• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
05 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 26

Kazakhstan Peace Talks: Basel Al-Haj Jassem on Syria and the South Caucasus

Basel Al-Haj Jassem, a Syrian political adviser and analyst, has worked on the Middle East, the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia for many years, with a particular focus on peace processes. He is the author of the Arabic-language book Kazakhstan and the Syrian Astana, which examines Kazakhstan’s role in the Astana Process on Syria. While Al-Haj Jassem was in Kazakhstan as an observer of the first elections to the country’s new unicameral parliament, the Kurultai, The Times of Central Asia spoke with him about Kazakhstan’s international standing and the country’s possible role as a mediator in the South Caucasus and the Middle East. He described the elections as well organized and “a new stage in the development of Kazakhstan’s political system,” although he added that “in a year it will already be possible to give a more concrete assessment of the Kurultai’s work.” TCA: You have known Kazakhstan for many years and have observed the country from different professional perspectives. In your view, how have Kazakhstan’s role and international standing changed over the past two decades? Al-Haj Jassem: I think the changes that have taken place in Kazakhstan over the past two decades go far beyond economic growth or the expansion of foreign relations. The country has gradually moved from being an important Central Asian state to one whose political and diplomatic presence extends beyond its immediate geographical surroundings. Several factors have contributed to this: its geographical position, balanced relations with Russia, China, the West, and the Islamic world, as well as its ability to avoid becoming rigidly aligned with opposing political blocs. But what I consider most important is that Kazakhstan has built a reputation as a state capable of maintaining dialogue with different parties, including those that are sometimes opposed to one another. TCA: One of your books is devoted to Kazakhstan and the Astana Process on Syria. That experience demonstrated Kazakhstan’s potential as a venue for negotiations. What further role could the country play in the Middle East? Al-Haj Jassem: The experience of the Astana Process on Syria was important because it showed that a state that is not itself a direct party to a conflict can provide space for dialogue that cannot be achieved elsewhere. Kazakhstan, of course, was not a party determining decisions on the Syrian issue, but it created a political and diplomatic environment that helped maintain channels of communication between participants who found it difficult to sit at the same table. I think this experience can be developed further, but it is not necessarily a matter of literally reproducing the Astana Process model. Today, the Middle East needs different forms of mediation, including quiet diplomacy, humanitarian initiatives, and support for dialogue between religious and cultural communities. Kazakhstan’s advantage is that it carries no colonial legacy in the region and is not part of traditional intra-Arab rivalries. At the same time, the country maintains good relations with various Arab and Islamic states. This gives Kazakhstan a certain freedom of action, particularly in situations where a settlement requires, above...

Kazakhstan Updates Its Foreign Policy Concept in a More Difficult Era

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has approved targeted amendments to the document that sets the principles and priorities for Kazakhstan’s dealings with the outside world. The changes align the doctrine with Kazakhstan’s new constitutional order, remove its remaining provisions tied to Nazarbayev’s formal role, and come at a time when multi-vector diplomacy has become far more demanding than it was in 2020. The amendments to the Foreign Policy Concept for 2020–2030, signed on August 14, attracted attention after KazTAG reported on them. Kazinform subsequently highlighted changes concerning the protection of citizens abroad, public understanding of foreign policy and the new Kurultai. A Foreign Policy Concept is Kazakhstan’s overarching diplomatic doctrine. It sets the principles, priorities and responsibilities intended to guide state policy through 2030. The August changes are limited in length. They remove its remaining references to Nursultan Nazarbayev’s formal role, bring the document into the Kurultai era, and give the Astana International Forum formal recognition in the doctrine. Other language now attracting attention is older. Sovereignty, protection of citizens, and resilience to negative external influence were already in the 2020 document. The difference is the world in which Kazakhstan now has to apply them. From Personal Legacy to Institutional Continuity The first principle in the 2020 concept referred to continuity with the foreign policy course of the First President and Elbasy, Nursultan Nazarbayev. The new wording promises “continuity of the foreign policy course at a new stage of the country’s development.” The revised text no longer names Nazarbayev or uses the Elbasy title. The amendments also remove a provision that gave the First President a lifelong right to address the public and state bodies on major foreign policy questions. The Constitutional Law on the First President was repealed in 2023, and the concept no longer lists it among its legal foundations. This follows a process that began years ago. The special legal provisions associated with the Elbasy framework have been repealed, while Tokayev has continued to acknowledge Nazarbayev’s place in the history of independent Kazakhstan. Tokayev was also closely involved in the foreign policy he inherited. He served twice as foreign minister, as prime minister, and later as director-general of the United Nations Office at Geneva. The revised concept places foreign policy continuity on an institutional rather than personal basis. Adapting the Foreign Policy Concept to the New Constitution Kazakhstan’s new Constitution came into force on July 1, replacing the Senate and Mazhilis with a unicameral Kurultai. The first election to the 145-seat body is scheduled for August 23. The old concept described the foreign policy functions of the bicameral parliament. The amended version now identifies the Kurultai as Kazakhstan’s highest representative body exercising legislative power. Signed nine days before the election, the change places the foreign policy doctrine inside the wider constitutional transition and removes references to institutions that no longer exist. The revision also fits Tokayev’s broader effort to move Kazakhstan beyond a political system shaped by the formal privileges of its first president and towards one intended to...

Opinion: Beyond Multivectorism – What Kyrgyzstan’s UN Security Council Win Really Shows

Kyrgyzstan's election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term is more than a diplomatic milestone. It is a case study in how a small state can create political weight without possessing a large economy, military power, or a dominant regional position. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan won its first-ever seat on the Security Council after a competitive four-round contest with the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific Group vacancy. Bishkek led from the first round, with 105 votes against Manila's 85, and increased its support through each subsequent ballot. It finished with 142 votes to 49. The result is significant because this was not an uncontested regional rotation. Kyrgyzstan had to assemble a qualified two-thirds majority across the wider UN General Assembly. That required more than support from its immediate neighbors. Bishkek had to build support across regions, institutions, and political blocs. The deeper lesson is that small-state agency should not be measured only by material resources. It should also be measured by the ability to assemble coalitions. A Campaign Larger Than Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's campaign was not presented simply as a request for national recognition. President Sadyr Japarov framed the bid as a question of representation. When Kyrgyzstan intensified its campaign in 2024, he drew attention to the number of UN member states that had never served on the Council and argued for broader representation, particularly for African countries. Bishkek also positioned itself as a voice for small, developing, landlocked, and mountainous states facing security, climate, and connectivity challenges. That framing gave the vote wider political weight. Kyrgyzstan could not outspend larger states; it could not offer a large domestic market or a major security umbrella. But it could translate its limitations into a broader political language: underrepresentation, sovereign equality, regional balance, and the need for smaller states to have a voice in global decision-making. The campaign also received visible regional backing. In December 2025, all five Central Asian presidents endorsed Kyrgyzstan's candidacy, presenting the bid as a regional effort rather than a purely national one. That was the first layer of the coalition. The second was broader. In May 2026, the African Group at the United Nations received a dedicated briefing on Bishkek’s candidacy from Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s newly appointed ambassador to the United States and a special envoy of the president. This followed Kyrgyzstan's public support for wider African representation in the Security Council. Because the UN ballot was secret, it would be impossible to claim that African votes delivered Kyrgyzstan's victory. Nor would it be accurate to reduce the campaign to a simple exchange of support. But the African track was an observable part of a wider coalition strategy. Bishkek aligned its own candidacy with an issue that mattered to a much larger group of states: the imbalance of representation inside the Security Council. From Multivectorism to Coalition Brokerage Central Asian foreign policy is often described through the language of multivectorism. The term usually refers to balancing among Russia, China, the West, Turkiye, and other external powers...

Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer

In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure...

Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords Dividend

Astana’s entry into the Abraham Accords is not the opening of a relationship with Israel so much as the re-platforming of one. Kazakhstan recognized Israel in the early 1990s and has maintained a functional, if understated, partnership since then. What has changed is the format. An existing bilateral channel is being placed inside diplomatic architecture with better access to political attention, private capital, and commercially useful networks. Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Accords on November 6, 2025, ahead of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington. The Times of Central Asia described Kazakhstan as the first Central Asian state and the only non-Middle Eastern or North African country to enter the framework. An official accession ceremony is still pending. For Kazakhstan, the value lies not in symbolism but in the Accords’ convening power. The Accords make Kazakhstan more legible to Israeli technology firms, Gulf investors, American policymakers, and the growing ecosystem of institutions and policy platforms built around regional economic integration. For Astana, this is the practical utility of membership. It does not need the Accords to talk to Israel. It can use them to widen the circle around specific projects. The formulation is also consistent with Kazakhstan’s foreign-policy habits. Astana has not presented the decision as a strategic turn against any other partner. Its Foreign Ministry said accession was made “solely in the interests of Kazakhstan,” and was consistent with a “balanced, constructive, and peaceful foreign policy.” The same statement reaffirmed support for a two-state settlement of the Middle East conflict. That wording appears carefully calibrated. It allows Astana to engage with a Trump-associated diplomatic framework while presenting the decision as an extension of Kazakhstan’s established multi-vector foreign policy, not a departure from it. The better interpretation is additive multi-vectorism in the form of another channel, another table, and another set of possible transactions. A Times of Central Asia analysis made this point directly, arguing that Kazakhstan’s aims include converting symbolic capital into policy traction, developing Gulf co-financing, and preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The commercial agenda is already visible. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s January 2026 visit to Astana, the first by an Israeli foreign minister in 16 years, produced a package of institutional and economic steps. A Kazakhstan-Israel business forum ran alongside the official meetings, and the sides identified a project map covering high-tech agriculture, water management, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, energy efficiency, renewables, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors are not ornamental but match Kazakhstan’s own reform priorities of productivity, digital administration, non-resource growth, infrastructure modernization, and technology transfer. Israel’s appeal lies less in its market size than in its applied capability. Gulf participation, where available, adds scale and financing. The Accords can help package those elements into projects that are easier for companies, development institutions, and governments to recognize. Energy and infrastructure may become the most consequential tests. The Times of Central Asia has argued that the Accords could give Israeli firms a clearer political and legal framework for...

Lavrov in Astana as Kazakhstan Prepares for Putin State Visit

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has visited Astana for talks with Kazakhstan’s leadership, as the two countries prepare for a planned state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin in late May. Lavrov arrived in Kazakhstan on April 29. The main working part of the visit took place on April 30, with meetings with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the agenda covered political, trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties, as well as cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At expanded talks in Astana, Kosherbayev said Russia remains one of Kazakhstan’s key trade partners. Bilateral trade exceeded $27 billion last year, and the two governments are working toward a target of $30 billion. Kosherbayev said the talks covered energy, transport, logistics, industry, digitalization, cultural ties, and international issues. The foreign ministers signed a cooperation plan between the two ministries for 2027-2028 during the visit. Kosherbayev said the plan reflected close coordination between Astana and Moscow on bilateral and international issues. The visit also comes ahead of Putin’s expected trip to Kazakhstan. The Kremlin said in February that Putin had confirmed his participation in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting in Astana in late May and accepted Tokayev’s invitation to make a state visit linked to the event. For Kazakhstan, relations with Russia remain a central part of its multi-vector diplomacy, alongside growing ties with China, the European Union, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the United States. The two countries share a long border, have deep trade links, and work together through several regional organizations. Russia also remains central to Kazakhstan’s energy export network. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk handles roughly 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports. That gives Astana a strong reason to keep stable ties with Moscow, but it also explains why Kazakhstan is pushing to diversify transport routes. The government has promoted the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, as a way to move freight between China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe with less reliance on Russian territory. The war in Ukraine has made that approach harder to sustain. Kazakhstan has kept ties with Moscow, but Tokayev has also stressed the importance of the UN Charter, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on August 10, 2025, Tokayev said Kazakhstan supported the UN Charter, the inviolability of sovereign borders, and the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Economic pressure has also grown. Western governments have increased scrutiny of trade routes that could be used to bypass sanctions on Russia. Kazakhstan has tried to protect its own trade from that pressure while avoiding a direct break with Moscow. Energy adds another dimension. Any disruption to the CPC route can quickly become a national economic issue for Kazakhstan. In April, Kazakhstan’s energy ministry said CPC exports through the Black Sea remained stable after Russia reported...