• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10431 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 9

Why Regional Connectivity Is Reshaping Central Asia: Insights from ISRS Director Eldor Aripov (Part Two)

The Times of Central Asia presents the second part of an interview in Washington, D.C. with Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan. Dr. Aripov sat down with our Washington Correspondent, Javier M. Piedra, to discuss Uzbekistan’s geoeconomic and geopolitical strategic thinking. The conversation focused on Uzbekistan’s and the region’s efforts to cooperate diplomatically to maintain peace and stability with neighbors, irrespective of historical “hotspots,” cultural sensitivities, or the all-important matter of water resources. Aripov comments on Afghanistan, Chabahar Port (Iran), Ferghana Valley, and business development – key for U.S. investors thinking about Uzbekistan and the broader Central Asian region. TCA: What message do you have for businesses and private investors who do not have any experience in Central Asia? Many companies are sniffing around at this time – what do you want to tell them? Aripov: Uzbekistan is ready for committed investors - those who deliver lasting benefits, quality jobs, and shared prosperity. A decade of reforms has strengthened our fiscal discipline, boosted SMEs, and anchored stability. Coupled with our focus on good relations and a secure, integrated Central Asia, we offer a reliable platform for long-term, sustainable investment. While we have more work to do, we invite you to be part of our momentum. TCA: What are the risks that companies might face when considering long-term investment? Aripov: No country is immune to downside risks – not only in the developed but developing world. Having said that, downside risks, including trade shocks, commodity price volatility, tighter external financing, and contingent liabilities from state-owned enterprises, are mostly exogenous factors driven by global conditions. Risks are mitigated through political stability, diversification of the economy, prudent macroeconomic management, and reforms to state-owned enterprises and governance. For more in-depth commentary, I refer you to recent IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank assessments about our economic conditions and trends. TCA: Let me move on to more regional issues. The first Ferghana Peace Forum was held in October 2025. How can it serve as a replicable model for other regions seeking sustainable peace? Aripov: First of all, I’d like to put this important forum on everyone’s radar. I’d like to underscore that peace is possible when hard work, respect for others, and a commitment to understanding guide our actions, despite historical memories and past differences. Someone should write a case study about our ability to bring consensus into an otherwise challenging region. In any event, the inaugural Ferghana Peace Forum brought together over 300 participants from more than 20 countries — representatives of Central Asian governments, international organizations, leading think tanks, research institutions, and local communities. A joint communiqué was adopted, confirming the intention to institutionalize the Forum as a permanent platform with rotating hosts. This broad participation highlighted an important reality: the Ferghana Valley is no longer viewed as a fragile zone; it is now viewed as a model of pragmatic peacebuilding. The Forum demonstrated how regional leadership — particularly the openness and...

Icy Relations Between Pakistan and Afghanistan Threaten Central Asian Trade Plans

On November 25, the Afghan authorities accused Pakistan of a new round of airstrikes in eastern Afghanistan. The bombing killed nine children and a woman, injuring several others. The attacks are the latest escalation in rapidly worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban-led government in Kabul, with key border crossings currently closed, and Afghan refugees being expelled from Pakistan. At the heart of the crisis is Pakistan’s claim that Kabul is providing support to the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban, or TPP), a militant group seeking to topple Pakistan’s government and impose its strict interpretation of Islamic law. The fallout may ripple beyond bilateral relations, with significant consequences for Central Asian trade, particularly the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan plan for a Trans-Afghan railway. The planned 647-kilometer line is set to connect the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif with Peshawar in Pakistan. When combined with existing infrastructure, this will mean that trains can travel from southern Uzbekistan all the way to the Pakistani ports of Gwadar and Karachi, granting landlocked Uzbekistan and Afghanistan a long-sought gateway to the Indian Ocean. But mounting instability, along with Islamabad’s willingness to shut borders as leverage, may now place the project in serious jeopardy. “The moment a state weaponizes geography, every financier in Tashkent, Moscow, or Beijing prices in risk, delays commitments, and quietly explores alternative alignments,” Anant Mishra, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the International Centre for Policing and Security at the University of South Wales, told The Times of Central Asia. So, what are the prospects for salvaging the Trans-Afghan railway? How can Pakistan and Afghanistan de-escalate? And what does this turmoil mean for Central Asia’s wider economic ambitions? A sudden frost On July 17, Uzbekistan’s Transport Minister Ilkhom Makhkamov, Pakistan’s Railway Minister Muhammad Hanif Abbasi, and Afghanistan’s acting Public Works Minister Mohammad Esa Thani signed an agreement to conduct a feasibility study for the proposed railway. Many hoped the railway would presage a new era of fraternal relations between Central and South Asia. “Civil society, the intelligentsia, media, and business community of Pakistan have been loudly calling for intimate trade relations with the Central Asian Republics,” Khadim Hussain, Research Director at the Centre for Regional Policy and Dialogue (CRPD), Islamabad, told TCA. For Uzbekistan, which has aggressively pursued diversification of trade routes to reduce reliance on transit through Iran and Kazakhstan, the project promised a cheaper, faster corridor to global markets. According to Nargiza Umarova, Head of the Center for Strategic Connectivity at the Institute for Advanced International Studies, University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Tashkent, the trans-Afghan is one of two high-priority transport projects, along with the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway – work on which began in April 2025. But the ink had barely dried on the July accord when tensions between Afghanistan’s Taliban government and Islamabad began escalating, throwing the ambitious railway into doubt. [caption id="attachment_40211" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Uzbek passenger and freight trains parked in Andijan; image: TCA, Joe Luc Barnes[/caption] In early October, Pakistan launched an airstrike in Kabul targeting the leader of the...

U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar.  To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central...