• KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01151 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09390 0.75%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 -0.14%

Our People > Bruce Pannier

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Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. He currently appears regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL.

Articles

Only Turkmen Names Allowed

Ethnic minorities in Turkmenistan are reportedly being told they must give their newborn children tradition Turkmen names. The process of “Turkmenization” has been underway in Turkmenistan for many years, but until recently it had not affected the proper names of non-Turkmen citizens. According to a recent report from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Turkmen service, known locally as Azatlyk, officials in the eastern Lebap Province were previously urging the Uzbek and Tajik communities in the province to give their newborns Turkmen names. Now this is no longer a suggestion, but a requirement. Lebap borders Uzbekistan. Many Uzbeks and Tajiks lived in this area long before Soviet mapmakers finally drew borders that after the collapse of the USSR in late 1991 became the frontier of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan for Turkmen [caption id="attachment_30930" align="aligncenter" width="1115"] stat.gov.tm[/caption] The credibility of official statistics from the Turkmen government has been called into question many times over the years, and the size and ethnic make-up of the population are no exception. According to the most recent census figures (released in 2023), Turkmenistan’s population is just over seven million people, though the real figure is almost certainly less than that, and could be as low as four or five million. Turkmenistan has been experiencing significant economic problems for some ten years, and many citizens have left the country. For example, as of December 2024, more than 205,000 Turkmen citizens are officially registered as living In Turkey, and that figure could be three times higher or more, including those Turkmen citizens who are illegally residing there. The census released by the Turkmen authorities lists the populations of 14 specific ethnic minority groups. Roughly one million Turkmen citizens are ethnic minorities. The top three are Uzbeks, numbering 642,476, Russians, 114,447, and Baluch, 87,503. These figures might be lower soon, however, at least officially. Authorities in Lebap are also reportedly recommending people from non-Turkmen groups give their nationality as Turkmen in their documents. Being an ethnic Turkmen matters when seeking employment in Turkmenistan, so there is an added incentive for minorities to claim they are Turkmen in official documents. Turkmenistan would not be the first country in Central Asia to have rules on naming newborns. Authorities in Tajikistan banned children from being given foreign names some eight years ago. The Language and Terminology Committee of Tajikistan’s Academy of Science produced a list of more than 3,000 approved Tajik names for children; however, that rule applies only to ethnic Tajiks. Minority groups in Tajikistan are free to name their children as they wish. Azatlyk reports that the authorities are also warning ethnic Turkmen about giving their children non-Turkmen names. Turkish names were becoming popular among Turkmen in Turkmenistan, and some Turkmen families living near Uzbekistan were giving their children Uzbek names. The difficulties in obtaining information from Turkmenistan make it difficult to know if the naming policy being enforced in Lebap exists in other parts of the country. Turkmenistan’s government has, to the greatest extent possible, sealed the country off from...

4 days ago

Complaint against Tajik Officials Filed with International Criminal Court

For many years now, Tajikistan’s government has been ruling the country as it wishes and ignoring all criticism of the many rights violations being committed in Tajikistan. On April 10, two NGOs -- the Ukrainian Fund of International Volunteers and Freedom for Eurasia -- and the banned Tajik opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) filed a complaint with the international Criminal Court (ICC). The complaint accuses Tajik President Emomali Rahmon and his government of committing crimes against humanity. IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri said, “We hope the (ICC), (after considering) our complaint, will begin procedures for opening a criminal case and arresting the perpetrators, including the top leadership of Tajikistan.” A Big Problem That’s Getting Worse Evidence provided in the complaint covers the period from 2002 to 2024, but events only in the last few years tell the story of the impunity with which Tajik authorities have acted toward their citizens inside and outside Tajikistan. In May 2022, the Tajik government responded to peaceful protests in eastern Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO) by implementing a counter-terrorism operation that saw dozens, at least, of locals killed, and hundreds detained. Tajik authorities arrested people who were not involved in the protests: lawyers, activists, artists, and journalists. More than a dozen Pamiris were detained in Russia and forcibly deported back to Tajikistan where they were immediately detained and soon after, convicted and imprisoned. GBAO is home to the Pamiris, a group of more than 200,000 who have been living in the remote Pamir Mountains for centuries. They are Shiite Muslims, not Sunnis as most ethnic Tajiks are. Pamiris have their own languages and a unique culture. GBAO has been a restive area since Tajikistan became independent in late 1991, mainly because the Pamiris prefer to govern their territory according to their own age-old customs and have been resistant to the government’s attempts to exert control over the region. Less than three years since the counter-terrorism operation, Pamiri culture is in danger of disappearing. Pamiris are followers of the Aga Khan. During more than 30 years of Tajikistan’s independence, the recently deceased Aga Khan IV Prince Karim spent more than $1 billion on projects in GBAO, which is the poorest region in Tajikistan.  Since 2022, the government has seized or is currently trying to seize nearly everything the Aga Khan Development Network built or established in GBAO. The hotels, schools, including the University of Central Asia in the GBAO capital Khorog, a medical center, the park in Khorog, and other objects financed by the Aga Khan are all coming under state control. Locals are forbidden from having portraits of the Aga Khan in their homes.  Rahmon is preparing his eldest son, Rustam Emomali, to become Tajikistan’s next president. In advance of the widely-expected transfer of power, Rahmon has been clearing away any potential opposition. The IRPT was banned and declared by a Tajik court to be an extremist group a decade ago, despite the party having been part of the government during the previous 18...

1 week ago

Historic Khujand Summit Paves Way for Peace in the Ferghana Valley

The presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan gathered in the northern Tajik city of Khujand on March 31 for meeting that is decades overdue. Among the agreements the three signed were one fixing the border where their three countries meet. Prior to Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s arrival, Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov and Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon exchanged ratified documents of the border agreement between the two countries. Rahmon and Japarov, via video link, also launched the Datka-Sughd power transmission line, a major step in the CASA-1000 project that aims for both their countries to supply electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. These agreements might not seem monumental, but they represent a major departure from the troubled past the three governments have had in their border areas. Trouble in Paradise The three countries share the Ferghana Valley, an area roughly the size of Costa Rica that is home to more than 20% of Central Asia’s population. Since the Central Asian states became independent in late 1991, the Ferghana Valley has also been the region’s hotbed of tension. The Ferghana Valley is the cradle of ancient Central Asian civilization. Some living there today say it was the location of the Garden of Eden, and it is not difficult to see why. The Valley is abundant in fruits and vegetables and has extensive arable and grazing land. It is surrounded by mountains to the north, east, and south, and the rivers that flow from these mountains supply ample water. Since independence, the Ferghana Valley has been the most dangerous place in all of Central Asia. The arbitrary borders Soviet mapmakers drew to divide Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan left many problems for the three after they became independent states. Agreement on where Kyrgyz-Uzbek border is came only in late 2022, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan just signed the agreement on delimitation of their border on March 12. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan The roots of Islam lie deep in the Ferghana Valley. There were already calls for Shari’a law in Uzbekistan’s section of the valley just months after Uzbekistan declared its independence. The most serious security threat to Central Asia to date originated in the Ferghana Valley in 1999 and 2000. In early August 1999, a group of some 20 armed militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appeared in southern Kyrgyzstan, captured a village, and took the villagers and subsequent government negotiators hostage. The IMU leaders were from the eastern Uzbek city of Namangan. They were connected to the protests in Uzbekistan in late 1991 and later joined the Islamic opposition in neighboring Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war. The peace accord that ended the civil war called for opposition fighters to either join the Tajik armed forces or disarm. There was no longer any need for the opposition’s foreign fighters, and the final phase of disarmament was underway by the summer of 1999. In mid-August, the Kyrgyz government paid a ransom for the hostages’ release and the departure of the IMU militants, but this provided...

3 weeks ago

Uzbekistan’s New Emphasis on the Military

Uzbekistan has become Central Asia’s leader in terms of military spending. This raises some questions about why Uzbekistan has boosted its military spending, but it should also get the attention of Uzbekistan’s Central Asian neighbors. According to Global Firepower’s 2025 Military Strength ranking, Uzbekistan’s defense budget was a little more than $2.8 billion, ahead of Kazakhstan which spent just over $2 billion. Kazakhstan still ranked ahead of Uzbekistan in overall military strength, 57th and 58th, respectively, but in 2024, Global Firepower ranked Kazakhstan 58th and Uzbekistan 65th. Voice of America noted in a July 2024 report that military spending was generally increasing across Central Asia, a "development officials link to regional conflicts such as the war in Ukraine.” Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan boosted their military spending after they fought brief but destructive battles against each at the end of April 2021, and again in mid-September 2022. In March 2023, Kamchybek Tashiyev, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s security service, said that since the 2021 conflict, his country had spent some $1 billion on military equipment, including military drones from Turkey. Global Firepower's 2025 report stated that Kyrgyzstan spent $221.8 million and Tajikistan $446 million on defense in 2024. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the poorest countries in Central Asia. Where is the Threat? Uzbekistan and more broadly Central Asia’s increase in defense spending raise the question of why is it necessary. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s surge in military spending was a reaction to the border conflicts of 2021 and 2022. The root cause of that fighting was disputed territories along their frontier, but this year the two countries finally signed a delimitation agreement and relations have improved. The Central Asian states have legitimate security concerns, most emanating from Afghanistan, though not necessarily from the Taliban. Despite occasional saber-rattling, the Taliban are unlikely to ever try to attack or invade any Central Asian country, and presently most of the Central Asian states have established an amiable business relationship with the Taliban. Militant groups operating in Afghanistan are the major concern. These groups based in Afghanistan are the main threats to the Central Asian governments and require the Central Asian states to develop counter-terrorism capabilities, something they have been doing since the late 1990s. The anti-aircraft systems and missiles the Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, are purchasing are ill-suited to counter-terrorism operations. The timing of the significant increase in military spending came not long after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Several Russian politicians and political commentators have spoken of reclaiming part of all of Kazakhstan in particular, but Uzbekistan has also been mentioned lately. It would be understandable for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to bolster their defenses in case the day comes when Russia looks to forcibly reincorporate Central Asia back into its empire. But Russia is listed second on Global Firepower’s ranking of military powers and the country’s defense budget in 2024 was some $126 billion. Without outside assistance, it is unlikely Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan could hold out for long against...

4 weeks ago

Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia

The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central...

1 month ago