Multi-vector Foreign Policy - The Times Of Central Asia

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President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Charts Its Own Course

In a rare, candid interview with Al Jazeera, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan projected a steady, pragmatic vision for his country’s future, portraying it as a stabilizing force amid turbulent global currents. Tokayev explained how his government is navigating complex pressures at home and abroad, from economic modernization and digital transformation to balancing ties with Russia, China, Europe, and the United States. The message was one of controlled ambition: Kazakhstan will not be rushed, but rather steer a measured course of reform and integration, balancing domestic stability with global engagement. Tokayev opened the interview by acknowledging the obstacles facing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms, notably the global pandemic and the war in Ukraine. These external shocks, he explained, have tested the country’s resilience and delayed the delivery of the “New Kazakhstan” that he promised three years ago. Yet he remained firm in his commitment to a gradual but determined path forward. “We must be frank, we must be pragmatic, but at the same time we need to be very much bold,” he said. Domestically, Tokayev defended his record on political reform, including the legalization of opposition parties and the introduction of a one-term presidency of seven years. “I have already announced that I will step down” in 2029, he said, adding that this was “a demand of my people.” This latter move is unprecedented in the region. Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan’s laws as “quite democratic,” dismissing criticisms from organizations like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Human Rights Watch as biased and detached from the country’s political and historical context. "I don't believe that we should follow recommendations of human rights organizations nowadays," he said, also mentioning foreign funders behind certain NGOs, which he left unnamed. Acknowledging the need for further reforms, particularly in media freedom and civil liberties, Tokayev made clear that stability remains the overriding priority. “Without stability, there will be no reforms, no modernization, no transformation of our society,” he said. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's commitment to a “law and order” strategy to promote greater stability, where the laws fully comply with international standards. Tokayev's remarks on measured progress typify his leadership style, which admits the complexity of transformation while setting pragmatic goals. His program of a “fair and just Kazakhstan” reflects his awareness of domestic discontent with wealth disparities that simmer beneath the surface of economic expansion. The country's economy remains dominated by hydrocarbon fuels, which account for over half of exports. Tokayev’s vision of transforming Kazakhstan into a “non-hydrocarbon country” by 2060 strikes a pragmatic note. “Coal in our domestic energy balance accounts for 73%. We cannot give up coal just overnight,” he said, signaling both realism and the limits of immediate energy transition. The diversification of transport routes — including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the Middle Corridor) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline — aligns with his goal of mitigating overdependence on Russia and ensuring economic security amid global uncertainty. Tokayev’s foreign policy strikes a careful balance between continuity and adaptation. While acknowledging Kazakhstan’s reliance on...

Multi-vector Foreign Policy Astana International Forum Middle Powers International Diplomacy

Kazakhstan’s Diplomatic Dance: Securing Power in Turbulent Times

For Kazakhstan, strengthening ties with neighboring Central Asian states – as well as with Russia, China, and the West – is a top foreign policy priority. That, however, does not mean that the energy-rich nation is not also seeking to build stronger relations with other actors on the international stage. The largest regional country views itself as an aspiring middle power. As such, it intends to continue pursuing what Roman Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Ministry, describes as a “balanced, constructive and pragmatic foreign policy.” Yet, in an increasingly turbulent world, this approach comes with its own sets of challenges. One of them is undoubtedly the construction of the nation’s first nuclear power plant. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly stated that an international consortium with participation by companies from China, France, Russia, and South Korea should be responsible for that. But how realistic is that under the current geopolitical circumstances? “No decision of the composition of the consortium has been made yet, although we are actively negotiating with the companies interested in the construction,” Vassilenko told The Times of Central Asia, emphasizing that Tokayev has stressed that Kazakhstan will need more than one nuclear power plant. That is why, in Vassilenko’s view, there will likely be different types of consortiums building different types of nuclear plants. Such an approach perfectly illustrates the Central Asian nation’s “multi-vector” foreign policy. “As the ninth largest country in the world, with only 20 million people, and neighboring such superpowers as Russia and China, we can naturally depend only on the best diplomacy we can deploy,” Vassilenko stressed. For that reason, Kazakhstan has initiated the Astana International Forum (AIF) – an event that reflects today’s interconnected global challenges, ranging from energy security and the climate crisis to technological innovation, sustainable development, and geopolitical cooperation. This year, the AIF – taking place in the Kazakh capital on May 29-30 – will host leaders from nations such as Rwanda, Qatar, Albania, Croatia, and North Macedonia, among others. The fact that Astana will host leaders from several Balkan countries clearly suggests that Kazakhstan plans to strengthen ties with this part of Europe. According to Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s policymakers view the Balkans as a “promising market” which is why the Central Asian nation plans to establish direct flights to Serbia later this year. “We already have direct flights to Montenegro, and we aim to connect Kazakhstan with other European countries as well,” Vassilenko said, adding that his nation has recently opened embassies in Albania and North Macedonia. This approach demonstrates that Astana sees not only the European Union but also the EU candidate countries as potential partners. Still, for Kazakhstan – a major oil and gas producer – energy plays an important role in its foreign policy strategy. Given that the Central Asian state supplies large quantities of crude oil and petroleum products to Europe via Croatia, it’s no surprise that the Prime Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic, Andrej Plenkovic, is among the major speakers at the Astana International...

Global South International Diplomacy Astana International Forum Multi-vector Foreign Policy

Kazakhstan’s Astana Forum Offers Global South a New Multi-Vector Platform

Kazakhstan will convene the Astana International Forum (AIF) later this month, on May 29–30, emphasizing its profile as an active mediator in the evolving architecture of global diplomacy. The AIF began in 2008 as the Astana Economic Forum, originally conceived as a technocratic venue focused on macroeconomic development, fiscal strategy, and public-sector reform. In its early iterations, it drew regional economists, central bankers, and international development agencies together to discuss Kazakhstan’s integration into global financial institutions. While modest in its geopolitical profile, the Forum reflected Astana’s broader ambitions to participate in the global rules-based order without overt alignment. In 2023, the AIF was reconstituted with its new, broader mandate in response to international demands for such forums, given the evident erosion of consensus in multilateral governance structures. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invoked Kazakhstan’s unique geopolitical position to advocate for the AIF as a new platform of balanced engagement, to serve as a “bridge between East and West,” reflecting Astana’s accumulated experience in dialogue facilitation and its ambition to ameliorate the deepening fragmentation of the international system. The rebranding of the Forum was more than cosmetic. It marked a deliberate effort by Kazakhstan to reach out beyond its customary Eurasian frame of reference. The Forum aspires to be a diplomatic innovation, seeking to complement existing institutions like the UN or OSCE without replacing them: a more flexible platform that would be more responsive to emergent global dynamics. This aspiration is of a piece with Kazakhstan’s growing participation in multilateral forums, serving different geopolitical functions, such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and its engagements within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and Organization of Turkic States (OTS). The AIF is envisioned as a complementary structure that transcends bloc affiliations, facilitating fluid dialogue among ideologically diverse actors. The 2024 edition of the Forum was intended to be larger-scale than the 2023 version, but it was abruptly canceled after catastrophic flooding struck several regions, an event President Tokayev described as the most devastating natural disaster in the country in eight decades. The state redirected its attention and resources toward recovery, and the Forum was deferred. The 2025 iteration, now reactivated, has adopted the banner message, “Connecting Minds, Shaping the Future.” This reflects an underlying logic in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy that privileges "multi-vectorialism" as a structure for autonomy. Within that structure, the AIF is seeking to create space for engagement among actors that often find themselves excluded from the inner circles of traditional diplomacy: the so-called "Global South," mid-sized Western powers, and immediate regional stakeholders. The agenda of the 2025 AIF consolidates four previous thematic streams into three: Foreign Policy and International Security, Energy and Climate Change, and Economy and Finance. This thematic restructuring signals an intention to deepen the Forum’s analytical focus while retaining general breadth across domains characterizing Kazakhstan’s long-term strategic interests. These interests are conditioned by the continuing development of Kazakhstan's economy. Domestic economic growth is projected to reach 4.5 to 5.0% in 2025, driven by...

Central Asian politics Multi-vector Foreign Policy Geopolitics International Diplomacy

Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West

Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case. All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials. A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats. The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a...

Multi-vector Foreign Policy Central Asia-EU Summit EU Middle Powers U.S. Astana International Forum Middle Corridor China Russia

How Tokayev’s Kazakhstan Bridges Global Powers

Amid the ongoing reshaping of the global order, Kazakhstan is seeking to enhance its role as an emerging middle power. Preserving strong relations with all key geopolitical actors, strengthening its position as a de facto leader in Central Asia, and developing closer ties with other influential states on the world stage appear to be Astana’s top foreign policy priorities. The largest Central Asian state is one of the few countries that maintains good relations with geopolitical rivals such as China and the United States, as well as Russia and the European Union. At the same time, Astana is actively developing closer ties with the Turkey-led Organization of Turkic States, while firmly upholding its longstanding commitment to international law. It is, therefore, no surprise that, during the recently held EU- Central Asia summit in Samarkand, Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, backed two UN resolution from the 1980s that reject the unilaterally-declared independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and deem all secessionist actions there legally invalid. Such a policy perfectly aligns with Kazakhstan President’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s 2022 statement, in which he affirmed Astana’s non-recognition of Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia, and the entities he described as quasi-states, namely Luhansk and Donetsk. “In general, it has been calculated that if the right of nations to self-determination is actually realized throughout the globe, then instead of the 193 states that are now members of the UN, more than 500 or 600 states will emerge on Earth. Of course, it will be chaos,” Tokayev stressed. In other words, Kazakhstan upholds the principle of territorial integrity for all UN-member states, a stance similar to China’s policy. Despite their history of often supporting the right to self-determination over the principle of territorial integrity, Russia and the West do not seem to oppose Tokayev’s approach. As a result, the President of Kazakhstan remains one of the few world leaders who can attend the May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow, regularly meet with EU officials, and participate in China-led initiatives. As the first Central Asian leader to speak with newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump in December 2024, Tokayev is also signaling his intention to deepen relations with the United States. All these actions demonstrate that, for Kazakhstan under Tokayev, the well-known multi-vector foreign policy remains without an alternative at this point. Although it is Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, who initiated this approach, it is Tokayev who has been actively implementing it since he came to power in 2019. That, however, does not mean that "multivectorism" has become Astana’s official ideology. It is rather a tool the energy-rich nation’s policymakers are using to improve their country’s position in the international arena. Nowhere is that more obvious than at the Astana International Forum – an annual summit taking place in Kazakhstan’s capital – where leaders from diverse countries, often with differing goals and values, come together to discuss global challenges, foster dialogue, and seek common ground. The fact that this year Astana will host...

Russia Turkey CSTO Geopolitics Organization of Turkic States EAEU Multi-vector Foreign Policy

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...