• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
22 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1089

Rahmon and Putin Discuss Migration, Afghanistan and Military Cooperation in Dushanbe

Few issues weigh on Tajikistan as heavily as the fate of its migrant workers, and it was high on the agenda when Presidents Emomali Rahmon and Vladimir Putin met in Dushanbe on November 20. Also on the table were bilateral relations, regional security, and economic cooperation. The talks followed the APEC Economic Leaders' Meetings in Shenzhen and, by only four days, the European Union’s decision to sanction Unistream, a Russian bank and money-transfer service that Tajik migrants depend on to send earnings home. Rahmon described Russia as a “strategic partner and reliable ally” and expressed his interest in discussing bilateral relations and international and regional issues in greater depth. Migration and the Economy According to World Bank data, remittances equaled 57.7% of Tajikistan’s GDP in 2025, the highest share for any country in the world. On November 16, the EU froze the assets of Unistream, a Russian commercial bank that operates the international money-transfer system of the same name, widely used by Tajik migrants to send earnings home. The measures bar EU entities from making funds available to it. The bank said it contests the EU’s allegations. The presidents stressed the need to keep addressing migration issues, but the Tajik president’s press service gave no details or agreements, Asia-Plus reported. Putin said in October 2025 that more than one million Tajik citizens were employed in Russia. More than 494,500 Tajik citizens made work-related entries into Russia in the first half of 2026, according to TASS. Meanwhile, about 160,000 Tajik citizens, including roughly 25,000 minors, were on Russia’s register of controlled persons, which lists foreigners with no legal grounds to stay, Tajikistan’s deputy labor minister said in July. Security and Afghanistan Putin told Rahmon he would brief him on the APEC summit in Shenzhen. He had said earlier that he would also report on Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk’s trip to Afghanistan. He said the leaders could also discuss regional security and Russia’s 201st Military Base in Tajikistan separately, outside the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Following the talks, Peskov said Rahmon had described security incidents and smuggling along Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. He said a degree of stability remained and emphasized cooperation between border and intelligence services. Putin said he had invited senior Moscow officials, including Marat Khusnullin, the Russian co-chair of the intergovernmental commission, and Defense Ministry representatives, to discuss military cooperation. Peskov later said both leaders supported the continued presence of Russia’s 201st Military Base, its largest military installation abroad. He said they also held separate talks with military officials, including military intelligence chief Igor Kostyukov. Trade and Broader Ties Putin said bilateral trade grew by more than 25% in 2025 and by nearly 19% in the first nine months of 2026, and that more than 70 Russian regions cooperate with Tajikistan, Asia-Plus reported. The leaders also discussed energy, industry, mining, agriculture, transport and investment, as well as the construction of a Russian drama theater in Dushanbe. Putin thanked Rahmon for his attention to the Russian...

Kazakhstan’s Trans-Afghan Railway Plans Target Indian Ocean Ports

Kazakhstan is exploring several railway routes through Afghanistan to Pakistan’s seaports. One private-sector proposal is estimated to cost $4.1 billion, with operations targeted to begin in 2029. For Central Asia, the new corridor could provide an alternative to existing export routes and direct access to South Asian markets. Preliminary details of the Central Asia–South Asia Railway (CASA) project were presented at the international New Silk Way business forum in Astana in October. Kanat Kudaibergen, chairman of the board of GWM Capital Ltd. (GreyWolf Management), told The Times of Central Asia that the southern route would help diversify freight transportation, complementing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor) and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Routes and Freight Potential One option under consideration involves using existing railway infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, followed by the construction of a line through western and southern Afghanistan to the Pakistani border. In early February 2026, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport and Pakistan’s Ministry of Railways signed a memorandum on railway cooperation, including plans to develop a railway connection through Afghanistan. Kazakhstan is also exploring a route through Uzbekistan. On September 30, 2026, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a memorandum with the United Arab Emirates on jointly assessing the technical and economic feasibility of the CASA railway corridor, which would provide access to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar. The government’s announcement said a joint working group was under consideration. The routes through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are separate infrastructure initiatives. Both share the objective of establishing a continuous railway connection between Central and South Asia. According to Kudaibergen’s projections, freight volumes through Central Asia and Afghanistan could reach 28 million metric tons. Exports from Central Asia to and through Afghanistan are estimated at seven million metric tons, while imports from South Asia into Central Asia and Russia, including transit shipments, are estimated at 2.2 million metric tons. He estimates the corridor’s overall freight potential at 35–40 million metric tons annually. Construction Costs and Financing The private-sector proposal presented at the forum envisages a Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak railway. Under the preliminary schedule, the feasibility study and approval of project documentation are to be completed by the end of 2026. The cost of this phase is estimated at $3.5 million. Construction is scheduled for 2027–2029, with commercial operations and investment recovery expected to begin in 2029. To attract financing, the CASA investment fund has been established at the Astana International Financial Centre, which operates under a special legal and financial framework. According to Kudaibergen, the fund has been structured in accordance with Islamic finance principles. The developers are still seeking investment agreements and arrangements with Pakistani ports. Kazakhstan's Involvement Kazakhstan has expressed its readiness to invest up to $500 million in constructing the approximately 75-mile Torghundi–Herat railway. This section is envisaged as the first phase in developing the western branch of the Trans-Afghan Corridor. According to Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Transport, preliminary technical work has already been completed. Once the necessary approvals have been obtained, Kazakhstan is ready to begin construction...

The Golden Crescent Is Shifting: Opium Returns as Synthetic Drugs Spread

Four years after the Taliban imposed a ban on opium poppy cultivation, poppy farming is expanding again in Afghanistan. In 2026, opium production increased nearly fivefold, with approximately 85% of poppy cultivation now concentrated in provinces bordering Central Asian countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) warns of a potential resurgence of drug trafficking along the Northern Route, which connects Afghanistan through Central Asia to Russia and other external markets. Meanwhile, Central Asia's own synthetic drug market is expanding, with some of these substances produced in local clandestine laboratories. The Changing Geography of the Golden Crescent According to a UNODC study presented in Tashkent in early November, the area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan increased over the past year from approximately 10,000 to 43,000 hectares, while estimated opium production rose from 300 to nearly 1,500 metric tons. Poppies are now cultivated in 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, compared with 11 a year earlier. Cultivation remains well below levels recorded before the Taliban imposed its ban in April 2022. At the time, approximately 233,000 hectares were under poppy cultivation. By the following year, that figure had fallen nearly 22-fold to 10,800 hectares. The geographical distribution of cultivation has changed substantially. Before the ban, Afghanistan's southern provinces were the main centers of poppy cultivation. Today, the northeast of the country accounts for 74% of opium production, with Badakhshan Province as its main growing area. The profitability of the crop remains one of the main factors behind the resurgence in cultivation. In 2026, the average price of a kilogram of opium in Afghanistan was approximately $500, compared with less than $100 before the ban. UNODC estimates that opium traders' revenues reached $525 million this year. Changes are also taking place elsewhere in the Golden Crescent, a historical opiate-producing region encompassing Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. British researcher David Mansfield, a specialist in Afghanistan's drug economy, points to satellite monitoring data from Alcis showing an expansion of poppy cultivation in Pakistan's Balochistan Province. More than 9,000 hectares were under cultivation in 2025, with researchers recording further growth in 2026. Similar developments have been observed in neighboring Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan Province. According to Mansfield, Afghan farmers are involved in poppy cultivation in both Pakistan and Iran. He links the geographical redistribution of production to economic decline, political instability, and armed conflicts across the region. Mansfield and UNODC differ in their assessments of the scale of opium production outside Afghanistan and the prospects for the depletion of stockpiles accumulated before the ban. Reliable data remain insufficient to establish the combined volume of production across all three countries. Afghan Drug Trafficking Through Central Asia Tajikistan is particularly exposed to the geographical shift in Afghan opium production. Its approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan runs predominantly through remote mountainous terrain. According to Tajikistan's Drug Control Agency, 2.74 metric tons of drugs were seized along the Afghan border in 2025, up from 1.82 metric tons in 2024. The number of armed clashes with Afghan drug smugglers...

Tajikistan–Afghanistan Border Market Proposed to Boost Trade

Tajikistan has proposed establishing a joint border market with Afghanistan. Dushanbe is seeking to expand economic ties with its southern neighbor despite not formally recognizing the Taliban government. The proposal was raised by Tajikistan’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Saadi Sharifi, during a meeting with Sayed Karim Hashemi, chairman of the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Investment. Sharifi said opening the market would facilitate trade between entrepreneurs and residents of border communities in both countries. Pajhwok Afghan News reported on the talks on November 18, citing a statement from the chamber. Hashemi proposed organizing a visit to Tajikistan by a delegation of at least 10 Afghan businesspeople to explore investment opportunities and establish direct contacts with local businesses. The Tajik-Afghan border stretches approximately 840 miles, much of it following the Panj River. Several border markets already exist along the frontier, providing one of the few accessible outlets for residents of remote mountainous areas to sell agricultural products. Tajikistan’s foreign minister, Sirojiddin Muhriddin, said in February 2026 that the markets had reopened. It remains unclear where the proposed market would be located. Following the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Tajikistan adopted a tougher stance toward Afghanistan’s new leadership than other Central Asian countries. Dushanbe advocated the formation of a government that included representatives of various ethnic groups, including Afghan Tajiks. Political disagreements did not sever economic ties, however, and Tajikistan continued supplying electricity to Afghanistan. In August 2024, Tajikistan’s Export Agency proposed establishing a major logistics zone near the Lower Panj–Sher Khan Bandar border crossing or on neutral territory. The agency’s head, Bahriddin Sirojiddinzoda, cited high transportation costs, saying Tajik drivers delivering goods to Afghanistan were required to obtain visas and pay road fees even to travel only about 550 yards.

Emergency Aid to Afghanistan Is Not Enough, Humanitarian Expert Says

The return of millions of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan is placing fresh pressure on a country already struggling with declining international humanitarian assistance. Closer cooperation with Central Asian countries could help Afghanistan meet its immediate needs while reducing its long-term dependence on emergency aid. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Abdul Wahab Arash, who has more than 17 years of experience working for international humanitarian and development organizations, discusses the challenges facing Afghanistan and the role its Central Asian neighbors could play in the country's recovery. TCA: How have the needs of the Afghan population evolved, and which challenges concern you most today? Abdul Wahab Arash: Having worked in Afghanistan’s humanitarian sector for more than a decade, I have witnessed how conflict, displacement, poverty, economic instability and natural disasters have affected Afghan communities. While emergency needs have persisted, economic hardship, limited employment opportunities and recurring disasters have placed additional pressure on vulnerable families. One of my greatest concerns is the large-scale return of Afghan migrants from neighboring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, including people who have been deported or compelled to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, approximately 6.5 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan between mid-September 2023 and Aug. 31, 2026. These movements place additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already limited resources and public services. Many returnee families urgently need shelter, food, employment, healthcare, education and other essential services. Their reintegration requires not only emergency assistance but also sustainable livelihoods, housing support and access to basic services. Another major concern is the widening gap between humanitarian needs and available funding. Funding reductions mean fewer people may receive essential assistance, while humanitarian programs, local organizations and employment opportunities for qualified Afghan professionals are also affected. Economic hardship and limited livelihoods can drive dangerous and irregular migration as people seek safety, work and a more secure future. In my view, Afghanistan needs continued international solidarity alongside a stronger focus on resilience, livelihoods and investment in Afghan people. Emergency assistance remains essential, but wherever feasible it should also help families recover, protect their dignity and build more secure futures. TCA: What are the main obstacles to delivering effective international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan? What changes would help produce more sustainable results? Arash: In my experience, one of the main obstacles is the growing gap between humanitarian needs and available resources. Other challenges include limited livelihood opportunities, difficulties in coordination, potential duplication across programs and the need to connect emergency assistance more effectively with longer-term recovery. Afghanistan needs assistance to address immediate suffering, but it also needs a humanitarian system that invests in Afghan professionals, strengthens local capacity, creates fair employment opportunities and uses limited resources effectively. International expertise remains essential, but it should complement and strengthen national capacity rather than unnecessarily replace it. International organizations could explore more cost-effective operating models, including leaner offices in Kabul and greater reliance on qualified Afghan organizations to implement activities and monitor assistance at the community level. This could reduce...

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....