Multi-vector Foreign Policy - The Times Of Central Asia

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UN Security Council

Opinion: Beyond Multivectorism – What Kyrgyzstan’s UN Security Council Win Really Shows

Kyrgyzstan's election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term is more than a diplomatic milestone. It is a case study in how a small state can create political weight without possessing a large economy, military power, or a dominant regional position. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan won its first-ever seat on the Security Council after a competitive four-round contest with the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific Group vacancy. Bishkek led from the first round, with 105 votes against Manila's 85, and increased its support through each subsequent ballot. It finished with 142 votes to 49. The result is significant because this was not an uncontested regional rotation. Kyrgyzstan had to assemble a qualified two-thirds majority across the wider UN General Assembly. That required more than support from its immediate neighbors. Bishkek had to build support across regions, institutions, and political blocs. The deeper lesson is that small-state agency should not be measured only by material resources. It should also be measured by the ability to assemble coalitions. A Campaign Larger Than Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's campaign was not presented simply as a request for national recognition. President Sadyr Japarov framed the bid as a question of representation. When Kyrgyzstan intensified its campaign in 2024, he drew attention to the number of UN member states that had never served on the Council and argued for broader representation, particularly for African countries. Bishkek also positioned itself as a voice for small, developing, landlocked, and mountainous states facing security, climate, and connectivity challenges. That framing gave the vote wider political weight. Kyrgyzstan could not outspend larger states; it could not offer a large domestic market or a major security umbrella. But it could translate its limitations into a broader political language: underrepresentation, sovereign equality, regional balance, and the need for smaller states to have a voice in global decision-making. The campaign also received visible regional backing. In December 2025, all five Central Asian presidents endorsed Kyrgyzstan's candidacy, presenting the bid as a regional effort rather than a purely national one. That was the first layer of the coalition. The second was broader. In May 2026, the African Group at the United Nations received a dedicated briefing on Bishkek’s candidacy from Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s newly appointed ambassador to the United States and a special envoy of the president. This followed Kyrgyzstan's public support for wider African representation in the Security Council. Because the UN ballot was secret, it would be impossible to claim that African votes delivered Kyrgyzstan's victory. Nor would it be accurate to reduce the campaign to a simple exchange of support. But the African track was an observable part of a wider coalition strategy. Bishkek aligned its own candidacy with an issue that mattered to a much larger group of states: the imbalance of representation inside the Security Council. From Multivectorism to Coalition Brokerage Central Asian foreign policy is often described through the language of multivectorism. The term usually refers to balancing among Russia, China, the West, Turkiye, and other external powers...

Middle Powers

Kazakhstan’s Middle Power Moment: From Balancer to Regional Organizer

In “What Is the Status of Middle Powers?”, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne presents Kazakhstan as a test case for whether middle powers can still influence outcomes in an era of intensifying great power rivalry. Writing after the Regional Ecological Summit in Astana, which brought together nine heads of state around President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Duclos notes that Kazakhstan “plays a leadership role” among states navigating pressures between China and Russia. He also argues that Tokayev, drawing on his experience as a former senior UN official, is seeking to elevate Kazakhstan into an intermediate power on multilateral issues. That is a useful lens for understanding Tokayev’s foreign policy. Rather than treating Kazakhstan’s position between larger powers as a liability, he has sought to turn geography, energy resources, logistics, diplomatic reliability, and convening power into regional agency. The result is an emerging model of middle power leadership rooted not in confrontation, but in coordination, credibility, and practical cooperation. That assessment places Tokayev’s foreign policy in a broader category than traditional balancing. Kazakhstan’s importance does not rest only on its raw assets — uranium, oil, minerals, logistics, or its position along Central Asian land routes. It also rests on how Astana uses those assets: as a convening state, a reliable partner, and a practical organizer of regional cooperation. Under Tokayev, multi-vector diplomacy has become less a defensive posture than an operating strategy, aimed at keeping Kazakhstan open to multiple partners while building platforms others have reason to use. In that sense, Kazakhstan is being presented not simply as a state located between great powers, but as one increasingly able to give structure to the space between them. Moving from “balancer” to “regional organizer” is only possible if Kazakhstan turns geography, resources, and diplomacy into practical systems others have reason to use. The clearest operational evidence of this shift is transport. Kazakhstan’s geography has often been described as a constraint. It is landlocked, vast, and positioned between larger powers. But the growth of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or Middle Corridor, allows Astana to recast that geography as a strategic advantage. In the first quarter of 2026, 125 container trains transited Kazakhstan via the Middle Corridor, a 34.4% increase from the same period in 2025. The Times of Central Asia also reported that freight volumes along the route through Kazakhstan have grown more than fivefold over seven years, from 0.8 million tons to 4.5 million tons annually. These figures show that Kazakhstan is not simply selling potential; it is building operational value into the corridor. This is where the idea of Kazakhstan as a regional organizer becomes concrete. A balancing state tries to avoid overdependence on any single power. An organizing state builds systems that others have a reason to use. If Kazakhstan can make the Middle Corridor faster, more predictable, more digitalized, and more commercially reliable, it is not merely balancing Russia, China, Europe, Türkiye, and the South Caucasus. It is creating connective tissue between them. World Bank analysis suggests that infrastructure...

Abraham Accords

Kazakhstan’s Abraham Accords Dividend

Astana’s entry into the Abraham Accords is not the opening of a relationship with Israel so much as the re-platforming of one. Kazakhstan recognized Israel in the early 1990s and has maintained a functional, if understated, partnership since then. What has changed is the format. An existing bilateral channel is being placed inside diplomatic architecture with better access to political attention, private capital, and commercially useful networks. Kazakhstan announced its intention to join the Accords on November 6, 2025, ahead of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with Donald Trump in Washington. The Times of Central Asia described Kazakhstan as the first Central Asian state and the only non-Middle Eastern or North African country to enter the framework. An official accession ceremony is still pending. For Kazakhstan, the value lies not in symbolism but in the Accords’ convening power. The Accords make Kazakhstan more legible to Israeli technology firms, Gulf investors, American policymakers, and the growing ecosystem of institutions and policy platforms built around regional economic integration. For Astana, this is the practical utility of membership. It does not need the Accords to talk to Israel. It can use them to widen the circle around specific projects. The formulation is also consistent with Kazakhstan’s foreign-policy habits. Astana has not presented the decision as a strategic turn against any other partner. Its Foreign Ministry said accession was made “solely in the interests of Kazakhstan,” and was consistent with a “balanced, constructive, and peaceful foreign policy.” The same statement reaffirmed support for a two-state settlement of the Middle East conflict. That wording appears carefully calibrated. It allows Astana to engage with a Trump-associated diplomatic framework while presenting the decision as an extension of Kazakhstan’s established multi-vector foreign policy, not a departure from it. The better interpretation is additive multi-vectorism in the form of another channel, another table, and another set of possible transactions. A Times of Central Asia analysis made this point directly, arguing that Kazakhstan’s aims include converting symbolic capital into policy traction, developing Gulf co-financing, and preserving equilibrium with Moscow and Beijing. The commercial agenda is already visible. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s January 2026 visit to Astana, the first by an Israeli foreign minister in 16 years, produced a package of institutional and economic steps. A Kazakhstan-Israel business forum ran alongside the official meetings, and the sides identified a project map covering high-tech agriculture, water management, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, logistics, energy efficiency, renewables, healthcare, and pharmaceuticals. These sectors are not ornamental but match Kazakhstan’s own reform priorities of productivity, digital administration, non-resource growth, infrastructure modernization, and technology transfer. Israel’s appeal lies less in its market size than in its applied capability. Gulf participation, where available, adds scale and financing. The Accords can help package those elements into projects that are easier for companies, development institutions, and governments to recognize. Energy and infrastructure may become the most consequential tests. The Times of Central Asia has argued that the Accords could give Israeli firms a clearer political and legal framework for...

Sergey Lavrov

Lavrov in Astana as Kazakhstan Prepares for Putin State Visit

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has visited Astana for talks with Kazakhstan’s leadership, as the two countries prepare for a planned state visit by Russian President Vladimir Putin in late May. Lavrov arrived in Kazakhstan on April 29. The main working part of the visit took place on April 30, with meetings with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev. Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the agenda covered political, trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian ties, as well as cooperation in the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. At expanded talks in Astana, Kosherbayev said Russia remains one of Kazakhstan’s key trade partners. Bilateral trade exceeded $27 billion last year, and the two governments are working toward a target of $30 billion. Kosherbayev said the talks covered energy, transport, logistics, industry, digitalization, cultural ties, and international issues. The foreign ministers signed a cooperation plan between the two ministries for 2027-2028 during the visit. Kosherbayev said the plan reflected close coordination between Astana and Moscow on bilateral and international issues. The visit also comes ahead of Putin’s expected trip to Kazakhstan. The Kremlin said in February that Putin had confirmed his participation in the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meeting in Astana in late May and accepted Tokayev’s invitation to make a state visit linked to the event. For Kazakhstan, relations with Russia remain a central part of its multi-vector diplomacy, alongside growing ties with China, the European Union, Turkey, the Gulf states, and the United States. The two countries share a long border, have deep trade links, and work together through several regional organizations. Russia also remains central to Kazakhstan’s energy export network. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal near Novorossiysk handles roughly 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude exports. That gives Astana a strong reason to keep stable ties with Moscow, but it also explains why Kazakhstan is pushing to diversify transport routes. The government has promoted the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, as a way to move freight between China, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Europe with less reliance on Russian territory. The war in Ukraine has made that approach harder to sustain. Kazakhstan has kept ties with Moscow, but Tokayev has also stressed the importance of the UN Charter, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. In a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on August 10, 2025, Tokayev said Kazakhstan supported the UN Charter, the inviolability of sovereign borders, and the territorial integrity of sovereign states. Economic pressure has also grown. Western governments have increased scrutiny of trade routes that could be used to bypass sanctions on Russia. Kazakhstan has tried to protect its own trade from that pressure while avoiding a direct break with Moscow. Energy adds another dimension. Any disruption to the CPC route can quickly become a national economic issue for Kazakhstan. In April, Kazakhstan’s energy ministry said CPC exports through the Black Sea remained stable after Russia reported...

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Iran Proposes Defense Cooperation to SCO Partners at Bishkek Meeting

Iran used a Shanghai Cooperation Organization defense meeting in Bishkek to signal that it is ready to share military experience and defense capabilities with other SCO members, giving a sharper geopolitical edge to the gathering hosted by Kyrgyzstan under its current chairmanship of the bloc. The meeting of SCO defense ministers opened on April 28 at the Ala-Archa state residence in Bishkek. Defense officials from the organization’s member states attended, along with SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev. Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Ruslan Mukambetov chaired the session. Iran was represented by Deputy Defense Minister Reza Talaei-Nik. In a statement carried by Mehr News Agency, Talaei-Nik said Iran was ready to share its defense weapons capabilities and experience with “independent countries,” especially SCO member states. He also described the SCO as part of a wider shift away from what Tehran called a “unipolar” international order. The remarks came after weeks of fighting between Iran, the United States, and Israel, including Iranian drone and missile strikes on U.S. bases in the region and Israeli sites. A ceasefire announced earlier this month reduced hostilities, but efforts to reach a wider settlement have stalled. Talaei-Nik also used the meeting to frame the recent conflict as a lesson for other states, declaring, “We are ready to share our experiences in defeating America with other members of the organization.” The SCO meeting gave Tehran a platform inside a bloc that now includes China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Iran became a full member in 2023. The SCO also has a wider circle of observer states and dialogue partners, including 15 dialogue partners listed by the organization’s secretariat. Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov received the SCO defense delegations before the ministerial session. He said Kyrgyzstan, as the SCO chair, attaches special importance to practical defense cooperation, including joint exercises, experience-sharing, and stronger coordination. He said agreements reached in Bishkek should strengthen defense cooperation and security across the SCO region. Kyrgyzstan’s SCO chairmanship is being held under the slogan “25 Years of the SCO: Together Towards Sustainable Peace, Development, and Prosperity.” Kyrgyzstan’s Defense Minister Mukambetov said the organization needed solidarity, mutual trust, and collective responsibility to respond to current security challenges. Kyrgyz state agency Kabar said the participants discussed military cooperation, regional security, and joint responses to current threats. The SCO began as a border-security framework. Its roots go back to agreements signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan on military trust and troop reductions along border areas. Uzbekistan later joined, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally founded in 2001. Since then, the bloc has grown into a wider Eurasian platform covering security, defense contacts, counterterrorism, transport, energy, and economic cooperation. Talaei-Nik also held talks with Russian and Belarusian defense officials on the fringes of the Bishkek meeting, with both sides discussing continued cooperation with Tehran. For Central Asian governments, including non-SCO member Turkmenistan, the Bishkek meeting highlighted the pressures facing multi-vector diplomacy. All five have spent years balancing security...

India

India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World

A widening conflict in West Asia is forcing India and Central Asia to reassess trade routes, diplomacy, and regional security, with key projects such as Iran’s Chabahar port now facing growing uncertainty. These risks framed discussions in New Delhi on March 25–26, where experts gathered under the banner of “India–Central Asia: Connectivity, Security, and Sustainable Partnerships in a Multipolar World,” with The Times of Central Asia in attendance. The conference unfolded against the backdrop of two active Eurasian wars—the Russo-Ukrainian and the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict. Central Asian and Indian participants agreed that the West Asian crisis is widening, putting not only ports and logistics routes but also economies across the globe under serious threat. India's Chabahar link to Afghanistan and Central Asia is now a high-risk, uncertain investment, weakening overall continental strategic thinking across Eurasia, including efforts to consolidate new trans-Caspian trade corridors. If the conflict cripples or destroys Chabahar, years of progress, hard-won partnerships, and millions in strategic investment would be erased. On the sidelines, some participants suggested that India could help cool what's becoming a dangerously global conflict. Unbeknownst to them, India had already held an all-party meeting on March 25 on the West Asia crisis. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message: India will not mediate. The revelation surprised some participants—others, not at all. In any event, Central Asian states, in principle, have backed any diplomatic push for peace. With West Asia in turmoil and platitudes in abundance, conference participants emphasized the need to rethink geopolitics, trade, security, and cultural ties beyond stale frameworks at a time of conflict. Four themes defined the Central and South Asian moment: the dangers of bloc politics, even as regional organizations continue to evolve and expand their influence, the ascendancy of national interests over external pressure, and the emergence of a firm refusal to pick sides in the midst of frictions between competing global pressures. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a member of the India Central Asia Foundation, stated: “The conference provided an important platform to move beyond theoretical discussion and toward practical engagement. With Central Asia’s ambassadors to India present, we focused on exploring concrete mechanisms to promote peace through sustained diplomatic efforts. Despite the proximity of the conflict in West Asia to both Central Asia and India, participants expressed confidence that dialogue and restraint – buttressed by trade and investment – will ultimately guide outcomes, with particular concern for civilians and those enduring hardship. Notably, the crisis did not overshadow the conference’s primary agenda or its scholarly contributions. Overall, the gathering can be seen as a constructive step in reinforcing diplomatic initiatives dedicated to peace and stability in a conflict-affected region.” The conference witnessed the release of three significant publications on India–Central Asia relations: India – Kazakhstan Partnership in a Changing Geopolitical Order (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi, Lalit Aggarwal, Kuralay Baizakova), Manas: Kirgiz Vir Gatha Kavya by Ramakant Dwivedi & Hemchandra Pandey and India and Central, East and Southeast Asia: Enhancing the Partnership (eds. Ramakant Dwivedi & Lalit Aggarwal). [caption id="attachment_46364" align="aligncenter" width="1379"]...