• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00212 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10799 -0.09%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Our People > Bruce Pannier

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Bruce Pannier

Bruce Pannier is a Central Asia Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the advisory board at the Caspian Policy Center, and a longtime journalist and correspondent covering Central Asia. For a decade, he appeared regularly on the Majlis podcast for RFE/RL, and now broadcasts his Spotlight on Central Asia podcast in partnership with The Times of Central Asia.

Articles

Afghanistan Advances Qosh Tepa Canal While Urging Regional Water Cooperation

Uzbekistan just hosted the Tashkent Water Week forum, and the speaker many wanted to hear from was the representative from Afghanistan. Central Asia and Afghanistan are being hit hard by climate change. This region has endured several droughts already this decade, and indications are that this year will bring drought again. Hanging over the forum was Afghanistan’s plan to complete the Qosh-Tepa Canal in 2028, which will draw water from a river that Central Asian countries also use and further complicate the regional water situation. [caption id="attachment_18865" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Qosh Tepa Canal, artist's rendition; image: TCA, Aleksandr Potolitsyn[/caption] Our Fair Share The forum, which actually spanned only two days, March 25-26, brought together some 80 speakers and more than 1,200 delegates from 19 countries. In the past five years, Central Asia has seen noticeably diminished precipitation, melting glaciers, and record high temperatures, making water conservation a priority. The last days of March saw temperatures soar into the 30s Celsius in southern Kazakhstan. In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, there were record-high temperatures in February. Rainfall for the last three months of 2025 was also far below normal across Central Asia. When the Taliban government announced in early 2022 that it would build the 285-kilometer-long, 100-meter-wide, 8.5-meter-deep Qosh Tepa to irrigate lands in northern Afghanistan, it added another water concern to Central Asia, particularly the governments in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan’s Deputy Minister of Water and Energy, Mujeeb-ur-Rahman Omar, led the Afghan delegation at the Tashkent Water Week. At the forum, he repeated his government’s position that historically, Afghanistan has taken only very small volumes of water from the Amu-Darya River basin, while its northern neighbors have been using large amounts for irrigation for decades. “We believe in the fair and sustainable development of the region,” Omar said, adding, “We intend to develop (water resources) on a legal basis, in accordance with the legal rights of the countries in the region.“ Omar is correct that under international law, Afghanistan has an equal right to water from the Amu-Darya, one of Central Asia’s two great rivers. The river currently marks the border between Afghanistan to the south, and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a small section of Turkmenistan to the north. There is no separate regional water use agreement between the Central Asian states and Afghanistan. Since none of the Central Asian governments officially recognize the Taliban as the legitimate Afghan government, Russia is the only country that does at the moment, there is no possibility of a legal treaty on water use being signed. So, shortly after the construction of the canal is finished in 2028, some 20% of the water in the Amu-Darya, starting from the point just west of the Tajik-Uzbek border, will be diverted into the Qosh Tepa canal. It is already clear that this will mean the end of some downstream communities in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan that are on the edge of the Kara-Kum Desert and which are already under strain from insufficient water supplies. Turkmenistan did not send a...

3 months ago

Alatau: Inside Kazakhstan’s $20 Billion “City of the Future”

Details about the ambitious plans for Alatau city were presented to a joint session of Kazakhstan’s parliament on March 20. Authorities are moving ahead full-speed on the project to build the new city that one day could be home to some two million people. According to the plans, Alatau will be a unique city, not only in Kazakhstan, but in the world. [caption id="attachment_45827" align="aligncenter" width="1704"] Image: Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) [/caption] From Village to Metropolis Alatau city is being built on the site of what was the village of Zhetygen, some 50 kilometers north of Almaty. It will occupy an area of some 88,000 hectares, “larger than both Singapore and Seoul.” Relieving the congestion of Kazakhstan’s commercial capital was one of the major concerns when selecting a site for the new city. Another consideration was Alatau’s location along the Middle Corridor, the developing East-West trade route linking Europe and China. Alatau city will have an airport and railway junctions. Alatau city will have four districts – Green, Growing, Golden, and Gate. [caption id="attachment_45826" align="aligncenter" width="1704"] Image: Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) [/caption] The Gate district will be the business and financial area and is where the airport and railways will be located. It will also be the southern-most area of the city and therefore closest to Almaty. The Golden district will be the “hub of knowledge, healthcare, and innovation,” the location of hospitals and other medical facilities, tech centers, and educational institutions able to take 40,000 students are planned for the district. The Growing district will be the industrial and logistics center for export-oriented trade. It will include clusters for food, chemicals, building materials, and light industry. The Green district, on the shore of Kapchagay Lake and with the Kaskelen River running through it, will be the recreational and tourist area of the city. [caption id="attachment_45828" align="aligncenter" width="1704"] Image: Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM) [/caption] Alatau city lies along the main road between the cities of Almaty and Konayev (the “gambling capital of Kazakhstan"). Deputy Prime Minister Kanat Boumbayev told parliament on March 20 that testing of air taxis to ferry people between Almaty and Alatau would start this year, and within two to three years, operations would open to the public. Bozumbayev said the flight time would be 10-15 minutes. Additionally, expansion of the Almaty metro system is progressing with plans for the Green Line to eventually reach Alatau. Alatau will be a smart city and will be developed under the principle “digital by default,” meaning people will be encouraged to go online as much as possible for goods and services, but will still offer support for those who prefer to use traditional means. Financing The Kazakh authorities are expecting construction of Alatau city to require some 10 trillion tenge (about $20.836 billion) of investment by 2050. Kazakhstan is seeking foreign investment and offering advantageous conditions to foreign companies. Deputy Prime Minister Bozumbayev said, “The tax model is described separately: incentives are proposed to be granted only...

3 months ago

Kyrgyzstan Braces for Showdown Between President Japarov and Former Security Chief Tashiyev

When Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov suddenly dismissed his long-time friend Kamchybek Tashiyev as head of the country’s State Committee for National Security (GKNB) on February 10, he cryptically said it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society.” Less than two months later, that split could be coming, and there is a possibility the country is headed for a confrontation between the two men and their supporters. The Gathering Clouds Tashiyev returned to Kyrgyzstan on March 19 after being outside the country for more than a month amid a widening corruption investigation targeting Tashiyev and people close to him. On the day he arrived, Tashiyev went to the Interior Ministry’s investigative department, where he was questioned about state-owned company Kyrgyzneftegaz. On March 17, the head of the State Tax Service, Almambet Shykmamatov, said that “Kyrgyzneftegaz was under the complete control of the GKNB.” The State Tax Service is looking into allegations that Kyrgyzneftegaz sold crude oil to private companies connected to Tashiyev’s relatives or associates who then sold the oil back to Kyrgyzneftegaz at a profit. These accusations are not new. Bolot Temirov, the host of the investigative news program Temirov Live, reported about this exact topic in January 2022. Two days after the report was posted on YouTube, police raided the office of Temirov Live, detaining Temirov on narcotics possession charges that were later dropped. Instead, Temirov was convicted of having a fake Kyrgyz passport and using false documents to cross in and out of Kyrgyzstan. At an appeals trial in November 2022, a judge ordered Temirov deported from Kyrgyzstan, and he was taken from the courtroom to the airport and put on a plane to Russia. Several journalists connected to Temirov Live have been detained, and some, including Temirov’s wife, have been imprisoned since Temirov’s expulsion from Kyrgyzstan. The State Tax Service has resurrected the Temirov Live accusations, while insisting that the evidence it collected has no relationship to the Temirov Live report. Tashiyev’s nephew, Baigazy Matisakov, who was the head of the Kyrgyzneftegaz refinery since 2021, was detained on March 18. Tashiyev’s son, Tay-Muras, who is connected to Moko Group, one of the private companies involved in purchasing oil from and then reselling it to Kyrgyzneftegaz, was questioned at the Interior Ministry. An article from March 16 states that the State Tax Service also connected Tashiyev’s brother, Shairbek, to illegal activities in the oil business. Reports about Tashiyev being questioned at the Interior Ministry on March 19 stressed that he was called in as a “witness.” Japarov Goes on the Offensive On February 10, the reason for sacking Tashiyev, who was out of the country at the time, was unclear. In the days that followed, it gradually became apparent that this was more than just a disagreement between two friends who had governed Kyrgyzstan together for five years. Japarov also dismissed top officials in the GKNB, which Tashiyev had headed since October 2020. Officials in the Interior Ministry, the prosecutor...

3 months ago

From Electricity to Fuel, Central Asia is Doing More Business with Afghanistan

Central Asia is becoming even more important to Afghanistan. After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most of the countries of Central Asia established a dialogue with its leadership that focused on business potential, backed up by security promises. This understanding is more important than ever to the Taliban government, as events along Afghanistan’s eastern and western borders have left Central Asia as the only reliable import-export route for Afghanistan at the moment. Booming Trade At the start of March, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce released figures for 2025 that showed trade with Central Asia increased from $1.79 billion in 2024 to $2.4 billion in 2025. While most of the trade is exports from Central Asia to Afghanistan, reports mentioned that Afghan exports to Central Asia -- mostly to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan -- increased by 77 percent, from $122 million in 2024 to $216 million in 2025. A closer look shows that Uzbekistan-Afghanistan trade in 2025 totaled some $1.6 billion.  A full figure for Kazakh-Afghan trade in 2025 is not yet available. However, trade between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan amounted to some $525.2 million in 2024.  Kazakhstan's Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhamangarin said at a Kazakh-Afghan business forum in Kazakhstan’s southern city of Shymkent in October 2025 that bilateral trade in the first eight months of 2025 had reached some $335.9 million. These figures are certain to have grown.  Fresh agreements worth more than $360 million were signed on the sidelines of the Kazakh-Afghan business forum. On March 6, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev signed a decree ratifying the Preferential Trade Agreement between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Trade totals for Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan with Afghanistan are more modest, but, as in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, are set to grow.  Kyrgyz-Afghan trade for the 12 months to March 2025 came to some $66 million, but, during a Kyrgyz-Afghan business conference in Kabul commercial contracts worth some $157 million were signed.  There are no figures for Turkmen-Afghan trade in 2025, but Turkmen electricity exports to Afghanistan are increasing. Turkmenistan is also preparing to export natural gas to Afghanistan. A natural gas pipeline is slowly being constructed from the Turkmen border to the western Afghan city of Herat, which could start operation as soon as 2027. Tajikistan was the lone Central Asian country to shun contact with the Taliban after they returned to power. Representatives of the previous government of Ashraf Ghani continue to occupy the Afghan embassy in Dushanbe.  Tajik and Taliban authorities finally established contacts only in late 2024 but even to this day the two sides rarely meet face-to-face. However, Tajik-Afghan trade in 2025 still totaled some $120 million. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce noted that most of Central Asia’s exports to Afghanistan are electricity, fuel products, and natural gas. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan export electricity to Afghanistan via transmission lines that were built during the 20 years the Taliban were out of power. Some 80 percent of Afghanistan’s electricity is imported, and most of that (75-80 percent) comes...

4 months ago

From Security Threat to Economic Partner: Central Asia’s New ‘View’ of Afghanistan

Afghanistan is quickly becoming more important to Central Asia, and the third week of February was filled with meetings that underscored the changing relationship. There was an “extraordinary” meeting of the Regional Contact Group of Special Representatives of Central Asian countries on Afghanistan in the Kazakh capital Astana. Also, a delegation from Uzbekistan’s Syrdarya Province visited Kabul, and separately, Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce organized a business forum in the northern Afghan city of Mazar-i-Sharif. A Peaceful and Stable Future for Afghanistan The meeting in Astana brought together the special representatives of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan for Afghanistan. The group was formed in August 2025. There was no explanation for why the fifth Central Asian country, Turkmenistan, chose not to participate. The purpose of the Astana meeting was to coordinate a regional approach to Afghanistan. Comments made by the representatives showed Central Asia’s changing assessment of its southern neighbor. Kazakhstan’s special representative, Yerkin Tokumov, said, “In the past [Kazakhstan] viewed Afghanistan solely through the lens of security threats… Today,” Tokumov added, “we also see economic opportunities.” Business is the basis of Central Asia’s relationship with the Taliban authorities. Representatives noted several times that none of the Central Asian states officially recognizes the Taliban government (only Russia officially recognizes that government). But that has not stopped Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in particular, from finding a new market for their exports in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan’s special representative, Ismatulla Ergashev, pointed out that his country’s trade with Afghanistan in 2025 amounted to nearly $1.7 billion. Figures for Kazakh-Afghan trade for all of 2025 have not been released, but during the first eight months of that year, trade totaled some $335.9 million, and in 2024, amounted to $545.2 million. In 2022, Kazakh-Afghan trade reached nearly $1 billion ($987.9 million). About 90% of trade with Afghanistan is exports from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For example, Kazakhstan is the major supplier of wheat and other grains to Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan is the biggest exporter of electricity to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan’s trade with Afghanistan is significantly less, but from March 2024 to March 2025, it came to some $66 million. To put that into perspective, as a bloc, the Central Asian states are now Afghanistan’s leading trade partner, with more volume than Pakistan, India, or China. Kazakhstan’s representative, Tokumov, highlighted Afghanistan’s strategic value as a transit corridor that could open trade routes between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Kyrgyzstan’s representative, Turdakun Sydykov, said the trade, economic, and transport projects the Central Asian countries are implementing or planning are a “key condition for a peaceful and stable future for Afghanistan and the region as a whole.” The group also discussed humanitarian aid for Afghanistan. All four of these Central Asian states have provided humanitarian aid to their neighbor since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. Regional security was also included on the agenda in Astana, but reports offered little information about these discussions. A few days before the opening of the meeting in Astana, Russian Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Sergei...

4 months ago

Kyrgyz President Dismisses Right-Hand Man to “Prevent a Split in Society”

A political earthquake hit Kyrgyzstan on February 10. The tandem of President Sadyr Japarov and security chief Kamchybek Tashiyev was seemingly broken when Japarov dismissed Tashiyev from his post. The reason given for relieving Tashiyev of his position was that it was “in the interests of our state, in order to prevent a split in society, including between government structures,” which hinted that something serious had caused the rift. Old Friends After the brief tumultuous events of October 5-6, 2020, that saw the government of President Sooronbai Jeenbekov ousted in the wake of parliamentary elections plagued by violations, Japarov came to power and appointed Tashiyev to be head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB). The two have remained in those positions and were often referred to as a tandem. Some believe Tashiyev has actually been the one making many of the important state decisions. Their relationship goes back much further, to the days when Kurmanbek Bakiyev was Kyrgyzstan’s president from 2005-2010. In August 2006, Japarov, Tashiyev, and some other politicians from Kyrgyzstan’s southern Osh area cofounded the Idealistic Democratic Political Party of Kyrgyzstan, which later became the foundation for the Ata-Jurt party. Both Japarov and Tashiyev were supporters of President Bakiyev. When Bakiyev was forced to flee the country after the 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, the Ata-Jurt party became the strongest opposition party to the government that emerged after the revolution. Ata-Jurt won the most seats, 28, in the snap October 2010 parliamentary elections, and among the party’s deputies were Japarov, Tashiyev, and another politician named Talant Mamytov. The three Ata-Jurt deputies helped organize anti-government protests, and during one outside the government building in Bishkek in October 2012, Japarov, Tashiyev, and Mamytov jumped the fence and led an armed crowd to the building. All three were convicted in 2013 of trying to overthrow the government. They were sentenced to a mere 18 months in prison, but did not even serve that, with all three being released in July 2013. Japarov helped lead a protest in Kyrgyzstan’s northeastern Issyk-Kul Province in October that year. A local official was captured and briefly held by protesters, and after order was restored, Japarov was charged with hostage-taking. He fled the country and only returned in March 2017. Japarov was immediately arrested and sentenced to 11 ½ years in prison. A crowd released Japarov from prison when unrest started on October 5, 2020. Tashiyev was among those who quickly put forth Japarov to be Kyrgyzstan’s next leader, and by October 15, Japarov was both acting prime minister and acting president. He appointed Tashiyev to be GKNB chief on October 16. Mamytov was elected speaker of parliament on November 4, 2020. The Dismissal Tashiyev was in Germany receiving medical treatment when Japarov dismissed him. On February 11, Tashiyev commented from Germany on his dismissal, calling it unexpected, but said he would heed the president’s decision. “I served our state, people, and president honorably, and I'm proud of it,” Tashiyev said, and expressed his “gratitude...

5 months ago

Is Kyrgyzstan About to Have a Snap President Election?

Kyrgyzstan held early parliamentary elections at the end of November 2025 that were moved forward by a year so that they would not overlap with the campaign for the presidential election scheduled for January 2027. On February 9, a group of 75 former officials and notable figures from various spheres of society publicly submitted a letter to the president and speaker of parliament calling on them to “immediately initiate a new election for president.” While there has yet to be any official response, such a proposal is likely to be accepted, leaving anyone who planned on running against incumbent President Sadyr Japarov with little time to organize a campaign. Early Parliamentary Elections In June 2025, amendments were introduced to the electoral system. The split system of using single-mandate districts and party lists to elect parliamentary deputies was changed to only single-mandate districts, and electoral districts were redivided. This sparked discussions that perhaps early parliamentary elections were needed to fill the 90 seats with deputies elected under the newly-approved system. The argument that tilted the debate toward early elections was that parliamentary elections were scheduled for late November 2026 and the presidential election for January 2027. The general opinion was that having the two elections so close together would make voters weary and unable to fully focus on the presidential campaign. Also, if the vote count was delayed in some districts or there were legal challenges, these processes would be ongoing as campaigning for the presidency got underway. The solution was to move parliamentary elections forward by a year. In September 2025, parliament voted to dissolve itself, and November 30 was named as the date for early elections. The Letter The petition addressed to President Japarov and Speaker of Parliament Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu was signed by former deputies, nine former governors, four former prime ministers, several high-ranking members of the military, academics, artists, and even an Olympic Games medal-winner. The letter praised the current administration for establishing stability in Kyrgyzstan, strengthening the country’s armed forces, resolving long-standing border issues with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, successfully battling corruption, and eliminating organized crime in the country. The letter also mentioned remaining problems such as the growing national debt, poverty, and the outflow of “especially young people” unable to find employment and going to other countries to work. A key point in the appeal for an early presidential election was that it would clear up an ambiguity in President Japarov’s term. Japarov came to power in the wake of the October 2020 revolution that was sparked by parliamentary elections riddled with irregularities. He was elected in January 2021 to a six-year term in office, but in April that year, a national referendum approved a new constitution with a five-year presidential term. Therefore, holding the presidential election this year would bring Japarov closer into line with the new constitution. Additionally, the previous constitution, which had a six-year presidential term, also limited a president to one term in office. The new constitution allows for two five-year terms....

5 months ago

Behind Turkmenistan’s Neutrality, Quiet U.S. Military Ties Endure

In late January, U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor visited Turkmenistan. Accompanying Gor was U.S. Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll. Driscoll’s presence in Turkmenistan, a country with a roughly 1,150-kilometer border with Iran, sparked some speculation that his visit was related to escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran. But while it is unusual for any top foreign military officials to visit Turkmenistan, U.S. military officials have stopped by Turkmenistan relatively often over the course of the last 30 years. Neutral Turkmenistan A good trivia question about Central Asia is, which country was the first to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program? The answer is Turkmenistan, in May 1994, and NATO had just created the PfP program in January of that year. However, in December 1995, the UN approved giving Turkmenistan official status as a neutral country. Turkmenistan’s president at the time, Saparmurat Niyazov, said as part of that neutral status, Turkmenistan would not join any military blocs or join in aggression against another country. Then came the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and U.S. President George Bush Jr’s remark that “you’re either with us or against us.” Central Asia, with its nearly 2,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan, suddenly became a frontline in Washington’s campaign against terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. The other Central Asian countries, which had watched with dread as the Taliban advanced toward Central Asian borders, quickly expressed their support. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan offered the use of military bases to the U.S. and NATO forces that were rapidly being assembled. Turkmenistan took a different position on events in Afghanistan. Remaining true to its UN-recognized neutrality status, Turkmenistan engaged with the Taliban and with the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, whom the Taliban had ousted from power. A round of peace talks between the two Afghan parties was held in the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat, in March 1999. After 9/11, Turkmenistan agreed to allow U.S. planes carrying non-lethal cargo to transit through Turkmen airspace and to refuel at Ashgabat airport. But officially, that was as far as the Turkmen government was willing to become involved. The U.S. had already established a military connection with Turkmenistan. The head of the U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks, visited Turkmenistan in September 2000 and again in May 2001. U.S. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld visited Turkmenistan in April 2002. General Franks followed in August that year, promising to help Turkmenistan fight the illegal narcotics trade. The United States gave Turkmenistan two small naval patrol boats for use in the Caspian Sea in 2002, and in 2003, gave 40 Russian-made off-road vehicles to Turkmenistan’s border guards. Reports started to appear stating that Turkmenistan’s military cooperation with the United States was quietly deepening. The Turkmen government had said when agreeing to allow overflights and refueling that no foreign troops would be stationed in Turkmenistan. But it turned out that a small U.S. Air Force team, only about seven servicemen, was stationed in Ashgabat to help refuel U.S....

5 months ago

Uzbekistan Fires Counter-Narcotics Chief as Drug Trade Surges

In late January, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev sacked a series of high-ranking officials in the Interior Ministry, National Guard, and the Emergency Situations Ministry. Their dismissals for corruption overshadowed the firing of the director of the Agency for Control of Narcotics and Illegal Firearms, who was let go for failing badly to combat illegal trafficking and use of drugs. Poor Results Ravshan Mamatov was appointed director of the National Center for Narcotics Control in August 2024. In July 2025, a presidential decree transformed the center into the Agency for Control of Narcotics and Illegal Firearms. On January 27, President Mirziyoyev criticized the work of the Narcotics Control Agency and warned Mamatov to engage in more than simply “analytical work and international cooperation.” Mirziyoyev dismissed Mamatov the next day, and it was not a surprise. Exactly two weeks earlier, Bahodir Kurbanov, the head of Uzbekistan’s State Security Service (SGB), spoke at a session of the country’s Security Council, chaired by President Mirziyoyev. Kurbanov detailed security measures along Uzbekistan’s borders, including the use of military surveillance drones. The security chief also spoke about illegal narcotics, noting the amount of drugs seized in 2024 was some 1,700 kilograms and that figure more than doubled to 3,600 kilograms in 2025. Kurbanov noted the 2025 figure included more than 180 kilograms of synthetic drugs and more than one million doses of psychotropic drugs. Additionally, the number of people arrested for illegal narcotics went from some 2,600 in 2024 to some 4,500 in 2025. In his January 27 comments, President Mirziyoyev said that during the last three months, the authorities in the capital Tashkent, had detained members from approximately 50 major narcotics trafficking groups and seized some 500 kilograms of illegal drugs. “Last year, more than 1,500 drug users were officially registered in the capital,” Mirziyoyev said, noting, “The saddest part is that the number of drug addicts living in the shadows is even higher.” The Uzbek president added that most were young people and that “in their quest to raise money, drug addicts naturally resort to crime.” Mirziyoyev also criticized the penal system, remarking that a significant number of people convicted for illegal narcotics were released from jail before serving even half their sentences. Mirziyoyev said that this has led to a 25% increase in the number of repeat offenders. Mamatov addressed Uzbekistan’s parliament on December 17, admitting the amount of synthetic drugs being seized had increased phenomenally during the last five years and that the number of crimes involving illegal narcotics had doubled during that time. Mamatov claimed that in a number of cases, “drug trafficking was being facilitated by officials,” though he did not name any specific officials. A Regional Problem The other Central Asian countries are facing the same problems as Uzbekistan. The amounts of drugs seized and people arrested have been growing in the last few years and continue to increase. Part of the problem is that the region’s counter-narcotics agencies are facing a new situation in combating the illegal drug...

5 months ago

Analysis: Three Decades of Parliamentary Reform in Central Asia — and What Changed

Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev announced his reform plans on January 20, including structural changes to the government. Arguably, one of the least consequential of those changes is replacing the current bicameral parliament with a unicameral parliament. Across Central Asia, over the last 35 years, parliaments have repeatedly switched from unicameral to bicameral parliaments, or vice versa, the number of deputies has increased and decreased, and in some cases, parallel bodies have come into existence and later disappeared. Kazakhstan When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, each of the former republics, including the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, had a unicameral, republican Supreme Soviet elected in 1990. These Supreme Soviets continued functioning after independence until 1994, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, until 1995. In Kazakhstan, in December 1993, the majority of the 360 deputies in the Supreme Soviet voted to dissolve the body. In March 1994, there were elections to the new parliament (Supreme Kenges) that had 177 seats. During the tumultuous year of 1995, the parliament was dissolved by then-President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who ruled by decree until snap parliamentary elections in December of that year. However, on August 29, 1995, voters approved a new constitution in a national referendum. That constitution created a bicameral parliament with 67 deputies in the Mazhilis, the lower house, and 50 deputies in the Senate, 10 of them directly appointed by the president. Deputies to the Mazhilis were chosen in popular elections. Senators were chosen in indirect elections involving deputies from local, provincial, and municipal councils of large cities. In the snap parliamentary elections of October 1999, 10 seats were added and chosen by party lists, while the original 67 continued to be contested in single-mandate districts. That structure lasted until 2007. Constitutional amendments adopted in late May that year increased the number of seats in the Mazhilis to 107, of which 98 were to be chosen by party lists. Nazarbayev’s Nur-Otan party won all 98 of the party list seats in the August elections. The remaining nine representatives came from the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, a group representing the various ethnic groups in Kazakhstan that Nazarbayev created in 1995. Eight additional members of the Assembly were given seats in the Senate. The Assembly held its own elections to fill those seats. Kazakhstan conducted a constitutional referendum in June 2022, in part aimed at mollifying discontent that lingered from the mass unrest in early January that year, which left 238 people dead. Some amendments stripped away powers in the executive branch that had accumulated during the 28 years Nazarbayev was president, and more power was given to parliament. Another amendment removed the nine Mazhilis seats reserved for members of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan. One amendment reduced the number of Senate members appointed by the president back to 10, after it had been raised to 15 under a 2007 amendment. Kyrgyzstan A referendum in Kyrgyzstan on constitutional amendments in October 1994 created a bicameral...

5 months ago