• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00204 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10571 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
17 February 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 24

Opinion: Abraham Accords Can Help Kazakhstan Reshape Its Energy Future

On 6 November 2025, after speaking with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Kazakhstan would join the Abraham Accords. Astana and Jerusalem have maintained full diplomatic relations since 1992, but Kazakhstan’s entry pushes the Accords beyond the Middle East and North Africa and into the Eurasian heartland. This matters at a time when Washington wants to re-energize the initiative and deepen its C5+1 engagement with the region. Kazakhstan’s decision fits its multi-vector policy. The decision also builds on the country’s role as a key component of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”), which links Chinese production to European markets. Cargo volumes reached about 4.5 million tons in 2024 and are expected to rise to around 5.2 million tons in 2025. A recent report by Boston Consulting Group expects rail freight through the Middle Corridor to quadruple by the decade’s end. The Accords do not change Kazakhstan’s formal status with Israel. The question is, rather, whether they unlock deeper economic cooperation. The Times of Central Asia has already reported on clear opportunities for cooperation in sectors such as water and agricultural efficiency, grid and industrial productivity, and cybersecurity and administrative modernization. In the energy sector, like the others, the Accords give Israeli companies a clearer political and legal framework for working with Kazakhstan’s energy and infrastructure sectors. Gulf Cooperation Council states, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in particular, could provide project finance as well. Hard Energy, Nuclear Fuel, and Israeli Technology Astana’s principal concern in the energy sector is how to raise net revenue: the goal here is to make the sector more resilient to external pressure without incurring prohibitive capital costs. Israeli firms can address that problem at an operational level. The PrismaFlow sensing system developed by Prisma Photonics is a proven technology that uses existing optical fiber as a sensing system. Thousands of kilometers of pipeline can be monitored in real time for leaks, third-party interference, and attempted theft, without having to install physical sensors along the route. KazTransOil and Prisma Photonics could develop a program through an Abraham Accords framework to overlay this technology on selected trunk network segments and on the systems that deliver crude to export pipelines. Energy-sector cybersecurity is another area where Israeli companies can help Kazakhstan’s hard-energy system. The Israeli firm Radiflow specializes in operational-technology (OT) cybersecurity for oil and gas installations, tailored to pipeline and production environments. Its systems provide continuous network visibility and better anomaly detection. Its risk-based threat management reduces both the likelihood and the cost of cyber incidents that might interrupt flows or force precautionary shutdowns. KazMunayGas, KazTransOil, and their joint ventures could implement a structured audit and remediation program with Radiflow as a strategic partner. The uranium sector presents another opportunity for Kazakhstan–Israel cooperation, potentially a more strategic one. OT security systems can provide monitoring and control layers for uranium mining, in-situ leaching fields, and logistics chains. Kazakhstan accounts for over 40% of the world's uranium...

Opinion: Multi-Vectorism 2.0 – Kazakhstan Seeks Balance in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The world is reverting to the logic of bloc confrontation. Sanctions regimes, technological barriers, and deepening mistrust between major powers are compelling medium-sized states to chart independent courses. Kazakhstan stands at the center of this evolving geopolitical matrix. While Moscow remains a vital partner in defense and energy, Astana is simultaneously cultivating strong ties with other global power centers, including China, the U.S., Turkey, the European Union, and the Gulf states. Yet Kazakhstan refuses to align with any single bloc, adhering instead to a strategy of "flexible autonomy", cooperating broadly while preserving its sovereignty. Russia: Alliance with Strategic Boundaries On November 11-12, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The two leaders signed a declaration on a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance, reaffirming cooperation on security, energy, and logistics projects. Key discussions included the gasification of border regions, the modernization of energy infrastructure, and the transit of Russian energy via Kazakhstan. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in a stable and prosperous Russia, calling Putin a “statesman of global stature.” Still, this alignment does not supplant Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy. The Moscow visit directly followed Tokayev’s talks in Washington, underscoring that Astana views relations with Russia as one of several strategic pillars. The U.S.: Investment and Critical Minerals Diplomacy During Tokayev’s visit to the U.S. in early November 2025, he and President Donald Trump oversaw the signing of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. The deals spanned industry, energy, digitalization, education, and innovation. Highlights in recent collaboration between Kazakhstan and the U.S. include a $2.5 billion John Deere production facility in Kostanay and Turkestan, a $1.1 billion development of tungsten deposits, and over $1 billion in digital infrastructure cooperation with companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Oracle, and Starlink. Leading global funds also pledged roughly $1 billion in new investments. These agreements reflect growing trust and a shared commitment to investment-driven, high-tech cooperation. China: Strategic Synergy and Technological Convergence China remains Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and a cornerstone of its eastern vector. During Tokayev’s October 17, 2023 visit to Beijing, he and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” built on political trust and economic cooperation. In June 2025, Xi Jinping visited Astana for the second China-Central Asia Summit, where he and Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev reinforced their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership”, oversaw deals spanning energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and digital technology. Later that year, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, the two leaders used the platform to deepen cooperation within a multilateral framework, promoting connectivity and regional trade under the Belt and Road Initiative. Turkey: Civilizational Ties and Strategic Growth Ties between Kazakhstan and Turkey are underpinned by shared cultural and historical foundations. At the fifth High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting in Ankara on July 29, 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Tokayev, reaffirming Turkey’s role as a major investor and educational partner. More than 12,000 Kazakh students are enrolled in Turkish universities. Defense cooperation is expanding under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and tourism and...

Kazakhstan’s Emerging Role in Global Rare-Earth Supply Chains

October 10 was one of the most consequential days for global trade policy and one of the most volatile for world markets since the U.S.–China tariff conflict first reignited. After China announced tighter export controls on rare earths, U.S. President Donald J. Trump first posted on Truth Social that “there seems to be no reason” anymore for him to meet with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in two weeks' time. Several hours later, the official White House account on X posted a message from Trump that he had learned that "effective November 1st, 2025, [China will] impose large-scale Export Controls [sic] on virtually every product they make, and some not even made by them." He then followed with the declaration that the U.S. will impose a 100% tariff on Chinese imports starting November 1, "or sooner," and launch export controls on critical software. As Washington and Beijing escalate their economic confrontation, the scramble for stable rare-earth supply chains has broadened beyond East Asia. Attention is shifting to Central Asia, where mineral potential and trade corridors align with the broader effort to reduce dependence on China. Kazakhstan has drawn particular attention, not as a single solution, but as a state seeking to leverage its Soviet-era industrial base and access to the Caspian to help meet emerging supply chain needs. Although Kazakhstan has made the most progress in translating its mineral reserves into a functioning mining industry, it remains part of a broader regional effort to diversify away from a single external partner, most notably China. Other Central Asian states are testing their own capabilities to meet global supply chain demands, though most remain constrained by infrastructure, financing, or lack of processing capability. Kazakhstan’s Position in the Emerging Supply Realignment On reserves, Kazakhstan’s rare-earth potential is rooted as much in continuity as it is in discovery. Decades of geological mapping under Soviet administration established its mineral profile, and recent joint surveys by Kazgeology and private firms have both confirmed and expanded those earlier findings. New delineated deposits in the east and center of the country, including the Zhana Kazakhstan site in Karagandy, have reinforced its status as a prospective non-Chinese source of critical materials, with verified concentrations of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and samarium. If current resource estimates are validated, the Zhana Kazakhstan deposit could rank among the largest rare-earth reserves in the world. These elements are essential inputs for high-efficiency magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. The U.S. Department of Defense classifies these rare earths as “critical defense materials,” a designation that underscores their strategic relevance rather than any immediate shift in supply. Both the Pentagon and the Defense Logistics Agency have begun increasing stockpiles and exploring alternative processing sources, but for now, the question in Kazakhstan is not geological endowment, which is established, but the terms under which that endowment can be brought to market. On processing capacity, Kazakhstan’s experience in large-scale mining of uranium, copper, and other critical minerals has...

Kazakhstan Consolidates Leadership at the Tianjin SCO Summit

The 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit, which convened in Tianjin (also known as Tientsin) in China from August 31 to September 1, was the largest in the bloc’s twenty-five-year history. It gathered more than twenty heads of state and institutional leaders, among them China’s Xi Jinping, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, India’s Narendra Modi, Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian, Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, and UN Secretary-General António Guterres. The agenda ranged widely: counterterrorism, supply chain resilience, energy transition, and climate cooperation all featured. For Beijing, the event was the centerpiece of its SCO presidency. Chinese officials cast it as a demonstration of “true multilateralism” at a time when protectionism and bloc politics are resurgent. The summit’s final product, the Tianjin Declaration, mapped strategic priorities to 2035. It stressed four pillars: collective security, economic integration, digital transformation, and sustainable development. Underpinning this ambition was trade estimated to be worth over $512 billion between China and SCO members in 2024, illustrating the economic weight now embedded in the organization. Over the past year, Kazakhstan’s policy entrepreneurship has heightened the significance of its spell as chair spanning 2024-2025. The country's prominence derives not only from these initiatives but also from its structural position as the largest economy on the Caspian Sea, endowed with the world’s largest reserves of uranium and significant critical minerals. Thanks to its successful implementation of a multi-vector foreign policy aligning with its national strategy priorities, including new energy and transportation agendas, Kazakhstan was able to consolidate its leadership profile. Policy Initiatives and Prolific Activism As one of the six founding members, Kazakhstan had chaired the SCO through 2024. At the 2024 Astana Summit, Tokayev unveiled initiatives that set the foundation for Tianjin. He called for the establishment of a UN Regional Center for Sustainable Development Goals in Central Asia and Afghanistan, arguing that the region’s fragility requires a dedicated UN presence. He also proposed an International Agency for Biological Security, intended to manage risks exposed by the pandemic era, and the creation of an SCO Investment Fund to finance joint projects in infrastructure and technology. During that year, Kazakhstan organized over 140 events in security, economic, and cultural fields, a scale that exceeded most previous chairs. This activism reinforced Astana’s image as a policy entrepreneur within Eurasia’s multilateral institutions. Energy cooperation emerged as the most concrete innovation. In 2024, under Kazakhstan’s presidency and at its motivation, the organization produced a new “SCO Strategy for Energy Cooperation to 2030” committing members to mutual coordination not only in hydrocarbons but also in renewable energy deployment, cross-border grids, and green finance.  In Tianjin in 2025, this framework was carried forward as members endorsed an action plan translating the strategy into specific mechanisms for project financing, technical standards, and pilot cross-border infrastructure. In this way, Kazakhstan’s energy agenda was embedded into the SCO’s medium-term program going forward. Cultural diplomacy was another theme. The “Spiritual Shrines of SCO Countries” project, launched under Kazakhstan’s chairmanship, sought to catalogue and promote shared civilizational heritage. Tokayev also advanced...

President Tokayev: Kazakhstan Charts Its Own Course

In a rare, candid interview with Al Jazeera, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan projected a steady, pragmatic vision for his country’s future, portraying it as a stabilizing force amid turbulent global currents. Tokayev explained how his government is navigating complex pressures at home and abroad, from economic modernization and digital transformation to balancing ties with Russia, China, Europe, and the United States. The message was one of controlled ambition: Kazakhstan will not be rushed, but rather steer a measured course of reform and integration, balancing domestic stability with global engagement. Tokayev opened the interview by acknowledging the obstacles facing Kazakhstan’s domestic reforms, notably the global pandemic and the war in Ukraine. These external shocks, he explained, have tested the country’s resilience and delayed the delivery of the “New Kazakhstan” that he promised three years ago. Yet he remained firm in his commitment to a gradual but determined path forward. “We must be frank, we must be pragmatic, but at the same time we need to be very much bold,” he said. Domestically, Tokayev defended his record on political reform, including the legalization of opposition parties and the introduction of a one-term presidency of seven years. “I have already announced that I will step down” in 2029, he said, adding that this was “a demand of my people.” This latter move is unprecedented in the region. Tokayev characterized Kazakhstan’s laws as “quite democratic,” dismissing criticisms from organizations like the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and Human Rights Watch as biased and detached from the country’s political and historical context. "I don't believe that we should follow recommendations of human rights organizations nowadays," he said, also mentioning foreign funders behind certain NGOs, which he left unnamed. Acknowledging the need for further reforms, particularly in media freedom and civil liberties, Tokayev made clear that stability remains the overriding priority. “Without stability, there will be no reforms, no modernization, no transformation of our society,” he said. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's commitment to a “law and order” strategy to promote greater stability, where the laws fully comply with international standards. Tokayev's remarks on measured progress typify his leadership style, which admits the complexity of transformation while setting pragmatic goals. His program of a “fair and just Kazakhstan” reflects his awareness of domestic discontent with wealth disparities that simmer beneath the surface of economic expansion. The country's economy remains dominated by hydrocarbon fuels, which account for over half of exports. Tokayev’s vision of transforming Kazakhstan into a “non-hydrocarbon country” by 2060 strikes a pragmatic note. “Coal in our domestic energy balance accounts for 73%. We cannot give up coal just overnight,” he said, signaling both realism and the limits of immediate energy transition. The diversification of transport routes — including the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (the Middle Corridor) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline — aligns with his goal of mitigating overdependence on Russia and ensuring economic security amid global uncertainty. Tokayev’s foreign policy strikes a careful balance between continuity and adaptation. While acknowledging Kazakhstan’s reliance on...

Kazakhstan’s Diplomatic Dance: Securing Power in Turbulent Times

For Kazakhstan, strengthening ties with neighboring Central Asian states – as well as with Russia, China, and the West – is a top foreign policy priority. That, however, does not mean that the energy-rich nation is not also seeking to build stronger relations with other actors on the international stage. The largest regional country views itself as an aspiring middle power. As such, it intends to continue pursuing what Roman Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Ministry, describes as a “balanced, constructive and pragmatic foreign policy.” Yet, in an increasingly turbulent world, this approach comes with its own sets of challenges. One of them is undoubtedly the construction of the nation’s first nuclear power plant. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has repeatedly stated that an international consortium with participation by companies from China, France, Russia, and South Korea should be responsible for that. But how realistic is that under the current geopolitical circumstances? “No decision of the composition of the consortium has been made yet, although we are actively negotiating with the companies interested in the construction,” Vassilenko told The Times of Central Asia, emphasizing that Tokayev has stressed that Kazakhstan will need more than one nuclear power plant. That is why, in Vassilenko’s view, there will likely be different types of consortiums building different types of nuclear plants. Such an approach perfectly illustrates the Central Asian nation’s “multi-vector” foreign policy. “As the ninth largest country in the world, with only 20 million people, and neighboring such superpowers as Russia and China, we can naturally depend only on the best diplomacy we can deploy,” Vassilenko stressed. For that reason, Kazakhstan has initiated the Astana International Forum (AIF) – an event that reflects today’s interconnected global challenges, ranging from energy security and the climate crisis to technological innovation, sustainable development, and geopolitical cooperation. This year, the AIF – taking place in the Kazakh capital on May 29-30 – will host leaders from nations such as Rwanda, Qatar, Albania, Croatia, and North Macedonia, among others. The fact that Astana will host leaders from several Balkan countries clearly suggests that Kazakhstan plans to strengthen ties with this part of Europe. According to Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s policymakers view the Balkans as a “promising market” which is why the Central Asian nation plans to establish direct flights to Serbia later this year. “We already have direct flights to Montenegro, and we aim to connect Kazakhstan with other European countries as well,” Vassilenko said, adding that his nation has recently opened embassies in Albania and North Macedonia. This approach demonstrates that Astana sees not only the European Union but also the EU candidate countries as potential partners. Still, for Kazakhstan – a major oil and gas producer – energy plays an important role in its foreign policy strategy. Given that the Central Asian state supplies large quantities of crude oil and petroleum products to Europe via Croatia, it’s no surprise that the Prime Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic, Andrej Plenkovic, is among the major speakers at the Astana International...