Afghanistan - The Times Of Central Asia

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Aid Dependence

Emergency Aid to Afghanistan Is Not Enough, Humanitarian Expert Says

The return of millions of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan is placing fresh pressure on a country already struggling with declining international humanitarian assistance. Closer cooperation with Central Asian countries could help Afghanistan meet its immediate needs while reducing its long-term dependence on emergency aid. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Abdul Wahab Arash, who has more than 17 years of experience working for international humanitarian and development organizations, discusses the challenges facing Afghanistan and the role its Central Asian neighbors could play in the country's recovery. TCA: How have the needs of the Afghan population evolved, and which challenges concern you most today? Abdul Wahab Arash: Having worked in Afghanistan’s humanitarian sector for more than a decade, I have witnessed how conflict, displacement, poverty, economic instability and natural disasters have affected Afghan communities. While emergency needs have persisted, economic hardship, limited employment opportunities and recurring disasters have placed additional pressure on vulnerable families. One of my greatest concerns is the large-scale return of Afghan migrants from neighboring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, including people who have been deported or compelled to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, approximately 6.5 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan between mid-September 2023 and Aug. 31, 2026. These movements place additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already limited resources and public services. Many returnee families urgently need shelter, food, employment, healthcare, education and other essential services. Their reintegration requires not only emergency assistance but also sustainable livelihoods, housing support and access to basic services. Another major concern is the widening gap between humanitarian needs and available funding. Funding reductions mean fewer people may receive essential assistance, while humanitarian programs, local organizations and employment opportunities for qualified Afghan professionals are also affected. Economic hardship and limited livelihoods can drive dangerous and irregular migration as people seek safety, work and a more secure future. In my view, Afghanistan needs continued international solidarity alongside a stronger focus on resilience, livelihoods and investment in Afghan people. Emergency assistance remains essential, but wherever feasible it should also help families recover, protect their dignity and build more secure futures. TCA: What are the main obstacles to delivering effective international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan? What changes would help produce more sustainable results? Arash: In my experience, one of the main obstacles is the growing gap between humanitarian needs and available resources. Other challenges include limited livelihood opportunities, difficulties in coordination, potential duplication across programs and the need to connect emergency assistance more effectively with longer-term recovery. Afghanistan needs assistance to address immediate suffering, but it also needs a humanitarian system that invests in Afghan professionals, strengthens local capacity, creates fair employment opportunities and uses limited resources effectively. International expertise remains essential, but it should complement and strengthen national capacity rather than unnecessarily replace it. International organizations could explore more cost-effective operating models, including leaner offices in Kabul and greater reliance on qualified Afghan organizations to implement activities and monitor assistance at the community level. This could reduce...

С5+1

C5+1 Statement Omits Afghanistan, Prioritizes Trans-Caspian Trade

The United States and the five Central Asian republics have issued a joint statement on economic and security cooperation that makes no mention of Afghanistan, once a central concern of U.S. regional policy. The document followed the October 19 C5+1 ministerial meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. Afghanistan's absence from the statement does not mean it has disappeared from negotiations or Washington's strategic interests. Nevertheless, a comparison with earlier C5+1 documents reveals a shift in the published agenda. Where Washington once placed considerable importance on connecting Central Asia with South Asia through Afghanistan, the latest statement focuses on trade across the Caspian Sea and investment in the region's minerals. Afghanistan's Changing Place in C5+1 Talks In July 2021, just weeks before the Taliban retook Kabul, C5+1 participants at a conference in Tashkent explicitly supported closer trade and transport links between Central and South Asia through Afghanistan, as well as efforts to secure peace in the country. That month, the U.S., Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan also announced plans for a quadrilateral platform to support trade and transportation projects linking the two regions. In July 2023, Afghanistan was the subject of a separate C5+1 special session in Astana. Officials called for an inclusive Afghan government that respected women's rights and backed further development of transport and energy links through the country. A joint statement issued by C5+1 leaders that September described Afghanistan as an important factor in Central Asian security. In the 2026 Samarkand statement, Afghanistan goes unmentioned even in the section on border security and terrorism. However, the October 2023 C5+1 connectivity statement had already highlighted the Trans-Caspian Trade Route, which connects Central Asia to Western markets, and also omitted Afghanistan. For Central Asian countries, the Afghan route remains important in practical terms. Uzbekistan is pursuing plans for a railway through Afghanistan to Pakistan, which would give it access to Indian Ocean ports. Kazakhstan is already a major supplier of food to Afghanistan, exporting around $216 million worth of flour and $122 million of wheat in the first seven months of 2026. In September, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed with the United Arab Emirates to study a railway corridor through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all share borders with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also face the prospect of reduced water supplies from the Amu Darya as Afghanistan builds its Qosh Tepa Canal. Afghanistan's omission from a joint statement should therefore not be taken as a complete account of the policies of all five Central Asian states. What Constrains Washington One possible explanation lies in the U.S. approach to Afghanistan's current authorities. Washington allows practical contacts with representatives of the Taliban but does not recognize the government it has formed. The movement remains designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, although it is not included in the U.S. Department of State's separate list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The designation restricts dealings with the Taliban, although U.S. sanctions rules permit many commercial transactions involving Afghanistan's governing institutions, including civilian infrastructure and transportation projects....

CSTO

CSTO in No Hurry to Help Tajikistan

The authorities in Tajikistan have been ringing the alarm bells over events in neighboring Afghanistan for more than three decades. The Tajik government did so again after violence broke out along a small section of the Tajik-Afghan border in the last months of 2025, and specifically called on the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for assistance. The CSTO has responded, but the promised aid has yet to arrive as Tajikistan continues to seek stronger border defenses. The Perennial Border Problem There had been unrest in Afghanistan since the late 1970s, long before Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, and the instability along Tajikistan’s approximately 1,360-kilometer border with Afghanistan has continued ever since. Most of the border area is mountainous and sparsely inhabited, making it ideal for narcotics and weapons smuggling. Weapons smuggling was a huge problem during Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, when weapons were being brought back and forth across the Afghan frontier to fuel civil conflicts in both countries. From the first day of Tajikistan’s independence until June 2005, Russian border guards helped keep watch on Tajikistan’s Afghan frontier. At least several hundred Russian and Tajik border guards, and Tajik and Afghan smugglers and militants have been killed along the Tajik-Afghan border in the last 35 years. Many countries worried about Tajikistan’s border problems with Afghanistan. Neighbors such as China, the other Central Asian states, and not so far away, Russia did not want narcotics or militants from Afghanistan reaching their countries. In the mid- and late-1990s, the Taliban push through Afghanistan to the Central Asian border increased these neighbors’ concerns. After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, the United States and its allies used facilities in Central Asia to support troops in Afghanistan. All these countries, and more, contributed to Tajikistan’s border defenses in some way, either by simply donating housing materials or winter uniforms, or providing security monitoring equipment and weaponry. It has never been enough to totally stem the border problems, but the security aid Tajikistan received is far more than the country could ever have allocated for that purpose from its state coffers. Emomali Rahmon was Tajikistan’s president in the late 1990s when the Taliban first seized power in Afghanistan. Rahmon viewed the Taliban as a threat, and Tajikistan’s policies toward the Afghan militant group reflected that. Rahmon’s opinion of the Taliban did not change when they regained power in 2021, and despite the other Central Asian states establishing a dialogue and trade ties with the Taliban, Tajikistan has been slow to engage the returned rulers of Afghanistan. In June 2024, Rahmon’s eldest son and heir apparent, Rustam Emomali, told a meeting of the CSTO’s Parliamentary Assembly Council that “Afghanistan has once again become a breeding ground for terrorism.” Emomali said more than 1,000 radical madrassahs had been established in Afghanistan, some in areas close to Tajikistan’s border, and that these religious schools were also preparing suicide bombers. A Turbulent End to 2025 In late August 2025, Tajik border guards...

Regional Security

The Taliban’s Road Reaches China, but the Border is Closed

After several years of slow progress, the road connecting Afghanistan to China is finally ready. On October 4, Taliban officials inaugurated the 121-kilometer road through Afghanistan’s remote and arid northeastern Wakhan Corridor. China, however, has not been too keen on the project, and, according to one report, when the Taliban reached the Chinese border, the way was barred, with Chinese border guards ordering the Taliban to leave the area. The Hard Road The Wakhan Corridor was part of ancient trade routes through Asia, but was clearly only used by hardy merchants. The area is one of the most isolated regions on the planet. Nearly all of it is 4,000 meters or more above sea level, mostly bare stone mountains with some grass and a few trees and bushes growing on hillsides and in the valleys. The Wakhan Corridor officially appeared on maps as part of Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century. It was a buffer zone agreed to by representatives of the British and Russian empires. Today, the far eastern section of the Wakhan Corridor is the only place where Afghanistan directly borders China. That 74-kilometer border was easy to ignore due to the remoteness of the area, but not long after the Chinese revolution in 1949, officials in Beijing still ordered it closed. The harsh climate and rugged mountains make most of the corridor virtually unhabitable, but that did not stop some from believing a modern trade route could be opened through Wakhan that would connect Afghanistan to China. Dirt roads reached a few of the larger settlements in the western part of the corridor, villages of, at most, several hundred people. The Taliban just finished building a gravel road and four bridges that finally make it all the way to the Chinese border. By itself, this is far from sufficient to qualify as a legitimate trade route. There is no infrastructure to serve traffic through the region, no petrol stations, no accommodation, no places to buy food or drink, and temperatures are well below freezing for at least half the year. China’s Big Objection The bigger obstacle is that China has no strong interest in opening this route, and in fact, would prefer the Afghan border to remain closed. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is still present in Afghanistan. ETIM is comprised mainly of ethnic Uyghurs from China’s western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the same Chinese region that borders Afghanistan. ETIM’s goal is to topple Chinese rule in Xinjiang. ETIM fighters have been in Afghanistan for at least 25 years, and were allies of the Taliban during the years foreign troops were in Afghanistan. The Islamic State of Khorasan Province is active in northern Afghanistan, and that group has also made specific threats against the Chinese government. The Taliban have promised that they will not allow any group to use Afghan territory to plot or carry out attacks on neighboring countries. However, the Wakhan Corridor is part of Afghanistan’s Badakhshan Province, and the Taliban have...

Regional Security

China Seeks Closer Intelligence Cooperation with Tajikistan

China has called for closer intelligence cooperation with Tajikistan and stronger protection for Chinese citizens and businesses. Premier Li Qiang raised both issues during October 19 talks with President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe, following attacks that disrupted Chinese projects near the Afghan border. According to China’s Foreign Ministry, Li urged the two countries to “strengthen intelligence exchange and sharing” and deepen law enforcement cooperation. He also called for “strong measures” to protect Chinese nationals and enterprises in Tajikistan. Li placed those requests alongside proposals for closer economic ties, including cooperation in infrastructure and minerals. The Chinese account did not announce a new intelligence-sharing agreement or explain how the proposed cooperation would operate. Security concerns have already affected work on a major road connecting Tajikistan with China. Chinese specialists returned under armed protection to the Kalai-Khumb–Vanj section of the Dushanbe–Kulma highway earlier this year after construction stopped following the November 2025 killings. Tajikistan’s Transport Ministry said the specialists returned in April. Radio Ozodi subsequently described Tajik special forces guarding Chinese workers in Darvaz in late May. The project is funded by a $230 million Chinese grant and is being carried out by China Road and Bridge Corporation. The road runs through difficult mountain terrain toward the Kulma Pass on the Chinese frontier. Its reconstruction is intended to shorten journeys and improve year-round access. For workers on sections close to the Afghan border, however, returning to construction also required protection from armed attacks. On November 26, 2025, an assault on a company camp in Tajikistan’s Khatlon region killed three Chinese workers. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry said the attack came from Afghanistan and involved a drone carrying explosives. Four days later, gunmen targeted China Road and Bridge Corporation employees in Darvaz district. Two Chinese nationals were killed. Tajik border officials said the perpetrators came from Afghanistan, but did not publicly identify the organization responsible. Beijing subsequently pressed Dushanbe to protect its citizens. Rahmon convened senior security officials and ordered measures to prevent further attacks. Taliban officials announced two arrests in December 2025 in connection with the killings, but did not publicly identify the suspects. China’s economic connections with Tajikistan have continued to expand. On October 17, state-owned Tajiktelecom and China Mobile International launched a direct fiber-optic link through the Pamirs. The connection has an initial capacity of up to one terabit per second and provides an additional route to international communications networks. The Tajik section extends for 1,010 kilometers, including 435 kilometers through Gorno-Badakhshan, joining China’s network at the Kulma Pass. Together with the highway, the cable illustrates the importance of eastern Tajikistan to the countries’ cross-border infrastructure. For Tajikistan, the immediate issue is protecting the people building and operating these connections. Li’s request brings the protection of those workers into discussions about closer intelligence cooperation at the highest level.

Regional Security

Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks

Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals...