U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations - The Times Of Central Asia

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U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

Central Asia Looks to a Possible Trump Visit

U.S. President Donald Trump has expressed an interest in visiting Uzbekistan, according to one of his special envoys, raising the possibility that Central Asia could eventually receive its first visit by a sitting American president. Paolo Zampolli, Trump’s Special Envoy for Global Partnerships and long-time Trump associate, made the comment in an interview with Uzbekistan 24 while visiting the country. “I know that he wants to come to Uzbekistan,” Zampolli said, adding that Trump had personally told him he wanted to make the trip. Zampolli said he was encouraging the idea, but gave no timetable, and there has been no announcement that a visit is being scheduled. Trump had already publicly indicated that he may visit Kazakhstan. Asked during the November 2025 C5+1 summit if he might become the first U.S. president to visit the country, Trump replied, “I think it’s very possible that we’ll do that.” The comments come as U.S. engagement with Central Asia is accelerating. Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents at the White House in November 2025. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has invited him to Kazakhstan, while Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has also invited him to Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Marco Rubio is reported to be planning a mid-October visit to Samarkand for a C5+1 ministerial, with a delegation expected to include representatives of more than 100 U.S. companies. Sergio Gor, Trump’s Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, has also been involved in Washington’s engagement across the region. In Uzbekistan, he co-chairs the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council with Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of the presidential administration. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan bring different economic and strategic profiles to Washington’s expanding engagement with Central Asia. Why Kazakhstan Matters Kazakhstan is Central Asia’s largest economy. Its GDP reached about $306 billion in 2025, accounting for more than half of the combined economy of the five Central Asian states. Its share of accumulated foreign investment is even larger, with Kazakhstan holding roughly two-thirds of the region’s inward FDI stock, according to The Times of Central Asia’s Central Asia Balance Sheet. Its strategic importance extends beyond those measures. Kazakhstan produces close to 40% of the world’s uranium and is a major oil producer and exporter, supplying primarily European markets. It also holds substantial critical mineral resources and occupies a central position on the Middle Corridor connecting China and Europe. Recent U.S.-Kazakh commercial agreements include several large transactions. Wabtec has a $4.2 billion locomotive agreement, while Tau-Ken Samruk and Cove Capital have signed transaction documents for at least $1.1 billion in tungsten development. Other agreements cover agricultural machinery, air-traffic management, and additional Boeing aircraft. Kazakhstan also has a distinct diplomatic role in Trump’s engagement with the Muslim world. In November 2025, Kazakhstan joined the Abraham Accords, becoming the first Central Asian and first non-Arab Muslim-majority country to join the framework. Why Uzbekistan Matters With about 39 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia. It is also the only state that borders all four of the other...

U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations

The American-Uzbek Business Council Launches in Washington

Washington D.C. - At the launch of the American-Uzbek Business and Investment Council in Washington on April 6, the most revealing line came early. Ambassador Sergio Gor, the White House’s special envoy for South and Central Asia, and Co-Chair of the Council, did not begin with trade statistics or a list of deliverables. He began with a blunt assessment of how the region has been treated in Washington. “For too long, this region has not found the attention that it deserves,” he said. That observation is hardly novel to anyone who follows Central Asia. What made it notable was the speaker and the setting. U.S. policy toward the region has often been episodic, driven at different times by Afghanistan, by Russia, by sanctions enforcement, or by concern over Chinese influence rather than sustained by a coherent regional economic strategy. Gor’s remarks suggested an attempt, at least by the current administration, to correct for that pattern. He was equally clear, however, that this was a political opening, not yet a settled doctrine. “Take this opportunity that the next two and a half years present,” he told the room, an unusually candid acknowledgment that Washington’s attention may be real without yet being durable. His other key formulation explained how the administration wants to make that attention count. “Never before in the history of the U.S. government has commercial diplomacy been such a major pillar of U.S. foreign policy,” Gor said. Whatever the phrasing, the intended shift was clear. Washington is signaling that in Central Asia, economic statecraft will not be treated as a side channel to politics, but as a primary instrument of policy. In that sense, the new council is less a ceremonial bilateral upgrade than a mechanism for turning political attention into projects, financing, and institutional follow-through. [caption id="attachment_46673" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] Image: TCA[/caption] Saida Mirziyoyeva, head of Uzbekistan’s presidential administration and the Uzbek co-chair of the council, answered that shift with a line that was just as pointed. “We are no longer at the stage where we speak about potential,” she said. “We are at the stage where we must deliver.” For a government that has spent years presenting Uzbekistan as a reforming economy open to outside capital, that was a significant change of emphasis. The argument is no longer that Uzbekistan deserves credit for opening up but that it now expects to be judged by execution. Her most substantive remarks were about institutions rather than ambition. The council matters, she said, because it should help “solve problems quickly, without unnecessary bureaucracy” and ensure that “no project is lost along the way.” That is a more serious claim than the language of partnership that usually fills these forums. Mirziyoyeva was effectively acknowledging the gap that often opens between political endorsement and project delivery. Uzbekistan’s challenge is no longer simply attracting attention from foreign partners but getting projects through financing, approvals, and implementation without losing momentum inside the state apparatus. That urgency reflects the scale of the opportunity. Uzbekistan, with a...

Critical Minerals

Uzbekistan Joins a U.S. Critical Minerals Implementation Track

On February 4, 2026, in Washington, D.C., Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on securing supply chains for critical minerals and rare earth elements, spanning both mining and processing. A further agreement signed on February 19 brought implementation and financing to the foreground. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) signed “heads of terms” (i.e., commercial principles and essential terms of a proposed future agreement) for a Joint Investment Framework and outlined a proposed joint holding company. An agreement to establish an “investment platform” was exchanged in the presence of Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. These agreements are not a single mining deal. They combine a political instrument with a financing-and-structuring track that is intended to yield a small set of projects that can be financed and built, and they treat processing capacity and supporting infrastructure not as optional add-ons but as core deliverables. They also provide a path for early projects to full review and financing while connecting them to longer-term offtake structures that match Washington’s newer supply-shock tools, including “Project Vault.” What the MoU Changes The MoU’s immediate purpose is to align government priorities for critical minerals across the value chain while setting expectations that will later shape which financing and partners are feasible. The press agency of Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry emphasized “responsible partnership” and “long-term development” as part of the public framing, placing governance and reputational risk on the same plane as the geological givens. The MoU also leaves several items deliberately unresolved in public form. These include project annexes, deposit designations, and operational timelines. That document design-choice pushes the next phase of bilateral cooperation into working-level scoping and sequencing, where only a small number of candidate projects can be advanced into full review. At the ministerial-level meeting, Washington clarified why it was framed as supply-chain security rather than commodity trade. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that critical minerals are inputs for infrastructure, industry, and defense, while Vice President J.D. Vance stressed the expansion of production across partner networks. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, this framing is part of a broader repositioning of U.S. engagement in Central Asia, where diplomatic formats are increasingly paired with mechanisms intended to generate trackable transactions and private-sector follow-through. For Uzbekistan, what is attractive about this cooperation is the potential to convert resource endowment into a lever for industrial development, rather than treating extraction as the endpoint. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has publicly valued the country’s underground wealth at roughly $3 trillion. He has linked rising global demand for technological minerals to the case for higher value-added activity around strategic reserves, including lithium and tungsten. The same logic supports a commercially open posture. For Tashkent’s other investors, buyers, and processing partners, Uzbekistan’s diversification toward U.S.-linked capital signals non-exclusivity. Turning the MoU Into Projects The next phase is practical. A candidate project will advance only if investors and public lenders can transparently evaluate its licensing and...

Board of Peace

Opinion: Mirziyoyev in Washington – New Deals Expected Amidst Peace Diplomacy

The President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has arrived on a working visit to Washington to participate in the inaugural meeting of President Trump’s Board of Peace on February 19, 2026, alongside the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and other heads of state. Against a backdrop of deep geopolitical tensions and raging conflicts across the world, Mirziyoyev’s second visit to the White House in less than four months suggests that U.S.-Uzbekistan relations are at their strongest in decades. Mirziyoyev will be joined by Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister, Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade, and other high-ranking officials. Uzbek Ambassador to the U.S. Sidikov and his team have been working around-the-clock for over two weeks, gearing up for the Trump–Mirziyoyev meeting. President Mirziyoyev’s objective will be to elevate U.S.-Uzbek relations from a constructive relationship to a fully functional, deal-oriented partnership with a focus on capital flows and bilateral trade. In addition to his desire for regional stability in West Asia, his signing up for the Board of Peace should be understood as indicating his desire to advance trade and investment and flows into Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks are keen to nail down new money and capital guarantees to fund infrastructure along the U.S.-brokered “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” aka, the Zangezur Corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan (TRIPP) – a roughly 27-mile-long piece of land that links Europe to Central Asia and beyond through the Caucasus. TRIPP matters to Trump because it advances two goals at once: stabilizing the South Caucasus while more fully integrating U.S. trade with Uzbekistan and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)—a multimodal, 4,000 km transport network connecting China and East Asia with Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Apart from the issues on the Board of Peace agenda, Mirziyoyev will push for ironclad U.S. commitments and cold, hard cash for transport corridors and their downstream beneficiaries. Two big reasons driving Mirziyoyev ‘s thinking: first, Uzbekistan is one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world, the other being Liechtenstein—and second, Trump’s desire to nail down a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby resolving a long-standing territorial dispute that has taken thousands of lives. Mirziyoyev knows that Trump sees TRIPP as a path to lasting peace and regional prosperity across the broader region, which fits into the Board of Peace narrative. Trump has referenced TRIPP repeatedly over the past year, and Mirziyoyev is well aware of this. At UNGA last September 23, 2025, Trump said: "President Mirziyoyev is a terrific leader, and with this TRIPP corridor, Uzbekistan is going to see massive trade flowing through – it's going to connect them directly to new markets without all the old hassles." And as Trump said on November 7, 2025, at the C5+1 Summit in Washington: "I've got great respect for President Mirziyoyev – he's doing amazing things in Uzbekistan. The Trump Route, i.e., the TRIPP, is perfect for them; it's going to cut transit times and costs, making Uzbekistan a powerhouse in regional trade." Mirziyoyev is paying...

Jackson-Vanik Amendment

Jackson-Vanik Repeal Gains Momentum as U.S. Courts Central Asia

For many years, U.S. relations with Central Asia were primarily political in nature, while economic ties developed slowly. However, in the past year, engagement has intensified significantly, with recent agreements suggesting the U.S. is poised to strengthen its economic presence in the region. A recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforces this outlook. Calls to repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions have been framed by U.S. officials as a way to facilitate trade with Central Asia and strengthen U.S. energy security. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted in 1974, restricts trade with countries that limit their citizens’ right to emigrate. At the time of its passage, Central Asia was still part of the Soviet Union. The amendment prohibits granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status, government loans, and credit guarantees to countries that violate their citizens’ right to emigrate, and allows for discriminatory tariffs and fees on imports from non-market economies. The amendment was repealed for Ukraine in 2006, and for Russia and Moldova in 2012. However, it remains in effect for several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which continue to receive only temporary normal trade relations. In May 2023, a bill proposing the establishment of permanent trade relations with Kazakhstan, which included repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, was introduced in the U.S. Congress. A follow-up bill with similar provisions was submitted in February 2025. Then-nominee and now Secretary of State Marco Rubio previously noted that some policymakers viewed the amendment as a tool to extract concessions on human rights or to push Central Asian states toward the U.S. and away from Russia. However, he characterized such thinking as outdated, stating that, “In some cases, it is an absurd relic of the past.” Rubio has consistently supported expanding U.S. ties with Central Asia. Expanding Cooperation In 2025, relations between the U.S. and Central Asia deepened significantly, particularly with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are seen by analysts as the primary beneficiaries of this cooperation. In late October 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the year’s major events was the Central Asia-U.S. (C5+1) summit held in Washington on November 6. Leaders of the five Central Asian states met with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. business community. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also met with U.S. Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus, with both sides focusing heavily on economic cooperation. At the summit, Uzbekistan finalized major commercial agreements with U.S. companies, including aircraft orders by Uzbekistan Airways and deals spanning aviation, energy, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan signed agreements worth $17 billion with U.S. companies in sectors including aviation, mineral resources, and digital technologies. This included a deal granting American company Cove Kaz Capital Group a 70% stake in a joint venture to develop one of Kazakhstan’s largest tungsten deposits, an agreement valued at $1.1 billion. Further agreements were signed on critical minerals exploration. Kazakhstan and the...

Central Asia-U.S. Relations

Astana and Tashkent Engage Washington’s Central Asia Vector

On January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace charter. The document matters less than what their participation signifies: recognized access to the White House and a willingness to be publicly associated with a U.S.-led initiative. This is all the more significant as Washington’s relations with several long-standing partners have recently become more fraught and publicly contested. The Central Asian response is part of that story. Their participation indicates that the Trump White House regards them as interlocutors of consequence, and that both Central Asian capitals are embracing that status. On December 1, Washington assumed the G20 presidency for 2026 and set three priorities: limiting regulatory burdens, strengthening affordable and secure energy supply chains, and advancing technology and innovation. It has also scheduled the leaders’ summit for December 14–15, 2026, in the Miami area. On December 23, Trump said that he was inviting Tokayev and Mirziyoyev to attend as guests. That invitation places Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan inside a host-defined agenda whose working tracks overlap with their strongest external bargaining assets, including energy, critical minerals potential, and transport connectivity. Trump publicly tied the invitations to discussions of peace, trade, and cooperation, which is in line with his subsequent Board of Peace invitations. Diplomatic Logic and Multi-Vectorism It is worthwhile situating these developments in the context of Central Asian cooperation, which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have driven as the regional core. At the August 2024 Consultative Meeting in Astana, all five leaders signed a Roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025–2027, and adopted a “Central Asia 2040” conceptual framework. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev referenced their 2022 allied-relations agreement and announced plans to adopt a strategic partnership program through 2034, including large-scale joint economic and energy projects. Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has widened the room for maneuver by other external actors, and Central Asian capitals have pursued these opportunities selectively. For example, the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in early August 2024, Japan has pursued its “Central Asia plus Japan” line as a counterweight to China’s influence, and Azerbaijan has been building an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Washington’s main channel into this complex is the C5+1, and the current U.S. emphasis is to create routines that survive individual summits. The U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau travelled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October 2025 ahead of the Washington summit that Trump hosted the following month for the five leaders. Such formats can concentrate attention on the implementation of standardized procurement procedures and regularized dispute resolution that new supply-chain corridors require for interoperable paperwork and predictable customs treatment. Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to host the second B5+1 forum (the business counterpart to C5+1) on February 4–5, 2026. This has already been prepared by a joint briefing...