• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00200 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10593 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
22 February 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 18

U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar.  To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central...

Lukoil ‘Garage Sale’ – Uzbekistan Bows Out, Kazakhstan Keeps Its Options Open

The story of the disposal of foreign assets by Lukoil, which has fallen under U.S. sanctions, is reaching its closing stages. A shortlist of potential buyers has already emerged, and in Kazakhstan intrigue remains: will the country’s national oil and gas company capitalise on the opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in major projects? A recent Reuters report noted that potential buyers of Lukoil’s assets face two key complications: first, U.S. firms, such as Carlyle, Chevron, and Exxon, are seen by analysts as more likely to get licensed, meaning deals will only be recognised after proper U.S. licence approval. Second, Lukoil itself had preferred to sell its assets as a package deal rather than piecemeal.  However, after a deal to offload assets to Guvnor collapsed, several analyses now say a full package sale is unlikely and that piecemeal deals are more realistic or even more profitable. A new negotiation deadline has now been set for December 13, 2025, for the completion of authorised transactions.  Kazakhstan-based oil and gas market observer Oleg Chervinsky suggests that this could increase the likelihood of a “twostage process”. “Most likely, a single buyer with sufficient resources will purchase all of Lukoil’s foreign assets at a significant discount, then sell them off in parts,” Chervinsky said. Some media reports point to the U.S. investment firm Carlyle Group as showing interest in Lukoil’s assets. The firm is considered a plausible main buyer due to its former ties to U.S. presidents Bush senior and junior. In this scenario, Carlyle would act both as buyer and organiser of the subsequent 'garage sale' of individual assets. Other firms, such as Chevron Corporation and ExxonMobil, have already been linked in reports with interest in Lukoil’s Kazakh stakes in the Tengiz and Karachaganak oil fields, while Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has shown interest in Lukoil’s Uzbek gas projects.  Meanwhile, three weeks ago, Uzbekistan made its position clear: it will not participate in the acquisition of Lukoil’s assets. Uzbekneftegaz Chairman Bahodir Sidikov said that "Buying out Lukoil’s assets in Uzbekistan is not on the table right now.”  In Kazakhstan, energy sector experts believe that this moment presents a real window of opportunity to acquire Lukoil’s shares in systemically important oil and gas projects. “Why hasn’t our Ministry of Energy asked: does the Ministry approve changes in the shareholder structure under the terms of the stabilized contracts for Tengiz and Karachaganak? These shares (if a sale takes place) should go to KazMunayGas. If KMG doesn’t have the cash, then the Chinese state-owned CNPC should be brought in. To balance interests, it would be optimal for one of the world’s largest oil corporations to enter Tengiz and Karachaganak,” argues specialist Olzhas Baidildinov. Baidildinov cited a review by Norway’s Rystad Energy estimating that Lukoil’s net cash flow from its Tengiz stake over the next five years will total $2.8 billion, and from Karachaganak $2.1 billion. However, Kazakhstan’s Energy Minister Erlan Akkenzhenov recently stated that the government is not considering a purchase of Lukoil’s shares. At the same time,...

U.S. Eases Sanctions on Key Kazakh Oil Projects

The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), oil producer Tengizchevroil (TCO), and the Karachaganak field have been granted permission to resume services and conduct transactions related to their operational activities, following a United States Treasury Department decision to ease sanctions. The Tengiz and Karachaganak fields are located in Kazakhstan, and Kazakh oil is exported through the CPC system. In October, the U.S. Treasury added Russian oil giants Lukoil and Rosneft, along with 34 of their subsidiaries, to its latest package of sanctions. However, experts now suggest that the exemption of key projects in Kazakhstan could have a stabilizing effect on the country's oil sector and its broader economy. The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License No. 124B, allowing services and other transactions required to maintain the operations of the CPC, Tengizchevroil, and the Karachaganak project, even when sanctioned entities such as Lukoil and Rosneft are involved. The license does not permit any transactions related to the sale or transfer of shares in these projects. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, confirmed on November 12 that the government is working to have the Karachaganak field fully exempt from the U.S. sanctions regime. The CPC system links oil fields in western Kazakhstan and parts of Russia with a marine terminal in Novorossiysk on Russia’s Black Sea coast. It remains the main export route for Kazakh oil, carrying more than 80% of the country’s crude. The system has an annual capacity of about 83 million tons. CPC shareholders include Kazakhstan, holding a combined 20.75% through KazMunayGas (19%) and Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC (1.75%). Other shareholders include Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium Company (15%), Lukoil International GmbH (12.5%), Mobil Caspian Pipeline Company (7.5%), Rosneft-Shell Caspian Ventures Limited (7.5%), BG Overseas Holdings Limited (2%), Eni International N.A. N.V. (2%), and Oryx Caspian Pipeline LLC (1.75%). The Russian government and Transneft also hold significant stakes. Tengizchevroil LLP, the operator of the Tengiz field, is a joint venture between Chevron (50%), ExxonMobil Kazakhstan Ventures Inc. (25%), KazMunayGas (20%), and Lukoil (5%). Tengiz is one of Kazakhstan’s largest oil fields, with reserves estimated at 3.1 billion tons. The Karachaganak field is among the world’s largest, with development carried out by the Karachaganak Petroleum Operating consortium. Shell and Eni serve as joint operators, and the partnership also includes Chevron (18%), Lukoil (13.5%), and KazMunayGas (10%). On November 13, it was reported that KazMunayGas is considering acquiring Lukoil’s stake in the Karachaganak project, reflecting efforts to manage shifting ownership dynamics under the sanctions environment.

How U.S. and EU Sanctions Are Rippling Through Central Asia

Russia’s economy has faced renewed pressure following a fresh round of sanctions imposed this past week by both the European Union and the United States. After abruptly canceling a planned meeting with Vladimir Putin in Budapest, President Donald Trump shifted to a more hardline stance, announcing new sanctions. While these sanctions may not cripple Moscow, they are already having secondary effects on Central Asia, particularly on Kazakhstan’s banking and energy sectors. The EU's 19th sanctions package, adopted on October 22, introduces a phased ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG). According to Reuters, short-term contracts will be terminated within six months, while long-term contracts are to expire by January 1, 2027. The package also includes a total ban on transactions with Russian oil giants Rosneft and Gazprom Neft, an expanded blacklist of so-called "shadow fleet" vessels, and sanctions against 45 companies in Russia and third countries supplying military-related technologies. Of growing concern in Central Asia is the inclusion of several regional financial institutions in the EU's sanctions list. These include the Kazakh branch of Russia’s VTB Bank, Kyrgyz banks Tolubai and Eurasian Savings Bank, and Tajik banks Dushanbe City Bank, Kommertsbank of Tajikistan, and Spitamen. These restrictions are scheduled to take effect between November and December 2025. Both Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and the nation's Foreign Ministry have publicly expressed dismay over the sanctions, with Japarov urging Western leaders to stop “politicizing the economy.” In his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York in September, Japarov criticized the impact of unilateral sanctions, while the Foreign Ministry has stated that the country adheres to its international obligations and maintains an open dialogue with the EU to prevent risks associated with possible sanctions circumvention. The ministry has proposed launching an independent, internationally recognized audit and forming a joint “Kyrgyzstan-European Union” technical working group to facilitate data exchange, transaction monitoring, and risk assessments. In Kazakhstan, the National Bank downplayed the impact of sanctions against VTB. Deputy Chairman Yerulan Zhamaubayev noted that the bank had already been under nominal restrictions, and handles few transactions. “VTB does not affect the country’s financial stability, and we do not expect serious risks for the economy,” Zhamaubayev stated. However, the latest U.S. sanctions may prove more consequential for Kazakhstan, particularly amid efforts to strengthen bilateral trade with the United States, including through the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned Russian oil majors Rosneft and Lukoil. The latter has deep economic ties with Kazakhstan. Just days before the announcement, on October 14, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev personally attended the 30th anniversary of Lukoil’s operations in Kazakhstan, awarding CEO Vagit Alekperov the Order of Barys, first class. Oil and gas journalist Oleg Chervinsky reported that the joint venture Kalamkas-Khazar Operating LLP, co-owned by Lukoil and KazMunayGas, is directly affected. “Only the Tengiz and CPC projects, which Lukoil operates with American partners, have been exempted from the sanctions,” Chervinsky noted. A final investment decision for Kalamkas-Khazar was expected in December 2025. Yerkanat Abeni, a member of...

Trump’s 100% Tariffs May Target Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

U.S. President Donald Trump has signaled a new wave of sanctions against Russia, including the potential imposition of 100% tariffs on its trading partners, which could affect Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other former Soviet states. Who Could Be Affected? On July 15, President Trump announced an escalation in U.S. arms deliveries to Ukraine and warned of intensified sanctions against Russia. If no progress is made in resolving the conflict within 50 days, the U.S. will implement additional measures, including secondary tariffs of up to 100% on countries trading with Russia. Experts warn that Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Azerbaijan may be particularly vulnerable. Although not among Russia’s largest trading partners, these countries maintain extensive commercial ties with Moscow. According to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), China, India, and Turkey accounted for 74 percent of Russia's fossil fuel revenue in 2024. Oil exports totaled €104 billion, petroleum products €75 billion, gas €40 billion, and coal €23 billion. Despite multiple sanctions packages, the European Union continues to import Russian energy. In 2024, the EU spent €21.9 billion on Russian oil and gas, just 1% less than in 2023. Over the same period, EU financial assistance to Ukraine amounted to €18.7 billion, according to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy. Yet Trump may spare Russia’s largest trading partners. In recent months, he has taken steps to impose severe tariffs on the European Union and China, only to reverse course under pressure from business groups and concerns about global trade disruptions. Nevertheless, Kazakhstan received formal notification from the U.S. on July 7 that a 25% tariff on its goods will take effect from August 1, 2025. This raises the possibility that smaller economies in Russia’s orbit may become targets of U.S. economic retaliation. Already in the Crosshairs Kazakh analyst Olzhas Baidildinov noted that trade between Kazakhstan and Russia totaled $27.8 billion in 2024, with $18.2 billion in exports from Russia and $9.5 billion from Kazakhstan. "Such figures certainly cannot escape the attention of OFAC,” Baidildinov wrote, referring to the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control. “European sanctions apply only within Europe. However, Kazakhstan continues to import Russian oil, gas, and petroleum products. Secondary sanctions, as I’ve previously warned, are merely a matter of minor adjustments to existing measures,” he added. Trump’s administration may also be overlooking Kazakhstan’s unique geographic and economic ties to Russia. The two countries share the world’s longest continuous land border, over 7,500 kilometers, and are closely connected through pipelines, energy infrastructure, and raw materials trade. Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan Also Vulnerable Azerbaijan’s trade with Russia reached approximately $4.8 billion in 2024, an increase of 10.1 percent. Russia ranks as Azerbaijan’s third-largest trading partner, after Italy and Turkey. Exports to Russia totaled $1.178 billion, accounting for 4.4 percent of Azerbaijan’s total exports. Notably, Russia is the largest buyer of Azerbaijan’s non-oil products, with a 34.6 percent share. Imports from Russia include foodstuffs, machinery, and metals, while Azerbaijan supplies gas, textiles, and agricultural goods. Kyrgyzstan is also at risk....

Kazakh Machine Builders Face Payment Hurdles in Russia Trade

Azat Peruashev, head of the Ak Zhol party's parliamentary faction, which represents Kazakhstani business interests, has appealed to Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov and National Bank Chairman Timur Suleimenov to address payment difficulties faced by machine-building enterprises exporting to Russia. According to the Majilis deputy, these challenges stem from within Kazakhstan itself. Peruashev explained that machine-building enterprises have approached his party, reporting that Kazakhstani banks are refusing them credit. Additionally, second-tier banks (BVUs) are declining to process payments for companies engaged in business with Russian partners. “These actions by financial institutions are driven by concerns that exported products could be added to U.S. and EU sanctions lists, which, in turn, could expose the banks to secondary sanctions,” Peruashev said. As a result, commercial banks in Kazakhstan have begun demanding that local factories provide guarantees that they will not export products to Russia - under threat of having their credit lines revoked. This is happening despite assurances from David O'Sullivan, the European Union’s sanctions envoy, who recently visited Kazakhstan. O'Sullivan stated that the European Commission would not impose sanctions on goods manufactured in Kazakhstan and exported to Russia. “The EU’s only concern is to prevent the re-export of sanctioned European products through Kazakhstan,” Peruashev said. “However, representatives of Kazakhstan’s largest banks find these assurances unconvincing. In their view, the decisive factor is not whether a product is re-exported or locally manufactured, but whether it appears on a sanctions list. This creates the risk of secondary sanctions, not necessarily from the EU, but from the U.S., including the potential disconnection from the SWIFT international banking system.” According to Ak Zhol, Kazakhstani exports of machine-building products and components to Russia fell by 15% last year. The banks’ refusal to process payments is not based on any official government restrictions. Last summer, seven Kazakh companies faced U.S. secondary sanctions for cooperating with Russian partners. In October, the list expanded to include Kazstanex, a company involved in supplying machine tools and components. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, during his visit to Astana in January, David O'Sullivan stated that the EU had sanctioned two Kazakh companies so far but did not rule out further additions to the list.