Astana and Tashkent Engage Washington’s Central Asia Vector
On January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace charter. The document matters less than what their participation signifies: recognized access to the White House and a willingness to be publicly associated with a U.S.-led initiative. This is all the more significant as Washington’s relations with several long-standing partners have recently become more fraught and publicly contested. The Central Asian response is part of that story. Their participation indicates that the Trump White House regards them as interlocutors of consequence, and that both Central Asian capitals are embracing that status. On December 1, Washington assumed the G20 presidency for 2026 and set three priorities: limiting regulatory burdens, strengthening affordable and secure energy supply chains, and advancing technology and innovation. It has also scheduled the leaders’ summit for December 14–15, 2026, in the Miami area. On December 23, Trump said that he was inviting Tokayev and Mirziyoyev to attend as guests. That invitation places Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan inside a host-defined agenda whose working tracks overlap with their strongest external bargaining assets, including energy, critical minerals potential, and transport connectivity. Trump publicly tied the invitations to discussions of peace, trade, and cooperation, which is in line with his subsequent Board of Peace invitations. Diplomatic Logic and Multi-Vectorism It is worthwhile situating these developments in the context of Central Asian cooperation, which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have driven as the regional core. At the August 2024 Consultative Meeting in Astana, all five leaders signed a Roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025–2027, and adopted a “Central Asia 2040” conceptual framework. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev referenced their 2022 allied-relations agreement and announced plans to adopt a strategic partnership program through 2034, including large-scale joint economic and energy projects. Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has widened the room for maneuver by other external actors, and Central Asian capitals have pursued these opportunities selectively. For example, the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in early August 2024, Japan has pursued its “Central Asia plus Japan” line as a counterweight to China’s influence, and Azerbaijan has been building an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Washington’s main channel into this complex is the C5+1, and the current U.S. emphasis is to create routines that survive individual summits. The U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau travelled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October 2025 ahead of the Washington summit that Trump hosted the following month for the five leaders. Such formats can concentrate attention on the implementation of standardized procurement procedures and regularized dispute resolution that new supply-chain corridors require for interoperable paperwork and predictable customs treatment. Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to host the second B5+1 forum (the business counterpart to C5+1) on February 4–5, 2026. This has already been prepared by a joint briefing...
