Critical Minerals - The Times Of Central Asia

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Critical Minerals

U.S.-Kazakhstan Tungsten Venture Advances as Critical Minerals Cooperation Deepens

A U.S.-linked critical minerals venture in Kazakhstan is moving forward with plans to develop one of the world’s largest undeveloped tungsten resources, strengthening cooperation between Washington and Astana at a time of growing demand for secure mineral supply chains and greater Western interest in Central Asia’s strategic minerals base. Skyline Builders Group Holding Ltd. and Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC have announced a merger agreement that would create Kaz Resources Inc., a Nasdaq-listed company focused on tungsten, rare earths, and other critical minerals. The combined company is expected to trade under the ticker symbol “KAZR,” subject to shareholder and regulatory approvals and other closing conditions. The transaction builds on cooperation between Cove Kaz Capital and Kazakhstan’s national mining company, Tau-Ken Samruk. Cove Kaz has acquired a majority interest in Severniy Katpar LLP, which holds licenses for the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten projects in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda mining district, while Tau-Ken Samruk retains a minority stake, giving Kazakhstan’s state mining sector continued participation in the project. The Financial Times has reported that Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump held indirect stakes in Skyline Builders, the Nasdaq-listed company that has agreed to combine with Cove Kaz Capital. The reported investments were made through a Dominari-affiliated vehicle before the business combination. The report has drawn scrutiny because of the project’s connection to U.S. critical minerals policy and potential U.S. government-backed financing. The report cites no evidence that the Trump sons influenced the project award or the financing process. A spokesperson for Donald Trump Jr. said he is a passive investor, has no operational role, and does not engage with the federal government on behalf of companies in which he invests or advises. Eric Trump did not respond to requests for comment reported by the Financial Times. The Export-Import Bank of the United States and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation have issued letters of interest indicating potential financing support for the project. Such letters are preliminary expressions of interest, not final loan approvals, binding commitments, or government contracts, and any financing would remain subject to due diligence, agency approvals, and other conditions. The projects are strategically significant because tungsten is widely used in defense, aerospace, industrial manufacturing, and advanced technologies. The United States has identified tungsten as a critical mineral and has sought to diversify supply chains amid heavy global dependence on China. Kazakhstan’s tungsten deposits hold significant potential, but many remain at an early stage of development, requiring substantial investment and time before production can scale. Even so, the country has begun to emerge as a meaningful producer, with public and industry estimates pointing to Kazakhstan becoming a top-three producer in 2025 after the launch of the Boguty deposit, behind China and Vietnam. The Association of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises has cited production of around 2,400 tons of tungsten in 2025. The country’s rising role in the global market coincides with a sharp increase in tungsten prices. Following export restrictions imposed by China in February 2025, prices rose sharply through 2025...

Sergio Gor

U.S. Envoy Gor Meets Rahmon in Tajikistan for Trade, Security Talks

Tajik President Emomali Rahmon met Special Envoy of the President of the United States for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor in Dushanbe on April 28 for talks focused on trade, investment, security, and the next stage of cooperation under the C5+1 framework. Gor also met Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin during the visit. “Just landed in Tajikistan!” Gor wrote on X. “Excellent meeting with Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin in Dushanbe on deepening U.S.-Tajikistan ties. Excited to build a stronger partnership that delivers greater security and prosperity for both our countries.” The U.S. Embassy in Dushanbe said Gor’s meetings would continue over the next few days. According to the Tajik president’s press service, the meeting with President Rahmon covered the current state of bilateral relations and prospects for expanding cooperation. Particular attention was given to agreements reached through the C5+1 dialogue, which brings together the United States and the five Central Asian states. Rahmon said Tajikistan is interested in expanding ties with Washington in areas of mutual interest, noting that the United States is among Tajikistan’s top five investment partners. The sides discussed the use of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, known as TIFA, as a tool for developing practical cooperation. The talks pointed to several sectors where Dushanbe hopes to attract greater U.S. involvement. These include hydropower, mining, mineral processing, light industry, food production, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. Tajikistan has long promoted its hydropower potential as a basis for regional energy trade and industrial development, while mining and processing are increasingly tied to wider U.S. interest in critical minerals and supply-chain diversification. Digital cooperation also featured, with the two sides identifying artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and the wider digitalization of the economy as promising areas for cooperation. They also discussed the creation of joint ventures to process agricultural products for export and attract investment. The Tajik Foreign Ministry said Muhriddin and Gor discussed political, economic, investment, humanitarian, and security cooperation. It said they also exchanged views on the regional situation, emphasizing stability and the prevention of humanitarian risks. “Particular attention was paid to the need for coordinated efforts in addressing modern challenges and threats, including terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking,” the ministry said. Security remains a central part of Tajikistan’s relationship with Washington. Tajikistan shares a long border with Afghanistan, where narcotics trafficking, militant activity, and cross-border violence have repeatedly tested Dushanbe’s security forces. Earlier this month, Tajikistan said its security forces killed two alleged drug smugglers from Afghanistan who crossed into the Farkhor district of the Khatlon region. The State Committee for National Security said the group was trying to smuggle 25 kilograms of hashish. The Afghan border has also become a concern for foreign investors. In late 2025, several Chinese workers were killed in attacks launched from Afghan territory, prompting China to urge Tajikistan to strengthen protection for Chinese citizens and businesses. The attacks sharpened attention on Tajikistan’s ability to secure border areas where foreign-backed infrastructure and mining projects are expanding. Cooperation has also extended into health....

Kazakhstan-U.S. Relations

No Longer a Startup Market: Kazakhstan Makes Its Case to U.S. Investors

Washington D.C. - Acting on President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s push to convert strategic alignment with Washington into tangible commercial gains, senior Kazakh officials told U.S. investors on April 14 that the bilateral relationship is entering a deeper phase focused on energy, critical minerals, and transport infrastructure. Within that context, the country has undertaken constitutional reforms and other modernization efforts to digitize and improve the investment climate. The Kazakhstan delegation was led by Erzhan Kazykhan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s Special Representative for Negotiations with the United States on priority issues of bilateral cooperation, and included National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov and Deputy Foreign Minister Alibek Kuantyrov, who traveled to Washington for the meetings. Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov, also participated. A Delivering Partner, Not a Prospective One Kazykhan presented the new commercial push as a direct outgrowth of Tokayev’s November 2025 Oval Office meeting with President Trump, casting the Kazakh leader as a partner in a more ambitious phase of U.S.-Kazakhstan relations aimed at converting political trust into practical cooperation on energy security, critical minerals, and strategic transport corridors. He placed that agenda within the framework of Kazakhstan’s participation in U.S.-backed regional diplomacy as well, pointing to Kazakhstan joining the Abraham Accords and President Trump’s broader peace initiatives. Kazykhan also highlighted Kazakhstan’s role as a founding member of the Board of Peace, noting that Tokayev signed its charter in Davos in January and participated in its inaugural meeting in Washington on February 19. Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a constructive U.S. partner not only in Eurasian connectivity and resource security, but also in Middle East stabilization through support for reconstruction, healthcare, education, and longer-term peace-building efforts. Kazakhstan is seeking to set itself apart as a partner that delivers. While many countries pitch cooperation with Washington in terms of future potential, Astana’s message is that engagement has already produced tangible commercial outcomes. Following the Oval Office meeting, 29 agreements had been signed, including with Cove Capital, Boeing, Cerberus Capital Management, and Wabtec, with a combined value of more than $17 billion. Kazykhan added that more than 600 American companies operate in Kazakhstan and that cumulative U.S. investment has exceeded $60 billion, making the United States the country’s largest foreign investor. [caption id="attachment_47222" align="aligncenter" width="1429"] Kazakhstan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Economy Serik Zhumangarin; Special Representative for Negotiations with the United States, Erzhan Kazykhan; and Kazakhstan's Ambassador to the United States Magzhan Ilyassov meet with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on April 15 to strengthen commercial ties and advance regional cooperation. Image: USDOS[/caption] No Longer a Startup Market Ambassador Ilyassov said the discussion was more in-depth than a typical roundtable, because the relationship with U.S. partners has matured over many years. The tone of the session matched that description. The discussion centered on specifics of expansion, supply chains, regulation, and long-term capital rather than general market entry. [caption id="attachment_47219" align="aligncenter" width="2048"] Kazakhstan’s Ambassador to the United States, Magzhan Ilyassov; image: Kazakhstan Embassy, U.S.[/caption] Unlike the rest of Central Asia,...

Energy Transition

Investments, Resources, and Digital Transformation: How Central Asia Can Preserve Its Strategic Balance

Rising global demand for critical resources, the accelerating green transition, and the digitalization of the economy are turning Central Asia from a peripheral region into one of the key arenas of geoeconomic competition. Kazakhstan and its neighbors are increasingly in the focus of the United States, China, the European Union, and the Gulf states—as sources of raw materials, sites for infrastructure projects, and markets for the implementation of digital solutions. Under these conditions, the key question is no longer the volume of investment, but control over its quality, structure, and long-term consequences. The resource factor: from raw materials to a geoeconomic asset Central Asia is now becoming a strategic storehouse for the global green transition and high-tech industries. The region possesses enormous reserves of critical raw materials: Kazakhstan leads the world in uranium production, at about 40% of the global market, while deposits of copper, lithium, cobalt, uranium, and rare metals across Kazakhstan and the wider region are making Central Asia an increasingly important link in clean-energy and high-tech supply chains. Investment activity in the extractive sector is stimulating the development of related high-tech industries within the region. Global players are increasingly coming not simply for raw materials, but with proposals to localize processing. Thus, in November 2024, Kazakhstan’s first tungsten processing plant began operating at the Boguty deposit in the Almaty region. The project, valued at $300 million, is being implemented by Aral Kegen, a subsidiary of Jiaxin International Resources Investment. In addition, in the East Kazakhstan region, with the participation of the German mining company HMS Bergbau AG, two new industrial enterprises specializing in lithium extraction and processing are planned by 2029. Work is underway on the construction of a mining and processing plant, as well as a pegmatite ore processing facility. This allows the countries of the region to move away from the “quarry” model toward the model of a technological hub, where natural wealth becomes leverage for gaining access to Western and Eastern innovation. Investment transformation: from capital to ecosystems The traditional model, focused on extraction, is gradually giving way to the formation of value-added ecosystems. This presupposes the development of processing, the creation of high-tech production, and the formation of a scientific base. Kazakhstan’s national companies, such as Tau-Ken Samruk, Kazatomprom, and KazMunayGas, act as a strategic “anchor” for foreign capital, taking on the primary risks and bureaucratic burden. They absorb part of the early project risk, from licensing and exploration to infrastructure and coordination with the state, making entry into Kazakhstan easier for major foreign investors. This allows the state to retain control over strategic assets while using private capital for accelerated modernization of the sector. The main emphasis today is shifting from raw material extraction to the localization of higher value-added stages. Through the creation of joint ventures, national companies are introducing Western technologies and building plants with high added value, from the production of nuclear fuel assemblies to the manufacture of polyethylene and metal refining. In this way, they integrate Kazakh business...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Supply Chains of Power: How Critical Minerals Are Shaping China–U.S. Competition in Central Asia

Central Asia is no longer a distant frontier for global geopolitics. It is developing into a central arena of competition for critical minerals, supply chains, and industrial power, where minerals are no longer simple commodities but have instead become key components of contemporary statecraft. In essence, this transformation highlights a recognition in Washington and other capitals that critical mineral supply chains are fundamental to next-generation energy systems, the development of artificial intelligence (AI), and strategic defense capabilities. Even as the global economy is multipolar, critical mineral supply chains remain highly concentrated and dominated by China. Control of rare earths is increasingly geopolitical, with clear economic, political, and security consequences. The significance of that imbalance is now shaping U.S. foreign policy, Central Asia’s development strategies, and the future of global economics. China’s Strategy: Control the Chain, Not Just the Mine Though many years in the making, China’s critical minerals strategy is still often misunderstood as focused primarily on resource access. However, Beijing’s efforts are far broader and more effective. Not only securing raw materials, the Chinese leadership has also worked to control the entire supply chain—from extraction to processing, refining, and manufacturing. China’s long-term focus and investments began in the 1980s with efforts that culminated in the Made in China 2025 plan for national and overseas manufacturing. In 2023 alone, Chinese firms invested more than $120 billion in overseas mining and processing, targeting key elements used in energy supply chains. Beijing also fed its industrial base by providing over $220 billion for the production of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable infrastructure. As a result, China now controls approximately 60% of lithium processing, more than 70% of cobalt refining, and over 90% of battery material manufacturing. Strategically, China controls roughly 90% of global rare earth refining and associated technologies. Early investments in supplies enabled Beijing to subsequently concentrate funds into refining capacity to feed its industrial sector. This integrated approach has shifted the power dynamic for global supply chains tied to the critical minerals economy. As evidenced by Beijing’s near monopoly on processing, market control is not just associated with geological supplies but with processing capacity. China’s willingness to weaponize access not only to rare earths but also to processing technology demonstrates Beijing’s market muscle. This distinction is critical. Rare earth elements are not inherently scarce, but they are rarely found in concentrated deposits, making them difficult to extract and refine. Over decades, Beijing developed unique refining capabilities and subsidized an industrial base that disincentivized competition and encouraged processing to shift to China. The Vicious Circle Prohibitive investment costs, long development timelines, and market volatility have discouraged Western investment in alternative supply chains. Each stage (mining, processing, refining, manufacturing) is interdependent: miners won’t invest without buyers and offtake agreements, processors and refiners need secure financing and stable mineral supply, and manufacturers need steady inputs. Such interdependence creates an investment standoff and heightens perceptions of risk. By integrating all stages, Beijing exerts influence across global markets, from pricing to production. This has conditioned global markets...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...