Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle East Crisis

Hormuz Crisis: Transit Routes Through Afghanistan, Pakistan Would Be an Opportunity for Central Asia

The Strait of Hormuz has long been regarded as a central artery of global energy trade. A substantial share of oil and gas exports moves through this corridor, and regional crises are often framed in terms of energy security. For Central Asia, however, current tensions carry broader implications. They may increase demand for alternative food supply chains and transit routes linking the region to the Arabian Sea and Gulf markets. Recent tensions involving Iran also point to the strait’s growing role in food logistics. For Gulf states, Hormuz remains an energy chokepoint and a vital route for essential goods. For Central Asian policymakers, this shift matters. Any prolonged disruption could raise the region’s importance as both a supplier of agricultural commodities and a transit hub. Member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are among the world’s most import-dependent food markets. According to Reuters, between 80% and 90% of food consumed in GCC countries is imported. This reliance creates external demand that could increasingly draw Central Asia into Gulf food security planning. At the same time, the geography of these supplies remains relatively concentrated. Analysts estimate that more than 70% of the region’s food imports transit the Strait of Hormuz. This pattern could heighten interest in Central Asia as a source of food exports and a transit route. Amid ongoing regional tensions, this dependence has attracted growing attention from experts. Reuters described recent developments as “the greatest test of the Gulf countries’ food strategy since the 2008 global food crisis.” In recent years, regional governments have sought to diversify suppliers and build strategic reserves. Analysts nevertheless warn that stockpiles and diversification measures may provide only limited protection. If disruptions persist, logistical constraints could drive up prices and extend delivery times. This would create both a market shock and new commercial opportunities in Central Asia. Under such conditions, GCC food security depends on access to global markets as well as the resilience of transport routes. This is where Gulf vulnerabilities begin to intersect more directly with Central Asia’s economic geography. The infrastructure of major regional ports plays a central role in this system. One of the key logistics hubs is Jebel Ali Port in Dubai, the largest container port in the Middle East and a major re-export center. A substantial share of food shipments destined for GCC states and neighboring markets passes through this facility. Estimates suggest that disruptions at major logistics hubs such as Jebel Ali could affect supply chains on which tens of millions of people depend. This concentration of logistics flows increases the region’s strategic exposure to maritime instability. For Central Asian economies, this raises the strategic value of diversified overland and multimodal routes. Food security concerns are also linked to agricultural inputs. Industry analyses suggest that roughly 25–30% of global nitrogen fertilizer exports transit the Strait of Hormuz, including about 31% of global urea trade. During the initial weeks of heightened tensions, urea prices in Middle Eastern markets reportedly rose by about $70–80 per ton, from roughly...

Afghanistan

From Electricity to Fuel, Central Asia is Doing More Business with Afghanistan

Central Asia is becoming even more important to Afghanistan. After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most of the countries of Central Asia established a dialogue with its leadership that focused on business potential, backed up by security promises. This understanding is more important than ever to the Taliban government, as events along Afghanistan’s eastern and western borders have left Central Asia as the only reliable import-export route for Afghanistan at the moment. Booming Trade At the start of March, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce released figures for 2025 that showed trade with Central Asia increased from $1.79 billion in 2024 to $2.4 billion in 2025. While most of the trade is exports from Central Asia to Afghanistan, reports mentioned that Afghan exports to Central Asia -- mostly to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan -- increased by 77 percent, from $122 million in 2024 to $216 million in 2025. A closer look shows that Uzbekistan-Afghanistan trade in 2025 totaled some $1.6 billion. A full figure for Kazakh-Afghan trade in 2025 is not yet available. However, trade between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan amounted to some $525.2 million in 2024. Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhamangarin said at a Kazakh-Afghan business forum in Kazakhstan’s southern city of Shymkent in October 2025 that bilateral trade in the first eight months of 2025 had reached some $335.9 million. These figures are certain to have grown. Fresh agreements worth more than $360 million were signed on the sidelines of the Kazakh-Afghan business forum. On March 6, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a decree ratifying the Preferential Trade Agreement between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Trade totals for Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan with Afghanistan are more modest, but, as in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are set to grow. Kyrgyz-Afghan trade for the 12 months to March 2025 came to some $66 million, but, during a Kyrgyz-Afghan business conference in Kabul commercial contracts worth some $157 million were signed. There are no figures for Turkmen-Afghan trade in 2025, but Turkmen electricity exports to Afghanistan are increasing. Turkmenistan is also preparing to export natural gas to Afghanistan. A natural gas pipeline is slowly being constructed from the Turkmen border to the western Afghan city of Herat, which could start operation as soon as 2027. Tajikistan was the lone Central Asian country to shun contact with the Taliban after they returned to power. Representatives of the previous government of Ashraf Ghani continue to occupy the Afghan embassy in Dushanbe. Tajik and Taliban authorities finally established contacts only in late 2024 but even to this day the two sides rarely meet face-to-face. However, Tajik-Afghan trade in 2025 still totaled some $120 million. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce noted that most of Central Asia’s exports to Afghanistan are electricity, fuel products, and natural gas. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan export electricity to Afghanistan via transmission lines that were built during the 20 years the Taliban were out of power. Some 80 percent of Afghanistan’s electricity is imported, and most of that (75-80 percent) comes...

Iran

Central Asia Faces an Arc of Instability to the South

Until a few weeks ago, looking south from Central Asia, observers of the region saw nothing but opportunities for connectivity. Admittedly, Iran on one side and the area between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the other have never been known for their stability. However, the current situation sees two serious conflicts on the southern border of Central Asia, which risk representing an arc of instability that will be difficult to overcome. While the global energy implications of the ongoing war in the Middle East, which began following the joint attack by the United States and Israel on Iran, are likely to be felt for months to come, the greatest risk for the Central Asian region is related to connectivity. This could also compromise significant efforts made in this regard by regional governments. Consider, for example, the recent trip to Pakistan by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, which focused on the possibility of building a railway from Pakistani ports to Kazakh territory via Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. For much of the past decade, Central Asian governments have invested heavily in opening southern trade routes to global markets. Railways through Afghanistan, port access through Iran, and new logistics corridors to Pakistan were meant to reduce dependence on northern routes and expand the region’s economic options. The sudden emergence of conflicts along the southern frontier now raises questions about how secure those connections will be. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Peter Frankopan, author and Professor of Global History at Oxford University, about the potential implications of the two wars on Central Asia’s southern border. According to him, the main risk is not related to connectivity, but to contagion: “The key issue is about the safety of civilians and the protection of infrastructure in Central Asia,” he told TCA. “In times like these, nothing can be ruled out. With Iran lashing out at neighbors and realizing that attacks on oil, gas and more give it leverage, it is not hard to see what might come next. Second, of course, are threats to national economies. Wars create winners and losers. One can see a boom for some people in Central Asian states, but plenty of pressures, especially on inflation.” Indeed, the economic repercussions of the Middle East conflict are already being felt in the region, particularly in Turkmenistan, which maintains some of the closest trade ties with Iran and shares a long border with the country. Frankopan does not see any particular differences in terms of the danger to Central Asia posed by what is happening in Iran and between Pakistan and Afghanistan: “Clearly, instability in Afghanistan is an immediate concern, but it is not related to Iran and will have its own velocity and rhythms. But the risks of expanding violence and terrorism, of refugees, of narcotics and other illicit trafficking are real - and may well get worse.” Regarding connectivity, one of the topics that Central Asian governments pay the most attention to, according to Frankopan, the current situation should not be considered an...

Geopolitics

Soft Power in Times of Geopolitical Turbulence: Kazakhstan’s Strategy as a Middle Power

For Kazakhstan, deeply embedded in global supply chains and international investment flows, soft power is evolving from an image-building asset into a strategic instrument of resilience. In an era of globalization, when even geographically distant conflicts can directly threaten national infrastructure and economic security, Astana’s ability to leverage institutional initiatives and investment interdependence as a form of diplomatic protection has become a decisive advantage. Over the long term, stability tends to characterize states whose infrastructure and economic interests are deeply interconnected with those of major global centers of power. A middle power and rational diplomacy Kazakhstan’s status as a middle power is not a matter of ambition, but a deliberate choice in favor of rational diplomacy, where flexibility and institutional engagement serve as key resources. Multilateral dialogue with the U.S., Russia, China, the EU, Turkey, and countries of the Middle East is being developed not as situational maneuvering but as a core strategy for minimizing external risks and preserving sovereignty. It is precisely the combination of proactive soft power, political neutrality, and economic openness that allows Kazakhstan to transform geopolitical turbulence into a strategic advantage, positioning the country as an indispensable hub of international stability. Ultimately, the rational diplomacy of a middle power transforms the country’s geographical position from a potential zone of conflict into a platform for dialogue, where pragmatism and institutional mediation become the principal guarantees of national sovereignty. The Ukrainian case: infrastructure protection as an element of soft power Developments surrounding Russia's war in Ukraine illustrate how Kazakhstan’s soft power can function as a form of economic protection. The attacks on infrastructure in the Novorossiysk area, through which the Caspian Pipeline Consortium exports oil, highlighted a distinctive mechanism for safeguarding national interests through investment interdependence. Strikes near the Black Sea hub posed a direct threat not only to logistics but also to the assets of major American investors in Kazakh energy projects, including Tengiz. According to reports cited in public discussions, the U.S. urged Ukraine to take into account the interests of American investors in Kazakhstan. If confirmed, such a step would represent an important precedent: even amid an intense military conflict, global actors remain attentive to protecting the economic interests tied to Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. For Astana, this episode illustrates how decades of building strategic relations with Western partners have created a significant layer of economic security. In this context, soft power manifests itself as a form of “investment protection,” discouraging actions that could damage oil production or transport infrastructure linked to global stakeholders. Institutionalizing neutrality: why Kazakhstan needs a Board of Peace The creation of the Board of Peace by U.S. President Donald Trump and Kazakhstan’s active participation signals Kazakhstan’s transition from ad hoc mediation toward a more structured institutional architecture of soft power. The signing of the Board of Peace Charter by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev formally embeds peacebuilding activities within the state’s foreign policy framework. Kazakhstan’s developing participation in this initiative is also linked to its experience hosting the Congress of Leaders of World...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Afghanistan

Three Main Principles of Kazakhstan’s Afghan Policy

August 15, 2026 will mark five years since the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan. This substantial period can be assessed in different ways, particularly given the widespread skepticism at the outset regarding the Taliban’s ability to govern effectively and build relations with other countries. The situation in Afghanistan remains complex and multifaceted, with diverging trends. On the one hand, the current Afghan leadership faces a wide range of internal challenges, primarily socio-economic. After the Taliban’s return to power, humanitarian assistance declined sharply. For many years, two-thirds of Afghanistan’s budget had been financed through foreign aid, and its reduction has significantly affected the social conditions of ordinary Afghans. According to the United Nations, only one-third of the $2.4 billion humanitarian response plan required for 2025 has been funded. Over 21 million Afghans require humanitarian assistance. The economic situation has been further complicated by the deteriorating humanitarian environment, largely due to the deportation of millions of Afghan refugees from Iran and Pakistan this year. In total, around 4.5 million Afghans have returned since 2023, primarily through deportations from Iran and Pakistan, resulting in a 10% population increase. Other pressing social issues remain. Several countries continue to focus on security and terrorist threats, as well as government inclusiveness and the rights of women and girls, particularly their access to employment and education. At the same time, nearly five years into Taliban rule, the anticipated “economic and political collapse” has not materialized. The national budget is gradually increasing, and small and medium-sized enterprises are emerging. Industrial parks aimed at developing domestic production have appeared in major cities such as Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Herat. Since 2023, relative macroeconomic stabilization has been observed, although growth rates remain insufficient to offset demographic pressures and reduce poverty. The World Bank forecasts Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth at 4.3% in 2025, with inflation projected to remain low at approximately 2%. According to the United Nations, the area under opium poppy cultivation has declined by 95% during the years of Taliban rule. At the same time, synthetic drug production has reportedly increased, reflecting trends observed in many other countries. Politically, the Taliban maintains consolidated control over most of the country. In other words, a more stable, albeit fragile, reality has emerged, one that Central Asian countries must engage with on a daily basis. Kazakhstan has adopted a pragmatic approach. Its policy toward Afghanistan is based on a model of “pragmatic engagement without recognition,” while developing an independent system of transport, energy, and humanitarian ties with the country. Kazakhstan’s decision to remove the Taliban from its list of banned organizations does not signify a departure from international law nor does it constitute automatic recognition of the current Afghan authorities. On the issue of formal recognition, Kazakhstan relies on decisions of the UN Security Council. From a foreign policy perspective, this step forms part of a broader strategy: Kazakhstan is adapting its instruments to a changed reality while remaining within international norms and avoiding symbolic gestures that could be interpreted as...