Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Afghanistan

Opinion: Hormuz Crisis Pushes Afghanistan Aid Routes Toward Central Asia

The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is usually viewed through the lens of energy security or military escalation. But it also has another, less visible, humanitarian dimension. A recent article in The Guardian, “Calls for humanitarian corridor through Strait of Hormuz as Iran war hits vital aid,” points to a critical shift: because of the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran, along with instability around Hormuz, traditional humanitarian supply routes are beginning to break down. For Afghanistan, this is no longer a theoretical concern but an operational reality. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), cited by The Guardian, the cost of delivering food to Afghanistan has tripled. Cargo that previously moved by sea through Hormuz and onward to Pakistani ports must now travel overland across multiple countries, adding weeks to delivery times. The consequences are felt most acutely by vulnerable populations, particularly children. Predictability is one of the core requirements of any humanitarian system, and that predictability is now disappearing. Some shipments are stranded in regional hubs. Routes are constantly changing. Fuel costs continue to rise. Even modest increases in oil prices significantly raise operational expenses for humanitarian agencies. For Afghanistan, the implications are severe. The country has been in a prolonged food crisis for several years, with millions dependent on external aid. Delays of even one or two weeks can directly affect malnutrition and mortality rates. According to United Nations estimates, around 3.7 million Afghan children are currently suffering from wasting, nearly one million of them from severe wasting, a condition associated with sharply elevated mortality risks. UNICEF estimates that in 2026 alone, 1.304 million children aged 6-59 months will require treatment for acute malnutrition, including severe cases and other high-risk groups. Another 1.2 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are also suffering from acute malnutrition. Under these conditions, even temporary disruptions in aid deliveries become a direct threat to human life. The situation is being compounded by several overlapping factors. First, instability around the Strait of Hormuz has made maritime routes both more expensive and riskier. Second, the Pakistani corridor, previously the main overland route, has become unreliable, as repeated border closures and restrictions have tied humanitarian deliveries to the fluctuating political and security relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Third, Iran has imposed restrictions on food exports and has itself become part of the conflict zone, undermining its role as both a supplier and transit route for Afghanistan. Together, these developments are creating what can be described as a “triple crisis” for humanitarian logistics into Afghanistan. The previous aid delivery system is effectively ceasing to function. In response, the WFP is restructuring its logistics network. One solution has been increased use of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor: Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea-Turkmenistan and Afghanistan. Although this route is longer and more expensive, it offers predictability and an alternative to disrupted maritime pathways. The key issue is no longer which route is cheapest, but which is reliable. This shift places Central Asia increasingly at the center of...

Deportation

Austria to Use Uzbekistan as Transit Route for Afghan Deportations Under New Agreement

Austria’s Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger and Interior Minister Gerhard Karner are expected to visit Uzbekistan on May 7 to sign a mobility agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation on migration, according to Die Presse. The agreement is intended to improve coordination between the two countries, particularly on deportations and the return of migrants. Austrian officials say it will create a more structured framework for handling individuals required to leave the country. A key provision involves the use of Uzbekistan as a transit route for deportations to Afghanistan. Afghan nationals facing removal from Austria could be escorted through Uzbekistan to Kabul. Until now, deportations to Afghanistan have largely taken place via Istanbul, meaning the new arrangement would open what officials describe as a “second route.” Karner said the deal would establish “the conditions for the consistent implementation of deportations as part of a firm and fair asylum policy.” The agreement also covers the readmission of nationals, third-country citizens, and stateless individuals who entered the European Union through Uzbekistan. In return, the document includes provisions to support legal migration from Uzbekistan to Austria. Despite its growing economy, Uzbekistan is heavily reliant on remittances from abroad, with Uzbek migrants sending home $4.8 billion in Q2 of 2025. Over the past few years, Tashkent has been seeking out alternative destinations than traditional routes dominated by Russia. To that effect, both Uzbekistan and Austria have committed to promoting “safe, orderly, and regular mobility of qualified workers” in line with national legislation. Austrian authorities note that Uzbek professionals already have multiple pathways to access the country’s labor market. The agreement does not provide for the establishment of return centers for rejected asylum seekers, an idea Austria has been pursuing with several EU partners, including Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The visit to Uzbekistan is part of a broader regional trip that will also include Kazakhstan, which Austrian officials consider an important partner, particularly in the energy sector. The planned agreement comes amid continued migration pressures linked to Afghanistan’s humanitarian situation. According to the United Nations Development Programme, in 2024 around 85% of Afghanistan’s population was living on less than $1 a day. In June 2025, the World Food Programme reported that approximately 15 million people in the country were facing severe hunger. At the same time, large-scale deportations from neighboring countries have added to the strain. In July last year, Tajikistan launched a campaign to detain and deport Afghan refugees, giving them 15 days to leave the country.

Healthcare

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan Plan Joint Hospital Project in Mazar-i-Sharif

Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have agreed to build a hospital in the Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif under a public-private partnership, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Health said. The agreement was reached during a visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Health Minister Asilbek Khudayarov to Afghanistan, where talks were held with Afghan Health Minister Mawlawi Noor Jalal, Balkh regional governor Mohammad Yusuf Wafa, and other officials. According to the ministry, the Afghan side highlighted the need to expand cooperation in healthcare, noting that many districts in the country still lack hospitals. Officials also pointed to a rise in cancer cases in recent years and requested Uzbekistan’s support in building a medical facility in Mazar-i-Sharif, training specialists, and simplifying procedures for Afghan patients seeking treatment in Uzbekistan. Wafa expressed appreciation for Uzbekistan’s continued support, particularly during difficult periods such as natural disasters, and emphasized the importance of strengthening humanitarian ties between the two countries. During the visit, the Uzbek delegation also toured healthcare facilities in Balkh province, including a district clinic in Dehdadi and the Abu Ali Ibn Sina Central Hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif, where they met with medical staff and reviewed current conditions. As a result of the talks, the parties agreed to establish a joint working group to develop proposals for supporting Afghanistan’s public healthcare system. Plans were also outlined to organize reciprocal visits by Afghan medical delegations to Uzbekistan. The sides discussed launching training programs that would allow up to 100 Afghan specialists each year to improve their qualifications at Uzbekistan’s specialized medical centers. In addition, the possibility of allocating annual scholarships for up to 50 Afghan students to study at Uzbek medical universities was considered. The Uzbek side also agreed to explore simplifying the issuance of medical visas for Afghan patients and easing procedures for the supply and registration of pharmaceuticals produced in Uzbekistan, which Afghan officials said are in strong demand in the local market. A key outcome of the visit was the agreement to construct a hospital in Mazar-i-Sharif in cooperation with Arman Group. Under the arrangement, the Afghan side will invest in the project, adapt an existing building for medical use, and procure modern equipment, while Uzbekistan will provide qualified medical personnel. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in March, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan established a joint Business Council aimed at strengthening trade and economic ties, bringing together representatives from both countries’ business communities and institutions. The new healthcare agreement reflects a broader trend toward expanding cooperation between the two neighbors.

Afghanistan

A View from Afghanistan: Silk Seven Plus a New Framework for Regional Integration

In recent years, regional integration has increasingly become a key instrument in countries’ economic and foreign policy strategies. This is particularly relevant for Central Asia, a landlocked region facing structural constraints in accessing global markets. In this context, the Silk Seven Plus (S7+) initiative, recently introduced by the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, has drawn attention. The concept is currently being promoted in Washington. According to its authors, the initiative has received “overwhelming bipartisan support from leading members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.” S7+ is positioned as a multi-stage framework for regional coordination centered on the countries of Central Asia, with plans for gradual expansion, first to Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, and potentially later to Pakistan. The initiative appears to propose a new model of cooperation focused on developing transport connectivity, facilitating trade, and coordinating economic policy among countries in Central and South Asia, as well as neighboring regions. Unlike traditional integration formats, S7+ is designed as a flexible, network-based framework rather than a rigid institutional structure. It functions more as a platform for practical cooperation, including the development of transit routes, the digitization of customs procedures, the reduction of logistics costs, and the expansion of trade and investment flows. This approach allows countries to participate voluntarily and at varying levels of engagement. Within this model, Central Asia is viewed as a key region for the formation of new economic linkages. Strengthening transport connectivity, diversifying trade routes, and reducing dependence on a limited number of corridors could enhance the resilience of regional economies and support deeper integration into global supply chains. Afghanistan holds particular significance within the S7+ framework. Geographically, it lies at the crossroads of Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, positioning it as a potential transit bridge. The development of routes through Afghanistan could shorten transport distances and improve regional logistics efficiency. In practice, however, this potential faces significant constraints. Key challenges include underdeveloped infrastructure, institutional limitations, and a lack of international recognition. These factors restrict Afghanistan’s ability to fully participate in multilateral initiatives and limit its access to investment and financial resources. At the same time, the flexibility of the S7+ format may create opportunities for Afghanistan’s gradual involvement. Unlike formal organizations, the initiative allows participation on a project-by-project basis without requiring full institutional integration. This aligns with the country’s current model of external engagement, where practical cooperation continues despite the absence of formal recognition. A comparison between S7+ and traditional regional formats highlights key differences. Existing frameworks, such as regional cooperation programs, typically rely on formal agreements and institutional mechanisms. In contrast, S7+ emphasizes flexibility, pragmatism, and the implementation of specific projects, potentially reducing political sensitivities and prioritizing economic interests. In a broader geopolitical context, interpretations of the initiative vary. For some external actors, it may signal the emergence of alternative transport routes and reduced dependence on established corridors. For others, it represents a complementary element within existing economic strategies. In any case, S7+ reflects intensifying competition over the development...

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

Afghanistan

Uzbekistan Expands Afghan Rail Capacity to Support Growing Trade

A new 1,000-meter siding track has been completed at Naibabad railway station in Afghanistan, aimed at increasing freight handling capacity and improving the efficiency of rail operations, according to Uzbekistan Railways. The project was implemented by Uzbekistan Railways in cooperation with Sogdiana Trans. The additional track is expected to significantly expand the station’s throughput and accelerate loading and unloading processes, reducing delays and congestion along the route. Afghanistan plays a key role in regional connectivity, linking Central Asia with South Asia through transport corridors that pass through its territory. Naibabad is expected to serve as an important hub for the movement of goods from countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan, and China to markets in Pakistan and India. The development comes amid a steady increase in cargo volumes between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The Hayraton-Naibabad-Mazar-i-Sharif corridor has become an important route for regional trade, and infrastructure upgrades are seen as essential to maintaining stable freight flows. According to project details, the new siding will enable more efficient processing of freight wagons and help prevent bottlenecks along the line. It is also expected to improve service quality for customers and support the long-term development of Naibabad station. Uzbekistan Railways noted that the project reflects the country’s ongoing efforts to modernize railway infrastructure in Afghanistan and strengthen cross-border logistics links. Cooperation with Sogdiana Trans has further reinforced their position as long-term partners in the development of Afghanistan’s rail sector. The expansion builds on earlier work at the station. In 2024, Uzbekistan Railways reported that the restored Naibabad station officially reopened on August 7, following reconstruction carried out in cooperation with the Termez regional railway hub and Sogdiana Trans. The arrival of the first freight cars marked the resumption of operations. As freight traffic along the corridor continues to grow, Uzbekistan Railways and its partners, in coordination with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works, are continuing efforts to modernize infrastructure along the route.