Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Bilateral Trade

West2West: Kazakhstan Adds a Regional Dimension to Trade with Afghanistan

In late September, a Kazakhstani official and business delegation led by Yerkin Tukumov, the Special Representative of the President of Kazakhstan for Afghanistan, visited Herat. The delegation included trade officials, representatives of the Mangystau and West Kazakhstan regions, and businesses. Officials called the new approach West2West, meaning cooperation between Kazakhstan's western regions and western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan and Afghanistan have held several business forums and exhibitions in recent years. However, the choice of Herat and the attempt to shift some cooperation from the intergovernmental to the interregional level make this initiative different. Since 2021, Kazakhstan’s economic dialogue with Afghanistan has developed mainly from the top down. The two governments set ambitious trade targets and sought to turn political engagement into commercial deals. The results looked impressive on paper. In October 2024, the two countries adopted a road map to raise mutual trade to $3 billion. In April 2025, documents worth $140 million were signed in Kabul, followed by 15 documents worth $303 million in Shymkent that October. Actual trade, however, grew much more slowly. In 2024, it totaled $545.2 million, while in 2025 it slipped slightly to $541.6 million. The $3 billion target remains more of a strategic benchmark than a near-term goal. According to official data from Kazakhstan, trade reached $581.1 million in January-July 2026, exceeding the total for the entire previous year. Kazakhstan’s exports accounted for $572.9 million, while imports from Afghanistan were just $8.2 million. Trade is therefore growing rapidly, but remains overwhelmingly one-sided. West2West is partly an attempt to broaden that relationship. Herat's Strategic Location Herat is one of Afghanistan’s main industrial and commercial centers, situated near several important transport routes. To the north is Torghundi, a rail border crossing with Turkmenistan. To the west runs the Khaf-Herat railway, which connects Afghanistan to Iran’s railway system. Herat could eventually become part of longer routes toward Kandahar and Pakistan, although much of the necessary infrastructure remains at the planning stage. During the September visit, officials opened a 43-kilometer section of the Khaf-Herat railway. Afghan sources estimate its cost at approximately $58 million. The section was built with the involvement of Kazakhstani company Integra Construction KZ. In August 2026, freight transported along the Khaf-Herat line totaled approximately 137,700 metric tons. Discussions have also focused on increasing its monthly capacity to 150,000 metric tons. Together with Uzbekistan and the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan has begun working on the Central Asia–South Asia railway project, which envisages a trans-Afghan connection to Pakistan’s ports. So far, the parties have agreed to conduct technical and economic studies, and no final route has been approved. The route through Turkmenistan is developing separately. Ashgabat views Torghundi-Herat as a joint project with Afghanistan linked to the expansion of the Serhetabat-Torghundi crossing and other infrastructure in western Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s interest in Herat predates West2West. In 2023, Astana announced plans to establish a Kazakhstan Trade House in Afghanistan, with its main office in Herat. It opened in May 2024. Arman Yessentayev, its head, described Herat in 2023 as a...

Islamic State

ISKP and Central Asia: How the Threat Extends Beyond Afghanistan’s Borders

Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) is developing transnational networks, complicating assessments of the threat to Central Asia. The group also retains territorial ambitions. One conventional way to assess the threat is to look at a map: the situation in Afghanistan’s northern provinces, their proximity to the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the number of militants, and the possibility of infiltration into neighboring states. An August report by the United Nations (UN) Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, based on information received through June 9, said the ability of terrorist groups to operate in Afghanistan remained an enduring threat to neighboring countries and Central Asia. The report also said ISKP had reportedly moved toward northern Afghanistan. During the period under review, the group suffered serious setbacks amid Taliban and Pakistani operations and was in the process of rebuilding. But looking only at Afghanistan’s borders is no longer enough. The Central Asian dimension of ISKP encompasses the group’s activities in Afghanistan, risks to the five Central Asian states themselves, and the involvement of some individuals from the region in transnational networks operating outside it. Old Networks and New Structures ISKP’s Central Asian dimension did not emerge from nowhere. Even before the group appeared in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, armed organizations formed by people from Central Asia were active there. Among them was the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). At different times, the IMU maintained ties with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2014, the Islamic State declared a “caliphate.” A year later, a faction of the IMU pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. Lucas Webber, a researcher of extremist networks, and Bruce Pannier, a longtime analyst of Central Asian politics and security, have highlighted the role of an Uzbek-language propaganda infrastructure associated with the IMU in ISKP’s outreach to Central Asian audiences. Their analysis was published by the Global Network on Extremism and Technology (GNET). The region’s older militant organizations have not simply been absorbed into ISKP. A July 2025 UN report separately mentions IMU members and fighters from other groups being used by Afghanistan’s Taliban authorities in law-enforcement and army units. A single “Central Asian network,” however, would misrepresent this fragmented environment of different connections and organizational affiliations. The same report described the recruitment of people from Central Asia, their significant presence among ISKP’s rank and file, and the group’s attempts to operate outside Afghanistan. In a 2024 article for CTC Sentinel, researchers Noah Tucker and Edward Lemon examined the involvement of Tajik citizens in a number of ISKP-linked attacks and networks. They argued that the recent surge in attacks and arrests was partly the “long tail” of the earlier Islamic State mobilization, including networks that had persisted after it. A February 2026 report by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team said ISKP continued to develop a network of cells capable of projecting a threat across the region and internationally. Propaganda Does Not Equal Mass Support Central Asian audiences occupy a noticeable place in ISKP propaganda....

Cold War

Opinion: Weaponizing Faith – The Cold War Roots of Central Asia’s Security Dilemma

Central Asia’s contemporary security dilemma is partly rooted in Cold War strategies that transformed Muslim identity into a factor of geopolitical competition. Washington viewed Soviet Central Asia’s Muslim populations as a potential pressure point against Moscow. The Soviet Union itself mobilized Central Asian Muslim personnel during its intervention in Afghanistan. These policies did not alone create later radical movements, but they contributed to a regional environment where existing grievances, ideological narratives, and transnational networks could be redirected and intensified. The origins of Washington’s interest in Soviet Muslim populations as a strategic factor emerged during the final years of the Cold War. In 1977, the Nationalities Working Group, an interagency task force within the National Security Council, was established to examine vulnerabilities among the Soviet Union’s non-Russian nationalities. Declassified U.S. records show that American officials studied ethnic, cultural, and religious identities as possible sources of pressure against Moscow. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, this approach became part of Washington’s broader effort to weaken Soviet influence. Through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the United States provided assistance to Afghan resistance organizations, while Saudi Arabia contributed significant financial support. Pakistan’s military government under General Zia-ul-Haq favored Islamist factions among Afghan resistance groups, helping connect military assistance with religious mobilization against Soviet forces. During his visit to the Khyber Pass in early February 1980, U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski addressed Afghan resistance fighters, declaring: "That land over there is yours. You will go back to it one day because your cause is right and God is on your side." The remarks reflected how the anti-Soviet struggle was framed not only in geopolitical terms but also through religious language and symbolism. [caption id="attachment_56711" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Soviet T-62 tank leaving Afghanistan; image: U.S. Department of Defense.[/caption] The Afghan conflict was also fought through education and information campaigns. Between 1986 and 1992, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) funded an approximately $50 million educational program through the University of Nebraska–Omaha’s Center for Afghanistan Studies for Afghan refugees and schools. Research has shown that some textbooks incorporated violent imagery, references to weapons and combat, and themes glorifying holy war and the duty of martyrdom. Produced for wartime Afghanistan, these materials reflected, and arguably helped sustain, a militarized ideological environment. Islamic religious life in Central Asia had its own deeper roots. Despite Soviet restrictions, religious learning survived through underground hujra networks and unofficial scholarship. Figures such as Muhammadjon Hindustoniy-Rustamov, born in the Fergana Valley and later one of Soviet Central Asia’s most influential unofficial Islamic scholars, shaped generations of students even as Afghanistan became an arena of international rivalry during the 1980s. Moscow also used Central Asian Muslim identity for strategic purposes. The 154th Separate Spetsnaz Detachment, known as the “Muslim Battalion,” was composed largely of Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen soldiers from the Soviet Turkestan Military District. The unit participated in Operation Storm-333 in December 1979, the Soviet operation that killed Afghan President Hafizullah Amin and installed Babrak Karmal. The selection of Central Asian...

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s Regional Ties Grow as Global Reintegration Stalls

For Central Asia, Afghanistan is both a source of risk and a potential route south. Governments across the region increasingly see a more stable Afghanistan as a way to open new markets and expand economic links with South Asia. Afghanistan is a direct neighbor of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. The geography is different for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but their political and economic interests are no less significant. Many long-term plans for expanding Central Asia’s connections to the south depend in part on Afghanistan’s future and the role it can play in the regional economy. At the UN Security Council’s September 16, 2026, meeting on Afghanistan, Kazakhstan set out a position that may reflect a wider Central Asian view. Astana argued that engagement with Afghanistan’s current authorities should not be equated with recognition and that isolation could not offer a sustainable solution. Astana proposes moving past the current focus on humanitarian aid. In Kazakhstan’s view, the next phase of international engagement should gradually move Afghanistan from dependence on humanitarian aid toward economic self-reliance through job creation, private-sector development, the restoration of financial channels, and expanded trade and investment. The statement also calls for Afghanistan’s integration into the regional economy. Kazakhstan’s representative specifically discussed connections between Central and South Asia, Kazakh-Afghan business ties, trade houses in Herat and Kabul, and the new UN Regional Centre for the Sustainable Development Goals for Central Asia and Afghanistan in Almaty. Astana also expressed concern about restrictions affecting Afghan women and girls. Georgette Gagnon, the UN secretary-general’s deputy special representative for Afghanistan, delivered the main briefing. Five years after the Taliban’s return to power, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) assesses that the de facto authorities face no significant armed or political threat to their control, although risks to long-term stability are accumulating and largely stem from their own policies. UNAMA therefore distinguishes between the Taliban’s control of the country and its prospects for long-term stability. UNAMA views the Doha process as the main multilateral framework for Afghanistan’s gradual reintegration into the international community. It links progress to women’s rights and inclusive governance, along with the fulfillment of counterterrorism commitments. The mission also notes that Kabul prefers bilateral relations to multilateral engagement. Russia and China focused on pragmatic engagement and economic recovery, stressing the need to avoid isolation. China also urged Kabul to step up its efforts against terrorist groups and lift restrictions preventing Afghan women employed by the UN from doing their jobs. Russia called for dialogue without pressure and for steps toward Afghanistan’s international reintegration without preconditions. Afghanistan’s economic ties with some regional partners are expanding while its political normalization at the global level remains unresolved. Kazakhstan’s position illustrates this divide. It allows for engagement without accepting the existing order as permanent or waiting for isolation to change it. Future international discussions on Afghanistan will have to address this tension.

Natural gas

Turkmenistan Advances TAPI Pipeline and Infrastructure Projects in Herat

Turkmenistan has spent years seeking new gas export routes, and in western Afghanistan that effort is taking physical form. By mid-September, 122.3 kilometers of pipe had been welded and laid along the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) route in Herat Province. Ashgabat is also pursuing two other connections with Afghanistan along the same corridor. Energy officials are discussing a 500 kV transmission line, while plans call for a railway from the Turkmen border to reach Herat and eventually extend farther south. Herat is becoming the focal point for Turkmen gas, electricity, and freight. For Ashgabat, supplying Herat could give TAPI its first functioning Afghan market without waiting for the entire pipeline to reach Pakistan and India. Afghanistan would gain energy supplies and infrastructure, as well as a chance to connect its western region more closely to regional trade. As of September 15, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum reported that 150.3 kilometers of the 153-kilometer TAPI route in Herat Province had been prepared for pipe installation. Of the 122.3 kilometers of pipe welded and laid, 71.5 kilometers had been buried. Hydrostatic testing had been completed on 33 kilometers. The ministry’s estimate of nearly 80% completion applies only to pipe-laying along this section. In May, the ministry reported that 63 kilometers of pipe had been laid. Four months later, the figure had nearly doubled. The pipeline is designed to run roughly 1,814 kilometers from Turkmenistan’s Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters a year. At full capacity, the Asian Development Bank’s current project description allocates 5% of the gas to Afghanistan and 47.5% each to Pakistan and India. The pipeline has been under discussion for more than three decades. Conflict, financing shortages, security threats, and disputes over commercial terms have repeatedly delayed it. Work on Afghan territory resumed in September 2024. The latest figures from Herat make it possible, for the first time in years, to measure TAPI’s progress in kilometers of pipeline rather than diplomatic statements. For Turkmenistan, the stakes are high. The country holds the world’s fourth-largest natural gas reserves, but most of its gas exports go to China. Beijing receives around 30 billion cubic meters of Turkmen gas annually and continues to work with Ashgabat on expanding production at Galkynysh. In February, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov said diversifying gas export routes was one of the country’s primary goals. Together, Pakistan and India would provide Turkmenistan with markets comparable in scale to its Chinese market. To reach them, however, the pipeline still has to cross most of Afghanistan and then Pakistan. Tensions between Kabul and Islamabad, along with the difficult relationship between Pakistan and India, continue to create political and transit risks for the full project. Herat offers a smaller market that could be reached sooner. A distribution network is planned in the city to supply gas to businesses, power plants, and households. In August, Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum on the gasification of the province. The memorandum covers local...

CSTO

For the CSTO, Afghanistan Might Be the Last Credible Threat

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is conducting its “Rubezh (Frontier) 2026” military exercises from September 12-19. Those exercises are designed with Afghanistan in mind, a country that the CSTO has been talking about frequently in 2026, and also one where militant groups pose a shared threat to its members. And even the Taliban are no longer viewed as the threat they once were. Frontier 2026 The Frontier 2026 exercises are taking place at the Koktal training ground in southeastern Kazakhstan’s Zhetysu Province. The CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force is practicing to repel cross-border incursions in mountain and desert terrain. The exercises come this time as concerns about infiltration by militants in Afghanistan into CIS territory are increasing. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said on September 8 that Russia is paying special attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. The Tajik authorities have been calling for additional aid for the country’s border forces since a series of attacks from Afghanistan in November 2025 left five Chinese workers in southern Tajikistan dead, followed by an attack in December that killed two Tajik border guards. Tajikistan has regularly asked for international help in guarding its frontier with Afghanistan since independence in 1991. But after the violence at the end of 2025, the Tajik government appealed especially to its fellow members in the CSTO for increased assistance. CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said at the end of August that the first shipment of weapons and equipment would be sent to Tajikistan this autumn. Raison D’être The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joined. The purpose was simple. If any of the member states was attacked by an external enemy, that state could request aid, including military assistance, from the other members. In the early 1990s, there were potential enemies for the Treaty members in practically every direction. The Soviet Union had collapsed in late 1991. There were questions about how the former Communist Bloc countries and their new Western allies might act. The theocratic regime in Iran was a possible threat to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the latter region had unstable Afghanistan to worry about also. China was a concern for Central Asia and Russia. Back then, banding together made sense for the nine newly independent states that signed the treaty. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan dropped out in 1999, it appeared the Collective Security Treaty was on the brink of becoming irrelevant. After Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, he put a new emphasis on a security bloc within the CIS, and in 2002, the remaining six treaty members signed a new charter. However, now, in 2026, the list of the CSTO’s potential external threats is greatly reduced. Far from being a security concern, China is now a leading trade partner for Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and provides military assistance to all four countries. Iran’s relations with the West remain...