Caspian Pipeline Consortium - The Times Of Central Asia

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Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Chevron Says CPC Is Loading Tankers as Kazakhstan Restores Oil Intake

Chevron CEO Mike Wirth said that oil was flowing through the CPC pipeline and tankers were being loaded on July 31, one day after two vessels were attacked near its Black Sea terminal. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry said intake reached 100,000 metric tons a day from August 1 and rejected reports of a complete shutdown. “The pipeline is flowing. We’ve been loading ships this week,” Wirth said during Chevron’s second-quarter earnings call. He said two of CPC’s three single-point moorings were in service. The third was undergoing refurbishment and was expected to return during the third quarter. The ministry said CPC temporarily suspended pipeline system operations on July 31 but continued receiving crude and filling storage tanks. A complete shutdown “is not being considered,” it said. Further increases would depend on tankers arriving for loading near Novorossiysk. The two statements indicate that loadings restarted quickly after the July 30 attacks, but do not establish a full return to planned export volumes. CPC can receive crude while storage space remains available, but if tanker loadings fall behind, storage fills and producers must cut output as they did in late July. On August 2, OPEC+ raised Kazakhstan’s September target by 10,000 barrels per day to 1.628 million barrels. The increase formed part of a combined 188,000-barrel-per-day rise for Kazakhstan and six other producers. The group said countries that had exceeded their quotas since January 2024 would make up for the excess by producing less in future months. A separate OPEC+ monitoring committee, which includes Kazakhstan, stressed the “critical importance” of safeguarding international maritime routes and expressed concern about attacks on energy infrastructure. Its statement did not name CPC or the Black Sea incidents. For Kazakhstan, the higher quota may have little immediate effect if export flows remain constrained. Reuters has reported that OPEC+ may pause further increases after September while it reviews production capacity for quota baselines which will apply in 2027. The immediate risk is a repeat of late July, when disrupted loadings filled storage and forced sharp production cuts at Tengiz and other major fields. CPC loadings had resumed on July 27 after a week-long suspension. Three days later, two more tankers were attacked near the terminal. NISSOS SIFNOS was struck while loading Tengizchevroil crude at the SPM-3 offshore mooring, while MARATHI was hit while waiting for a berth about six nautical miles offshore. Both fires were extinguished, and no injuries to the crews or pollution were reported. Neither CPC nor Kazakhstan publicly identified an attacker. Ukraine’s drone forces later said they had struck four Russian tankers in the Black and Azov seas, but did not name the vessels or locations. The earlier stoppage had already demonstrated how swiftly export disruption can reach Kazakhstan’s oilfields. National oil and gas condensate production fell to about one million barrels per day on July 26, less than half the June average of 2.16 million barrels per day. CPC runs for about 1,510 kilometers from western Kazakhstan through Russia to the Black Sea. It handles...

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Europe Must Defend the Distinction It Has Made Between Kazakhstani and Russian Oil

In the early hours of July 30, drones struck two tankers at the marine terminal of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) near Novorossiysk: the Nissos Sifnos while it was loading Tengizchevroil crude at Single Point Mooring 3, and the Marathi as it approached the terminal. Loading was temporarily suspended, although the pipeline remained operational. Neither vessel sank; no casualties or oil spill were reported. Earlier attacks in July had already interrupted CPC loading operations and prompted a formal protest from Kazakhstan. Astana said that an agreed mechanism for exchanging information about civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded. The recurrence was more important than the damage: it could alter commercial expectations and behavior. The pipeline is not the relevant analytical unit; the export chain is. It can remain operational even when the maritime egress of its oil to world markets has ceased to function. Once loading stops and terminal storage fills, CPC must restrict intake from Kazakhstan, transmitting the interruption backward through the system until producers reduce output. After two tankers bound for the CPC terminal were struck in January, Black Sea war-risk premiums rose from 0.6–0.8% to 1% of vessel value, while insurers shortened their review of terms from every 48 hours to every 24 hours. By July, vessels were avoiding the terminal on safety grounds even though no structural damage to it had been reported. Commercial use of CPC was thus impaired despite the integrity of its infrastructure. The concentration of Kazakhstan’s exports magnifies the effect. CPC carries approximately four-fifths of its oil exports, including production from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak. The July interruption exposed the consequence: full terminal storage obliged CPC to halt intake, while the Kazakhstani government confirmed that producers had reduced output because of export constraints. The vulnerability reaches backward from maritime egress into production. Crude from Kazakhstan occupies a material place in the EU’s non-Russian import structure, giving Europe a direct interest in the matter. Kazakhstan supplied 11.5% of EU petroleum-oil imports in 2024 and 9.6% in the first quarter of 2026, ranking among the Union’s three largest suppliers in both periods. The EU’s sanctions architecture already recognizes that Kazakhstani oil passing through Russian territory does not thereby become Russian oil. Commission guidance treats CPC crude as originating in Kazakhstan when supported by certificates of origin or other documentation, notwithstanding unavoidable admixture with Russian oil. EU legislation also provides targeted derogations permitting goods, technology, and services required for the operation and maintenance of CPC infrastructure. The differentiated treatment is narrow: it attaches to the origin and documentation of the cargo, not indiscriminately to every vessel, facility, or transaction associated with CPC. Cargo, route, terminal, and vessel remain legally separable. The distinction became especially salient when the sanctioned Nelsa, which had carried Russian Urals crude, was attacked at the same terminal after vessels loading Kazakhstani crude had been struck. Europe nevertheless lacks a CPC-specific public-policy position on repeated disruption of the export chain carrying exempted crude, even though its...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan Weighs Proposal to Process Russian Crude

Kazakhstan is considering a plan to process Russian crude at its refineries, a step Astana says could support plant utilization and domestic fuel supplies but could also raise sanctions-compliance and diplomatic questions, depending on its scale and structure. The Energy Ministry said on July 30 that discussions cover refining oil “of Russian origin,” selling part of the output in Kazakhstan, and exporting part back to Russia. It did not identify the refineries, volumes, counterparties, or commercial terms. The talks come as parts of Russia face fuel shortages following repeated Ukrainian strikes on refineries. Moscow has extended export restrictions on gasoline, diesel, marine fuel, and gas oils until January 31, 2027, although producers regain exemptions for several products from September 1. The two countries already exchange crude, feedstock, and refined products. Russia discussed buying about 50,000 metric tons of Kazakh gasoline in June. Astana said at the time that it had received no formal request and would protect domestic supply. Trade has since moved beyond discussion. Kazakhstan's Condensate refinery is processing Russian naphtha and exported gasoline to Russia for the first time in July. Kazakhstan has a practical industrial case for considering the proposal. Although the ministry has not identified any refinery involved in the talks, the Pavlodar refinery was designed to process West Siberian crude and remains connected to Russian supply routes. The two countries share extensive energy transport systems and coordinate annual fuel balances. The ministry said steady feedstock would support refinery utilization and domestic supply. The wider regional focus on fuel security was evident on July 31, when Tajik President Emomali Rahmon proposed building large oil refineries in Central Asia, prioritizing domestic demand for essential petroleum products. Decades of infrastructure integration also constrain Kazakhstan’s room for maneuver. More than 80% of its oil exports cross Russian territory through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Much of Kazakhstan’s rail trade is tied to Russian networks. These links narrow Kazakhstan’s near-term options and raise the economic cost of abrupt changes to established energy arrangements. The scale and destination of the resulting fuel would determine much of the political meaning. Small volumes sold mainly in Kazakhstan could resemble established regional commerce. A larger export-oriented program supplying Russia during a period of refinery disruption would draw more scrutiny, particularly if it materially eased pressure on Russia’s fuel system. The sensitivity has been heightened by renewed disruption around the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. On July 30, attacks hit NISSOS SIFNOS and MARATHI near the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk. Oil loading stopped only three days after Kazakhstan resumed exports following a week-long disruption. The route is Kazakhstan’s principal oil export artery. The earlier stoppage cut national oil and gas condensate output to about one million barrels per day by July 26, less than half the June average. Russia explicitly blamed Ukraine. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova called the July 30 strikes “actions of a terrorist nature” and said they harmed Kazakh and U.S. economic interests. Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry confirmed the incidents but did not name an attacker....

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

CPC Halts Oil Loadings Again After Two More Tankers Attacked Near Novorossiysk

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium has stopped oil loading at its Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk after two more tankers were attacked early on July 30. The suspension came only three days after Kazakhstan resumed exports through the route following a week-long disruption. The Marshall Islands-flagged NISSOS SIFNOS was attacked at 1:48 a.m. Moscow time while loading Tengizchevroil crude at single-point mooring SPM-3, CPC said. A drone hit the cargo deck near the manifolds used to receive oil. The strike caused a fire, which the crew extinguished with help from three CPC support vessels. CPC said no employees or contractors were injured, no oil spill occurred, and the crew did not request medical assistance or evacuation. Okeanis Eco Tankers, the vessel’s owner, said NISSOS SIFNOS sustained only minor damage, its crew was safe, and no spill or pollution occurred. The company said the tanker was continuing its voyage operations. The tanker MARATHI was also attacked while awaiting a berth at the CPC terminal, about six nautical miles, or eleven kilometres, offshore. Dynacom Tankers, the vessel’s operator, said it was struck by two projectiles of unknown origin. The resulting fire was extinguished by the crew, all of whom were safe and accounted for. No pollution was reported. Dynacom said it had activated its emergency response plan and remained in contact with the crew and the relevant authorities. “Oil loading has been stopped, while pipeline facilities are operating normally,” CPC said. The consortium did not identify who carried out either attack. No party had claimed responsibility when the suspension was announced. Ukraine’s drone forces later said they had struck four Russian tankers in the Black and Azov seas overnight but did not identify the vessels or locations. The statement therefore did not establish responsibility for the attacks on NISSOS SIFNOS or MARATHI. CPC said appeals from Kazakhstan and its foreign shareholders had been ignored. It said some representations were made through the U.S. State Department. On July 23, the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on South and Central Asia, Bill Huizenga, told The Times of Central Asia that further strikes affecting CPC infrastructure would “not be tolerated.” CPC said attacks near loading equipment could cause a major fire and oil spill. The consortium also warned of damage to Kazakhstan and to shippers including Chevron, ExxonMobil, Eni, TotalEnergies, and Shell. On July 27, CPC had restarted tanker loadings and resumed accepting oil from Kazakhstan after storage constraints forced producers to cut output. The July 30 incidents bring the number of tankers struck near or while serving the CPC terminal during July to at least eight. The sequence began with the Chevron-chartered Yasa Polaris on July 7. Nordic Zenith was hit on July 17. ASIA and NISSOS IOS were attacked while loading Kazakh crude on July 19. NELSA was struck at SPM-1 on July 20, and HERA was reported damaged while approaching the terminal on July 23. The earlier attacks repeatedly stopped loadings. CPC then stopped accepting crude, and tankers scheduled to collect...

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Rubio and Kosherbayev Discuss CPC Ahead of Tokayev’s U.S. Visit

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a telephone conversation with Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev on 29 July. The discussion focused on the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, energy cooperation, critical minerals, trade and investment ties, and current international issues. According to the U.S. Department of State, Rubio and Kosherbayev discussed the importance of energy security, including the “reliable and uninterrupted” export of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the CPC system. Rubio also thanked Kazakhstan for supporting President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives and expressed interest in deepening bilateral economic cooperation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the two ministers discussed in detail the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, cooperation in the energy, transport and logistics sectors, supplies of critical minerals, efforts to attract U.S. investment, and coordination in international organisations. The ministry said the conversation also covered preparations for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s forthcoming visit to the United States for the G20 summit. The telephone call took place shortly after Kazakhstan resumed crude oil exports through the CPC system. The pipeline carries the vast majority of crude exports from the Tengiz oilfield, whose largest shareholders include the U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the two ministers reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining regular political dialogue. The conversation followed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with U.S. Senator Steve Daines on 8 July, when the two sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, attracting investment and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector. On 28 July, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kazakhstan had resumed oil exports through the CPC system after a week-long disruption at the consortium’s Black Sea marine terminal near Novorossiysk. The interruption more than halved oil production at Tengiz and again highlighted Kazakhstan’s dependence on its principal oil export route.

Energy Security

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...