming - the water supply. In 2018, 79,942 internally displaced people were reported in Uzbekistan. The dwindling water supply and the threat to agro-ecosystems are creating a new generation of climate migrants. The number of climate-related displacements is expected to reach 200,000 in the coming years. The Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, Uzbekistan’s hydrological lifelines, are under growing strain from climate change, inefficient irrigation, and transboundary water-distribution pressures. Experts warn that the country's water deficit could reach 7 billion cubic meters by 2030, and 15 billion cubic meters by 2050. The World Bank predicts that Uzbekistan's economy could shrink by 10% by 2050 if no meaningful action is taken to adapt to climate change. Now, another new factor threatens to accelerate this trend. The Taliban government in Afghanistan is building the Qosh Tepa Canal, a 285-kilometer irrigation project that will divert water from the Amu Darya River. According to Rieks Bosch, an international expert on natural resources and economics, the canal will divert 20% of the Amu Darya's water, which will exacerbate water shortages in some parts of Uzbekistan and negatively affect agriculture. "In any case, Uzbekistan will definitely suffer," he said.  Analyses show that up to 250,000 people could lose their jobs in agriculture as a result of water shortages. The most vulnerable regions - Bukhara, Khorezm, Karakalpakstan, Surkhandarya, and Kashkadarya - are located mainly in rural areas and depend on agriculture and livestock. With almost half of Uzbekistan’s population living outside urban centers, the loss of agricultural viability is not just an economic problem; it is the disruption of a way of life. “Water scarcity, air pollution, biodiversity loss, and a sharp decline in agricultural productivity are constantly increasing,” President Shavkat Mirziyoyev said at COP 28, acknowledging that these problems are “reaching their “critical peak.” Yet policy responses are still lagging behind the pace of environmental change. Uzbekistan’s climate migration problem cannot be solved by managing water resources alone. This requires a new strategic framework – a “Water-Migration-Security” strategy that combines regional cooperation, innovative water-saving technologies in agriculture, and proactive adaptation measures for the communities most at...

Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation

Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again. Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation. [caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption] Our Fair Share The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries. In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia. When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades. “We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“ Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north. There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed. So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal. It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies. Turkmenistan did not send a...

Opinion – Qosh Tepa Canal: Transboundary Impacts Without a Transboundary Mechanism

In recent months, media attention has increasingly focused on infrastructure projects underway in Afghanistan. Chief among them is the Qosh Tepa Canal, widely seen not only as an irrigation initiative but as a development with significant transboundary implications for the Amu Darya River basin. The canal draws water from one of Central Asia’s most critical transboundary rivers. For downstream countries, primarily Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the Amu Darya is a vital water source, directly linked to agricultural output and the sustainability of rural communities. As such, the conversation surrounding Qosh Tepa extends well beyond Afghanistan’s domestic agenda. Concerns voiced by experts and analysts stem from both the scale of the project and the absence of an inclusive, basin-wide mechanism that includes Afghanistan, which is not a party to the main post-Soviet Amu Darya allocation frameworks. As a result, discussions regarding the canal’s potential impacts are taking place largely outside formal multilateral frameworks. One positive development is the increasing presentation of Qosh Tepa within a broader context, where water flow management is recognized as a factor shaping regional political and economic relations. However, these assessments often highlight not the canal’s stated purpose, but rather the absence of a sustainable mechanism for coordinating discussion of its cross-border effects. [caption id="attachment_43173" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: TCATCA[/caption] A recurring concern among experts is the lack of a structured multilateral platform that enables early-stage evaluation of such projects before they are perceived as risks. Infrastructure development in the region frequently outpaces the establishment of mechanisms for joint impact assessment and management. In this light, Kazakhstan’s initiative to establish a specialized structure within the UN system, the International Water Organization, acquires particular relevance. This proposal is not about building a theoretical global agenda but about addressing a specific institutional gap: the lack of a neutral forum for technical and expert discussion of transboundary water projects at an early stage. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently a unilateral infrastructure undertaking rather than the result of an international agreement, could serve as a test case for such a preventive mandate. While the project is already underway and its transboundary implications are actively being discussed among experts, it has not yet escalated into a regional dispute. This creates an opportunity for professional dialogue, without entanglement in political or status-related debates. The present situation can be summarized as one of “transboundary implications without a transboundary mechanism.” The project, while entirely within Afghan territory, objectively affects the interests of downstream states, yet it remains disconnected from any multilateral framework for consultation or agreement. Is it in Afghanistan’s interest to engage in multilateral formats? Though the question is often left unanswered, the answer is a clear “yes.” Such engagement would help dispel suspicion not only among Central Asian states, but also in Iran and Pakistan, both of which have voiced concerns over shared water resources. First, it would reduce negative external rhetoric. Currently, Qosh Tepa is largely discussed via external media with alarmist scenarios and with little to no Afghan participation. This reinforces the image...

Astana Accelerates Northern Aral Sea Recovery Plan

The Kazakh government plans to accelerate the second phase of the project to restore the Northern Aral Sea. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov has instructed the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to secure financing for the second phase of the project by the end of 2026. The goal is to increase the volume of water in the Northern Aral Sea by around 10–11 billion cubic meters over the next four to five years. History of Degradation and Early Restoration Results The Aral Sea, which straddles the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, began to shrink rapidly in the 1960s due to large-scale irrigation projects that diverted water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for cotton cultivation and other agricultural needs. As a result of the sea’s degradation, the Northern Aral Sea separated in 1987 and has since been sustained largely through the construction of the Kokaral Dam. In 2012, the sea and the Syr Darya delta were added to the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance. Since then, Kazakhstan has undertaken systematic efforts to restore the northern part of the former Aral Sea. Unlike earlier efforts to save the Aral Sea as a whole, Kazakhstan’s approach since the mid-2000s has been shaped by a narrower and more pragmatic premise: that partial restoration is environmentally and politically achievable, while attempts to revive the entire basin are not. The construction of the Kokaral Dam marked a turning point, demonstrating that targeted hydraulic interventions could stabilise water levels, reduce salinity, and revive fisheries in the northern basin, provided expectations were kept within achievable limits. The recovery has already enabled the return of small-scale fishing, improved local livelihoods, and reduced dust storms from the exposed seabed around Aralsk. This strategy reflected a deliberate acceptance that restoring the Northern Aral would come at the expense of the southern basin, prioritising long-term ecological viability over symbolic ambitions. Over the past several years, roughly 5 billion cubic meters of water have been redirected into the Northern Aral Sea basin, increasing its total volume to more than 23 billion cubic meters. This exceeds the targets set out in Kazakhstan's Water Resources Management Concept, which had forecast reaching 20.6 billion cubic meters by 2025, with that volume previously expected only by 2029. [caption id="attachment_24691" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Tastubek Bay, Northern Aral Sea; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Infrastructure Plans and International Support With the support of the World Bank, Kazakhstan is considering raising the height of the Kokaral Dam by up to two meters and constructing a new hydraulic facility. These upgrades aim to increase both the volume and quality of water in the Northern Aral Sea, rehabilitate the Syr Darya delta, and reduce salt dispersion from the exposed seabed. The second phase of the initiative targets increasing the sea’s volume to 34 billion cubic meters. Bektenov has directed the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation to finalize technical preparations by mid-2026 and secure financing by the end of the year, including through international partnerships. The second phase...

Kazakhstan Warns of Severe Water Shortages as Syr Darya Levels Drop

Kazakhstan’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, gave a sober warning to the country on January 13 that this year there could be significantly less water for agriculture in the southern parts of the country. Nurzhigitov said that as of January 12, there was 1.9 billion cubic meters (bcm) less water in the reservoirs of southern Kazakhstan than on that date in 2025. The Importance of the Syr-Darya These areas are part of the Syr Darya Basin. The Syr Darya is one of Central Asia’s two large rivers, the other being the Amu Darya to the south, which runs along the Central Asia-Afghan border. Equally alarming for Kazakhstan, Nurzhigitov noted that in the mountains of upstream neighboring countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where the Syr Darya originates, officials are also reporting low levels in reservoirs. According to the Kazakh Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, the reservoirs in those two countries are a combined 3.2 bcm lower than last year at this time. Kyrgyzstan’s Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev said in November 2025 that the water level in the massive Toktogul reservoir was less than 11 bcm, nearly 2 bcm lower than in November 2024, and only at about 60% of its 19.5 bcm capacity. Water from the reservoir is released into the Naryn River, which eventually merges with the Syr Darya in Uzbekistan, and flows on further into Kazakhstan. The Toktogul hydropower plant (HPP) depends on that water to supply some 40% of Kyrgyzstan’s domestically-produced electricity, and Ibrayev called on Kyrgyzstan’s citizens to conserve electricity and help the water in Toktogul accumulate before the 2026 agriculture season. Tajikistan’s state power company, Barqi Tojik, also called in November for the country’s citizens to save electricity as the water level at the Nurek HPP’s reservoir was low. The Nurek reservoir uses water from the Vakhsh River that does not flow into the Syr Darya, but the water shortage problems at Nurek are similar throughout Tajikistan, including tributaries that do flow into the Syr Darya. Conservation and New Wells In Kazakhstan, Nurzhigitov said inspections and repairs of irrigation canals were currently underway. He also mentioned that in December, Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Bozumbayev had ordered officials in the Kyzylorda, Turkestan, and Zhambyl provinces to hold meetings with farmers and herders to discuss water conservation. There were also talks with farmers about planting crops that required less water. Water limits would be announced in February, Nurzhigitov said, and in March the Agriculture Ministry would decide how much land to sow for this year’s crops based on expected water supplies during the spring-summer period. Nurzhigitov added that work was being done to increase the use of underground water, which he claimed could amount to some 15.7 bcm of extra water for Kazakhstan annually. Currently, Nurzhigitov said, only some 7-10% of this underground water is being used. Bleak Forecast Kazakhstan gathered a record harvest in 2025, some 27.1 million tons of grain, despite planting less wheat. Given the reduction in precipitation in Central Asia in...

Central Asian Countries Agree on 2026 Water Allocations from Amu Darya and Syr Darya

Central Asian states have reached an agreement on water allocations from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers for 2026. The decision was made during the 91st meeting of the Interstate Coordination Water Management Commission (ICWC), held in Ashgabat on November 13, 2025, according to Kun.uz. At the meeting, the countries agreed on how water resources will be managed during the 2025–2026 non-growing season, the period when agricultural demand is low. For the Amu Darya, the total allocation from October 2025 to October 2026 is set at approximately 55.4 billion cubic meters, with 15.9 billion cubic meters designated for the cold months from October through April. Under the agreement, Tajikistan will receive 9.8 billion cubic meters, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan will each receive 22 billion. A key provision is that roughly 44 billion cubic meters of the Amu Darya’s flow must reach the Kerki hydrological station in Turkmenistan to sustain downstream areas. Additionally, 4.2 billion cubic meters is allocated to support the Aral Sea and the Amu Darya delta, with half to be delivered in winter and early spring. Another 800 million cubic meters will be used for irrigation in Dashoguz, Khorezm, and Karakalpakstan. These allocations are crucial for both communities living in water-scarce regions and for preserving fragile river ecosystems. For the Syr Darya, the total allocation for the non-growing season is 4.219 billion cubic meters. Of this, Uzbekistan will receive the majority share, 3.347 billion cubic meters. Kazakhstan will receive 460 million cubic meters through the “Dustlik” canal, Tajikistan 365 million, and Kyrgyzstan 47 million. These figures are based on projected river inflows, reservoir capacities, and the need to maintain ecological flows. The ICWC also approved operational plans for key reservoirs. In Tajikistan, the Nurek Reservoir is expected to enter the non-growing season with 10.5 billion cubic meters and decline to around 9.7 billion by spring. The Tuyamuyun reservoir, located on the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan border, will start with 4.5 billion cubic meters and reduce to 3.4 billion. Both will gradually release water to support irrigation and sustain the Amu Darya’s flow. In the Syr Darya basin, total water volume in the Toktogul, Andijan, and Charvak reservoirs at the beginning of the season is approximately 10.6 billion cubic meters, slightly below average. Tajikistan’s Bahri Tojik reservoir is expected to contain 2.6 billion cubic meters, while Kazakhstan’s Chardara reservoir will hold about 1.65 billion. Collectively, the Syr Darya basin will have around 14.9 billion cubic meters of water at the start of winter, roughly 90% of the long-term seasonal average. The 92nd ICWC meeting is scheduled to take place in Dushanbe, where officials will assess reservoir performance and water usage during the 2025-2026 season. The agenda will also include strategies to strengthen regional water security in the face of escalating climate pressures.