History - The Times Of Central Asia

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 135

National Identity

Kazakhstan Looks to the Golden Horde for a Deeper National Narrative

A major international symposium dedicated to the Golden Horde opened this week in Kazakhstan’s capital, underscoring the country’s growing effort to redefine its historical narrative and national identity through the legacy of the Great Steppe. The symposium, held under the patronage of UNESCO and titled “The Golden Horde as a Model of Steppe Civilization: History, Archaeology, Culture and Identity,” brought together more than 300 scholars, including 120 foreign researchers from over 20 countries. The event reflects Kazakhstan’s effort to align its national narrative with a growing body of scholarship that treats nomadic societies not as a “backward” alternative to sedentary civilizations, but as a distinct and highly sophisticated model of statehood shaped by the economic realities of the Eurasian steppe. Opening the symposium, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev declared that “no historian today questions the power of the Golden Horde, the empire that ruled the Great Steppe and occupied vast expanses of Eurasia. The empire that connected East and West and exerted a profound influence on the development of civilizations and the formation of states was unquestionably one of the largest political structures in history,” Tokayev said. [caption id="attachment_49194" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: Akorda[/caption] The Legacy of the Great Steppe The Golden Horde, also known as the Ulus of Jochi, emerged from the empire created by Genghis Khan across the Eurasian steppe. The wider Eurasian steppe stretched from Eastern Europe toward Mongolia, while the Golden Horde controlled a vast western portion of that world. The region long served as home to Indo-European, Turkic and Mongol nomadic peoples. Its open geography, largely free of impassable mountain barriers, enabled the large-scale movement of herds of horses, sheep and cattle in search of pastures and water sources. It was in this region, on the territory of present-day northern Kazakhstan, that horses were first domesticated about 5,500 years ago near the settlement of Botai. The archaeological Botai culture dates back to roughly 3700-3100 BCE. The Golden Horde itself traces directly to Jochi, the eldest son of Genghis Khan, whose descendants ruled the Ulus of Jochi across a vast territory from the Irtysh to the Danube. Over time, the Ulus of Jochi was divided between Jochi’s sons into western and eastern wings known respectively as the White Horde (Ak-Orda) and the Blue Horde (Kok-Orda). By the middle of the 15th century, the Ulus of Jochi had fragmented into successor polities, including the Siberian, Uzbek, Kazan, Crimean, and Kazakh khanates, as well as the Nogai Horde. Moscow’s rise also unfolded in the shadow of this post-Horde order before it later became the core of the Russian Empire. [caption id="attachment_49193" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Between Myth and Statehood Because written sources on the Golden Horde remain fragmented, much of its legacy survived through oral traditions, epics, myths, and legends. In Kazakh tradition, for example, khans continued to be chosen from among the Chinggisids, direct descendants of Genghis Khan, and elevated on a white felt carpet during coronation ceremonies. The period also produced oral epics preserved through the tradition of the...

TCA Interviews

Identity and a New National Canon: Interview with Kazakhstan Historian Zhaxylyk Sabitov

Interest in Kazakhstan’s history is increasingly moving beyond academic circles. For many people, it has become a way to understand the country’s modern identity as well as its past. The Times of Central Asia spoke with historian Zhaxylyk Sabitov, director of the Institute for the Study of the Ulus of Jochi, about why many chapters of Kazakhstan’s history remain insufficiently studied. The Ulus of Jochi, also known as the Golden Horde, was one of the largest medieval states in Eurasia and is closely tied to debates over Kazakhstan’s statehood and historical memory. The interview also explored which topics resonate most strongly with society today and how a new understanding of national memory is taking shape. TCA: To begin, please tell us a little about yourself. How did you become interested in history, and why did you decide to work in this field? Zhaxylyk: I am the director of the Research Institute for the Study of the Jochi Ulus. My interest in history began in childhood. The problem was that in the 1980s and 1990s, history in Kazakhstan was taught rather poorly. There were few textbooks and teaching materials, and schoolchildren generally knew little about the subject. That is why I was always interested in trying to understand the past for myself. In addition, I inherited a library of history books from my grandfather. I read those books, and in the 1990s my mother helped me buy new publications. All of this gradually shaped my interest in the history of Kazakhstan. You could say I became interested in history while still at school and later continued to study it professionally. TCA: For readers who may not know much about you, how would you describe your research work and the main topics you focus on? Zhaxylyk: I have several main areas of work. The first is the history of the Golden Horde. This was the state that preceded the Kazakh Khanate and occupied a vast territory stretching from the Altai to the Danube. The second area is the history of the Kazakh Khanate. This also remains insufficiently studied. In the history of both the Golden Horde and the Kazakh Khanate, there were more than 100 khans. It is interesting to study how they interacted, where and how they ruled, and under what circumstances their rule took place. The third area is genetics, or the genetic history of Kazakh tribes and clans, as well as those of other Turkic peoples, including Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks, Nogais, and Bashkirs. This topic allows us to address questions that have been debated for two centuries. For example, there are many theories regarding the origins of certain Kazakh tribes. With the help of genetics, we are trying to understand which of these theories is closer to the truth and, more broadly, to better understand the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs and other Turkic peoples. The fourth topic is nation-building policy and historical memory. I am interested in how the state constructs the canon of national history and how this influences...

History

How Koreans Were Deported to Central Asia: Myths and Reality

The 1937 deportation from the Soviet Far East was the greatest tragedy in the history of Soviet Koreans, Koryo-saram, the self-designation of ethnic Koreans living across the former Soviet Union. It became the first case in Soviet history in which an entire ethnic group was forcibly relocated solely on the basis of ethnicity. Later, Soviet Germans, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, Poles, Kurds, and many other peoples would endure similar repression. For decades, this history remained largely suppressed, giving rise to numerous myths and misconceptions surrounding the deportation. Yet it is inaccurate to claim that Koreans first appeared in Kazakhstan and Central Asia only in 1937. Historical and archaeological evidence points to earlier Korean ties with the region. The 1897 census of the Russian Empire recorded 42 Koreans living in Turkestan, while in 1929 a Korean agricultural cooperative called “Kazakh Rice” was established in Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, 1937 marked the beginning of the modern history of Koreans in Central Asia. Myth One: The Deportation Was a Sudden Decision One common belief is that Joseph Stalin suddenly decided to deport Koreans from the Soviet Far East as part of a campaign against Japanese espionage. Reality In fact, plans to relocate Koreans had been discussed since the late 1920s. The Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party repeatedly revisited the issue of the Korean population living in border regions. The joint decree issued by the Soviet government and Communist Party on August 21, 1937 (No. 1428-326ss), was the culmination of a long-term state policy. By the mid-1930s, the Soviet Far East was increasingly viewed as a vulnerable frontier zone. Japan had expanded its military presence in the region, and Soviet authorities feared a possible war. Koreans living in compact settlements near the border, while maintaining cultural and family ties with Korea, came to be regarded as politically unreliable. Ironically, many of them had originally fled to Russia precisely to escape Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Myth Two: The Deportation Was Entirely About Japanese Espionage Officially, Soviet authorities justified the deportation as a measure aimed at preventing Japanese espionage. Reality The espionage threat served more as a pretext than the principal cause. During the years of the Great Terror, Stalin’s regime perceived danger not only in individuals, but also in entire social and ethnic groups. Suspicion replaced evidence, and ethnic origin itself could become grounds for repression. Local officials sought to demonstrate political vigilance, while the state simultaneously pursued broader strategic and economic goals: strengthening military control in the Far East and redirecting labor resources to Kazakhstan and Central Asia, regions devastated by collectivization and famine. [caption id="attachment_48623" align="aligncenter" width="854"] Museum of the History of Russian Koreans (Koryo-saram) in Ussuriysk.[/caption] Myth Three: The Operation Was Chaotic For many deported families, the expulsion felt like a sudden catastrophe, creating the impression of disorder and improvisation. Reality At the state level, however, the operation was carefully organized. Before the deportation, party purges and political repression had already targeted the Korean intelligentsia. Soviet authorities fabricated cases involving alleged...

Victory day

No Tanks on Red Square as Moscow’s Victory Day Pull Fades in Central Asia

Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9 is set to be more restrained this year, with tanks, armored vehicles, and missile systems absent from Red Square for the first time in nearly two decades. The Russian Defense Ministry cited the “current operational situation,” while the Kremlin blamed what it called Ukrainian “terrorist activity.” Russia also reported drone attacks aimed at Moscow in the days before the ceremony, and security around President Vladimir Putin has been tightened. The reduced scale of the parade carries a resonance beyond Russia. Victory Day remains one of the most emotionally charged dates in the post-Soviet calendar, including in Central Asia, where families still remember relatives who fought, died, or labored during World War II. But across the region, the holiday has increasingly been placed inside national calendars rather than left as part of Russia’s political script. The contrast with last year is sharp. In 2025, Moscow marked the 80th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat with its largest Victory Day parade since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese troops marched on Red Square, Xi Jinping sat beside Putin, and foreign leaders attended from across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet space. Tanks, rocket launchers, missile systems, drones, and other military hardware rolled through the square. This year’s guest list is more limited. The Kremlin’s initial list of foreign delegations included leaders and senior figures from Belarus, Laos, Malaysia, Slovakia, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and representatives from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Republika Srpska. Attendance has also been hard to read. Earlier reports said Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov were expected in Moscow, while the Kremlin’s initial published list of foreign guests did not include any Central Asian presidents. On May 8, however, Kazakh and Uzbek media reported that Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s Shavkat Mirziyoyev were traveling to Moscow for Victory Day events. The late confirmations complicate the picture, but they do not restore the full regional show of unity seen in the last two years, when all five Central Asian presidents were present at the Moscow parade. It does suggest, however, that Moscow’s political ownership of the date is less automatic than it once was. Victory Day, which commemorates the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in what Russia calls the Great Patriotic War, has long been one of the main rituals of modern Russian power. It draws large television audiences, fills public space with military symbolism, and presents the Kremlin as the guardian of a sacred national memory. The holiday speaks of sacrifice and family loss, but also of nationalism and state control over history. Putin has used that language repeatedly. On May 9, 2024, after appearing on Red Square in snowfall, he said Russia was going through a “difficult, milestone period,” and warned: “We will not allow anyone to threaten us. Our strategic forces are always in combat readiness.” In 2025, he used the 80th anniversary parade to link Soviet wartime memory to Russia’s current war, saying...

Shoqan Walikhanov

Shoqan Walikhanov: Kazakh Scholar Recognized in the West

Shoqan Walikhanov gained recognition far beyond the Kazakh steppe, earning admiration in Russian and European intellectual circles. Although his life was brief, he left a lasting impact on Oriental studies, ethnography, geography, history, and folklore research. Western academics especially valued his expedition to Kashgar and his detailed studies of Central Asia. Even today, many scholars writing about the region continue to rely on Walikhanov’s observations and publications. One example of this influence appears in A Century of Russian Rule in Central Asia, a scholarly volume edited by Edward Allworth and published in the United States in 1967. In the book, researchers frequently cite Walikhanov’s articles and reports on Central Asia, recognizing them as important historical sources. Russian Oriental scholars famously compared Walikhanov to “a fleeting meteor” whose brilliance appeared only briefly. The respected orientalist Nikolai Veselovsky also wrote about the high expectations scholars had for his future. Walikhanov’s studies first became known in Europe through the Russian Geographical Society. His works, including Sketches of Dzungaria, Journey to Altyshahr, and Notes on the Kyrgyz, introduced Western readers to the history, customs, and traditions of Central Asian peoples. By 1865, Walikhanov’s reputation had already reached the English-speaking world. That year, The Russians in Central Asia was translated into English and published in London by John and Robert Michell. The book examined the Russian Empire’s expansion into Central Asia, the Syr Darya military frontier, and political relations with the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. It included Walikhanov’s accounts from his 1858 and 1859 expedition to Kashgar and Dzungaria, identifying him as “Capt. Valikhanof,” a Russian-based transliteration of his name. His writings offered Western audiences rare insights into the geography, political climate, ethnography, and daily life of Xinjiang and neighboring territories. The publication also featured studies by Russian travelers such as Mikhail Venyukov. The authors described the incorporation of the Kazakh steppe into the Russian Empire, the unstable political situation in the Central Asian khanates, and the international rivalry associated with the “Great Game.” [caption id="attachment_48496" align="aligncenter" width="300"] Decree of Emperor Alexander II on awarding Chokan Valikhanov the Fourth Class Order of Saint Vladimir for his journey to Kashgar, 1860. Photo credit: shoqan.kz[/caption] [caption id="attachment_48497" align="aligncenter" width="300"] Clothing of Kashgar Women. Drawn by Chokan Valikhanov, 1858.Photo credit: shoqan.kz[/caption] Modern historians still consider the book one of the most valuable nineteenth-century sources on Russian colonial expansion in Central Asia. At the time, Walikhanov’s observations on Kashgar were regarded as some of the most reliable information available to European scholars about a region that remained largely inaccessible. Western academics admired Walikhanov not only for his scholarship, but also for his role as a bridge between Eastern and Western cultures. English-language studies often describe him as “the first European-educated Kazakh intellectual.” His growing reputation in the English-speaking academic world has also been examined in later research. In the article Chokan Valikhanov and the English-speaking World, British researcher Nick Fielding explains how Walikhanov’s writings attracted the attention of nineteenth-century British scholars. According to Fielding, members of the...

Silk Roads

The Northern Silk Road and the Middle Corridor

The recent hostilities in the Persian Gulf and the ensuing naval blockades of Iran have brought into sharp relief the growing importance of the Middle Corridor – or Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) – the rapidly expanding trade link between Western China and Europe. This vast network of road, rail and maritime transport links had already increased in importance as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing sanctions, which have crippled large parts of Russia’s economy. With hundreds of container ships and oil tankers bottled up in the Gulf and the prospect of serious economic consequences, particularly in the developing world and for China and India, the idea of an overland – mostly – trade route to Europe is increasingly seen as a solution that provides a viable alternative in uncertain times. And not for the first time, as we shall discover. The TITR is around 3,000 km shorter than the so-called Northern Corridor through the Russian Federation, and transit times from China to Europe now average 10-15 days, compared to double that time for the Northern Corridor and anything up to 60 days for sea transport. According to World Bank estimates, the Middle Corridor could soon account for 20% of overland trade between China and the EU, with a tripling of current traffic levels by 2030, mainly due to economic growth in the Greater Caspian region. When planning began on the Middle Corridor almost 15 years ago, few people appreciated how rapidly it would develop. But as uncertainties over trade policies have increased, a route that avoids both the Russian Federation and the increasingly dispute-prone waterways in the Gulf and the Red Sea makes sense. Goods produced in Chinese factories in Chongqing, Xi’an and Urumqi can now be transported westward across Kazakhstan by rail to its Caspian Sea ports at Aktau and Kuryk. There are now major rail termini at the Kazakhstan-China border and more than 4,250 kms of rail lines in the network, together with 500 kms of sea transport. In Aktau on the Caspian, containers are loaded onto ships bound for Baku in Azerbaijan, where they are transferred onto the rolling stock of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) Railway for shipment into Turkey. The original plan was designed to handle 6.5 million tons of freight annually, but this figure is expected to top 17 million tons by 2034. New port facilities to handle the increasing number of containers arriving at Aktau and Kuryk have been financed by Kazakhstan’s Nurly Zhol Programme. Aktau, for example, is being dredged to enhance maritime safety and expand capacity. Its port currently handles up to 15 million tons of cargo a year. According to the TITR itself, around 57,000 containers travelled along the route in 2024, up from 20,500 in 2023. The route has continued to gather momentum in 2026: from January to March, 125 container trains were dispatched from China via the corridor, a 34.4% increase over the same period last year. Rail traffic volume increased by 5.7% in Azerbaijan...