Caspian Pipeline Consortium - The Times Of Central Asia

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U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Rubio and Kosherbayev Discuss CPC Ahead of Tokayev’s U.S. Visit

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a telephone conversation with Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev on 29 July. The discussion focused on the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, energy cooperation, critical minerals, trade and investment ties, and current international issues. According to the U.S. Department of State, Rubio and Kosherbayev discussed the importance of energy security, including the “reliable and uninterrupted” export of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the CPC system. Rubio also thanked Kazakhstan for supporting President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives and expressed interest in deepening bilateral economic cooperation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the two ministers discussed in detail the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, cooperation in the energy, transport and logistics sectors, supplies of critical minerals, efforts to attract U.S. investment, and coordination in international organisations. The ministry said the conversation also covered preparations for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s forthcoming visit to the United States for the G20 summit. The telephone call took place shortly after Kazakhstan resumed crude oil exports through the CPC system. The pipeline carries the vast majority of crude exports from the Tengiz oilfield, whose largest shareholders include the U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the two ministers reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining regular political dialogue. The conversation followed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with U.S. Senator Steve Daines on 8 July, when the two sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, attracting investment and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector. On 28 July, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kazakhstan had resumed oil exports through the CPC system after a week-long disruption at the consortium’s Black Sea marine terminal near Novorossiysk. The interruption more than halved oil production at Tengiz and again highlighted Kazakhstan’s dependence on its principal oil export route.

Energy Security

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...

opinion

Kazakhstan’s Mineral Future Still Carries an Oil Risk Premium

In June, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev went to Brussels with a future-facing offer: Kazakhstan could become Europe’s non-Chinese option in critical minerals. Astana presented the country as a base for processing, long-term offtake, and industrial cooperation, rather than another source of ore. A month later, Kazakhstan’s older vulnerability reappeared. Drone attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk disrupted loadings and forced production cuts in Kazakhstan. By July 27, loading had resumed, with tankers receiving crude supplied by Tengizchevroil. The interruption was brief, but it exposed a structural problem. Kazakhstan’s future mineral offer still rests on an economy whose main export artery runs through Russia and the Black Sea. That is the central tension in Kazakhstan’s new resource diplomacy. Astana wants Europe to help build a future supply chain. Its present still depends on an oil corridor it does not fully control. Kazakhstan is asking Europe to make future demand bankable. A mineral deposit does not become part of a European supply chain when officials announce it in a joint statement. It needs geological confirmation, financing, processing technology, reliable power, water, logistics, and customers prepared to sign contracts years before the first shipment. This is why offtake sits at the heart of Tokayev’s proposal. Long-term purchase commitments can turn European concern over Chinese dominance into financeable projects. If Europe wants another source tomorrow, it must help fund extraction, processing, and internationally accepted standards today. Kazakhstan says it is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU’s critical raw materials list. It also wants more of the value chain to remain at home. European capital and technology would support local processing, laboratories, skills, and higher-value production instead of simply moving raw materials abroad. Europe has good reason to listen. China dominates the processing of many minerals used in batteries, advanced manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and defence. European industry wants alternatives, but diversification cannot be improvised after a supply shock. Mines and processing plants take years to finance, permit, construct, and qualify. For Kazakhstan, the minerals offer is also an attempt to upgrade an older relationship. Western companies already know the country through Tengiz, Kashagan, and decades of oil investment. Astana now wants to move from extraction towards processing and a stronger position in industrial supply chains. But the old oil story still prices the new minerals story. The CPC episode showed why. The pipeline carries crude from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak through Russian territory to Novorossiysk. It handles more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and ties much of the country’s hard-currency income to a route outside Astana’s full control. A short halt was enough to cut output sharply at fields more than 1,500 kilometres away. Tokayev’s call in Omsk to freeze the war in Ukraine should be read partly in that context. It reflected more than the diplomatic caution expected from a neighbour of Russia. The war is now touching Kazakhstan’s export system through tanker security, insurance risk, production schedules, and investor confidence. Astana wants European finance for...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Kazakhstan Resumes CPC Oil Exports After Output More Than Halves

Kazakhstan resumed oil exports through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium on July 27 after the consortium restarted accepting crude and loading tankers at its Black Sea terminal near Novorossiysk. The Energy Ministry said the SEAMAJESTY and MILOS tankers were loading crude supplied by Tengizchevroil at two of the terminal’s single-point moorings. CPC said its pipeline had been back online since 12:28 p.m. Moscow time. Loading operations resumed after a week-long suspension. The ministry said terminal operations would continue according to assessments of the security situation and compliance with safety requirements. It remains in contact with CPC management, oil producers, and other companies involved in the shipments. The restart followed the sharpest production decline recorded during the disruption. Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate output fell to about one million barrels per day on July 26, according to an industry source. That was less than half the June average of 2.16 million barrels per day. Production had already fallen by about 21% as of July 22, to 1.63 million barrels per day. Tengiz, Kazakhstan’s largest oilfield, bore the heaviest initial reduction. Its output dropped by 56%, from a July average of 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000 barrels per day. By July 26, the cuts had spread across Kazakhstan’s three largest oil projects. Daily production at Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak fell by between 70% and 90% compared with June levels, according to an industry source. The Energy Ministry and the projects’ operators did not comment on the field-level figures. Producers reduced output after CPC restricted intake from Kazakhstan and suspended tanker loadings. Storage tanks at the terminal had reached capacity, leaving the pipeline system with little room to receive additional crude. The Energy Ministry described the reductions as a technical measure intended to keep production operations stable. The halt followed a series of drone attacks on tankers near the CPC terminal. Three vessels were struck on July 17 and 19, including two loading Kazakh oil. Loadings briefly resumed before another tanker, NELSA, was hit at a single-point mooring on July 20. No casualties or oil spills were reported. Kazakhstan condemned the attacks and said an agreed information-sharing mechanism intended to protect civilian vessels carrying CPC crude had been disregarded. The government described the incidents as a threat to international energy security and demanded an immediate halt. The 1,510-kilometer CPC pipeline carries crude from western Kazakhstan through Russia to the Black Sea. It handles more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, including most production from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak. The shutdown added to a difficult year for the sector. Kazakhstan produced 45.7 million tonnes of oil in the first half of 2026, down 8.4% year-on-year. The ministry expects full-year production of 98 million tonnes after lowering its previous target because of earlier Tengiz outages and CPC disruptions. It was not immediately clear how quickly output would return to earlier levels. The reopening restores Kazakhstan’s main export outlet, but the speed and scale of the cuts again exposed its dependence on infrastructure vulnerable to...

Russia's War in Ukraine

Why Tokayev Urged Putin to Freeze the War in Ukraine

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has delivered his most direct public appeal to Vladimir Putin for an end to Russia's war in Ukraine. Speaking alongside the Russian president during the 22nd Kazakhstan-Russia Interregional Cooperation Forum in Omsk on July 25, Tokayev called for freezing the war and returning to what he described as the "Istanbul Formula 2.0." For many observers, the statement marked a significant departure from the cautious language traditionally used by leaders across the post-Soviet region. Although Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly criticized the war and reaffirmed support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, Tokayev's intervention was notable because he advanced a concrete proposal directly to Putin on Russian territory. Tokayev's remarks were consistent with Kazakhstan's long-standing foreign policy, which has emphasized negotiated settlements and diplomatic conflict resolution. While Russia remains one of Kazakhstan's largest trading partners and a crucial infrastructure partner, Astana has not recognized Moscow's annexation of Ukrainian territory. The war has also become a direct economic concern for Kazakhstan. More than 80% of the country's crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), whose Black Sea export route has recently been affected by attacks on tankers and related security incidents. Those disruptions have highlighted Kazakhstan's continued dependence on the CPC corridor and the risks posed by an expanding conflict zone. Tokayev's Proposal According to the Kremlin transcript, Tokayev told Putin that he had been receiving “many signals” from Europe and the United States regarding the current state of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and had already discussed them with the Russian president by telephone. Tokayev also stressed that he regarded the conflict as an interstate war rather than a civil war. He added that Kazakhstan had always treated the Ukrainian people, their culture and their language with respect. He further said Putin had demonstrated “maximum diplomatic flexibility” during his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Anchorage, Alaska. “This is simply my humble opinion, since people keep asking me: perhaps the conflict should already be frozen, and we should return to the ‘Istanbul Formula 2.0,’ because significant results had been achieved there. Then, naturally, under guarantees from the major powers, including Russia, it would be possible to move toward long-awaited peace,” Tokayev said. Tokayev also made clear that he did not intend to serve as an official mediator in any future negotiations. Tokayev did not define the formula in detail. Russia and Ukraine held talks in Istanbul in 2022 and resumed direct negotiations there in 2025, but neither round produced a settlement. It remains unclear whether he envisaged a ceasefire along the current front line, how occupied territory would be treated, or what guarantees any major powers would provide. Planned or Spontaneous? Major strategic decisions in the post-Soviet space have traditionally been shaped behind closed doors. That is one reason why Tokayev's remarks, delivered while sitting beside Putin, immediately attracted the attention of political analysts. Several experts argue that such a proposal was unlikely to have been made spontaneously. Tokayev's call to freeze the fighting and resume negotiations...