• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1073

Islamic State Khorasan Province Expands Reach Beyond Afghanistan

More than a decade has passed since the formal emergence of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). For Central Asia, the history of this group is especially significant: the region features prominently in its propaganda and recruitment, and people from Central Asian countries have become part of transnational networks linked to ISKP. Today, ISKP must be assessed as more than an armed group operating in Afghanistan. Over the past decade, it has repeatedly lost leaders, been driven from most of its original territorial strongholds, and endured several major campaigns against it. Yet it has not disappeared. The current iteration of ISKP differs markedly from the organization that tried to establish itself in eastern Afghanistan in 2015-16. The main change is that it has learned to survive and spread its influence without controlling substantial territory. This transformation makes it especially important for Central Asia. Distance from the Afghan border and the number of districts under the group’s control are becoming less important measures of the threat. Its ability to maintain transnational ties, address audiences in local languages, and use migrant and digital networks is becoming more important. A large body of recent research, including a recently published monograph by the Usanas Foundation, makes it possible to trace this transformation. The group’s decade-long history is important for what it reveals about changes in the modern terrorist threat: loss of territory and a decline in membership do not necessarily mean an organization will disappear. ISKP did not emerge in a vacuum. Its original core was formed largely by members of existing jihadist organizations. They included former commanders of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Taliban members, and representatives of other groups who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leadership after the organization emerged in Iraq and Syria. On January 26, 2015, Islamic State officially announced the creation of its “Khorasan Province.” Eastern Afghanistan became its main territorial base. This choice was no accident. Significant Salafi communities and religious networks had long existed in the region. Their development can be traced at least to the Soviet-Afghan War of the 1980s, and by 1990, Kunar Province already had its own Salafi political-religious movement, which briefly established the Islamic Emirate of Kunar. These networks should not automatically be equated with jihadism, but the presence of an established religious milieu and long-standing tensions between some Salafis and the Taliban gave ISKP more favorable conditions for its initial recruitment and entrenchment. The initial strategy largely replicated the Islamic State model in Iraq and Syria. ISKP sought to do more than carry out terrorist attacks. It tried to establish itself on the ground, build bases and its own control structures, collect local revenue, and demonstrate an ability to impose an alternative order. It was an effort to implement a specific territorial project. That effort to establish a territorial foothold soon became the group’s main source of vulnerability. From the middle of the decade, ISKP came under pressure from several adversaries at once. The armed forces of the former Afghan government and the...

TAPI Pipeline Moves Closer to First Gas Sales in Afghanistan

After decades of delays, the TAPI gas pipeline has moved closer than ever to actual gas sales – but first to the smallest of its intended markets. Turkmenistan is preparing to supply gas to Afghanistan’s Herat province, while the timeline for extending the pipeline to Pakistan and India remains uncertain. On August 10, state-owned Turkmengaz and Afghan Gas signed a memorandum covering the purchase of gas through TAPI. The document does not itself set a price or supply volume, but it brings closer the prospect that Afghanistan could become the first TAPI customer actually to receive gas. Afghanistan was already part of TAPI’s original customer base. Afghan Gas and Turkmengaz signed a gas sale-and-purchase agreement in 2013. What has changed is that the pipeline is now approaching a market it can physically serve. On August 27, Herat Governor Islam Jar said the local section of TAPI was expected to be commissioned within two months. Turkmenistan has not announced an equally specific date for the start of commercial gas supplies. TAPI was conceived as an approximately 1,800-kilometer pipeline running from Turkmenistan’s giant Galkynysh gas field through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian border. Its planned capacity is 33 billion cubic meters of gas a year. At full capacity, Pakistan and India are each allocated 14 billion cubic meters of gas a year, while Afghanistan is allocated 5 billion. But after decades of planning, the pipeline has still not reached its principal intended customers. Construction of the 153-kilometer section from the Turkmen border toward Herat began in September 2024. Earlier this year, Turkmenistan said it expected to complete the section by the end of 2026, but no timetable has been announced for extending the pipeline farther south. According to the Afghan side, 116 kilometers of pipeline had been laid by early August. The August agreement also envisages the infrastructure needed to use the gas locally. Turkmen and Afghan officials have agreed to develop infrastructure in Herat to supply gas to industrial facilities, power plants, and households. The volumes involved would be modest compared with the roughly 30 billion cubic meters of gas Turkmenistan exports to China each year. But even limited sales through TAPI would give Ashgabat another export outlet. In February, Turkmenistan's still-influential former president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov described diversification of gas exports as one of the country’s main priorities. For TAPI itself, however, the first gas sales could matter even if the volumes are modest. Writing for The Times of Central Asia, Central Asia analyst Bruce Pannier noted that amid strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as between Pakistan and India, completion of the entire TAPI pipeline remains a distant prospect. He argued that supplying Herat alone could demonstrate to potential investors that the pipeline actually works. The memorandum signed on August 10 has offered little clarity on price, volumes and start dates. Afghanistan has separately proposed negotiating a long-term contract and pricing formula, while the gas distribution network in Herat still needs to be developed. The governor’s statement that the...

JICA’s Sota Tosaka on Afghanistan’s Economic Ties With Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is deepening trade and transport ties with Afghanistan despite continuing political and humanitarian concerns, drawing its southern neighbor closer to Central Asian markets. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Sota Tosaka, chief representative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for Afghanistan, described that engagement as part of a practical regional approach. Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries, he said, are seeking areas where economic cooperation can continue. Tosaka, who previously worked at JICA headquarters overseeing Central Asia and the Caucasus, has also visited Uzbekistan several times, including Termez. He said his current position gives him a different perspective on the relationship between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. “I previously visited Termez in 2019 when I was overseeing the Central Asia and Caucasus region at JICA headquarters,” Tosaka told The Times of Central Asia. “At that time, the free trade zone aimed at facilitating business with Afghanistan did not exist yet. Returning to Termez recently, I was genuinely surprised to see how much progress has been made and how actively various cross-border initiatives are now being explored and implemented through Termez to connect Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.” Since taking charge of JICA’s Afghanistan operations, his work has focused on supporting Afghan people through international organizations. Tosaka noted that JICA’s primary focus remains on addressing the immediate needs of the Afghan population. To ensure that assistance directly reaches local communities and vulnerable groups, the agency coordinates its support through United Nations agencies and international partners. “Our priority is to deliver tangible support directly to the people of Afghanistan,” he said. “Working alongside UN partners allows us to effectively implement humanitarian activities that address daily challenges on the ground.” “Although the geopolitical environment surrounding Afghanistan has shifted significantly, Central Asian nations are actively pursuing opportunities to expand economic ties from their respective strategic viewpoints,” Tosaka continued. “Recognizing the importance of regional stability, countries like Uzbekistan are taking pragmatic steps to foster trade and commercial cooperation that serve mutual interests.” In particular, Uzbekistan’s proactive approach to encouraging business initiatives reflects a broader regional trend aimed at maintaining essential economic linkages. For Uzbekistan, the economic relationship has already become significant. Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said in February that bilateral trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has increased 2.5 times over the past five years, from $653 million in 2021 to $1.7 billion in 2025. The two countries have set a goal of raising annual trade to $5 billion. Tosaka noted that this economic orientation may become increasingly crucial given the diplomatic and logistical constraints Afghanistan faces on its eastern and western borders. “Complex relations with Pakistan and the geopolitical situation involving Iran present significant challenges for Afghanistan,” he explained. “Consequently, deepening economic ties with its northern neighbors becomes a vital strategic alternative. In this context, Central Asian nations serve as indispensable partners, creating mutually beneficial opportunities for sustainable regional development.” In parallel with these macro-economic trends, JICA is dedicated to strengthening grassroots economic resilience by empowering Afghan entrepreneurs, particularly women, in...

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...

Central Asia Builds a Regional Track for Engagement with Afghanistan

The United States and Europe may have stepped back from Afghanistan, but the country’s instability still affects migration, security, trade, and humanitarian pressures far beyond its borders. Given their proximity, Central Asian states cannot and have not disengaged, and their efforts to keep Kabul connected to regional diplomacy and commerce serve interests that are also shared by the West. On June 16, the Center for Strategic Studies of Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the first Afghanistan-Central Asia Think Tank Forum in Kabul, bringing together leaders and senior representatives from strategic research institutions across the region. Held under the theme "The Strategic Role of Think Tanks in Advancing Regional Cooperation," the forum included delegations from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan alongside their Afghan counterparts. [caption id="attachment_52266" align="aligncenter" width="1080"] Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan[/caption] In his keynote address, Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi observed that the international order stands at a delicate crossroads, divided by competing narratives and opposing camps: “Given the developments and challenges in the global structure, the current international order finds itself at a sensitive juncture in history — a period marked, on the one hand, by various illusions and contradictory narratives, and, on the other, by efforts toward cooperation and multilateralism.” In essence, Muttaqi was advocating for an international order that allows Afghanistan and its neighbors to chart their own courses while engaging constructively with willing partners. Speaking to those in his immediate region, he drew attention to shared challenges, among them climate change, water shortages, economic headwinds, and conflict spillover, and asserted that “There is no doubt that, in order to make more effective and constructive decisions and to develop indigenous narratives for our region and shared future, specialists and researchers from academic and intellectual institutions must draft practical and comprehensive roadmaps for future cooperation across various fields.” Muttaqi underscored to participants the growing recognition that regional states stand to gain more through practical cooperation than through isolation or unilateral approaches. He reaffirmed Afghanistan's commitment to advancing the research-based proposals discussed at the April Consultative Dialogue in Kabul to help inform regional political and economic decision-making. His remarks reflected a view that broad-based economic development and good-neighborly relations are mutually reinforcing foundations of societal stability within a shared civilizational context—a perspective widely shared across the Central Asian republics. That is why, for example, he highlighted the need to follow through on economic and connectivity opportunities, citing projects such as CASA-1000, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission project (TAP-500), the Lapis Lazuli Route, and the Afghan-Trans railway. These initiatives are in various stages of development, some having been stalled for decades. Javlon Vakhabov, former Uzbek ambassador to the United States and currently Director of the International Institute for Central Asia (IICA) in Tashkent, travelled to Kabul for the Forum. In his address, he summed up the mood of the participants: “In this emerging Greater Central Asia, Afghanistan is not a periphery. It is the southern gateway of our region, linking Central...

Twenty-Five Years Ago, Karimov and Powell Opened a Humanitarian Lifeline. Today, Global Support Wanes

During the first week of June 2026, World Food Programme Afghanistan Country Director John Aylieff, Supply Chain Officer Shukhratmirzo Khodzhaev, and TCA’s Javier M Piedra visited the Termez–Hairatan border crossing and the Termez Free Economic Zone (TFEZ), a logistics hub between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan on the Amu Darya River. The trip was organized by the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies (ISRS) in connection with Termez Dialogue 2026, a flagship Uzbekistan initiative designed to advance economic integration, trade, and cultural exchange across Central and South Asia. For 25 years, Uzbekistan has maintained the Termez crossing as a key humanitarian gateway, ensuring Afghanistan’s continued access to regional and global supply chains. [caption id="attachment_51321" align="aligncenter" width="850"] Geographical position of the Amu Darya; source: snipview.com/amudarya[/caption] A quarter-century on, the gateway that has saved millions of Afghans from famine remains open, but the funding that makes it so meaningful is on life support. While Central Asia has stepped up, its increased contributions only partially offset the huge shortfall left by wealthier countries. Termez, Uzbekistan Twenty-five years ago, with winter approaching, borders closed, logistics shattered, and five million Afghans in urgent need of food, WFP's Petar Bojilov and Tim Lavelle—on loan to USAID OFDA's DART from USUN Rome—took on an impossible mission: to open a lifeline and get emergency food aid across the Amu Darya River from Uzbekistan into Afghanistan. What began with one barge and a handful of hopelessly underequipped and understaffed personnel in 2001 has become one of the world's most consequential logistics hubs, through which WFP has delivered over 220,000 metric tons of food into Afghanistan in recent years. In 2026, the Bridge of Friendship Marks its 25th Anniversary Once a barely functional border crossing, Termez is now a Free Economic Zone (AIRITOM) with multimodal connectivity and extensive storage, providing WFP with what John Aylieff calls unmatched operational flexibility. “What makes the Termez hub today so strategically important is its reliability and versatility,” says Aylieff. “It offers dependable transshipment through multiple Afghan corridors—a vital lifeline where speed matters – as well as loading and storage. Given current geopolitical tensions, from the closure of the Pakistan–Afghanistan border to the spillover of the Middle East crisis, its role has become even more essential for humanitarian operations.” [caption id="attachment_51320" align="aligncenter" width="761"] John Aylieff and Javier Piedra, Termez (June 7th, 2026). Image: TCA[/caption] Since February 2026, violence along Afghanistan's 2,400-kilometre border with Pakistan has escalated sharply, triggering the displacement of approximately 20,000 families. With heightened instability along the Afghan-Pakistan border and in Iran, forced returns of Afghan refugees have increased sharply; the Termez transit corridor has become all the more critical as a channel for humanitarian food aid. Termez's value extends well beyond WFP's own operations. "The hub not only serves WFP in Afghanistan but also supports numerous humanitarian agencies in the country, including UNHCR, UNFPA, and UNICEF," says Aylieff. "It is the backbone of the northern corridor supply chain into Afghanistan, and more and more agencies are relying on WFP's logistics capabilities to bring their...