• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00207 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10465 0.1%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0.28%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 27

Uzbekistan Joins a U.S. Critical Minerals Implementation Track

On February 4, 2026, in Washington, D.C., Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau signed an intergovernmental Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on securing supply chains for critical minerals and rare earth elements, spanning both mining and processing. A further agreement signed on February 19 brought implementation and financing to the foreground. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) signed “heads of terms” (i.e., commercial principles and essential terms of a proposed future agreement) for a Joint Investment Framework and outlined a proposed joint holding company. An agreement to establish an “investment platform” was exchanged in the presence of Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. These agreements are not a single mining deal. They combine a political instrument with a financing-and-structuring track that is intended to yield a small set of projects that can be financed and built, and they treat processing capacity and supporting infrastructure not as optional add-ons but as core deliverables. They also provide a path for early projects to full review and financing while connecting them to longer-term offtake structures that match Washington’s newer supply-shock tools, including “Project Vault.” What the MoU Changes The MoU’s immediate purpose is to align government priorities for critical minerals across the value chain while setting expectations that will later shape which financing and partners are feasible. The press agency of Uzbekistan’s foreign ministry emphasized “responsible partnership” and “long-term development” as part of the public framing, placing governance and reputational risk on the same plane as the geological givens. The MoU also leaves several items deliberately unresolved in public form. These include project annexes, deposit designations, and operational timelines. That document design-choice pushes the next phase of bilateral cooperation into working-level scoping and sequencing, where only a small number of candidate projects can be advanced into full review. At the ministerial-level meeting, Washington clarified why it was framed as supply-chain security rather than commodity trade. Secretary of State Marco Rubio noted that critical minerals are inputs for infrastructure, industry, and defense, while Vice President J.D. Vance stressed the expansion of production across partner networks. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, this framing is part of a broader repositioning of U.S. engagement in Central Asia, where diplomatic formats are increasingly paired with mechanisms intended to generate trackable transactions and private-sector follow-through. For Uzbekistan, what is attractive about this cooperation is the potential to convert resource endowment into a lever for industrial development, rather than treating extraction as the endpoint. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has publicly valued the country’s underground wealth at roughly $3 trillion. He has linked rising global demand for technological minerals to the case for higher value-added activity around strategic reserves, including lithium and tungsten. The same logic supports a commercially open posture. For Tashkent’s other investors, buyers, and processing partners, Uzbekistan’s diversification toward U.S.-linked capital signals non-exclusivity. Turning the MoU Into Projects The next phase is practical. A candidate project will advance only if investors and public lenders can transparently evaluate its licensing and...

Opinion: Mirziyoyev in Washington – New Deals Expected Amidst Peace Diplomacy

The President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has arrived on a working visit to Washington to participate in the inaugural meeting of President Trump’s Board of Peace on February 19, 2026, alongside the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and other heads of state. Against a backdrop of deep geopolitical tensions and raging conflicts across the world, Mirziyoyev’s second visit to the White House in less than four months suggests that U.S.-Uzbekistan relations are at their strongest in decades. Mirziyoyev will be joined by Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister, Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade, and other high-ranking officials. Uzbek Ambassador to the U.S. Sidikov and his team have been working around-the-clock for over two weeks, gearing up for the Trump–Mirziyoyev meeting. President Mirziyoyev’s objective will be to elevate U.S.-Uzbek relations from a constructive relationship to a fully functional, deal-oriented partnership with a focus on capital flows and bilateral trade.  In addition to his desire for regional stability in West Asia, his signing up for the Board of Peace should be understood as indicating his desire to advance trade and investment and flows into Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks are keen to nail down new money and capital guarantees to fund infrastructure along the U.S.-brokered “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” aka, the Zangezur Corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan (TRIPP) – a roughly 27-mile-long piece of land that links Europe to Central Asia and beyond through the Caucasus. TRIPP matters to Trump because it advances two goals at once: stabilizing the South Caucasus while more fully integrating U.S. trade with Uzbekistan and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)—a multimodal, 4,000 km transport network connecting China and East Asia with Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Apart from the issues on the Board of Peace agenda, Mirziyoyev will push for ironclad U.S. commitments and cold, hard cash for transport corridors and their downstream beneficiaries. Two big reasons driving Mirziyoyev ‘s thinking: first, Uzbekistan is one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world, the other being Liechtenstein—and second, Trump’s desire to nail down a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby resolving a long-standing territorial dispute that has taken thousands of lives. Mirziyoyev knows that Trump sees TRIPP as a path to lasting peace and regional prosperity across the broader region, which fits into the Board of Peace narrative. Trump has referenced TRIPP repeatedly over the past year, and Mirziyoyev is well aware of this.  At UNGA last September 23, 2025, Trump said: "President Mirziyoyev is a terrific leader, and with this TRIPP corridor, Uzbekistan is going to see massive trade flowing through – it's going to connect them directly to new markets without all the old hassles." And as Trump said on November 7, 2025, at the C5+1 Summit in Washington: "I've got great respect for President Mirziyoyev – he's doing amazing things in Uzbekistan. The Trump Route, i.e., the TRIPP, is perfect for them; it's going to cut transit times and costs, making Uzbekistan a powerhouse in regional trade." Mirziyoyev is paying...

Jackson-Vanik Repeal Gains Momentum as U.S. Courts Central Asia

For many years, U.S. relations with Central Asia were primarily political in nature, while economic ties developed slowly. However, in the past year, engagement has intensified significantly, with recent agreements suggesting the U.S. is poised to strengthen its economic presence in the region. A recent statement by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio reinforces this outlook. Calls to repeal the outdated Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions have been framed by U.S. officials as a way to facilitate trade with Central Asia and strengthen U.S. energy security. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, enacted in 1974, restricts trade with countries that limit their citizens’ right to emigrate. At the time of its passage, Central Asia was still part of the Soviet Union.  The amendment prohibits granting most-favored-nation (MFN) status, government loans, and credit guarantees to countries that violate their citizens’ right to emigrate, and allows for discriminatory tariffs and fees on imports from non-market economies. The amendment was repealed for Ukraine in 2006, and for Russia and Moldova in 2012. However, it remains in effect for several countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which continue to receive only temporary normal trade relations. In May 2023, a bill proposing the establishment of permanent trade relations with Kazakhstan, which included repealing the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, was introduced in the U.S. Congress. A follow-up bill with similar provisions was submitted in February 2025. Then-nominee and now Secretary of State Marco Rubio previously noted that some policymakers viewed the amendment as a tool to extract concessions on human rights or to push Central Asian states toward the U.S. and away from Russia. However, he characterized such thinking as outdated, stating that, “In some cases, it is an absurd relic of the past.”  Rubio has consistently supported expanding U.S. ties with Central Asia. Expanding Cooperation In 2025, relations between the U.S. and Central Asia deepened significantly, particularly with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which are seen by analysts as the primary beneficiaries of this cooperation. In late October 2025, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau and U.S. Special Representative for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. One of the year’s major events was the Central Asia-U.S. (C5+1) summit held in Washington on November 6. Leaders of the five Central Asian states met with President Donald Trump and members of the U.S. business community. Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also met with U.S. Senator Steve Daines, co-chair of the Senate Central Asia Caucus, with both sides focusing heavily on economic cooperation. At the summit, Uzbekistan finalized major commercial agreements with U.S. companies, including aircraft orders by Uzbekistan Airways and deals spanning aviation, energy, and industrial cooperation. Kazakhstan signed agreements worth $17 billion with U.S. companies in sectors including aviation, mineral resources, and digital technologies. This included a deal granting American company Cove Kaz Capital Group a 70% stake in a joint venture to develop one of Kazakhstan’s largest tungsten deposits, an agreement valued at $1.1 billion.  Further agreements were signed on critical minerals exploration. Kazakhstan and the...

Astana and Tashkent Engage Washington’s Central Asia Vector

On January 22 at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed President Donald Trump’s new Board of Peace charter. The document matters less than what their participation signifies: recognized access to the White House and a willingness to be publicly associated with a U.S.-led initiative. This is all the more significant as Washington’s relations with several long-standing partners have recently become more fraught and publicly contested. The Central Asian response is part of that story. Their participation indicates that the Trump White House regards them as interlocutors of consequence, and that both Central Asian capitals are embracing that status. On December 1, Washington assumed the G20 presidency for 2026 and set three priorities: limiting regulatory burdens, strengthening affordable and secure energy supply chains, and advancing technology and innovation. It has also scheduled the leaders’ summit for December 14–15, 2026, in the Miami area. On December 23, Trump said that he was inviting Tokayev and Mirziyoyev to attend as guests. That invitation places Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan inside a host-defined agenda whose working tracks overlap with their strongest external bargaining assets, including energy, critical minerals potential, and transport connectivity. Trump publicly tied the invitations to discussions of peace, trade, and cooperation, which is in line with his subsequent Board of Peace invitations. Diplomatic Logic and Multi-Vectorism It is worthwhile situating these developments in the context of Central Asian cooperation, which Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have driven as the regional core. At the August 2024 Consultative Meeting in Astana, all five leaders signed a Roadmap for the development of regional cooperation for 2025–2027, and adopted a “Central Asia 2040” conceptual framework. Tokayev and Mirziyoyev referenced their 2022 allied-relations agreement and announced plans to adopt a strategic partnership program through 2034, including large-scale joint economic and energy projects. Moscow’s preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has widened the room for maneuver by other external actors, and Central Asian capitals have pursued these opportunities selectively. For example, the EU’s then foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell visited Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in early August 2024, Japan has pursued its “Central Asia plus Japan” line as a counterweight to China’s influence, and Azerbaijan has been building an energy bridge between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Washington’s main channel into this complex is the C5+1, and the current U.S. emphasis is to create routines that survive individual summits. The U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs Sergio Gor and Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau travelled to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in October 2025 ahead of the Washington summit that Trump hosted the following month for the five leaders. Such formats can concentrate attention on the implementation of standardized procurement procedures and regularized dispute resolution that new supply-chain corridors require for interoperable paperwork and predictable customs treatment. Kyrgyzstan is scheduled to host the second B5+1 forum (the business counterpart to C5+1) on February 4–5, 2026. This has already been prepared by a joint briefing...

Trump’s G20 Invitations: Why Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Matter

On December 23, President Donald Trump said he would invite Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to attend the United States–hosted 2026 G20 summit in Miami. The meeting is planned at Trump National Doral. The announcement followed separate telephone calls with Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, which Trump described as focused on peace and expanded trade, and cooperation. The G20 is a group of major economies, with membership based mainly on large nominal GDP and global economic importance, collectively representing about 85% of global GDP. Kazakhstan is ranked roughly 50th in the world by nominal GDP, at approximately $300 billion, while Uzbekistan is ranked around 62nd, with a nominal GDP of about $137–140 billion. According to Polish radio, the president of Poland stated that his country would also be on the guest list. Poland is the world’s 21st-largest economy. The G20 is a forum, not a treaty body. Leaders’ summits include member governments and a limited number of host-selected guest countries. Invitations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan would place their leaders physically at the table with G20 heads of state, allowing them to be seen, heard, and recognized by other leaders, without conferring membership or a formal role in shaping the summit agenda. On average, the host invites six to seven guests. One official host-country explainer notes that guest invitations allow non-members to bring their own perspectives. For them, the significance of attending is access, not membership. What Washington Wants and What Can Be Transacted The host typically uses the guest invitations to signal which countries and regions they regard as priorities. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan rests on an immediate material basis. The United States is rebuilding its nuclear-fuel supply chain away from Russian-origin material. Federal law now bans imports of certain Russian uranium products, with waivers terminating no later than January 1, 2028. U.S. agencies have been explicit that supply diversification is a policy objective. In 2024, Kazakhstan-origin material accounted for 24% of uranium delivered to U.S. owners and operators, while Uzbekistan-origin material accounted for about 9%. Kazakhstan’s structural advantage is scale and reliability. It remains the world’s leading uranium producer, with 2024 output around 23,270 metric tons of uranium and the largest share of global mine production. Astana has also signaled an interest in moving beyond extraction toward higher value-added fuel-cycle activity. Uzbekistan’s advantage is growth potential and its fit with Western joint-venture structures. Its uranium sector has attracted major external entrants, including Orano’s South Djengeldi joint venture Nurlikum Mining with the state partner Navoiyuran to develop a new mine alongside an Itochu (Japan) minority stake. The second instrument is the resource-focused diplomacy under the C5+1 umbrella. The State Department frames the C5+1 as organized around economy, energy, and security, within which framework it has elevated critical minerals to a dedicated track. The United States launched a C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in early 2024, and subsequent U.S. statements have described it as a vehicle for geological exploration, mining, processing, and investment opportunities across the region. This...

The New Geoeconomics of Uzbekistan: Insights from ISRS Director Eldor Aripov

The Times of Central Asia presents a two-part interview in Washington, D.C. with Eldor Aripov, Director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan. Dr. Aripov sat down with our Washington Correspondent, Javier M. Piedra, to discuss Uzbekistan’s strategic thinking regarding its diplomatic posture, regional integration, and relations with Central Asian and global partners. The conversation includes commentary on “Great Game” geopolitics, U.S.–Uzbekistan relations, trade, the meaning of “Uzbekistan First,” the historically explosive Ferghana Valley, and water management. Recognizing the link between investment, a stable geopolitical ecosystem, and the need to de-risk potentially conflictive issues, Aripov further sheds light on Tashkent’s practical approach to internal governance and business development. [caption id="attachment_40284" align="aligncenter" width="2360"] Central Asia on the Front Lines; image: Defense.info[/caption] TCA: “America First” refers to U.S. policies prioritizing national interests, often associated with non-interventionism, nationalism, and protectionist trade. Given Uzbekistan’s pragmatic foreign policy, can we speak of an “Uzbekistan First” policy? It is certainly not isolationist — but how is it manifested on a day-to-day basis? Aripov: What you describe as “Uzbekistan First” is, in our understanding, fundamentally about prioritizing national interests – stability and predictability for the people of Uzbekistan. Yet Uzbekistan’s uniqueness lies in the fact that our national interests are closely intertwined with those of the entire region – this means shared upsides at the transactional and strategic levels and thinking long-term. We border every Central Asian country as well as Afghanistan, and therefore any issue — security, trade, transport, or water management — directly depends on the quality of our relationships with neighbors. From his first days in office, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev — with his strategic vision and deep understanding of regional dynamics — declared that regional unity and mutual benefit stand at the core of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. The essence of his doctrine is to resolve agreeably any historically or materially problematic issues with neighbors, remove barriers to understanding, and create predictable, stable conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation and the free movement of goods, ideas, and people. That is the true meaning of “Uzbekistan First”: not isolation, but openness, predictability, and regional consolidation. TCA: How are you realizing “Uzbekistan First” in practice? Aripov: Uzbekistan is strengthening its economy domestically and global track - putting in place the building blocks for internal sustainable development and accelerating accession to the World Trade Organization. The latter means expanding the geography and composition of exports and increasing the country’s investment attractiveness. This approach is rooted in the logic of sustainable development within the broader international context: long-term national interests are best served by Uzbekistan integrating into global value chains and markets. The results speak for themselves: in 2024, Uzbekistan’s GDP grew by 6.5%, foreign direct investment increased by more than 50% to reach $11.9 billion, and the target for 2025 is to attract $42 billion. This performance is also a tribute to our style of diplomacy, grounded in respect and having a constructive attitude towards others. Thus, “Uzbekistan First” represents a modern model...