• KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00223
  • TJS/USD = 0.10860
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
07 November 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 15

Expanding U.S.–Turkmenistan Ties: Envoy and Business Group Visit Ashgabat

Turkmenistan and the United States are working to deepen their economic and diplomatic relationship, with a top American diplomat and a U.S. business delegation visiting Ashgabat this week. The U.S.-Turkmenistan Business Council had announced a semiannual business mission to Ashgabat on November 4–5, a trip that comes amid a wider effort by the United States and Central Asian countries to expand trade and investment ties with each other. The council is a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit group led by Eric Stewart, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary for Europe/Eurasia at the Department of Commerce who has founded more than a dozen similar groups focusing on other countries and regions. The trip, which was coordinated with the U.S. government, followed a visit to Ashgabat this week by S. Paul Kapur, U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs. On November 3, Kapur and Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov talked about “expanding business ties and identifying new opportunities” for partnership, according to Turkmenistan’s embassy in the U.S. U.S. support for the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline was also discussed, the embassy said. That support was also noted in a Turkmen state media report on Kapur’s meeting with Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, the former president who still has a powerful leadership role in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan recently said there was progress in laying the pipeline in Afghanistan’s Herat province, though the overall TAPI project has faced years of delays and challenges in its implementation. While U.S.-Turkmen trade and investment are relatively small, Turkmenistan’s strategic location on Caspian Sea trade routes and the fact that it has some of the largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world make it a potentially important partner for the U.S. Turkmenistan mainly exports energy to China but is aiming to diversify export options, including through projects such as TAPI and the planned Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.

U.S. Midterms Hand Democrats a Central Asia Agenda They Helped Build

Democrats have won control of Congress in the November 3 midterms, ending President Donald Trump’s Republican majority. But they inherit a Central Asia agenda their party helped build, backed by substantial orders for American manufacturers. Uzbekistan Airways’ new Boeing deliveries are due to begin in 2031, while Kazakhstan’s $4.2 billion Wabtec agreement covers a decade. For American businesses, the region’s importance is already measured in export orders that outlast a congressional majority. American Jobs Behind the Diplomacy Kazakhstan signed its Wabtec agreement in September 2025. The U.S. Commerce Department said the Pennsylvania-based manufacturer would supply 300 heavy-haul locomotive kits over the next decade. It estimated that the deal would support more than 11,000 American jobs. Uzbekistan Airways initially ordered 14 Boeing 787-9 Dreamliners, with options for eight more. The Commerce Department valued that package at approximately $8.5 billion. The airline subsequently exercised the options, bringing its firm order to 22 aircraft. Those purchases give Astana and Tashkent a direct argument in Washington: engaging with them brings business to American factories. The relationship also gives U.S. manufacturers a reason to support continued engagement, whichever party controls congressional committees. From Biden to Trump The minerals agenda has already survived a change of president. The Biden administration signed a critical minerals cooperation memorandum with Uzbekistan in September 2024, aimed at diversifying global supplies. Under Trump, critical minerals and digital infrastructure remained on the agenda at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. The United States and the five Central Asian republics also backed increased trade through the Trans-Caspian route and closer links between their business communities. Congressional support crosses the same party divide. In October, Democratic Senator Chris Coons and Republican Senator Tim Sheehy introduced legislation to strengthen critical mineral supply chains through mining and processing partnerships with U.S. allies. A bipartisan artificial intelligence (AI) bill, reintroduced in February, similarly aims to strengthen American research and testing capacity. Kazakhstan’s June 2026 agreements with Firebird, a U.S. technology company, cover proposed AI infrastructure and advanced computing capacity. Central Asia offers customers for American technology as well as potential sources of strategic minerals. Both fit priorities Democrats have backed alongside Republicans. The incoming majority has reasons of its own to maintain that engagement. Congress’s Unfinished Business The Democratic majority will take office in January 2027, gaining control of committees and greater influence over legislation and oversight. Central Asian governments will also lose two established advocates. Republican Steve Daines and Democrat Gary Peters, who founded the Senate Central Asia Caucus in 2024, are both retiring that month. Their successors will inherit an unfinished trade agenda. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain subject to the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, despite years of calls to remove its trade restrictions. Republican and Democratic lawmakers introduced repeal legislation in November 2025. While American manufacturers are booking Central Asian business into the 2030s, Congress is still debating whether to lift trade restrictions dating from 1974. At a September 2026 House hearing, lawmakers from both parties heard arguments for removing the restrictions. The discussion...

Kazakhstan and Türkiye: Partners Across the Middle Corridor

On October 28 in Ankara, Kazakhstani President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held talks in a narrow format and then with their delegations. They met less than six months after chairing the sixth bilateral High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Astana on May 14, suggesting a more intensive phase of presidential engagement. The agenda covered transport and logistics, energy, agriculture and investment. Erdoğan reaffirmed the ambition to raise bilateral trade to $15 billion. The Middle Corridor remains central to bilateral cooperation, alongside trade, energy production and corporate investment linking both countries. Complementary Commercial Roles The partnership supports cargo flows both westward to Europe and eastward from Türkiye. In May, KTZ Express and Pasifik Eurasia organized a train carrying 50 forty-foot containers of refrigerators from Izmir toward Chengxiang in China via Aktau and Altynkol. KTZ Express reported an 83-hour transit on the Aktau–Altynkol leg within Kazakhstan. The companies are developing eastbound backhaul, coordinating schedules and transit arrangements to balance cargo flows. Turkish exporters gain a route through Kazakhstan toward Chinese customers, while the operators seek cargo to sustain services in both directions. Kazakhstan’s inland rail network and Türkiye’s connections to European markets give the two countries complementary roles along the corridor. After crossing the Caspian, the Middle Corridor offers shippers an overland continuation through Türkiye alongside maritime routes through Georgian Black Sea ports. KTZ Express also cooperates with Maersk on Black Sea logistics. Azerbaijan and Georgia connect the Kazakhstani and Turkish sections of this route. Ankara and Astana share an interest in attracting cargo through Türkiye within this network of alternative routes. Kazakhstan’s inland rail investment supports the route toward Türkiye. According to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s 2026 project appraisal, the second track on the Dostyk–Mointy line has been completed. A further project would construct a new Mointy–Kyzylzhar section, bypassing congestion in central Kazakhstan to improve corridor alignment and capacity. Farther west, rail services reach Kazakhstan’s Caspian ports, where cargo transfers to maritime transport. Added rail capacity benefits bilateral services insofar as ports and vessels can accommodate the resulting flows. Connecting the Route Azerbaijan’s ports and railways connect Kazakhstan’s Caspian services with routes through Georgia to Türkiye. Crossing between rail networks separated by sea requires coordination of trains, vessels, and port handling. Kazakhstan’s container traffic uses Aktau, while Kuryk handles rail and road-vehicle ferries serving Alat in Azerbaijan. Kazakhstan and Türkiye therefore need cooperation with Azerbaijan and the operators responsible for transferring cargo between rail and sea. Work on the Georgian section of the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway was completed in 2026. In June, Türkiye’s Transport Ministry described the completion as a new operational stage for the line, which opened in 2017. The railway carries cargo arriving through Azerbaijan across Georgia into Türkiye. At the June ceremony, Transport Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu emphasized regular cargo flows, operational coordination, and reliable service. Türkiye’s rail improvements toward the Bulgarian border strengthen its European connection and extend the corridor’s commercial reach. The Çerkezköy–Kapıkule section opened in October as part of the wider Halkalı–Kapıkule project;...

A First for Kyrgyzstan – Japarov’s Historic Visit to Armenia

For the first time, a Kyrgyz head of state has made an official visit to Armenia. President Sadyr Japarov arrived in Yerevan on October 15 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and called the three-day trip “historic.” Talks remained firmly bilateral and produced ten signed agreements, a joint commitment to protect Lake Issyk-Kul and Lake Sevan (Armenia), and a stated interest in expanding transit links. Nothing in Japarov’s statement framed cooperation as directed against any third country. He presented it in terms of trade, cooperation, and friendly relations, with dialogue and peace underpinning regional stability. Japarov opened his remarks by noting that Pashinyan had visited Kyrgyzstan twice this year, including the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council session in Cholpon-Ata in August. Pashinyan, for his part, said Japarov’s first official visit to Armenia would open a new page in bilateral relations. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia have been independent since 1991, and both belong to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a five-nation bloc with a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor. Even so, their leaders have mostly met on the sidelines of multilateral summits. Quiet to Active Diplomacy Under Japarov, Kyrgyzstan has abandoned its quiet diplomacy and begun taking a more active role in international affairs. This year, Japarov has traveled to Armenia (October 15-17), Azerbaijan (October 14-15 and May 17), Turkmenistan (October 8-9), the United States (from September 19), South Korea (September 15-18), Kazakhstan (July 29, May 28-29, and May 15) and Russia (April 23). He reached Armenia fresh from the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Baku, where Central Asian leaders linked trade and security issues. Bishkek’s shift in foreign policy emphasis owes less to geopolitics than to economic necessity and a practical, non-ideological pursuit of national interests. Its commitment to dialogue, regional stability and good-neighborliness is central to a foreign policy aimed at win-win results. Biodiversity Diplomacy In Yerevan, Japarov attended the opening of the Leaders' Summit within the 17th UN Conference of the Parties on Biological Diversity (COP17). On October 16, he addressed the plenary, presenting initiatives on glacier melt and biodiversity in Central Asia, and met UNESCO Director-General Khaled El-Enany. Among the specific proposals, Japarov recommended a special mountain program within the Global Environment Facility at the World Bank to fund environmental projects in mountain regions, and a UN-backed trust fund for Issyk-Kul, to which Kyrgyzstan proposed an initial $10 million contribution from its state budget. He also called for a Global Center for Mountain Region Resilience in Bishkek, where countries could share knowledge and experience on environmental protection. Japarov further backed a debt-for-nature swap mechanism, which would let countries use financial resources more effectively to protect ecosystems, and urged stronger regional cooperation to protect rare animals and birds. The Yerevan Declaration followed the usual diplomatic template, restricted mainly to high-level language. Japarov invited Pashinyan to attend “Bishkek+25,” the Second Global Mountain Summit, on 21–23 October 2027, to mark the culmination of Kyrgyzstan’s Five Years of Action for Mountain Development. Transport at...

Uzbekistan’s U.S. Package: What Supports the $12 Billion Figure?

Uzbekistan announced a package of 54 agreements and prospective initiatives that it valued at about $12 billion during U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Samarkand on October 19. The Ministry of Investment, Industry and Trade lists engine supplies from GE Aerospace for new Uzbekistan Airways aircraft as part of the package. The investment ministry makes that value conditional on implementation. The presidency’s account says a comprehensive implementation program will be developed for the agreements and initiatives. October’s $12 billion may include projects still awaiting finance or development, but the values assigned to them must have an identifiable basis in project estimates or specific transactions. The official announcements identify counterparties and sectors, but the evidence examined does not provide the individual values needed to reconstruct the $12 billion total. Earlier Announcements and Additional Value In November 2025, Donald Trump announced that Uzbekistan would undertake roughly $35 billion in purchases and investment in American sectors over the following three years. The stated total did not separate the amounts assigned to purchases and investment. Uzbekistani purchases from American suppliers and investment in American sectors cannot be counted as an equivalent inflow of U.S. capital into Uzbekistan. Purchasing American equipment and receiving American investment give Uzbekistani participants different roles in the financing and implementation of projects. In September 2026, Investment Minister Laziz Kudratov said projects worth $7 billion had already been completed within a $35 billion portfolio. UzDaily described the figure as one-fifth of the value of the previous year’s agreements, without identifying the completed projects or defining completion. A transaction-level account would show what equipment was delivered, which facilities were commissioned, and what contract payments were made, giving the value and completion date of each transaction. October’s $12 billion cannot be added to the earlier figures without reconciling the transactions included in each package and the values assigned to them. The matching $35 billion figures do not establish that Kudratov and Trump referred to the same transaction list. An October agreement could introduce a fresh transaction or add obligations within an existing project, but it could also cover work already reflected in an earlier valuation. A company’s reappearance in successive announcements does not establish which relationship applies. What the Agreements Establish American Resources Corporation and ReElement Technologies announced an October 19 agreement with Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex and the Fund for Reconstruction and Development, advancing their November 2025 memorandum. ReElement’s release describes a further stage of technical and commercial work under an existing partnership, but it provides no valuation showing how that work contributes to the $12 billion total. The companies report successful processing of Uzbek-sourced tungsten into high-purity oxide. The planned demonstration at ReElement’s U.S. facilities is intended to evaluate commercial viability, processing efficiency, and scalability; preliminary engineering and economic modeling concern possible refining operations in Uzbekistan. In the financial sector, the investment ministry describes Franklin Templeton, Oppenheimer, Citigroup, and BlackRock as helping to attract capital, but does not explain whether or how these arrangements contribute to the $12 billion...

Opinion: C5+1 in Samarkand: What Uzbekistan Expects and What Washington Wants

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has arrived in Uzbekistan with a delegation representing more than 200 American companies. He is attending a C5+1 ministerial meeting with the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The agenda includes regional connectivity, energy security, trade, private investment, and economic modernization. The visit brings the format back to its birthplace. The first C5+1 ministerial meeting was held in Samarkand on November 1, 2015, with then-Secretary of State John Kerry. The November 6, 2025, summit in Washington gave the relationship a substantial commercial dimension. Uzbekistan and the United States announced economic agreements and trade contracts worth approximately $34.5 billion. President Donald Trump also said Uzbekistan intended to purchase and invest more than $100 billion in the United States over the following decade. Samarkand is now hosting a ministerial meeting accompanied by a large business delegation. The immediate question is how much of the previously announced portfolio has moved toward financing and implementation. In late September, Uzbekistan's Minister of Investment, Industry, and Trade, Laziz Kudratov, valued the project portfolio with the United States at $35 billion, with approximately $7 billion already completed. On that accounting, about $28 billion remains. In my assessment, the strongest overlap between American and Uzbek interests lies in processing critical minerals inside Uzbekistan, using American financing and technology to serve international supply chains. Washington wants alternative sources of strategic materials. Tashkent wants investment in industrial production rather than simply exporting raw materials. Their positions are less closely aligned on technology and relations with Iran. Uzbekistan seeks access to American artificial intelligence infrastructure while maintaining cooperation with China. It also regards Iran as an important transit partner. Washington's approach to sensitive technologies and sanctions could complicate both ambitions. Another Uzbek priority is ending the application of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment to Uzbekistan, a U.S. trade-law provision dating from 1974 that continues to affect the legal framework for bilateral commerce. Rubio can support its repeal, but Congress must make the decision. Investment Deals The C5+1 format has become more commercially focused. At the Washington summit, the U.S. Department of Commerce organized a dedicated venue for business agreements and announced more than $25 billion in commercial deals involving the five Central Asian countries. Since the Washington summit, Uzbekistan has developed additional channels for economic cooperation with the United States. A bilateral Business and Investment Council has brought together officials and business representatives. Cooperation has also expanded into critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. In June 2026, Uzbekistan's Ministry of Investment, Industry, and Trade, its Fund for Reconstruction and Development, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) announced a joint investment platform. Uzbekistan has also adopted a critical minerals development program for 2026–2030, covering 120 projects valued at $4.2 billion. The first stage includes 12 projects worth $166 million, with plans to produce high-purity selenium, tellurium, and rhenium. These plans reflect Tashkent's industrial priorities. Uzbekistan wants foreign partners to help build processing facilities and...