Radicalization - The Times Of Central Asia

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Syria

Syrian Security Forces Detain Uzbek Fighters During Operation in Idlib

Syrian security forces have detained a group of Uzbek fighters during a security operation in the country’s northwest, according to two Syrian security officials cited by Reuters. The arrests followed unrest in Idlib province after the authorities attempted to detain an Uzbek militant accused of opening fire in Idlib city. According to Reuters, the incident escalated when armed Uzbek fighters gathered outside a government security facility demanding the release of the suspect. The protests later triggered a broader security sweep in several parts of the countryside, including the towns of Kafriya and al-Foua. Locals and Syrian officials said security forces deployed military convoys and reinforcements to the area, where sporadic gunfire was heard during the operation. It remains unclear how many Uzbek fighters were detained. The Syrian Interior Ministry did not immediately comment on the reports. The latest incident highlights ongoing tensions between Syria’s Islamist-led authorities and foreign militants who traveled to the country during the civil war that began in 2011. Many foreign fighters, including Uzbeks, fought alongside factions linked to current Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa before he formally severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016. Reuters previously reported, citing a Syrian security source, that around 1,500 Uzbek fighters were believed to be living in Syria, some accompanied by their families. The Syrian government has attempted to integrate thousands of foreign fighters into the country’s newly reorganized military structures following the December 2024 ouster of former President Bashar al-Assad. Some foreign militants have assumed senior state roles, including a Jordanian commander of the Republican Guard and an Australian head of a newly established sovereign fund. Others, however, have resisted joining state institutions, creating continuing security concerns for Damascus. The recent operation marks the second major confrontation in Idlib involving foreign militants in recent months. Last year, Syrian government raids targeting foreign fighters near the Turkish border drew in Uzbek militants after clashes erupted around a compound linked to French jihadist Omar Diaby, also known as Omar Omsen. At the time, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said Syrian transitional authorities were conducting “a low-level effort to target foreign fighters in Syria who have not integrated into the Ministry of Defense.” The institute reported that Uzbek militants had deployed to reinforce foreign fighters during clashes in Harem, a city near the Turkish border. The same report stated that Syrian authorities had arrested two prominent Uzbek foreign fighters in August 2025, contributing to growing dissatisfaction among Central Asian militant groups operating in Syria.

Radicalization

Kazakh MP Calls for a Legislative Ban on Radical Religious Movements

Kazybek Isa, a deputy of the Mazhilis (Kazakhstan's lower house of parliament ), has called for a legislative ban on radical religious movements, arguing that their spread poses a threat to social stability and national security. In a parliamentary inquiry addressed to the government and law enforcement agencies, Isa stated that the ability of such groups to recruit followers could undermine social cohesion and national values. “A legislative ban on radical religious movements is a matter of national security. Such movements threaten social stability, and the state is obligated to protect its citizens from their influence,” the deputy said. He added that the proposed measures are not aimed at religion itself, but at organizations promoting what he described as destructive ideologies. Several recent high-profile incidents prompted the inquiry. In March 2026, a blogger criticized the celebration of Nauryz, describing it as “not a Kazakh or Muslim holiday." He was subsequently detained, and a criminal case was opened against him on charges of inciting religious discord. In a separate case, a YouTube interview circulated featuring a man presenting himself as an imam who claimed to have given his second wife to a student. Following public backlash, he was held administratively liable and fined. According to Isa, existing regulations governing extremist and radical organizations are dispersed across multiple legal acts and are not always effectively enforced. He proposed developing a more comprehensive legislative framework focused on prevention. The deputy also raised concerns about compliance with laws regulating face-covering clothing. He referred to a court case in Aktobe in which the defendants’ wives attended hearings wearing niqabs, arguing that this highlighted the need for stricter enforcement of identification requirements. Kazakhstan previously adopted legislation on the prevention of offenses that includes fines for wearing clothing that conceals the face and hinders identification in public places, including niqabs. Isa further called for tighter oversight of individuals acting as religious preachers and questioned the role of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan in preventing the spread of radical ideologies. He warned that individuals presenting themselves as religious mentors may contribute to social polarization and the recruitment of young people into radical movements. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, in recent years, Kazakhstani authorities have strengthened measures to counter religious extremism, including efforts to prevent radicalization and curb the spread of extremist ideologies.

Counterterrorism

Tajikistan Launches Program to Reintegrate Convicted Extremists into Society

Tajik authorities have launched a state-backed program aimed at reintegrating citizens convicted of extremism and terrorism into peaceful civilian life. The initiative, which will run from 2025 to 2029, seeks to reduce the likelihood of re-engagement with radical movements and support the return of these individuals to society. New State Initiative: Goals and Budget According to official documents, the program is set to receive 38.5 million Tajikistani somoni (approximately $3.6 million) in funding. Nearly half of the funds will come from the state budget, with the remainder provided through international grants and extra-budgetary sources. The initiative includes a comprehensive set of measures: physical and psychological rehabilitation, vocational training, employment support, and involvement in patriotic and cultural activities. These components are designed to assist former prisoners in adjusting to life outside correctional facilities. Upon release, participants will be closely monitored to prevent any return to extremist ideologies. Implementation and oversight will be managed by local authorities and specialized agencies under the Ministry of Justice, which is tasked with submitting regular progress reports to the government. Understanding Pathways to Radicalization The drivers of radicalization in Central Asia are complex and multifaceted. Rustam Azizi, a specialist in countering violent extremism, told Asia-Plus that economic hardship alone does not account for why some individuals are drawn to extremist groups such as ISIS, Ansarullah, or the Taliban. “Economic difficulty doesn't automatically lead to radicalization, other negative outcomes like crime or social withdrawal are also possible,” Azizi explained. “Moreover, real-life cases show that not all recruits come from impoverished backgrounds.” Migration, while often discussed as a risk factor, does not directly cause radicalization, according to Azizi. Rather, it can create an environment where individuals are more exposed to recruitment efforts, particularly among youths aged 18 to 26. Azizi identifies three main categories of individuals most susceptible to radicalization: 1. Identity crisis: Often from secular, modernized, or mixed-background families, these individuals turn to religion as a way to find belonging, purpose, or self-worth. Frequently recent converts or newly observant Muslims, they may express a sentiment such as: “I may not be a good Tajik, but I am a very good Muslim.” 2. Individuals with criminal tendencies: For this group, terrorist organizations offer a platform to continue illicit activities under the cover of religious struggle. Notable examples include Abu Khalid Kulobi (Nusrat Nazarov) and Abu Usama Noraki (Tojiddin Nazarov), both of whom were involved in drug trafficking before joining ISIS. 3. Marginalized citizens: Representing the largest group, these individuals often come from remote areas and have limited access to education and economic opportunity. Lacking formal religious training, they are especially susceptible to simplistic, binary religious narratives—such as Muslims versus infidels, halal versus haram, jihad versus martyrdom—and are particularly vulnerable to recruitment. It is this demographic that the new government program primarily targets, with an emphasis on prevention, education, and structured support after incarceration. Authorities believe these efforts will promote national stability and help curb the threat posed by radical movements.

Migration

Lithuania to Review Migration Policy Toward Central Asian Countries

Lithuania is preparing to revise its migration policy toward citizens from Central Asian nations, citing growing concerns over radicalization risks. Prime Minister Gintautas Paluckas announced the potential changes following a meeting with President Gitanas Nausėda, according to local media reports. “Unfortunately, it seems we need to recognize that people from some countries are more likely to become radicalized,” Paluckas told reporters. “We should consider adjusting our immigration policy and focus on bringing in skilled workers from countries that are closer to us culturally.” His remarks came shortly after the head of Lithuania’s State Security Department, Darius Jauniškis, revealed that approximately ten individuals from Central Asian countries had recently been denied entry over alleged ties to terrorist groups and concerns regarding radicalization. Jauniškis also warned of a broader trend, noting a rising risk of radicalization among migrants from both Central and South Asia. Paluckas added that Lithuania currently maintains numerous visa centers in countries whose cultural values may not align with those of Lithuania. “We are looking ahead and planning to update our migration policy so that it better reflects cultural closeness,” he said. Migration Trends from Central Asia Lithuania has experienced a significant increase in migration from Central Asia in recent years, prompting authorities to heighten security oversight. According to Lithuanian intelligence, the number of migrants from the region in 2024 was 14 times higher than in 2021. Despite this sharp rise, former Prime Minister Ingrida Šimonytė has urged caution in interpreting the figures, noting that the total number of migrants remains relatively small and not a cause for alarm. She attributed the increase in part to labor shortages, particularly after many Ukrainian men were conscripted for military service amid the ongoing war. As of October 2024, approximately 10,600 Uzbek nationals were residing in Lithuania, up from fewer than 1,000 in early 2022. Uzbeks now constitute the fourth-largest foreign community in the country. The number of Tajik citizens also rose significantly, from 5,700 to 7,200 in the first nine months of 2024 alone.