• KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01126 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00226 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09158 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 898

Without Security, There Can Be No Development in Afghanistan

Indian author Arundhati Roy once said, “Either way, change will come. It could be bloody, or it could be beautiful. It depends on us.” Almost three years after Taliban’s resurgence to power in Afghanistan, there are practically no developments to highlight in its relations with the outside world. The situation remains at a dead end as the international community and the authorities in Kabul are stuck on intransigent issues, and as Afghanistan continues to face a humanitarian crisis. In the context of current geopolitical realities after the recent fall of its “democratic” regime, Afghanistan finds itself in a gap between the experiences of the past and a yet undetermined future. It has a unique opportunity to transcend its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” and determine its own fate while simultaneously integrating into the international community. How the de facto authorities in Afghanistan handle this opportunity will not only shape the future of the Afghan people and the region, but also influence the development of the entire global security paradigm. Currently, the Taliban have every opportunity to lay the foundation for a new model of regional and international security, which would allow them to create conditions for the return of Afghanistan to the system of normal international relations. But they need to act quickly. Rising tensions in the Middle East engage almost every global and regional power, and further escalation there will negatively affect the situation around Afghanistan. In this unpredictable geopolitical environment, the Taliban can either take the lead on new security arrangements or once again experience an undesirable worsening of the security situation that goes beyond their control.   A path forward is possible with the Taliban acting responsibly at the helm It seems that since the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century, the world has become accustomed to seeing Afghanistan as a place where global geopolitical steam can be let off. But the Afghan people deserve progress, and various outside actors have offered different proposals. What the Taliban need is a chance at a breakthrough where they are the key player and can take full responsibility. The international community needs to allow such an opportunity to serve as a “maturity test” with which it can gauge the Taliban. At this important juncture, the international community must support Afghanistan in determining its own future. If external actors continue to promote political blueprints, Afghanistan will once again become a site for proxy wars, an arena of rivalry and a fertile ground for old narratives about international terrorism and other threats. Slamming the Taliban for their democratic failings, on which they clearly do not share the outsiders’ perspectives, will not yield productive results. For its part, if Kabul is really seeking to be a key player in Asia and a regular participant in international affairs, and if it seeks to realize its significant geographic and economic potential, then it must start implementing practical initiatives involving regional countries and international organizations in a dialogue on security. Maintaining internal security and stability...

Kazakhstan and the Taliban Discuss Transport Links

Members of Kazakhstan's government and representatives of the Taliban have discussed expanding transportation links between Astana and Kabul, according to the Kazakh government's press service. The Kazakh side has said it's ready to participate in projects to develop the Trans-Afghan corridor: the construction of the railroad routes Termez - Mazar-e-Sharif - Kabul - Peshawar and Herat - Kandahar - Spin - Buldak. The projects, say Kazakh officials, will make it possible to reduce the cargo-transit time between the countries of the region almost 90%, as well as reducing the costs. Kazakhstan is ready to participate in the construction of a Trans-Afghan highway by supplying sleepers and fasteners to Afghanistan. Representatives of the national rail carrier Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, or KTZ, spoke about the new cargo delivery route. "Today we launched a pilot project to organize a new multimodal export route from Kazakhstan through Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and further by sea to the port of Jebel Ali in the UAE. The new route is organized with the participation of KTZ Express. The exporter is Kazakhstan's Bio Synergy, and the shipping partner is Pakistan's National Logistics Cell (NLC). The loading of cargo has already started in Pavlodar region. That cargo is aluminosilicate hollow microsphere. In Almaty, the cargo will be reloaded into containers and transferred to the cars of the Pakistani partner. From there by motor transport it will pass through Uzbekistan and Afghanistan to the port of Karachi in Pakistan. From there, two containers will be sent by sea to the port of Jebel Ali in the UAE," commented KTZ's managing director Bauyrzhan Urynbasarov. The parties also discussed the possibility of arranging more flights between the countries. Under earlier agreements, air carriers from Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have the right to perform three regular passenger/cargo flights per week. Kazakhstan is ready to consider accepting more flights from Afghan airlines. Over the past three years the volume of exports from Kazakhstan to Afghanistan has been steadily growing. In 2023, the volume of transportation by rail amounted to 2.7 million tons, of which 1.5 million tons was flour and grain. In December 2023 Kazakhstan removed the Taliban from its list of banned organizations. According to the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Taliban was no longer classed as a banned organization "in accordance with the practice of the UN [United Nations]."

The Taliban and its Neighbors: An Outsider’s Perspective

This is part two of a piece of which part one was published here. The topic of a regional approach to solving Afghanistan's problems is increasingly being discussed in various expert and diplomatic circles. The International Crisis Group (ICG), a reputable think tank whose opinion is extremely interesting as part of an "insider vs outsider" set of viewpoints, writes about this in particular. A report from ICG entitled "Taliban's Neighbors: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan" is one of the first works to summarize the role and place of the region as regards the situation around Afghanistan. In the voluminous work, the authors touch upon almost all aspects - issues of diplomatic recognition, security, terrorist activity, trade and economic relations within the region, water issues and others. In their conclusions, ICG analysts point out that many steps towards regional cooperation aren't related to Western donors, but European countries should nevertheless be interested. Europeans in particular would benefit from a stable, self-sufficient region that isn't a major source of illegal drugs, migrants or terrorism. But sanctions and other Western measures designed to show disapproval of the Taliban are obstacles to a more functional relationship between Kabul and the countries of the region. Significant progress depends on Western support - or at least tacit acquiescence. While such practical steps need not lead to  recognition of the Taliban regime, they will contribute to regional peace and security. However, experts are concerned that the emerging regional consensus is directly dependent on security and stability issues in Afghanistan - if regional neighbors feel that the government cannot restore order within Afghanistan's borders and contain transnational threats, the consensus may well collapse. If that happens, regional countries may be tempted to choose sides in another intra-Afghan civil conflict, repeating the destructive pattern of past decades. At the same time, experts believe that the first step toward improving regional security cooperation would be to cool down the rhetoric on all sides and get regional players to agree on security issues, even if they have different priorities. Security information sharing within the region also suffers because the Taliban have yet to build a trusted dialog. They lack credibility because of their complete denial of certain threats. Meanwhile, countries in the region and the world are guided by inflated estimates of militant numbers. The ICG's assessments of the security threats posed by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) are broadly in line with the consensus - in some ways, the growing concern about ISKP is paradoxical due to the fact that the overall level of violence associated with the group has declined over the past two years. The question of whether ISKP could become a more potent transnational threat in the future remains open. So far, its operations outside of its original territory near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have been limited. On the other hand, ISKP continues to attract recruits from different parts of Central and South Asia and encourages attacks outside Afghanistan - arguably making it the most dangerous armed group in...

Poor-Quality Gasoline Refused by Taliban Doesn’t Belong to Uzbekistan

The Customs Committee of Uzbekistan denied that gasoline returned by the Taliban due to its poor quality in fact belongs to Uzbekistan, according to a post on the committee's Telegram channel. The Times of Central Asia has reported that the Taliban returned 120,000 liters of gasoline imported via the Hayraton border point to Uzbekistan due to its poor quality. It has been reported that the returned oil products didn't originate in Uzbekistan. On the contrary, 120 tons of gasoline loaded in two tanker trucks were sent to Afghanistan from Russia and moved through the territory of Uzbekistan only in transit mode. On February 7, these tankers left for Afghanistan through the Ayritom station in Surkhandarya, Uzbekistan. These oil products returned by Afghanistan entered Uzbekistan on April 6 through the Ayritom station. Also, the Customs Committee asked certain mass media operating in the country not to distribute unverified, one-sided, unconfirmed information. “At this point, we ask the mass media to study carefully before disseminating such information, taking into account the friendly relations between the two countries,” the Customs Committee report said.

Islamic State – Khorasan Province: An Element of Geopolitical Rivalry?

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Moscow, the media has once again been saturated with discussions about the terrorist group Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), also known as ISIS-Khorasan and “Wilayat Khorasan.” At this point, most of the coverage has focused on the Afghan wing of Islamic State, and not its other “wilayats,” such as on the Arabian Peninsula, “Wilayat Sinai” (Islamic State – Sinai Province) or “Wilayat Caucasus” (Islamic State – Caucasus Province). The international media covering the ISKP attack in Moscow, including journalists from Russia, widely speculated that the terrorist group is looking at Central Asia as its next base. Such media coverage included a variety of sentiments indicating that Central Asia should be worried. Reports have suggested that the alliance of Central Asian leaders with Moscow makes them look weak in the eyes of ISKP and that the terrorist threat emanating from Central Asia has become a point of weakness for the Putin regime. It has also been suggested that Islamic terrorism in Central Asia remains a real problem for the FSB, and even though the FSB has extensive experience in fighting extremists in the Caucasus, having committed enormous resources to the issue, Central Asia is a blind spot. Alarm bells sounded that regional jihadist groups have become more powerful. Thus, the terrorist attack in Moscow significantly increased media attention on ISKP in the context of Central Asia. Overall, the ISKP theme fits into existing narratives regarding threats to the southern border of the CIS. Sanaullah Ghafari, Emir of ISIS-K; image: rewardsforjustice.net   The more likely reality is that in Central Asia, ISKP has been more of a challenge to regional security than an existential threat. In recent years, the region has been broadly successful in dealing with threats from Afghanistan.   How real of a threat is the ISKP? A very narrow circle of experts can give a truly objective assessment of ISKP. Information about ISKP membership is contradictory and seemingly based on political considerations. As such, it is difficult to back these up with statistics. The number of fighters reported vary greatly from 2,000 to several tens of thousands. What remains indisputable are two facts: 1. Despite measures declared by the Taliban to eliminate the ISKP, terrorist acts by the group are still recorded throughout Afghanistan, and 2. The group lacks a serious infrastructure in Afghanistan. The activity of ISKP in Afghanistan consists of carrying out targeted, low-level terrorist acts, mainly against local Hazara Shiites. Based on the assessments of the UN Afghanistan monitoring team, the potential of ISKP success looks dubious. In its reports, UN experts point to a decrease in ISKP activity in Afghanistan. Recently, the UN has avoided estimating the size of the group, but previous estimates put it at 1,500-2,200 fighters. At the same time, according to a UN report in January, “ISKP adopted a more inclusive recruitment strategy, including by focusing on attracting disillusioned Taliban and foreign fighters.” Taliban officials, meanwhile, tend to play down the situation....

Taliban Returns 120,000 Liters of Uzbek Oil Products Over Low-Quality

The National Department of Standards of Afghanistan has reported that it returned two tanker trucks worth of oil products with a volume of 120,000 liters from the port of Hairatan back to Uzbekistan. According to Radio Television of Afghanistan (RTA) English, the reason for this was the low quality of the imported refined products. Furthermore, the National Administration of Standards sent back another 19 oil tankers from Sheikh Abu Nasr Farahi Port to Iran over their low-quality. The standards board once again asked Afghan businessmen to prevent the import of low-quality goods into the country. In January of this year, it was reported that the Taliban returned more than 62 tons of low-quality oil to Uzbekistan through the Hairatan border point. In response to this, Uzbekneftgaz Chairman Bahadir Sidikov said the report was misinterpreted, and that the oil products returned by the Taliban was of high quality. Sidikov stated that the product was returned not because of its low quality, but because its standard isn't available in Afghanistan. "This new product was supposed to enter the Afghan market. Unfortunately, the first batch was sent back. But it’s a process. It will not be easy to enter every market. To prove the quality of this product, we sold 1,000 tons of the same diesel to Estonia last month. They received it as a “premium” and ordered 10,000 tons [more]. Currently, we are producing 10,000 tons of [oil] products. In addition, there are inter-governmental agreements," commented Sidikov at that time.

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