Critical Minerals - The Times Of Central Asia

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Oil and Gas

U.S. Firm to Test Oilfield Water Recycling in Kazakhstan

U.S.-based IBL Elements will test technology in Kazakhstan for treating water produced during oil and gas extraction. The treated water could be reused, while the substances it contains will be studied to determine whether valuable and critical minerals can potentially be recovered. IBL Elements, the National Hydrogeological Service Kazhydrogeology, and oil producer Kazakhoil Aktobe have signed a memorandum of cooperation. The parties are preparing a pilot project to test technologies for treating industrial and produced water at oil and gas facilities. Produced water occurs naturally in underground formations and is brought to the surface along with oil and gas. Once separated from hydrocarbons, it can be treated for reuse or disposal, or reinjected underground. The new project is intended to determine whether some of this water can be returned to industrial use. Specialists will also study its composition and the possibility of recovering minerals. For now, the project is limited to research and testing. No commercial extraction of any elements has been announced. IBL Elements is based in Oklahoma and develops technologies for treating oilfield wastewater and recovering minerals from brines. The company says it is developing iodine extraction technology and also plans to recover lithium and other minerals. If the trials are successful, the technology could also be used at other oil and gas facilities in Kazakhstan, according to Bolat Bekniyaz, chairman of Kazhydrogeology. The project comes as American interest in Kazakhstan’s critical minerals is growing. In June, representatives of more than 20 U.S. companies and government agencies attended the AMM 2026 mining and metallurgy congress in Astana. Washington is looking at projects in Kazakhstan involving not only mining, but also processing and the development of new supply chains. For the IBL Elements project, critical minerals are only one part of the equation. The other is growing pressure on Kazakhstan’s water supplies. The country uses about 25 billion cubic meters of water annually, with industry accounting for roughly a quarter of that amount. Kazakhstan’s new Water Code requires industrial enterprises and heat producers to gradually transition to circulating and reused water supply systems. So far, 168 transition plans have been prepared. The authorities aim to increase the share of reused water in industry from 13% to 28% by 2030. The issue is particularly acute in Kazakhstan’s oil-producing west, where freshwater shortages coincide with large volumes of water brought to the surface during oil production. The outcome of the pilot will therefore depend on two factors: whether this water can be treated for reuse and whether it contains minerals at concentrations high enough to make their recovery economically viable.

Critical Minerals

India Uzbekistan Free Trade Agreement Floated as Tashkent Courts Minerals Investment

India has floated the possibility of a free trade agreement with Uzbekistan as Tashkent seeks Indian investment in copper and rare-earth processing. Indian Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal described a potential agreement as a “promising idea” during an India-Uzbekistan Business Forum in New Delhi, saying the two governments could examine it further. He also called for bilateral trade to reach approximately $3 billion within three years. Uzbek government figures put trade turnover at $1.3 billion in 2025, an increase of 33% from the previous year. The relationship remains heavily weighted toward Indian exports: Uzbekistan imported goods worth $1.15 billion from India while exporting $164.6 million in the opposite direction. Mining provided the clearest new commercial focus during the visit by Uzbekistan’s Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade, Laziz Kudratov. He highlighted the country’s deposits of gold, copper, uranium and rare-earth elements, and invited Indian companies to provide capital and technology for copper refining and the production of higher-value rare-earth products. More than 250 officials and business representatives attended the forum. Despite the, the event ended up being very light on investment announcements. Uzbekistan is already trying to turn its mineral deposits into a domestic processing industry. In March, the government announced a $4.2 billion critical-minerals program comprising 120 projects. [when?] The first projects include the production of high-purity selenium, tellurium and rhenium, while the country is also seeking to expand its established tungsten and molybdenum industries. India’s interest has a clear supply-chain rationale. China supplied between 60% and 81% of India’s permanent-magnet imports by value between 2022 and 2025, and an even larger share by volume. Rare-earth permanent magnets are used in electric-vehicle motors, wind turbines, electronics and defense equipment. New Delhi has begun looking overseas for alternative supplies. Under its National Critical Mineral Mission, the state-owned Khanij Bidesh India Limited has secured exploration and mining rights covering five lithium-brine blocks in Argentina. It has also examined potential lithium and cobalt investments in Australia. Beyond mining, pharmaceuticals appear to offer the strongest established basis for expanding trade, with Uzbekistan inviting Indian companies to establish local production facilities. According to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approximately 400 Indian-owned companies already operate in Uzbekistan. [source?] While no formal negotiations have begun, a free trade agreement could lower duties on these products. That said it would not remove larger regulatory logistical obstacles. India and Uzbekistan have no direct land connection, meaning freight must cross several borders or travel through Iranian ports and overland transport corridors. Uzbek Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov said the visit produced agreements to expand investment and industrial cooperation, but provided no details of individual projects. For now, both the proposed trade agreement and the minerals partnership remain at an exploratory stage.

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Rubio and Kosherbayev Discuss CPC Ahead of Tokayev’s U.S. Visit

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a telephone conversation with Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev on 29 July. The discussion focused on the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, energy cooperation, critical minerals, trade and investment ties, and current international issues. According to the U.S. Department of State, Rubio and Kosherbayev discussed the importance of energy security, including the “reliable and uninterrupted” export of Kazakhstan-origin oil through the CPC system. Rubio also thanked Kazakhstan for supporting President Donald Trump’s peace initiatives and expressed interest in deepening bilateral economic cooperation. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the two ministers discussed in detail the situation surrounding the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, cooperation in the energy, transport and logistics sectors, supplies of critical minerals, efforts to attract U.S. investment, and coordination in international organisations. The ministry said the conversation also covered preparations for President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s forthcoming visit to the United States for the G20 summit. The telephone call took place shortly after Kazakhstan resumed crude oil exports through the CPC system. The pipeline carries the vast majority of crude exports from the Tengiz oilfield, whose largest shareholders include the U.S. companies Chevron and ExxonMobil. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry said the two ministers reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining regular political dialogue. The conversation followed President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s meeting with U.S. Senator Steve Daines on 8 July, when the two sides discussed expanding trade and economic cooperation, attracting investment and strengthening cooperation in the energy sector. On 28 July, The Times of Central Asia reported that Kazakhstan had resumed oil exports through the CPC system after a week-long disruption at the consortium’s Black Sea marine terminal near Novorossiysk. The interruption more than halved oil production at Tengiz and again highlighted Kazakhstan’s dependence on its principal oil export route.

opinion

Kazakhstan’s Mineral Future Still Carries an Oil Risk Premium

In June, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev went to Brussels with a future-facing offer: Kazakhstan could become Europe’s non-Chinese option in critical minerals. Astana presented the country as a base for processing, long-term offtake, and industrial cooperation, rather than another source of ore. A month later, Kazakhstan’s older vulnerability reappeared. Drone attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal at Novorossiysk disrupted loadings and forced production cuts in Kazakhstan. By July 27, loading had resumed, with tankers receiving crude supplied by Tengizchevroil. The interruption was brief, but it exposed a structural problem. Kazakhstan’s future mineral offer still rests on an economy whose main export artery runs through Russia and the Black Sea. That is the central tension in Kazakhstan’s new resource diplomacy. Astana wants Europe to help build a future supply chain. Its present still depends on an oil corridor it does not fully control. Kazakhstan is asking Europe to make future demand bankable. A mineral deposit does not become part of a European supply chain when officials announce it in a joint statement. It needs geological confirmation, financing, processing technology, reliable power, water, logistics, and customers prepared to sign contracts years before the first shipment. This is why offtake sits at the heart of Tokayev’s proposal. Long-term purchase commitments can turn European concern over Chinese dominance into financeable projects. If Europe wants another source tomorrow, it must help fund extraction, processing, and internationally accepted standards today. Kazakhstan says it is ready to supply 21 of the 34 materials on the EU’s critical raw materials list. It also wants more of the value chain to remain at home. European capital and technology would support local processing, laboratories, skills, and higher-value production instead of simply moving raw materials abroad. Europe has good reason to listen. China dominates the processing of many minerals used in batteries, advanced manufacturing, digital infrastructure, and defence. European industry wants alternatives, but diversification cannot be improvised after a supply shock. Mines and processing plants take years to finance, permit, construct, and qualify. For Kazakhstan, the minerals offer is also an attempt to upgrade an older relationship. Western companies already know the country through Tengiz, Kashagan, and decades of oil investment. Astana now wants to move from extraction towards processing and a stronger position in industrial supply chains. But the old oil story still prices the new minerals story. The CPC episode showed why. The pipeline carries crude from Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak through Russian territory to Novorossiysk. It handles more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports and ties much of the country’s hard-currency income to a route outside Astana’s full control. A short halt was enough to cut output sharply at fields more than 1,500 kilometres away. Tokayev’s call in Omsk to freeze the war in Ukraine should be read partly in that context. It reflected more than the diplomatic caution expected from a neighbour of Russia. The war is now touching Kazakhstan’s export system through tanker security, insurance risk, production schedules, and investor confidence. Astana wants European finance for...

Critical Minerals

Resources, Capacity, Connectivity: Kazakhstan and the Critical Minerals Nexus

Kazakhstan’s place in diversified critical mineral supply chains rests on an unusual combination: a broad resource base, an established mining and metallurgical sector, and transport infrastructure extending across Eurasia. The task is to make these assets work together. Their strategic value depends on converting resources into financeable projects, existing capacity into internationally qualified products, and geographic connectivity into contractually reliable delivery. Kazakhstan approaches this task with an established industrial base. The world’s leading uranium producer, it also has production or processing capabilities in chromite and ferroalloys, titanium sponge, copper, zinc, aluminum, beryllium, molybdenum, rhenium, and other strategic materials. Much of that base was established during the Soviet period and extends beyond mines and plants to freight rail and experienced technical personnel. These assets reduce the burden of greenfield development for projects able to use them economically. By joining the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative in June 2026 as its first Central Asian participant, Kazakhstan brought these questions into a wider strategic setting. Pax Silica connects critical minerals and energy to an industrial agenda extending from semiconductor production to artificial-intelligence infrastructure. Membership creates an institutional opening for higher-value processing and technology cooperation. For Kazakhstan, the opportunity is to retain more value domestically through technology transfer, skilled employment, and a broader range of processed exports. From Resources to Financeable Projects Mineral abundance makes projects possible but not automatically bankable. Current drilling and internationally recognized resource statements must first establish the size, grade, and confidence level of the resource. Feasibility work must then show that it can be developed, and permits must authorize development. The project must still secure an off-taker and financing able to withstand commodity and construction risk. Predictable permitting and clear ownership help lenders assess risk. Traceability is important to lenders and buyers alike. Kazakhstan has begun to make its geological information more usable. More than 4.6 million primary geological records have been digitized. In 2025, the country also developed 20 projects for detailed 1:50,000 surveys covering 100,000 square kilometers; the government plans approximately $470 million in exploration spending during 2026–28. Digitization can open inherited records, but surveys and spending acquire commercial relevance only through completed fieldwork and usable results. Those results must then support economically recoverable reserves and financeable projects. Bankability also depends on the institutions through which capital is raised and transactions governed. The Kazakhstan Stock Exchange and Astana International Exchange give issuers access to investors. The Astana International Financial Centre operates under a legal framework based on common law and has a separate court. Parties may also agree to international arbitration. Kazatomprom’s initial public offering in London and Astana demonstrated access to global capital for a mature national producer. Glencore’s controlling stake in Kazzinc and production by Central Asia Metals at Kounrad since 2012 provide evidence of sustained foreign participation. Taken together, these cases show that Kazakhstan’s system can support substantial transactions and long-term partnerships. Still, each new venture must establish its own economics under commodity and construction risk. From Industrial Capacity to Qualified Products The OECD identifies...

Critical Minerals

Opinion: Could Vanadium Be Kazakhstan’s Next Breakout Critical Metals Story?

Vanadium is viewed as a critical mineral by the United States, the European Union, Russia, China and many other countries because of its importance to energy storage and industrial alloys. At the Astana Metals & Metallurgy (AMM) Congress, Ferro-Alloy Resources CEO Nicholas Bridgen discussed the company’s assets, strategy, and valuation with The Times of Central Asia, noting that the company appears undervalued amid supply chain disruptions and the rising strategic importance of vanadium. The discussion highlighted vanadium’s emerging demand-supply imbalance and efforts to better align market perception with fundamentals. Of the critical metals that will define the next half-century, vanadium has perhaps the strongest claim to indispensability: it hardens the steel in our infrastructure and defense systems, and it stores the energy that our grids will increasingly depend on. Yet the market has consistently failed to price that future in, and nowhere is that mispricing more visible than in the vanadium deposits of Kazakhstan. In 1941, with the Second World War raging, Soviet geologists fanned out across Central Asia looking for strategic minerals. Around 180 kilometers east of Almaty, in the foothills of the Tian Shan mountain range along the borders with China and Kyrgyzstan, they found tungsten at the Boguty deposit. At roughly the same time, they were delineating what would become the Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits. The geology was well understood, and the resource was real, but nothing happened for the better part of 75 years. The deposits sat idle not because tungsten was unimportant, but because there was no pressing reason for, first, the Soviet Union or later the West to develop them. That changed when the scale of China's dominance in critical metals became impossible to ignore. By the early 2020s, China was producing over 75% of the world’s tungsten output, alongside similarly dominant shares of rare earth elements and a range of other strategic minerals. This concentration of supply was not accidental. It was the product of decades of deliberate industrial policy, patient capital, and a willingness to operate at low margins long enough to drive out competitors. The Tungsten Lesson Chinese mining company Jiaxin International Resources Investment Ltd. moved in 2014 to acquire Boguty for an undisclosed sum, almost certainly a modest one. The deal further consolidated China’s grip on global tungsten supply. Jiaxin then spent approximately $300 million developing the deposit and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange at a valuation in excess of $600 million. The investment thesis seemed straightforward enough at the time. In 2025, it looked positively prescient: China imposed export controls on tungsten, and key prices outside China more than doubled. According to the Financial Times, Jiaxin’s market capitalization stands at close to HKD 22.3 billion, equal to $2.84 billion, approximately 9.5 times the stated development expenditure. [caption id="attachment_52262" align="aligncenter" width="1432"] Image: Kaz Resources[/caption] Meanwhile, Skyline Builders Group Holding Ltd. and Cove Kaz Capital Group LLC (“Cove Kaz”) have moved to acquire the two other formerly dormant tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan, Northern Katpar and Upper Kairakty. On this...