• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00213 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10456 0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 112

The History of Nauryz: An Ancient Festival That Continues to Unite Central Asia

Ahead of the Nauryz holiday, The Times of Central Asia looks at the origins and enduring significance of one of the region’s oldest celebrations. More than a seasonal festival, Nauryz reflects a deep connection between people, nature, and cultural identity, a tradition that has evolved over thousands of years and remains central to life across Central Asia. Origins and Meaning Nauryz, also known as Nowruz, is one of the world’s oldest holidays, marking the arrival of spring and the beginning of a new year. It is celebrated on the day of the spring equinox, when day and night are approximately equal and nature appears to begin a new cycle. For many communities, the holiday symbolizes renewal, hope for prosperity, and the start of a new stage in life. The name “Nowruz” derives from ancient Iranian words meaning “new day.” This concept lies at the heart of the celebration: the renewal of life and the symbolic rebirth of nature after winter. With a history spanning more than 3,000 years, the holiday spread across Eurasia along the Silk Roads and became embedded in the cultural traditions of Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Caucasus. [caption id="attachment_45687" align="alignnone" width="300"] @depositphotos[/caption] Today, Nowruz is recognized not only as a calendar event but also as a cultural tradition that promotes values such as peace, mutual respect, and harmony with nature. Connection to the Spring Equinox Nauryz is traditionally celebrated during the spring equinox, which usually falls on March 20 or 21, when the Sun crosses the celestial equator and daylight and nighttime hours are nearly equal. Since ancient times, this moment has symbolized the awakening of nature and the beginning of a new agricultural year. Historical sources indicate that different communities once observed various dates in March, often guided by natural signs. Over time, however, the astronomical equinox, commonly observed on March 21, became the most widely accepted date. Medieval scholars paid close attention to this phenomenon. In the 11th and 12th centuries, astronomers such as Omar Khayyam refined calendar calculations to align the start of the year more precisely with the equinox. Alongside scientific knowledge, traditional methods were also used to forecast harvests and weather conditions, including observing seed germination or measuring the length of shadows before the holiday. Today, Nauryz is officially celebrated on March 21 in countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while UNESCO also recognizes Nowruz as marking the first day of spring. Rituals and Traditions For centuries, Nauryz has been marked by rituals symbolizing renewal, fertility, and prosperity. Among both nomadic and settled communities, it has traditionally been celebrated with public festivities, games, and family gatherings. Common customs include ritual cleansing with water, exchanging gifts, and offering food to neighbors and guests. The altybakan swing is widely regarded as a symbol of spring and joy. In some regions, the ancient practice of jumping over fire has been preserved as a purification ritual. Food plays a central role in the celebration. Although culinary traditions vary by country, they share a...

Threats to Regional Security: Why Escalation Around Iran Matters for Central Asia

For Central Asia, the central question is not simply whether a wider conflict involving Iran would destabilize the Middle East, but how that instability could spill north into a region that has repeatedly absorbed the consequences of crises to its south. Central Asian states have seen before how militant infiltration, narcotics trafficking, and extremist mobilization can intensify when neighboring wars weaken state control and create more permissive transit corridors. History gives Central Asia specific reasons to take that risk seriously. During the Tajik civil war and its aftermath, the Tajik-Afghan border became a frontline against crossings by Afghan militants and narcotics traffickers. In 1999 and 2000, fighters from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU, carried out the Batken incursions  into southern Kyrgyzstan, took hostages, and demonstrated how quickly insecurity from the Afghan theater could penetrate Central Asia. At the same time, Afghan opiates moved north through the Northern Route, tying militancy, organized crime, and border insecurity into a single regional problem. Afghanistan remains the most important precedent, but the comparison with Iran must be made carefully. After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, Afghanistan fragmented into competing militias and warlord zones. The Taliban later emerged from that disorder, and the Afghan state collapsed again when the Taliban captured Kabul and returned to power in 2021. Iran is structurally different. It has a centralized state, a denser security apparatus, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, which is deeply embedded in regime security and domestic politics. For that reason, the most plausible risk is not an immediate Afghanistan-style collapse, but a slower weakening of control in peripheral regions that could open space for armed groups, trafficking networks, and extremist recruiters. Those peripheral regions matter because Iran’s borderlands already contain armed actors with their own agendas. In the northwest, PJAK remains part of the Kurdish militant landscape. In the southeast, Jaysh al-Adl operates in Sistan-Baluchistan and adjoining border areas. Their capabilities should not be exaggerated, and they do not represent entire Kurdish or Baloch populations. But in a period of prolonged instability, such groups could exploit weaker local control, greater arms circulation, and more permissive smuggling corridors. For Central Asia, however, the greatest concern is the interaction between any Iranian crisis and the threat environment centered on Afghanistan. United Nations reporting in 2025 assessed ISIL-K as the predominant extra-regional terrorist threat, and the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center says ISIS-K has carried out attacks in Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia while using media to recruit new members and advance a vision of “Khorasan” that explicitly includes parts of Central Asia and Iran. In other words, Central Asia already faces a live extremist ecosystem to its south; wider instability involving Iran could amplify that pressure rather than replace it. This is why Central Asia should not be seen as a passive observer. The region sits at the junction of security corridors linking Afghanistan, Iran, the Caspian basin, and Russia. A wider conflict involving Iran could intensify trafficking through existing routes, strain border...

Weaponizing the Past: Russian Commentators Invoke Famine in Attacks on Kazakhstan

The concept of a “besieged fortress,” adopted by the Kremlin in the second half of the 2010s, increasingly conflicts with Russia’s earlier foreign policy doctrine, under which post-Soviet states were expected to remain within Moscow’s sphere of influence. That doctrine relied on alliances across the post-Soviet space, with Central Asia often described as an area of privileged interest. By contrast, the “besieged fortress” narrative assumes encirclement by enemies and frames external communication less in diplomatic than in military terms. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, officially termed a “special military operation” by Moscow, has now lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s involvement in World War II, undermining earlier assumptions that some post-Soviet economies would remain dependent on Russian loans and access to the Russian market. In the integration sphere, Kazakh political analyst Marat Shibutov has argued that Russia is effectively “reducing its participation in the EAEU by reinstating permanent customs controls on the borders with Kazakhstan and Belarus.” Such assessments reflect growing debate within the region over the future of integration mechanisms. At the same time, segments of the Russian media space have adopted increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward Kazakhstan. In recent weeks, television host Vladimir Solovyov suggested the possibility of extending a “special military operation” to Central Asia, remarks that triggered strong reactions in Kazakhstan. Political commentator Dmitry Verkhoturov followed with statements directed specifically at Astana, invoking the sensitive historical subject of Asharshylyk, the term used in Kazakhstan for the famine of the early 1930s that followed forced collectivization under Joseph Stalin. In Ukraine, the same period is referred to as the Holodomor and is recognized there as a genocide. Kazakhstan’s official terminology does not classify the famine in those terms. Last year, the inscription on a memorial in Astana dedicated to the victims of collectivization was revised. The earlier wording referred to “victims of the Holodomor,” while the updated plaque reads “victims of the famine of 1932-1933.” The change was widely interpreted as aligning the memorial with Kazakhstan’s established historical framing. Despite this, Verkhoturov warned that further public discussion of Asharshylyk could be dangerous for Kazakhstan “from the point of view of statehood,” suggesting that such debates might escalate into armed confrontation. He also stated that Kazakhstan was “too weak and small” to oppose Russia, remarks that were widely perceived in Kazakhstan as dismissive and offensive. Particular outrage was sparked by comments contrasting Ukrainians and Kazakhs, "for us, Ukrainians are very close relatives, they are practically our own people. And yet, yes, they have brought us to a situation where we have started to fight them, while Kazakhs are not quite our own people for Russians. Yes, you can be friends with them and all that, but they are still distant people, and, as they say, they will be beaten more willingly and, it seems, more harshly than the Ukrainians," the Russian political scientist said. Kazakh political analyst Gaziz Abishev characterized the comparison as “hard-to-hide racism.” He argued that the tragedy of the famine is not exclusively a Kazakh or...

An Early European View of Nomadic Central Asia

During a period when Central Asia remained largely unknown to European audiences, Among Kirghiz and Turkimans offered Western readers a rare first-hand account of the vast steppe and desert regions. The book was written in the late nineteenth century by Richard Karutz, a German traveler whose work belongs to the broader tradition of European exploratory travel literature. I first encountered this book while studying in the United States and later incorporated it into my research. A copy preserved in the library of the Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., was published in Leipzig in 1911. Since then, it has been regarded as one of the more noteworthy works in early European writing on Central Asia. Who Was Richard Karutz? Richard Karutz was a late nineteenth-century German traveler and writer who journeyed through parts of the Russian Empire’s Central Asian territories. Though not widely known today compared to some British or Russian explorers, Karutz represents a generation of European intellectuals fascinated by the perceived “frontier zones” of empire, regions seen as remote, exotic, and culturally distinct. [caption id="attachment_44400" align="aligncenter" width="312"] Richard Karutz[/caption] He was neither a colonial administrator nor a military officer; rather, he traveled as an independent observer. His writings reflect the curiosity of an educated European shaped by the intellectual currents of his era, including Orientalism and the growing interest in ethnography. Like many travelers of his time, Karutz sought to document ways of life he believed were on the verge of transformation under imperial modernization. Across the Steppe and Desert In Among Kirghiz and Turkimans, Karutz traveled among communities then commonly referred to in Russian and European sources as “Kirghiz”, a historical term often applied to Kazakhs, as well as Turkmen tribes. His route took him across vast grasslands, caravan routes, and oasis settlements shaped by pastoral migration, tribal organization, and Islamic traditions. Rather than producing an official report or military survey, Karutz wrote in a personal and descriptive style typical of travel literature. His narrative often reads as impressionistic reflection rather than systematic analysis. He documents everyday life, including nomadic encampments and felt yurts, equestrian culture and elaborate codes of hospitality, tribal leadership and clan loyalty, as well as desert trade routes and caravan movement. Mangyshlak, a peninsula on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea in present-day Kazakhstan, features prominently in his descriptions. Significant mineral deposits were later discovered there, leading to its designation as a “peninsula of treasures.” Mangyshlak is characterized by stark desert landscapes and was once described as a barren land consisting largely of sand and stone. In the Middle Ages, it served as a gateway for trade between East and West. The region also played a role in the early history of Turkmen communities. Karutz’s writing attempts to capture both the hardship and the quiet grandeur of steppe existence. Depicting Nomadic Society A central strength of the book lies in its attention to social organization. Karutz was particularly struck by the mobility of Kazakh life, seasonal migrations, a livestock-based economy, and...

New Earthquake Jolts Almaty, Highlighting Central Asia’s Seismic Threat

Many residents of Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city, have known since childhood what to do in the event of an earthquake. Children are taught to stand near load-bearing walls or structural beams in their homes, as these areas are considered more resistant during tremors. Many households keep an emergency kit with water, food and blankets in an accessible place. Such precautions are not excessive: Almaty experiences regular seismic activity. The latest significant tremor occurred on February 17, with an epicenter located 74 kilometers northeast of the city. The earthquake registered a magnitude of 5.0. City residents left their homes and offices and gathered outside, a familiar reaction in a city long accustomed to seismic risk. National alert system In May 2024, Almaty introduced the Mass Alert system to notify residents of emergencies, including earthquakes, floods, and man-made disasters. The system uses Cell Broadcast technology to send text notifications to all mobile subscribers within a specific geographic area, regardless of their mobile operator. Because messages are transmitted through cell towers rather than individual calls or messages, the system is designed to avoid overloading mobile networks during emergencies. It is integrated with 28 seismic stations. Many experts say the system’s launch followed the January 2024 earthquake, which was felt across southern Kazakhstan. Almaty experienced several tremors measuring up to magnitude 5.0, triggering widespread panic. Traffic jams stretching for kilometers formed on roads leading out of the city. Forty-four people sought medical attention, most of them injured while attempting to exit buildings quickly. Scientists warn that a powerful and destructive earthquake in the region is inevitable, although the timing cannot be predicted. Almaty is located in a zone rated at up to 10 points on the MSK-64 seismic intensity scale. Each year, up to 200 minor tremors are recorded within an 80-kilometer radius of the city. Earthquakes with magnitudes between 2.0 and 4.0 are considered typical. Approximately 30 tectonic faults run through the city and its surroundings, more than 60% of them in mountainous areas. Experts estimate that, given current dense and high-rise construction, as many as 30% of buildings could be destroyed in the event of an earthquake measuring 9-10 points in intensity. During the Soviet period, buildings taller than nine stories were generally prohibited in the city. The notable exception was the 25-story Kazakhstan Hotel, which was constructed with seismic reinforcement measures. Today, high-rise construction has expanded significantly, including in some of the city’s more seismically vulnerable foothill areas. The emergency warning system does not predict earthquakes in advance; it issues alerts only once tremors have already been detected. The system has been activated during several real seismic events. Seismological predictions In Kazakhstan, official forecasts are issued by the Institute of Seismology. At the same time, attempts at earthquake prediction have occasionally emerged outside the scientific mainstream. One of the most prominent figures associated with such efforts is biophysicist Viktor Inyushin. In the 1990s, he appeared in the media describing experiments aimed at predicting earthquakes by observing crushed peas, acorns, barley seeds,...

Kyrgyzstan’s Revolutions Since Independence: Three Uprisings That Remade the State

Since gaining independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan has experienced three major uprisings that removed presidents and reset the political system. The events in 2005, 2010, and 2020 did not follow one script, but shared familiar triggers: disputed elections, corruption, rising living costs, and a belief that the state had been captured by a narrow circle. Kyrgyzstan began its post-Soviet life with a reputation for relative openness. Askar Akayev initially presented himself as a reform-minded leader, but by the early 2000s, public frustration had grown over perceived corruption and patronage. Political competition increasingly revolved around money, influence networks, and regional loyalties. Weak institutions made leadership transitions risky, and street politics became a recurring instrument of change. The 2005 Tulip Revolution: The Akayev Era Ends The first upheaval occurred in spring 2005, following parliamentary elections widely criticized by international observers. The OSCE/ODIHR final report on the February–March 2005 parliamentary elections documented serious irregularities that undermined confidence in the vote: Protests began in the south and spread to Bishkek. On March 24, 2005, Akayev fled the country as demonstrators seized key government buildings. His resignation was later formalized from abroad. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on April 4, 2005, that Akayev had signed a resignation agreement intended to stabilize the situation and pave the way for new elections. Kurmanbek Bakiyev emerged as interim leader and later won the July 2005 presidential election. The OSCE/ODIHR assessment of that vote noted improvements compared with the parliamentary elections but highlighted continuing structural weaknesses. The 2010 April Revolution: Bakiyev Overthrown By 2010, public anger was focused on rising utility prices and the concentration of power around Bakiyev’s family. The International Crisis Group’s report Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses detailed how economic grievances and corruption helped spark a violent uprising. On April 7, 2010, clashes between protesters and security forces in Bishkek left dozens dead and injured, with the official death toll later revised to 99. Bakiyev fled the country, and a referendum later that year shifted Kyrgyzstan toward a parliamentary system designed to reduce presidential dominance. The transition produced a more plural political environment, though corruption and instability persisted. In June 2010, interethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan, particularly around Osh, caused significant loss of life and displacement, deepening divisions and reshaping the political climate. The 2020 Upheaval: Election Protests and Rapid Power Shift Kyrgyzstan’s third major uprising followed disputed parliamentary elections on October 4, 2020, when allegations of vote buying triggered mass protests. The Central Election Commission annulled the results, plunging the country into a political crisis. President Sooronbay Jeenbekov resigned on October 15, 2020, with Reuters reporting that “newly sprung from jail,” Sadyr Japarov had consolidated power amid the turmoil. The OSCE/ODIHR assessment of the January 2021 presidential election and constitutional referendum noted that the vote occurred against the backdrop of political upheaval following the annulled parliamentary elections. Japarov won the presidency in January 2021, and a new constitution entered into force in May 2021, strengthening presidential powers and reshaping the political system. Why Revolutions Keep Happening...