Middle East - The Times Of Central Asia

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Abraham Accords

Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords Dividend

Astana’s entry into the Abraham Accords is not the opening of a relationship with Israel so much as the re-platforming of one. Kazakhstan recognized Israel in the early 1990s and has maintained a functional, if understated, partnership since then. What has changed is the format. An existing bilateral channel is being placed inside diplomatic architecture with better access to political attention, private capital, and commercially useful networks. Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Accords on November 6, 2025, ahead of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington. The Times of Central Asia described Kazakhstan as the first Central Asian state and the only non-Middle Eastern or North African country to enter the framework. An official accession ceremony is still pending. For Kazakhstan, the value lies not in symbolism but in the Accords’ convening power. The Accords make Kazakhstan more legible to Israeli technology firms, Gulf investors, American policymakers, and the growing ecosystem of institutions and policy platforms built around regional economic integration. For Astana, this is the practical utility of membership. It does not need the Accords to talk to Israel. It can use them to widen the circle around specific projects. The formulation is also consistent with Kazakhstan’s foreign-policy habits. Astana has not presented the decision as a strategic turn against any other partner. Its Foreign Ministry said accession was made “solely in the interests of Kazakhstan,” and was consistent with a “balanced, constructive, and peaceful foreign policy.” The same statement reaffirmed support for a two-state settlement of the Middle East conflict. That wording appears carefully calibrated. It allows Astana to engage with a Trump-associated diplomatic framework while presenting the decision as an extension of Kazakhstan’s established multi-vector foreign policy, not a departure from it. The better interpretation is additive multi-vectorism in the form of another channel, another table, and another set of possible transactions. A Times of Central Asia analysis made this point directly, arguing that Kazakhstan’s aims include converting symbolic capital into policy traction, developing Gulf co-financing, and preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The commercial agenda is already visible. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s January 2026 visit to Astana, the first by an Israeli foreign minister in 16 years, produced a package of institutional and economic steps. A Kazakhstan-Israel business forum ran alongside the official meetings, and the sides identified a project map covering high-tech agriculture, water management, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, energy efficiency, renewables, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors are not ornamental but match Kazakhstan’s own reform priorities of productivity, digital administration, non-resource growth, infrastructure modernization, and technology transfer. Israel’s appeal lies less in its market size than in its applied capability. Gulf participation, where available, adds scale and financing. The Accords can help package those elements into projects that are easier for companies, development institutions, and governments to recognize. Energy and infrastructure may become the most consequential tests. The Times of Central Asia has argued that the Accords could give Israeli firms a clearer political and legal framework for...

Middle East

Technology and Investment: What Kazakhstan Stands to Gain from Its Middle East Outreach

The ongoing escalation in the Middle East, with Iran at its epicenter, appears to be accelerating economic rapprochement between countries in the region and Central Asia. Kazakhstan’s diplomacy has emerged as a key driver of this process. In recent days, Kazakhstan’s foreign minister has visited several Gulf states, while Israeli President Isaac Herzog arrived in Astana on April 27 for an official visit. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev has visited the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. In the UAE, he delivered a written message from Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan on bilateral relations, and held talks with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan. The sides discussed the consequences of Iranian missile strikes on the UAE and other countries, as well as their impact on international shipping security, energy supply, the global economy, and regional stability. Kosherbayev reaffirmed Kazakhstan’s support for the UAE in taking measures to protect its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of citizens and residents. Senior UAE officials responsible for energy and sustainable development also participated in the meeting. In Qatar, the minister met with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani. Discussions focused on investment cooperation, with both sides emphasizing the importance of implementing joint projects in priority sectors such as energy, telecommunications, digital technologies, agriculture, and transport and logistics. Regional escalation was also addressed, with Kosherbayev reiterating that President Tokayev’s proposal to host peace negotiations in Turkestan remains in place. While in Qatar, the minister also met with the leadership of Power International Holding and Milaha. Talks with Power International Holding Chairman Moutaz Al-Khayyat focused on cooperation in gas processing, natural gas transportation, and electricity generation. Transport and transit issues were central to discussions with Milaha CEO Fahad Saad Al-Qahtani. The parties explored opportunities to develop multimodal transport and expand access to port infrastructure, which could significantly increase cargo transit through Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports. Kazakhstan’s engagement with Middle Eastern countries is increasingly reciprocal. Representatives from the region are also visiting Astana. Recently, Oman’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Sayyid Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said, visited Kazakhstan. President Tokayev, who received him, expressed support for the people of Oman during the current period of regional instability. According to the presidential press service, the sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, with a focus on energy, metallurgy, transport and logistics, agriculture, and digitalization. They also emphasized the importance of strengthening cultural and humanitarian ties. At the conclusion of the meeting, Tokayev awarded Theyazin bin Haitham Al Said the Order of Dostyk (Friendship), First Class, for his contribution to strengthening bilateral cooperation. Kazakhstan and Oman currently maintain a joint portfolio of five major investment projects worth $3 billion. Two projects worth $1.1 billion, covering energy and railway transport, have already been implemented, while additional projects in ore processing are under development. The following day, in the presence of Olzhas Bektenov, Samruk-Kazyna and the Oman Investment Authority signed a Heads of...

Aviation Industry

Iran War Redraws Air Routes, Boosting Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan

Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are emerging as potential beneficiaries of disruptions in the global aviation fuel market as tensions around Iran force airlines to reroute flights and rethink transit hubs. The escalation of tensions in the Middle East, including heightened risks to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, has led to sharp increases in energy prices and supply disruptions. Gas prices in the EU have risen by 70%, and oil by 60%, with additional costs reaching €14 billion. Roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, making any disruption critically significant for global markets. The aviation industry has been among the hardest hit sectors. According to industry sources cited by Bloomberg, Europe is expected to have sufficient jet fuel supplies in the short term, but stocks are under pressure, and supply risks could emerge if the conflict continues. The cost of jet fuel has risen from about $742 to more than $1,700 per ton in recent weeks in some markets. This increase is outpacing the rise in oil prices, intensifying pressure on airlines. As reported by The Telegraph, citing data from Cirium, around 7% of scheduled flights were canceled at the peak of recent disruptions, equivalent to more than 7,000 departures, compared with about 4.7% a year earlier. Airlines are responding by cutting flight schedules and revising their business models. Lufthansa, for example, is considering temporarily grounding part of its fleet. According to CEO Carsten Spohr, fuel shortages are likely to be felt first outside Europe, where supply chains are more vulnerable. At the same time, airfares have already risen by 15-20%, beginning to dampen demand. As passenger demand softens and costs rise, carriers are balancing route cuts with the need to maintain key markets. Fuel Costs Drive Route Shifts According to Sergey Agibalov, consulting director at Argus in the CIS, significant changes are also occurring in the geography of international air travel. Major Middle Eastern hubs, such as Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, have seen a decline in transit traffic amid safety concerns and are operating below normal capacity on key routes. Agibalov argues that this creates a window of opportunity for alternative routes between Europe and Asia, including Istanbul, Addis Ababa, and hubs in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. “Airports in Central Asia and the South Caucasus are now attractive not only to passengers, but also to airlines. Disruptions to Middle Eastern jet fuel exports linked to instability around the Strait of Hormuz have led to a sharp rise in fuel prices globally. This increase is outpacing the rise in oil prices, intensifying pressure on airlines. Recent industry data shows prices reaching as high as $1,600–1,800 per ton in some markets. Under these conditions, many airlines have begun optimizing their flight schedules; even if fuel is available, flying has become very expensive,” he noted. Against this backdrop, airports in Almaty, Astana, and Baku are seeing increased traffic and stronger airline interest. Argus estimates suggest volumes are already rising in Baku, as routes across Central...

Fuel prices

Central Asia Avoids Fuel Shock as Global Pressures Build

Central Asia has so far avoided the immediate fuel shocks spreading across much of the world following the U.S. and Israel’s war with Iran. There are no lines at gas stations, no visible shortages, and no signs of panic buying. But that stability sits within a rapidly tightening global market, where disruptions in Asia and policy responses in Europe are reshaping fuel flows in ways the region will struggle to avoid. Across Southeast Asia, governments are already taking precautionary steps. Some state agencies and private firms are shifting parts of their workforce to remote work to reduce fuel consumption and prepare for potential price spikes and logistics disruptions, while Thailand is preparing contingency measures, including possible fuel rationing. China, one of Asia’s largest suppliers of refined fuels, has moved to restrict exports of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel in an effort to prevent domestic shortages linked to the war. The move is expected to tighten supplies across Asia, especially for countries that rely on Chinese fuel imports. China supplied about one-third of Australia’s jet fuel last year, highlighting the wider regional impact, and roughly half of the Philippines’ and Bangladesh’s in 2024. Vietnam has already warned airlines to prepare for flight reductions in April due to the risk of shortages caused by these export restrictions. Indonesia is also imposing limits on fuel sales. Fuel-related pressures have begun to emerge in Europe as well. Poland has introduced tax measures aimed at reducing fuel prices, with the government saying this will lower prices for consumers. Slovenia, meanwhile, has introduced significant restrictions on fuel consumption. Under new rules, private motorists are limited to purchasing a maximum of 50 liters per day, while businesses and farmers may purchase up to 200 liters daily. The combined effect of war-driven energy shocks and renewed tariff barriers is raising global costs and adding pressure across trade, transport, and inflation. Against this backdrop, Central Asia’s apparent stability is misleading. It is highly unlikely that import-dependent states such as Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan will be as well protected as Kazakhstan, which may benefit in the short term from higher crude prices. Starting April 1, Russia is banning gasoline exports in an effort to stabilize its own domestic market. Russia is a key fuel supplier to Central Asia. However, according to assurances from the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the temporary export ban will not affect supplies to Uzbekistan. Deliveries under intergovernmental agreements are expected to continue, ensuring that at least part of the region’s supply remains uninterrupted. In Kyrgyzstan, despite recent developments, fuel prices and supplies remain relatively stable. The government is considering lowering taxes or temporarily waiving excise duties for fuel importers should the crisis continue. Information from Turkmenistan is difficult to verify independently. Despite reports of fuel shortages at gas stations last year, official media are now indicating a significant increase in domestic gasoline production. The production plan for January-February 2026 was reportedly fulfilled at 122.7%, according to Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Guvancha...

Caspian

Caspian Escalation Raises Stakes for Central Asia

Central Asia, which has increasingly sought to present itself as a coordinated actor on the global political stage, has until recently maintained a cautious, non-aligned stance regarding the escalation in the Middle East. However, attacks affecting infrastructure in the Caspian region have altered the diplomatic balance. The Caspian Sea is a critical transit zone for Central Asia, linking Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and onward to European and Middle Eastern markets. It forms part of key east–west and north–south trade corridors that have gained importance since Russia’s war in Ukraine disrupted traditional transit routes. In recent years, regional dynamics have also been shaped by Azerbaijan’s growing engagement with Central Asian states, including its formal inclusion in the expanded Central Asian consultative format, which has effectively evolved from the C5 into the C6. Baku has played an important role in regional connectivity. It has developed close relations with both Turkey and Israel, factors that influence geopolitical calculations in the Caspian basin, which directly borders Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. This growing alignment has reinforced efforts to develop the Middle Corridor across the Caspian, linking Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus. Turkey maintains political, economic, and cultural influence in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan through the Organization of Turkic States. Russian political discourse has at times portrayed this cooperation as part of a broader pan-Turkic geopolitical project, a characterization widely dismissed by officials and analysts in Central Asia. Nevertheless, Astana and Baku continue to maintain strong relations with Ankara, a development that has periodically caused concern in Moscow. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has also strengthened ties with Gulf states. Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have become significant investors in the country’s economy. In this context, Iranian attacks on Gulf states not directly involved in the conflict have shaped Astana’s diplomatic positioning during the current crisis. Reports of drone attacks widely blamed on Iran targeting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan have further heightened regional tensions. At the initial stage of the escalation, Kazakhstan’s response was largely limited to diplomatic contacts with regional leaders. At the same time, several Central Asian countries, along with Azerbaijan, expressed concern over the humanitarian consequences of the conflict and began dispatching aid to Iran. Azerbaijan sent nearly 30 tons of food and medical supplies on March 10, followed by another 82 tons of humanitarian aid on March 18. Uzbekistan delivered approximately 120 tons of humanitarian supplies, including flour, vegetable oil, sugar, and canned food, according to regional media reports. Turkmenistan also sent humanitarian aid consisting of medicines, medical supplies, and other goods, primarily intended for children. The Tajik government reported sending a convoy of 110 heavy trucks carrying humanitarian cargo to Iran, with a total weight of 3,610 tons. The diplomatic environment shifted further after Israeli air strikes on March 18 targeting Iranian naval facilities in the Caspian Sea. According to Israeli military statements cited by international media, the targets included a major port of the Iranian Navy, where, reportedly, "dozens of ships were destroyed,”...

Peace Talks

Tokayev Proposes Turkestan as Venue for Middle East Peace Talks

Kazakhstan’s president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has called for immediate negotiations to resolve the conflict in the Middle East and proposed the city of Turkestan as a venue for talks. Tokayev made the remarks during a visit to the Turkestan region, warning that escalating conflicts worldwide, including the conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, are harming global stability and trade conditions for countries not directly involved in the hostilities. He said the situation in the Middle East has reached a critical stage and that further escalation by Iran, the United States, or Israel would benefit none of the parties. “First and foremost, I call for an end to armed attacks on civilian and economic targets. Then it is necessary to sit down at the negotiating table,” Tokayev said. The president said Kazakhstan is not seeking to mediate in the conflict but is prepared to offer its territory as a neutral platform for negotiations. “I believe such a dialogue could be organized in Turkestan. This would demonstrate the goodwill of the Kazakh people,” Tokayev added, noting that the final decision depends on the parties involved. The choice of Turkestan is both geographic and symbolic. The city is regarded as one of Central Asia’s spiritual centers and an important destination for pilgrims. It is home to the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi, a prominent Sufi poet and thinker. The structure, commissioned in the 14th century by Amir Timur, adds historical resonance to Tokayev’s proposal and is included on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Turkestan’s historical legacy and religious significance make it a potentially neutral and symbolically meaningful setting for peace talks. The proposal also reflects Kazakhstan’s long-standing effort to position itself as a neutral diplomatic platform. Astana has previously hosted international negotiations, including talks on Syria, and has sought to build a reputation as a venue for dialogue between competing powers. Offering Turkestan, rather than the capital, reinforces both the initiative's symbolic and political neutrality. Tokayev’s proposal comes amid continued escalation in hostilities involving Iran and a U.S.-Israel coalition, which intensified in late February following exchanges of missile strikes and air attacks. For Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states, the conflict carries direct implications. Iran’s status as a Caspian littoral country raises additional security concerns for Kazakhstan’s western regions in the event of further escalation. The Times of Central Asia previously reported on disruptions to regional supply chains and transport routes. Volatility in global oil prices and the risk of disruption across Caspian-linked trade routes add further pressure, underscoring how conflicts far beyond Central Asia’s borders can quickly translate into economic and security risks for the region.