Sanctions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Nuclear power

Central Asia’s Nuclear Push: Uzbekistan Starts Construction as Kazakhstan Plans at Least Three Plants

Uzbekistan has poured concrete for its first nuclear power plant, while Kazakhstan has signed a $16.5 billion agreement for a two-reactor facility near Lake Balkhash and approved a site for a second plant. Kazakhstan's long-term strategy calls for at least three nuclear power plants by 2050, with a fourth possible. Both governments are presenting nuclear power as a way to meet rapidly growing electricity demand and strengthen energy security. Yet the projects are advancing at different speeds and are reviving questions over water use, cross-border safety, financing, and long-term reliance on Russian technology and credit. Uzbekistan Moves Into Construction On June 4, 2026, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Russian President Vladimir Putin launched construction by video link. Rafael Mariano Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, also took part. The first nuclear-grade concrete was poured overnight from June 4 to June 5 for the foundation slab of the first RITM-200N small modular reactor unit in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region. Uzatom subsequently classified the site as a nuclear power plant under construction. The facility is one plant with four planned reactor units: two large VVER-1000 units and two smaller RITM-200N units, each rated at 55 MW. Together, they would provide more than 2.1 GW of installed capacity. The present configuration is the latest version of a project that began with a 2017 peaceful-use agreement and a 2018 plan for two large reactors. In 2024, the focus shifted to six small reactors, before the design changed again in 2025 to the mixed large-and-small format now under construction. Uzbek and Russian projections put annual generation at about 17 billion kWh, or roughly 15% of future national demand. The current schedule envisages the first small unit reaching criticality in late 2029, with the large reactors expected to be commissioned in 2033 and 2035, although Uzatom has said final dates depend on outstanding contract arrangements. The project's stated base price is $9.5 billion, and Tashkent is seeking loans for most of the cost. Those financing terms, along with the final allocation of construction and operating risk, remain central to the project's viability. Water and Cross-Border Concerns The plant will stand near Lake Tuzkon in the Aydar-Arnasay lake system, about 40 kilometers from Kazakhstan's border. That proximity has made what is formally an Uzbek project a regional issue. Residents and environmental advocates in southern Kazakhstan have raised concerns about accident preparedness, radioactive waste, and possible pressure on already stressed water systems. Aiman Tleulesova, national coordinator of the Central Asian Regional Water Network, has argued that reactor cooling could require greater discharges into Lake Tuzkon and additional withdrawals linked to the Syr Darya system. In her assessment, that could intensify competition for irrigation water in Kazakhstan's Turkestan and Kyzylorda regions. These are concerns raised by specialists and campaigners, rather than established measurements of the completed plant's impact, but they require a quantified response because water scarcity is already a recurring regional problem. Uzbekistan held public hearings on the environmental impact assessment in...

Iran

U.S.-Iran Framework Could Reopen Central Asia’s Southern Route

The United States and Iran said on June 15 that they had reached a framework to end their war, halt the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, and reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The sides said a memorandum of understanding could be signed on June 19 in Switzerland. The exact terms were not immediately known, with Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief left for later talks. Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said the pact called for “the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon.” Trump posted, on Truth Social, “Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Brent crude fell by more than 4% in early trading, and Asian stock markets advanced. Reuters later said shippers remained cautious after one LNG tanker passed through Hormuz on June 15. A reopened strait would not restore normal traffic immediately, with freight flows depending on mine clearance, insurance rules, port inspections, and shipping guidance for vessels entering the area. Kazakhstan was the first Central Asian state to publicly welcome the latest announcement. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised the political will of the parties, saying they had helped “restore trust and mutually acceptable solutions.” Azerbaijan also issued a supporting statement praising Pakistan’s mediation and saying further talks could support “lasting peace and stability.” Central Asian governments had previously welcomed the U.S.-Iran ceasefire in April, with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan calling for de-escalation and diplomacy. For Central Asia, oil prices are only part of the story. The larger question is whether de-escalation can reopen practical access to southern trade routes, ports, and markets beyond the Caspian. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the region has paid closer attention to alternatives to routes through Russia. Iran offers one of its shortest paths to the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, Türkiye, and India. But sanctions, banking risk, war insurance, and U.S. policy shifts have kept that path fragile. Chabahar is the clearest example. In May 2024, India signed a 10-year contract with Iran to develop and operate the port on the Gulf of Oman. India’s shipping minister, Sarbananda Sonowal, called Chabahar “a vital trade artery connecting India with Afghanistan and Central Asian Countries.” The port allows Indian cargo to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia without crossing Pakistan, and gives Central Asian exporters another route toward India and the Indian Ocean. The sanctions picture remains uncertain. On October 30, 2025, Washington granted India a six-month waiver that allowed operations at Chabahar to continue. No public replacement had been announced by June 15. The new framework could make another waiver easier to justify, but banks and insurers will wait for signed text, U.S. guidance, and proof that Hormuz and Iranian ports are safe. Reuters cited a senior Iranian official who said the draft framework included no new U.S. sanctions before a final deal, a temporary oil sanctions waiver, and the release of $25 billion in frozen Iranian assets. The same source said Iran would refrain from further enrichment and...

Sanctions

Kyrgyzstan Orders 50 Companies to Cease Activity Over Sanctions Risks

Kyrgyzstan has ordered 50 companies to cease activity after state agencies flagged them for sanctions risks, as Bishkek faces growing pressure over Russia-linked trade and payment channels. The move follows months of pressure from Western governments, which say some routes through Central Asia can be used to bypass sanctions imposed over the war in Ukraine. The Ministry of Justice did not name the companies, their owners, or their sectors. It also did not say whether any of them had direct links to Russia. The list was prepared by the Ministry of Economy and Commerce and other state bodies after checks into possible attempts to evade sanctions restrictions. The order was issued under an interagency mechanism for identifying dishonest participants in foreign economic activity and transactions with increased sanctions risks. The mechanism allows state bodies to use a simplified procedure to terminate the activity of legal entities after a formal submission. The Justice Ministry linked the move to efforts to protect the national economy from possible secondary sanctions. The European Union adopted its 20th sanctions package against Russia on April 23, less than a month before the Ministry of Justice order. The package added measures on energy, finance, trade, and crypto channels. It also used the EU’s anti-circumvention tool against Kyrgyzstan for the first time. Under that measure, the EU banned exports of computer numerical control machines and radios to Kyrgyzstan when there is a high risk that the goods will be re-exported to Russia. The Council of the EU said trade data showed a sharp rise in re-exports of common high-priority items through Kyrgyzstan to Russia. The EU treats the goods as sensitive because they can support industrial production, communications, and military-linked supply chains. The financial aspect of the sanctions has also reached Kyrgyzstan. The EU said it was targeting four financial institutions in third countries for circumventing sanctions or connecting to Russia’s financial messaging system. Local media identified Keremet Bank and Capital Bank as the Kyrgyz banks included in the package. The EU also designated a Kyrgyz entity that operates a platform where significant amounts of the A7A5 stablecoin are traded. Local outlets identified the entity as TengriCoin, registered in Bishkek, and linked it to the Meer platform. The pressure on Kyrgyz banks and crypto companies has been growing. The U.S. Treasury designated Keremet Bank in January 2025, saying the bank had coordinated with Russian officials and Promsvyazbank, a sanctioned Russian state defense lender, to support cross-border transfers. In August 2025, the UK government sanctioned Capital Bank of Central Asia, its director Kantemir Chalbayev, Grinex, Meer, TengriCoin, Old Vector, and other targets linked to Russian payment and crypto channels. London said the ruble-backed A7A5 token had moved $9.3 billion on a dedicated crypto exchange in four months. Kyrgyz officials have rejected the broader claim that the country helps Russia evade sanctions. The Foreign Ministry said on April 28 that Kyrgyzstan acts within national laws and its international obligations. It said Bishkek had supplied the requested documents to European partners...

Sanctions

Opinion: Bishkek Between Sanctions and Africa: The Quiet Architecture of Proxy Sovereignty

The official visit of Togo’s head of government, Faure Gnassingbé, to Kyrgyzstan on April 28–30 should not be read as an isolated diplomatic event. It is taking place inside an unusually dense cluster of activity: the SCO Council of Defence Ministers, the presence of China’s defence minister, the fifth meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) digital and ICT ministers, and a parallel SCO Forum on Artificial Intelligence. Bishkek, in other words, was not simply hosting an African leader. It was presenting itself — intentionally or not — as a Eurasian platform where security, digital governance, AI, transport, tourism, and external partnerships intersect. This geometry deserves attention. Bishkek as a Digital Interface Over the past several years, Kyrgyzstan has worked to reposition itself — not only as a mountainous transit country, but as a provider of digital state capacity: e-government tools, secure documents, digital identification, fintech infrastructure, and special financial regimes such as the proposed Tamchy special financial and investment territory, which combines Kyrgyz sovereignty with elements of English law and international arbitration. For many African countries, this offer can be attractive. Governments across the continent are looking for administrative modernization, digital sovereignty, and alternatives to legacy Western-controlled infrastructure. For Bishkek, such partnerships offer something equally valuable: visibility, geopolitical relevance, and an opportunity to export state technology beyond Central Asia. Togo is a particularly interesting test case. Lomé is one of West Africa’s important maritime and logistical hubs, with access not only to the Gulf of Guinea but, indirectly, to the Sahel region — Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — where Russia has expanded its security footprint. If Kyrgyz digital infrastructure were to enter this corridor, it would not be a minor technical export. It would connect a Central Asian jurisdiction to one of Africa’s most strategically sensitive zones. It must be said honestly: this remains a hypothesis. Public information about specific Kyrgyz digital products being offered to Togo remains limited. But the political signal is difficult to ignore: Bishkek is not approaching this visit as a routine bilateral courtesy. The Russia Question There is a more sensitive layer to this picture. Kyrgyzstan is a close partner of Russia. Russia, in turn, is under heavy Western sanctions and is searching for alternative financial, commercial, and logistical routes. This creates a natural suspicion that Kyrgyz digital and financial infrastructure could — directly or indirectly — become useful to Russian-linked actors. This does not mean every Kyrgyz initiative abroad is directed from Moscow. That reading is too simplistic. A more precise framing is this: Kyrgyzstan may be becoming part of a distributed sanctions-era infrastructure in which Russian, Chinese, Central Asian, and Global South interests increasingly overlap. In this sense, Bishkek may not be a “front office” for Russia alone. It may be emerging as a Eurasian adapter — a jurisdiction through which larger actors can interact with sensitive markets under a less toxic, more flexible brand. A7A5 and the Closing Window The crypto-financial dimension makes this issue urgent. A7A5, a ruble-pegged stablecoin issued...

Court Cases

Minister Sydykov on the Bakai Bank Verdict and Kyrgyzstan’s Economic Path Forward

On April 13 in Washington, D.C., The Times of Central Asia’s Javier M. Piedra spoke with Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy and Commerce, Bakyt Tolomushevich Sydykov, regarding the April 7 verdict in the “Bakai Bank vs. Open Dialogue Foundation” case before the Enterprise Court of Brussels - an important legal win for Kyrgyzstan and its stance in international financial markets. In a verdict with international implications for Kyrgyzstan and the region, the Enterprise Court of Brussels sided with Bakai Bank, a Kyrgyz financial institution, in connection with a high-profile defamation case between Bakai Bank and Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF) – finding that ODF published allegations about the bank’s financial conduct without sufficient evidence. The judgment marks a significant development in a cross-border reputational and financial dispute, setting a visible bar for accountability and offering a more balanced snapshot of Kyrgyz efforts to cultivate transparency and compliance in its banking sector. Kyrgyz government officials responded to the ruling with a practical and positive outlook, acknowledging that the country has prioritized policy, monitoring, and enforcement steps to bolster integrity and trust in its institutions. This ruling is expected to reinforce public confidence and strengthen the long-term resilience of Kyrgyzstan’s governance framework. In Washington D.C. this week, Sydykov told TCA that, “We welcome this decision not just as an affirmation of Bakai Bank, but also for our broader financial system. It helps to convey our message to policymakers, diplomats, investors, and partners that Kyrgyzstan is open for business – and a ready contributor to regional and international trade. Our financial institutions operate in line with international standards, compliance expectations, and responsible governance. We are glad to move forward with strengthening our banking system and growing Kyrgyzstan’s economy for the benefit of its citizens.” Case background The proceedings were brought before the French-speaking Enterprise Court of Brussels (Tribunal de l’entreprise francophone de Bruxelles) after Bakai Bank challenged a series of publications issued by the Open Dialogue Foundation in 2023. The NGO had alleged that Bakai Bank was involved in facilitating financial transactions linked to sanctions circumvention and networks connected to Russian capital flows following the expansion of Western sanctions in early 2022. Bakai Bank rejected these allegations as unsubstantiated and damaging to its international reputation and access to financial markets. It subsequently filed a civil action in Belgium, where the ODF is active and publishes much of its advocacy material. Court proceedings and findings In its judgment, the Brussels court examined whether the Open Dialogue Foundation had sufficient factual grounds to support its published claims. The court found that the NGO’s statements were presented as factually assertive allegations rather than opinion or conjecture, thereby requiring a higher evidentiary threshold. The court concluded that the ODF had failed to provide adequate supporting evidence for its assertions regarding Bakai Bank’s alleged involvement in illicit financial activity. As a result, the court determined that the publications were unlawful in their form and impact, particularly in relation to reputational harm inflicted on the bank. The ruling ordered the ODF...

court case

Kyrgyz Bank Wins Brussels Court Case Over Sanctions Accusations

Kyrgyzstan's Bakai Bank has announced victory in a Brussels court case against the non-governmental organization Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF), which had previously published materials calling for sanctions against the bank. The court said the allegations were not supported by sufficient evidence. According to the bank, it filed the lawsuit to protect its business reputation after the Open Dialogue Foundation published materials in 2023 calling for sanctions against the financial institution to be considered. The ODF publications alleged that the bank may have been involved in schemes to circumvent European Union anti-Russian sanctions. Bakai Bank denied these allegations and initiated legal proceedings in Brussels. According to the bank’s statement and reporting on the ruling, a Brussels court held that ODF had made serious allegations without sufficient evidence. As a result, the court ordered the organization to remove the relevant publications, publish the text of the court decision on the main page of its website, and reimburse legal costs. At the time of publication, the Open Dialogue Foundation had not publicly commented on the court's decision. Bakai Bank stated that the court's decision stands as confirmation of the allegations' groundlessness. "We welcome this decision, which confirms the lack of basis for the charges and protects the bank's business reputation. We consistently comply with international law and adhere to the principles of transparency in our operations," the bank's representatives said. Askat Alagozov, press secretary to the President of Kyrgyzstan, commented on the situation on social media. He noted that this is not the first time Kyrgyz banks have faced accusations of evading sanctions. Specifically, Keremet Bank has been sanctioned by the United States and the United Kingdom, while Capital Bank of Central Asia, also known as Kapital Bank, has been sanctioned by the United Kingdom. According to Alagozov, such measures are accusatory in nature, and no public evidence of violations has been presented. He also added that President Sadyr Japarov previously rejected such accusations and stated the country's readiness to conduct an independent international audit of the banking sector. Moreover, Capital Bank of Central Asia, one of the banks targeted by sanctions, is state-owned.