• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00217 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10625 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 360

Opinion: Iranian Unrest Creates Opening for U.S., Partners in Central Asia

As protests in Iran enter their third week, nationwide unrest is exerting political strain and societal pressure on the Islamic Republic. The nation’s current escalation reflects a level of sustained mobilization comparable to Iranian demonstrations that erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini. While the outcome of these developments remains uncertain, ongoing unrest in Iran is more likely to impact Central Asia’s existing energy, transit, and security dynamics, rather than alter the broader regional landscape. This moment nonetheless offers the United States and its partners a strategic opportunity to advance long-term objectives in Central Asia while supporting regional resilience at a time when geopolitical alignments are rapidly shifting. Combined with ongoing disruptions caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine, the recent protests in Iran may create a heightened sense of uncertainty or risk perceptions in global energy markets. In particular, the current Iranian unrest may raise concerns regarding potential oil supply disruptions and broader geopolitical tensions. For neighboring producers like Kazakhstan, which maintains an oil-dependent economy, this elevated volatility could translate into higher revenues from existing exports. Increased fiscal flexibility from rising oil revenues may therefore provide Astana with the opportunity to expand its scope for economic cooperation with Western partners. The United States, which maintains long-standing bilateral energy ties with Kazakhstan, could draw on these existing partnerships to deepen its bilateral energy and technical ties. Beyond its impact on energy markets, ongoing instability in Iran may also affect regional connectivity initiatives. For example, disruptions could emerge along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network connecting India, Iran, and Russia, with branches that involve the Caspian and Central Asia. Although the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway sits along this route and facilitates the transport of energy resources and critical minerals across the region, the corridor currently plays a more limited role in regional transit across Central Asia. This route nonetheless remains of interest to Central Asia because it offers the region an opportunity to enhance long-term economic diversification through access to new markets in the Persian Gulf. Minor disruptions could therefore underscore the corridor’s growing geopolitical value as a connector for trade and energy transport across multiple countries and regions. This context creates a strategic opening for the United States and its partners to contribute to the region’s long-term trade and connectivity landscape. By supporting Central Asian nations in reducing reliance on Iranian transit, the United States can accelerate investment in alternative routes like the Middle Corridor that bypass both Russia and Iran. During an investors' forum in Tashkent late last year, Europe announced it would increase its investment in the Middle Corridor. However, the United States continues to remain on the periphery of this project. By collaborating with European partners to enhance infrastructure along this route during a critical time, the United States can help Central Asian nations position the Middle Corridor as the region’s most resilient and viable alternative for trade and exports. This would ultimately advance shared interests by enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity and facilitating greater U.S....

From Tehran to Tashkent: How Iran’s Crisis and U.S. Tariffs Reverberate Across Central Asia

At the end of 2025, Iran once again emerged as a flashpoint on the global political map. Mass protests erupted across the country, fueled by spiraling inflation and economic hardship. At present, the Iranian rial has plummeted to the point where it is effectively worth less than the paper it's printed on. The current wave of unrest, already the largest and deadliest nationwide unrest Iran has seen since 2022, is not occurring in isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump has renewed what his administration describes as a policy of “maximum pressure” on Tehran, and his administration is now pursuing what observers have characterized as a strategy of “pushing the falling,” a move aimed at reshaping the political order of the Middle East. What might this mean for neighboring Central Asia? Tajik political analyst Muhammad Shamsuddinov argues the crisis must be viewed within a broader geopolitical context. “The situation in Iran is directly tied to Trump’s second-term pressure campaign,” Shamsuddinov said, referencing a string of destabilizing events. “These include the 12-day U.S.-Israel war against Iran and the reimposition of U.N. sanctions in September 2025," he added, referring to the 12-day June 2025 conflict between Israel and Iran, during which U.S. forces also struck Iranian nuclear facilities. "All of these have deepened the domestic crisis in Iran.” In a further escalation, on January 12, Trump announced 25% tariffs on countries conducting trade with Iran. The move appears targeted primarily at Russia, China, and India - Iran’s largest international partners, but also has implications for Central Asian economies. In the first nine months of 2025, trade between Kazakhstan and Iran grew by nearly 45%, reaching $310.8 million. Tajikistan, which maintains the closest economic ties to Tehran among Central Asian states, reported trade worth $430.7 million in the first eleven months of 2025, an increase of 28% over the same period in 2024. Uzbekistan, while less directly exposed to Iran than Kazakhstan or Tajikistan, has also moved cautiously in recent years to expand trade links with Tehran, making it sensitive to further sanctions pressure. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, faces its own exposure through gas swap arrangements involving Iran, which could become collateral damage of escalating regional tensions. Iranian investments in Tajikistan are also substantial. Among the most prominent projects is the Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power plant, estimated at $256 million. The Iranian government contributed approximately $180 million, with an additional $36 million from an Iranian contractor. The remainder was financed by Tajikistan. According to official data, roughly 160 companies with Iranian capital are currently operating in Tajikistan across multiple sectors. In Kazakhstan, around 650 Iranian companies are registered, with over 350 operational, primarily in manufacturing, infrastructure, and agriculture. By contrast, trade between Iran and Russia, a strategic partner since the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement in January 2025, increased by only 8% in the first nine months of 2025, according to official figures. Despite modest growth, Russian analysts view the figures optimistically. “Growth is happening under challenging geopolitical conditions, with sanctions, logistical restructuring, and financial hurdles,” said...

The Trump Factor: Why Central Asia Has Remained Silent on Iran’s Protests

The wave of protests that erupted in Iran in late December and spread to at least 27 of the country’s 31 provinces has become the largest since 2022, when mass demonstrations followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police. The unrest has raised new concerns across the region about political stability, energy markets, and the risk of external intervention. Rights monitors say protests have been reported in hundreds of locations nationwide, with death and detention tolls still contested. Human rights groups and independent monitoring organizations estimate that dozens of people have been killed and more than 2,000 detained, while Iranian officials have offered varying accounts and blamed violence on what they describe as “rioters.” In Kazakhstan, observers are drawing comparisons to the country’s own January 2022 unrest, officially labeled an attempted coup that ended in a violent crackdown. But beyond the parallels with Kazakhstan’s ‘Qantar’ events, analysts are focusing on the wider implications, particularly the potential impact of Iran’s domestic turmoil on global oil markets. For Kazakhstan, the stakes are heightened by the country’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports and the sensitivity of global energy markets to supply shocks. Any sharp change in Iranian output, even if temporary, could place downward pressure on prices and complicate budget planning for oil-dependent economies across Central Asia. Kazakh financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov has voiced concern that unrest in Iran could trigger a surge in oil production aimed at funding social spending, a move that could drive down global oil prices and harm Kazakhstan’s oil-dependent economy. “Iran could add half a million barrels a day within six months and cause oil prices to collapse, but it would not do so casually. The Middle East is very sensitive and knows how to negotiate. Still, if the protests persist, Tehran might ramp up production to finance social needs. [This would be] painful for Kazakhstan. If Venezuela is a bear cub, then Iran is a grizzly bear in the bushes with its oil,” Rysmambetov warned on his Telegram channel. While political unrest typically raises oil prices by increasing supply risk, analysts note that Iran’s response could be atypical. Faced with fiscal pressure, Tehran may opt to increase production to stabilize revenues, a move that would push prices lower despite heightened instability. Iran’s chronic social issues, exacerbated by inflation and the collapse of the national currency, have fueled public discontent for more than a decade. While the Iranian authorities acknowledge the severity of the economic crisis and have conceded that some demands are legitimate, they have also warned of further hardships. On January 5, the judiciary announced that no leniency would be shown toward those detained during the protests. Russian experts, meanwhile, have framed the unrest in geopolitical terms. Irina Fedorova of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies cited renewed sanctions, critical shortages of water and electricity, and foreign interference as the root causes. However, she dismissed the likelihood of regime change, pointing to disunity among opposition factions. “The difference...

Opinion: Prospects for Central Asia’s Access to Persian Gulf Infrastructure

The agreement signed on December 8, 2025, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar to construct a high-speed railway linking Riyadh and Doha marks a pivotal development in transport connectivity across the Persian Gulf. Beyond its bilateral implications, the project could have broader consequences for transregional logistics, particularly for Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The 785-km railway will pass through key cities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, including Dammam and Al-Hufuf, and will connect King Salman and Hamad International Airports. Trains are expected to reach speeds exceeding 300 km/h, reducing travel time between the two capitals to approximately two hours. The six-year project is projected by officials to boost the combined GDP of both countries by around $30 billion and create up to 30,000 jobs. The Gulf Railway and New Regional Connectivity The Riyadh-Doha line is a central element of the Gulf Railway initiative, which is seeking to establish a unified railway network among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, with a target date of around 2030. Originally envisioned primarily as a freight system, the Gulf Railway is increasingly incorporating high-speed passenger services alongside freight, reflecting the region’s push for greater internal integration and reduced dependence on air travel. The Riyadh-Doha segment forms a vital axis between the Gulf’s political and financial hubs and is expected to link with Saudi, Emirati, and Omani infrastructure, laying the groundwork for a more integrated regional transport system. Beyond the Peninsula While the Gulf Railway’s scope is geographically confined to the Arabian Peninsula, meaningful integration with Eurasia would require additional connectivity, particularly via land and multimodal routes through Iran, Turkey, and the Caspian region. Among these, the overland corridor through Iran is especially significant, though constrained by sanctions, financing risks, and political uncertainty. Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran Corridor Unlike many conceptual infrastructure proposals, the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway, operational since 2014, is already a functioning freight corridor. It provides Central Asian nations with direct access to Persian Gulf ports and Middle Eastern markets. For Kazakhstan, the route offers strategic diversification away from traditional corridors. While no formal plans exist to link GCC rail infrastructure directly with Central Asia, the emergence of high-capacity Gulf rail corridors reshapes the long-term connectivity landscape. A future interface could allow Astana overland access to Gulf markets, while enabling reciprocal flows from the Gulf into Central Asia, China, and Europe. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has previously described Iran as a “gateway” to Southeast Asia and Africa. Kazakhstan has also outlined plans to establish its own logistics terminal in the Iranian port of Shahid Rajai in Bandar Abbas, further enhancing its position in Gulf-Eurasia trade flows. Iran’s Evolving Role Historically, Iran’s role as a transit state has been hampered by international sanctions and regional tensions. However, the 2023 normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, brokered by China, has altered the regional calculus. Although still fragile, this diplomatic thaw improves prospects for long-term infrastructure projects involving Iran as a critical transit link between the Persian Gulf and Eurasia. Alternatives and Their...

From Medieval Persia to Modern Kazakhstan: Decolonizing History

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Kazakhstan might have appeared routine amid a series of diplomatic engagements by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2025. Yet one element of the visit stood out for Tokayev, a gift of 27 ancient Persian manuscripts, which were immediately put on public display in Astana’s National Museum. Together, the two presidents opened the exhibition titled The History of the Great Steppe in Iranian Sources, highlighting long-standing historical ties between Persian states and the Kazakh steppe. Speaking at a joint briefing, Tokayev emphasized the significance of the manuscripts, which he said contain historical accounts affirming the Kazakhs as a "brave people" and detailing diplomatic relations between the Kazakh khans and Iranian shahs. “Close relations were established between Tauke Khan and Shah Sultan Hussein,” Tokayev noted. “Records show embassies met in Moscow, and the Iranian ambassador visited the Kazakh steppe. Abul Khair Khan sent an envoy to Nadir Shah to foster diplomatic ties,” he said, underlining the depth of historical relations. Tokayev also referenced the cultural and linguistic connections between the two peoples. The taikazan (large ceremonial cauldron) in the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi in Turkestan, he noted, was crafted by the Iranian master Abdul-Aziz Sharafuddin Tebrizi. Persian has left a linguistic imprint on the Kazakh language, with estimates suggesting Persian-origin words comprise 4% of the vocabulary, including astana (capital), paida (benefit), oraza (fast), and dәri (medicine). Tokayev further cited the Persian epic Shahnameh by Ferdowsi as culturally significant to the peoples of Turan, adding that Kazakh poet Abai was familiar with Persian literature. According to Tokayev, the newly acquired manuscripts contain historical analyses of the socio-economic and political conditions of the 18th-century Kazakh Khanate, including interactions with neighboring powers, records on Turkestan, and reports on Russian imperial activities in the region. The documents also reference resource extraction, coal, iron, copper, lead, and turquoise, on Kazakh territory. [caption id="attachment_40893" align="aligncenter" width="750"] Image: Akorda[/caption] “This is a very valuable gift. We will present this exhibition to the Kazakh public and promote it widely in the media,” Tokayev told reporters. “The documents contain previously unknown historical material. I think this will be useful for our compatriots.” The Ministry of Culture and Information, which organized the exhibition, confirmed that the manuscripts substantiate centuries-old ties between Kazakhstan and Iran, including evidence of trade and diplomatic exchanges along the Silk Road and archival references to intergovernmental negotiations and ambassadorial visits. Tokayev’s enthusiasm for the manuscripts is closely linked to Kazakhstan’s broader effort to “decolonize” its national history. The country is currently preparing a new seven-volume historical account under the editorial leadership of State Advisor Yerlan Karin. This project aims to reposition Kazakhstan not simply as a site of ancient states, but as an independent cultural and political center that influenced the broader region. “Kazakhstan is presented as a hub for civilizational development,” Karin explained. “This is our methodological innovation.” Previously, Kazakhstan’s history was largely framed within the narrative of the Russian Empire and Soviet rule. The current academic effort seeks to...

Kazakhstan and Iran Discuss Trade on Pezeshkian’s Visit to Astana

Kazakhstan and Iran have announced plans to significantly deepen economic cooperation, aiming to triple bilateral trade turnover to $1 billion in the coming years. The announcement was made by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev during the Kazakh-Iranian business forum, held as part of the official visit of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Astana. According to Tokayev, mutual trade exceeded $340 million last year and is expected to “increase many times over” in 2024. The two countries have set an initial target of reaching $1 billion in trade, with an eventual goal of $2 billion, relying on expanded logistics and the establishment of sustainable supply chains. A key mechanism will be the opening of the Kazakhstan Trade House in Tehran, intended to facilitate systematic exports of Kazakhstani products. Over the past two decades, Iran has invested more than $226 million in Kazakhstan’s economy, and more than 350 Iranian companies currently operate in the country. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s readiness to initiate new joint projects across sectors ranging from industry to agribusiness. Strengthening corridors and access to the Persian Gulf Tokayev highlighted the development of transport and logistics infrastructure as a primary enabler of increased trade. Kazakhstan, he noted, is a vital transit hub in Eurasia, with 85% of cargo between China and Europe passing through its territory. Astana plans to construct a transport and logistics terminal at the port of Shahid Rajai, linking Kazakhstan’s ports of Aktau and Kuryk with the Iranian ports of Amirabad and Anzali. The Kazakh side also expressed readiness to integrate the ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar into the regional supply chain. The Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway plays a central role in these plans. Traffic volumes along this corridor are expected to double by 2030, delivering a substantial boost to regional trade and industrial development. Key market for Kazakh grain Iran remains a key buyer of Kazakh grain. In the first 10 months of 2024 alone, exports reached $280 million. Total agricultural trade between the two countries stood at $220 million in 2023, underscoring the sector’s growth potential. Iran’s Solico Group plans to build a dairy plant with an annual capacity of 200,000 tons and launch baby food production. Meanwhile, Kourosh Food Industry is exploring opportunities to establish vegetable oil plants and poultry farms. Kazakhstan, in turn, is inviting Iranian investors to participate in modern manufacturing projects and develop export-oriented supply chains. A shared challenge: the declining Caspian Sea The environmental situation in the Caspian region was another key topic of discussion. Falling sea levels are already affecting port operations, logistics, and fish stocks. Tokayev called for the creation of an intergovernmental program to preserve the Caspian Sea and urged greater involvement from international organizations. Kazakhstan intends to take part in the upcoming VII Caspian Summit in Tehran and has proposed hosting the IV Caspian Economic Forum within the next two years. Pezeshkian noted that the private sector has already identified promising areas for collaboration from the creation of a joint shipping consortium on the Caspian to the development of...