• KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
  • KZT/USD = 0.00219
  • TJS/USD = 0.10800
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29850
07 September 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 120

Kazakhstan Takes Center Stage in U.S. House Critical Minerals Hearing

Kazakhstan’s growing role in global critical-mineral supply chains came into sharp focus on Capitol Hill on September 2. During a nearly four-hour hearing of the full U.S. House Ways and Means Committee, lawmakers and expert witnesses repeatedly presented the country as a major resource producer, an established U.S. supplier and a strategically important partner in Central Asia. The hearing, titled "Strategic Partnerships to Secure Critical Resources and Supply Chains," covered a broad range of issues, including domestic mining, processing capacity, Africa and trade policy. Kazakhstan nevertheless emerged as one of the hearing’s most frequently cited country examples. Three of the five witnesses explicitly supported removing Jackson-Vanik Amendment restrictions from Kazakhstan and other qualifying Central Asian states, while another encouraged Congress to consider doing so. Their position was reinforced by members of both parties. The discussion followed a congressional delegation to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Mongolia led one week earlier by Committee Chairman Jason Smith. Opening the hearing, Smith said all three countries possess significant critical resources, operate amid a strong Chinese and Russian economic presence and are looking to the United States as a stronger trade and investment partner. Kazakhstan entered the debate as an existing and reliable contributor to U.S. supply chains. Smith noted that the country already provides more than a quarter of U.S. uranium imports. Uzbekistan was discussed largely in terms of its plans to nearly double uranium production by 2030, while Kazakhstan’s importance rested on current production, established commercial ties and its capacity to support immediate diversification of American supplies. Former U.S. Ambassador John Herbst, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, described Kazakhstan as the world’s largest uranium producer, the holder of the second-largest manganese reserves and one of the leading producers of titanium. He also pointed to its substantial copper, lithium and tungsten resources. According to Herbst, the United States currently receives only about 2.1 percent of Central Asia’s mineral exports. That limited share, he argued, leaves considerable space for American companies to expand their presence in a region that is actively seeking investment, technology and alternatives to dependence on Russia and China. Kazakhstan’s significance was also linked to its position at the heart of the Trans-Caspian, or Middle Corridor. Participants described the route as an increasingly important connection between Central Asia and Western markets. Combined with new transport links through the South Caucasus, the corridor could give Kazakhstan greater access to global markets while strengthening the resilience of supply chains serving the United States and its allies. For Kazakhstan, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment became the hearing’s defining political issue. Smith said his recent meetings in Central Asia showed that regional partners regard the Soviet-era measure as an obstacle to deeper economic ties. Witnesses added that the continued application of Jackson-Vanik and the absence of permanent normal trade relations make the trade relationship less predictable and raise questions about the durability of Washington’s commitment. Herbst called for Congress to remove the remaining Jackson-Vanik restrictions on Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. He acknowledged that reforms...

How the U.S. Is Building a Critical Minerals Chain Across Central Asia

The United States is trying to turn its political dialogue with Central Asia into concrete projects for mining and processing critical minerals. American capital is already moving into Kazakhstan’s tungsten sector and has long been present in Tajikistan’s antimony industry, while Washington is looking more closely at the mineral potential of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. But access to deposits is only part of the challenge. China is already deeply embedded in the region’s mining, processing, and supply routes. A new round of talks took place during a visit by U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor and Senator Steve Daines. In Bishkek, the U.S. delegation met with regional leaders and discussed investment and resource projects. Daines represents Montana, one of the United States’ major mining states, and serves on the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. He has also advocated repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era provision that still applies to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The 1974 law was designed to pressure Soviet-bloc governments that restricted emigration and still prevents the four countries from receiving permanent normal trade relations with the United States. In Washington, its repeal is increasingly being linked to expanding trade and U.S. investment in the region. U.S. mineral diplomacy has already acquired a dedicated regional format. In June, Astana hosted the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue with representatives of all five Central Asian states. Discussions ranged from geological exploration and access to data to processing and getting raw materials to international markets. U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce David Fogel called for faster progress in turning those discussions into investment projects. More than 20 U.S. mining and related companies joined the delegation, while a Kazakhstan-U.S. roundtable focused on processing capacity and new supply chains. The question now is whether Washington can turn that diplomatic push into projects that not only extract Central Asia’s minerals, but process them in the region and move them to Western markets without relying on China. Kazakhstan: America’s Bet on Tungsten The most prominent U.S.-backed project is already taking shape in Kazakhstan. Cove Capital, through Cove Kaz Capital Group, is working with state-owned Tau-Ken Samruk to develop the Severny Katpar and Verkhneye Kairakty deposits in the Karaganda Region. The U.S. investor holds a 70% interest in the project, while its Kazakh partner has a 30% stake. Investment is estimated at around $1.1 billion. The project goes beyond mining: processing is also planned in Kazakhstan. At Severny Katpar, average annual production is projected at about 5,000 tons of tungsten trioxide. Mining is scheduled to begin in 2030. Tungsten is particularly important to the United States. It is used in aerospace, electronics, machinery, and defense, while the global market remains heavily dependent on China. Professor Younkyoo Kim of Hanyang University and his co-authors highlighted the middle of the production chain – smelting, refining, and separation – in a 2026 study. These processing capabilities are even more concentrated geographically than mining itself. Kazakhstan is trying to use competition among investors to keep more stages of...

Bipartisan U.S. Congressional Visit Highlights Expanding Partnership with Kazakhstan

A bipartisan six-member delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives met with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana on August 25, two days after Kazakhstan elected the first members of its new unicameral Kurultai. Tokayev called the timing symbolic and proposed closer dialogue between Congress and the new legislature. The delegation was led by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Jason Smith and included Greg Murphy, Carol Miller, Ronny Jackson, Wesley Bell, and Ed Case. Smith said President Donald Trump had called him at 2 a.m., several hours before the meeting. Trump sent his regards, expressed appreciation for his relationship with Tokayev, and said he looked forward to the Kazakh president’s visit to Miami for the G20 summit. Smith said one purpose of the visit was to explore opportunities to expand economic ties and pursue a substantive bilateral dialogue. The visit reinforced Congress’s role in a relationship that has recently gained momentum at the presidential level. It also showed the breadth of the emerging agenda, from trade and investment to energy security, strategic supply chains, nonproliferation, and regional stability. A Delegation With Trade and Security Reach The delegation’s committee assignments closely matched that agenda. Smith, Murphy, and Miller serve on the Ways and Means Committee, which oversees trade and tariff legislation. Jackson serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, and Agriculture committees. Bell serves on the Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and Oversight and Government Reform committees. Case sits on the Appropriations Committee and its Defense and Homeland Security subcommittees. That mix places delegation members on committees with jurisdiction over many of the issues now shaping the bilateral relationship. Congress can advance cooperation through trade legislation, appropriations, oversight, and support for American companies entering or expanding in Kazakhstan. Smith’s committee has jurisdiction over H.R. 1024, the bipartisan U.S.-Kazakhstan Trade Modernization Act, which would authorize the president to end the application of the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik restrictions and extend permanent normal trade relations to Kazakhstan. Miller was among the bill’s original co-sponsors, although the issue was not mentioned in the public account of the meeting. Bipartisan congressional engagement could help translate recent presidential momentum into more durable institutional ties. Kazakhstan Has Made the U.S. Relationship a Priority From the Kazakh side, Tokayev has treated closer ties with Washington as a presidential priority. During his November 2025 visit to Washington, the two leaders welcomed commercial agreements worth more than $17 billion. Trump reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the Enhanced Strategic Partnership, while the two presidents identified new areas for cooperation. The August 25 meeting also highlighted Kazakhstan’s support for the Abraham Accords and the Board of Peace, as well as the countries’ longstanding work on nuclear security and nonproliferation. Trade, investment, advanced technology, science, education, and culture were also discussed. Tokayev’s proposal for closer dialogue between Congress and the Kurultai would strengthen the parliamentary channel alongside the relationship’s presidential and executive-level diplomacy. In January, Tokayev appointed veteran diplomat Erzhan Kazykhan as his representative for negotiations with the United States on priority bilateral issues....

Kazakhstan’s Uranium Advantage Is Difficult to Replicate

Kazakhstan supplies about two-fifths of the world’s mined uranium, making it a critical supplier to nuclear markets in Asia, Europe, and the Americas. What sets it apart is not simply its resource base, but its ability to produce and deliver uranium at scale. Kazakhstan already dominates global uranium mining. It produced 25,839 tonnes in 2025, about 40% of world mine output, and production rose another 9% in the first half of 2026. It has been the world’s largest producer since 2009. Kazakhstan holds about 14% of identified global uranium resources, while Australia, Canada and others also have large deposits. Its advantage is that production capacity is already in place. Developing comparable new supply elsewhere would take years. Demand is meanwhile expected to rise. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency and International Atomic Energy Agency project annual uranium requirements could rise by about 50% by 2050 in their lower case, and more than double in their higher case. In either scenario, Kazakhstan’s existing production base would be hard to quickly replace. A Uranium Supplier Across Major Markets Kazakhstan supplies markets whose fuel-security priorities increasingly differ. Asia accounted for 56% of Kazatomprom’s consolidated uranium sales in 2025, according to its May 2026 investor handout. The Americas accounted for 25%, and Europe for 19%. The sales map gives commercial weight to Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy. China is a major customer and industrial partner. Russia remains an important partner through joint ventures, enrichment services, and long-term supply arrangements. European and North American utilities, meanwhile, buy Kazakh uranium as part of increasingly diversified procurement portfolios. Kazatomprom widened that customer base in 2025, adding buyers in Switzerland and the Czech Republic, and expanding relationships with Japan and India, according to its full-year financial results. What distinguishes Kazakhstan is the combination of scale and cross-market integration. It supplies Asian, European, and North American markets while maintaining industrial ties with China, Russia, and Western partners. That gives Kazakhstan room to tailor commercial arrangements to different markets. For Western buyers, this could support additional processing and transit options that meet their commercial and regulatory requirements. Kazakhstan could develop these while continuing to serve established Asian markets, attracting new investment while preserving its multi-vector position. Kazakhstan’s importance to the U.S. market is substantial. Kazakh-origin uranium accounted for 28% of deliveries to American civilian reactor operators in 2025, second only to Canada, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Kazakhstan was also the EU’s second-largest source of natural uranium in 2025, accounting for 20.3% of deliveries to EU utilities, according to the Euratom Supply Agency. Kazakhstan’s production share does not mean that equivalent volumes are available for new customers. Twelve of Kazatomprom’s 14 mining operations are partially owned through partnerships, and much of their output is already committed under long-term contracts. Budenovskoye’s 2026 production, for example, is reserved under an existing offtake agreement for Russia’s civilian nuclear industry. Additional capacity would give Kazakhstan more flexibility to respond to demand across multiple markets. Kazakhstan’s Stability Underpins Global Uranium Supply Kazakhstan’s importance to uranium...

Kazakhstan’s Role in Pax Silica After WAICO

Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country to join the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative. It also signed the agreement establishing China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, or WAICO. That dual participation could now become consequential. Reuters reported on August 14 that the State Department had prepared an undated draft letter warning the 35 signatories of the U.S. AI Opportunity Statement that participation in Pax Silica could be incompatible with membership in competing initiatives. Kazakhstan is the only country presently known to have joined both frameworks. The draft could still change, and the State Department has not publicly adopted the position it contains. Kazakhstan’s decision to join both initiatives also reflects its long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. Astana has sought practical relations with competing powers rather than exclusive alignment with any one bloc, an approach its official foreign-policy concept describes as maintaining mutually beneficial relations with states and organizations of practical interest to Kazakhstan. Joining a U.S.-led supply-chain initiative and a China-led AI organization fits that pattern, although it also makes the question of compatibility more consequential. Washington’s concern is understandable. Pax Silica is intended to create trusted supply chains, strengthen investment security and protect sensitive technology and infrastructure from undue access or control. Membership is meant to represent more than attendance at another diplomatic forum. The question is what Kazakhstan has agreed to do through WAICO, how those commitments will be implemented, and whether they create competing expectations or affect specific Pax Silica projects. Kazakhstan’s Role in the Supply Chain Pax Silica spans the AI supply chain from energy and mineral processing to semiconductors, data centers and models. Kazakhstan also has ambitions in digital infrastructure and AI services, but its strongest existing capabilities relevant to Pax Silica are concentrated in energy, mineral production, selected processing and Eurasian connectivity. The framework is designed to combine the different industrial strengths of its participants rather than reproduce the entire technology chain in every country. Kazakhstan produced about 40% of the world’s mined uranium in 2025. Kazakh-origin material accounted for 28% of uranium delivered to U.S. civilian reactor operators that year, second only to Canada. Kazakhstan’s most immediate relevance is not semiconductor production, but its role as an energy, minerals and processing partner. Uranium is the clearest example, providing large-scale fuel supplies for the power systems on which expanding AI infrastructure depends. As TCA recently noted, Kazakhstan sits at the nexus of resources, processing capacity and connectivity, and its role extends beyond raw-material extraction. Ulba Metallurgical Plant produces uranium dioxide powders and nuclear-fuel pellets, along with beryllium, tantalum and niobium products. Kazakhstan also produces copper, titanium, silver, aluminum and zinc used across power, communications, aerospace and advanced manufacturing. Its position on the Middle Corridor also gives it a logistics role connecting Central Asian production with Caspian and European markets. Other contributions remain prospective. Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) plans a 15-tonne-a-year gallium facility backed by a long-term supply agreement with Mitsubishi, while a U.S.-supported tungsten project is moving forward with plans to mine and refine the...

Kazakhstan Navigates Rival U.S. and China AI Frameworks

Kazakhstan has found itself in an unusual position as the technological rivalry between the United States and China intensifies. Within a matter of weeks, Astana first joined the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative and then became a founding member of the Beijing-backed World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO). Washington is now preparing to warn countries aligned with its AI strategy that participation in competing frameworks may be incompatible, Reuters has reported. For Kazakhstan, such a choice would be uncomfortable for more than political reasons. The United States is home to many of the world’s leading AI and semiconductor companies and offers access to investment and advanced technology. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has critical mineral reserves that Washington is keen to bring into secure supply chains. China is next door, remains one of Kazakhstan’s leading trading partners, and offers countries without their own advanced technologies broader access to Chinese developments. Zamir Karazhanov, a political scientist and director of the Kemel Arna Public Foundation, believes Kazakhstan is unlikely to abandon cooperation with China on artificial intelligence. Much, he says, will depend on how far Washington is prepared to go and whether technological alignment becomes a condition for continued partnership with the United States. Pax Silica was launched by Washington in late 2025. Despite its name, the initiative goes far beyond silicon and chips. It covers the supply chains and physical infrastructure underpinning AI, including critical minerals, semiconductors, energy, and computing capacity. Kazakhstan officially joined Pax Silica on June 25, 2026, becoming the first Central Asian country to enter the initiative. The accession declaration was signed in Washington by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development Zhaslan Madiyev. For Kazakhstan, participation also has a tangible economic dimension: the country has a substantial mineral resource base needed for high-tech manufacturing. The Times of Central Asia has previously examined why joining Pax Silica could help Kazakhstan attract foreign investment into mining, energy, data centers, and manufacturing for the AI economy. U.S. interest in Kazakhstan’s mineral resources predates Pax Silica. In June, Astana hosted a C5+1 critical minerals dialogue involving representatives of all five Central Asian states and U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor. The American side spoke openly about expanding cooperation with the region on secure supply chains. But in July, Astana took another step, this time toward Beijing. Kazakhstan became one of 29 founding members of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization. The agreement establishing WAICO was signed in Shanghai, where the organization will also be headquartered. Beijing has presented the new organization as a mechanism for international cooperation on AI governance and narrowing the technological gap between countries. Chinese President Xi Jinping has also promoted China’s open-weight AI models as a more accessible alternative for countries that cannot afford or easily access leading proprietary systems. However, Beijing is also considering restrictions on overseas access to some of China’s leading AI models. In July, Xi Jinping pitched WAICO as part of China’s effort to advance its own model of global...