Kazakhstan’s Main Oil Route Remains Vulnerable. It Is Expanding Alternatives
Kazakhstan’s prosperity has been built largely on oil, much of which still reaches world markets through infrastructure crossing Russian territory. That would be a strategic exposure for any country; for a landlocked state bordering Russia during the largest war in Europe since 1945, it is impossible to ignore. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium route to the Black Sea remains Kazakhstan’s most important oil artery, carrying about 80% of its crude exports. Three tankers were struck near the terminal on July 17 and 19, two while loading Kazakh oil. Loadings briefly resumed before a fourth tanker, NELSA, was hit on July 20, forcing another suspension. No casualties or oil spill were reported, but the attacks repeatedly interrupted Kazakhstan’s main export route. Kazakhstan treated the attacks as a direct threat to its own economic interests, not as an incident confined to Russia. Its Foreign Ministry condemned the July 17 and 19 strikes as unacceptable, said an agreed mechanism for sharing information about civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded, and demanded an immediate halt. Ukraine’s General Staff said it had struck two tankers overnight on July 19 as part of its campaign against Russian oil and military-fuel logistics, but did not identify them. CPC said the vessels at its terminal were loading Kazakh crude. The episode exposed Kazakhstan’s dependence on infrastructure beyond its control. That exposure reflects geography and inherited infrastructure, not Kazakhstan’s foreign policy alignment. It is a serious strategic vulnerability that Astana is trying to reduce. Kazakhstan did not choose its geography, and its export system was not designed for the rupture that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is the world’s largest landlocked country, bordered by Russia and China, and sits on the Middle Corridor linking China and Central Asia with the South Caucasus and Europe. No government in Astana can alter those facts. The relevant question is how it has responded to them. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan remains highly exposed to oil, but it is not an oil economy standing still. KAZENERGY’s 2023 National Energy Report put the hydrocarbon sector at about 23% of GDP in 2019 and about 20% in 2022. Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics put the oil and gas sector at 16.3% of GDP in 2024. The series are not directly comparable, but both indicate that hydrocarbons remain central even as non-oil sectors expand. Oil dependence has not disappeared. UNCTAD notes that oil exports still account for more than half of total exports and remain central to foreign exchange earnings and public finances. Kazakhstan has made more progress in reducing oil’s share of GDP than its weight in exports and state revenue. Any serious assessment has to account for both. Kazakhstan’s position on Ukraine also needs to be judged in context. Binary judgments obscure the constraints facing a country that shares a long border, trade channels, energy infrastructure and significant security exposure with Russia. Kazakhstan has not recognized Russia’s attempted annexations. In 2022, its Foreign Ministry said it would...
