• KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01144 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00203 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10685 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28530 0%
09 February 2026

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The Income Gap Between Rich and Poor Kazakhs Is Widening

Analysts at Ranking.kz note that the income gap in Kazakhstan has remained consistently high in recent years. According to the National Statistics Bureau (NSB), from 2019 to 2023, the incomes of the poorest 10% and the wealthiest 10% of Kazakhstani citizens differed by an average factor of 5.9 to 6. In 2024, the gap reached a record high of 6.2 times. Who Are the Poor and Who Are the Rich? The NSB divides the population into ten equal income groups, or deciles. Formally, not only the bottom 10% can be classified as poor, but also the four adjacent deciles. Their average per capita income does not even reach the minimum monthly wage of 85,000 KZT ($157). Collectively, this bottom half of the population receives only 30.2% of the country’s total income. At the other end of the spectrum, the wealthiest 10% account for 24.1% of total income. This group includes individuals with monthly incomes ranging from 181,300 KZT ($336) to 1.6 million KZT ($2,963). However, this wide income range also includes many middle-class earners. Only a small fraction are truly wealthy. Salaried Employees: Who Earns What Among salaried employees (excluding the self-employed and those working in small businesses), income disparities remain stark. In 2024: 3.3% of employees (112,100 people) earned over 1 million KZT ($1,852) per month. 6.1% (210,600 people) earned less than 100,000 KZT ($185). The largest share of employees fell into the following income brackets: 100,000-200,000 KZT ($185-370) - 23.9% 200,000-300,000 KZT ($370-555) - 23.2% High salaries are more prevalent in sectors with higher nominal wages: Finance and insurance - 13.9% of employees earned over 1 million KZT Information and communications - 12.6% Professional, scientific, and technical fields - 10.1% Among civil servants, only 0.7% earn this amount. Meanwhile, low-wage earners (earning under 100,000 KZT) are most concentrated in: Administrative and support services - 18.4% Agriculture - 12.2% Across most industries, the most common salary level is between 200,000 and 400,000 KZT ($370-740). Regional Disparities Unsurprisingly, the highest concentration of “salary millionaires” is found in Kazakhstan’s oil-producing regions: Mangistau - 14.5% Atyrau - 11.5% In major cities, the numbers are more modest: Almaty - 6% Astana - 4.8% The regions with the lowest share of low-paid workers (earning under 100,000 KZT) are: Turkestan - 11.1% North Kazakhstan - 10.3% Zhambyl - 10% However, the Turkestan region remains one of the most economically vulnerable: in the first quarter of 2025, 8.1% of its population lived below the subsistence level, compared to the national average of 4.5%. More than 175,000 families survive on an income of just 52,500 KZT ($97) per person. Spending Patterns: Common Ground and Divergence Income inequality is also reflected in spending patterns. Despite the income gap, both poor and relatively affluent citizens spend a disproportionate share of their budgets on food. The lowest-income group spends 60.6% on food, while the wealthiest decile still spends 51.7%. For comparison, in developed European countries, the average is just 8-12%. However, differences become clearer in other spending categories. Wealthier citizens...

Why Tajikistan Cannot Give Up Remittances from Migrant Workers

Labor migration is no longer a temporary phenomenon in Tajikistan. Remittances from migrants now account for nearly half of the country’s GDP, supporting families, sustaining the national budget, and helping preserve social stability. But at the same time, the country has found itself dangerously dependent on external factors, factors that directly impact the welfare of millions of citizens. Thirty Years On Since gaining independence, Tajikistan has undergone a transformation in which labor migration has become a systemic feature of society. While the country remained predominantly agrarian during the Soviet era, over the past three decades, the word “Tajik” has become closely associated, particularly across the post-Soviet space, with low-skilled labor abroad. This shift traces back to the 1990s, when Tajikistan, unlike its Central Asian neighbors, failed to restructure its economy and descended into civil war. With factories shuttered, jobs scarce, and political instability rampant, tens of thousands of people left the country. The early waves of migrants were mainly working-age men. Some educated professionals moved to Europe or the US, others to Kazakhstan, but most went to Russia, where cultural and linguistic ties remained strong and the labor market was more accessible. Even after the peace agreement, migration continued and even intensified. Today, more than 30 years later, the annual outflow of the working-age population remains consistently high. The Economy on the Migrant “Needle” Official data record up to 600,000 migrant departures per year. However, the real number is likely higher: many migrants do not return home between seasons, and some have settled permanently in Russia. Since the war in Ukraine began in 2022, migration routes have shifted again, some now leave for Europe and the United States, sometimes under refugee status. According to the World Bank, in 2024, remittances from migrant workers reached $5.8 billion, representing 45.3% of Tajikistan’s GDP, a global record. Over the past 17 years, this figure has dropped below 30% only three times. For the last three years, remittances have consistently made up nearly half of the national economy. A Hushed-Up Contribution Despite the critical role of labor migration, the topic is largely avoided by the Tajik authorities. As far back as 2013, then-head of the National Bank Abdujabbor Shirinov refused to disclose statistics, stating that “this issue could take on a political connotation.” In 2019, his successor, Jamshed Nurmahmadzoda, advised journalists “not to focus on migrants’ money.” Today, the National Bank attributes the lack of up-to-date data to “technical difficulties” linked to electronic and online transfers. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labor has not published migration figures for Russia in two years, citing discrepancies with Russian data. As a result, one of the main sources of economic stability remains unacknowledged at the official level. What Keeps the Budget Afloat Tajikistan’s economy remains structurally fragile. Its export potential is 3-4 times smaller than its import demand. Foreign currency earned through trade covers only about a quarter of the country’s imports, the rest is financed by remittances. These funds support domestic consumption: families use them to buy...

Russia’s Gasoline Export Ban: Limited Shock, Broader Lessons for Central Asia

Russia’s decision to prolong restrictions on gasoline exports has raised concerns in energy markets, but for Central Asia, the immediate fallout appears limited. The true significance lies in what the move reveals about structural dependencies, the role of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and the region’s long-term push to diversify energy supplies. Moscow Extends Ban On September 2, Russian officials confirmed that the government may prolong its gasoline export ban for oil producers into October, extending measures first introduced in late summer. Deputy head of the Federal Antimonopoly Service, Vitaly Korolev, told state media that the authorities were weighing a one-month extension beyond the current deadline of September 30. As reported by Reuters, the aim is to stabilize domestic fuel supplies following refinery outages and a seasonal spike in demand. Ukrainian drone strikes have also damaged key refineries, reducing Russia’s production capacity by an estimated 10–17%. The ban affects a relatively small share of Russia’s overall fuel output but highlights the state’s readiness to intervene in energy markets. Previous restrictions in 2023 and 2024 temporarily halted shipments to stabilize domestic prices. The latest decision reflects similar concerns: tightening inventories, growing demand from the agricultural sector, and pressure to prevent inflation ahead of winter. While Moscow insists the measure is temporary, traders and governments across post-Soviet space are watching closely. Russia remains one of the world’s largest fuel exporters, and even marginal policy changes can cause significant ripples. Fuel Security in Central Asia For Central Asia, the impact of the ban will be blunted by exemptions. As members of the EAEU, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan continue to import Russian gasoline without interruption. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement stressing that the country is self-sufficient, pointing to its refineries in Pavlodar, Shymkent, and Atyrau. “For countries that have signed the relevant intergovernmental agreement… these restrictions do not apply,” Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, stated. Kyrgyzstan is highly dependent on Russian imports. However, according to Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Energy, the 1.6 million tons of fuel the country consumes annually, 93% of which is imported from Russia under intergovernmental agreements, will remain unaffected by the export ban. Since mid-summer, gasoline and diesel prices have climbed, driven by rising global oil benchmarks and repair work at several Russian refineries. Talks are already in progress to set revised supply volumes for 2026. Non-EAEU states face a different challenge. Uzbekistan sources fuel through state-brokered contracts with Russian companies, ensuring stability for now, but smaller private importers outside of these deals have reported difficulties accessing volumes. Late last year, the Chairman of Uzbekistan’s Central Bank warned that the country’s growing reliance on Russian fuel imports could increase vulnerability to supply shocks, which may translate into limited competition and rising prices. Tajikistan remains heavily dependent on Russian fuel through bilateral import agreements, and its virtually non-existent refining capacity makes it highly susceptible to external price fluctuations, a vulnerability underscored by seasonal diesel shortages and repeated spikes in domestic fuel prices. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, continues subsidizing its energy sector heavily:...

Kazakhstan’s Rare Earth Reserves Surpass Projections Following New Geological Surveys

Geological exploration at Kazakhstan’s largest rare earth metal deposit, Kuirektykol, in the Karaganda region, has revealed significantly higher reserves than previously estimated. The latest data suggests that the site holds 28.2 million tons of commercially viable rare earth elements, up from an initial estimate of 20 million tons. Exploration work began in 2022, and by November 2024, geologists had already confirmed significant concentrations of cerium and other lanthanides across four key zones at depths of up to 300 meters. Regional Potential Expands Alibek Aldeney, Deputy Akim of the Karaganda region, said that the surveys also revealed new prospective sites for gold, copper, and tungsten. “Foreign companies are already conducting surveys. This will allow us to expand our mineral resource base and create new production facilities for processing rare earth and precious metals,” Aldeney said. Industry experts have long maintained that Kazakhstan holds the potential to ensure stable supplies of critical minerals amid rising global demand. Strategic Priorities and Government Support In August, Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov convened a meeting to discuss the development of Kazakhstan’s rare earth sector. He emphasized the need to modernize production, adopt advanced technologies, and increase scientific research. According to the Ministry of Industry, rare and rare earth metals currently account for 2.4% of the country's metallurgical sector. Since 2018, the government has invested KZT 67 billion (approximately $124 million) in the industry. Kazakhstan is currently exploring 25 promising rare earth sites across a combined area of 100,000 square kilometers. In 2024 alone, 38 new deposits of solid minerals were identified. Production of beryllium, tantalum, niobium, scandium, titanium, rhenium, and osmium is already underway, along with the extraction of associated elements such as bismuth, antimony, selenium, and tellurium. Future Outlook and Strategic Concerns There are emerging industrial opportunities include the production and recycling of battery materials, heat-resistant alloys, semiconductors, and permanent magnets. However, as The Times of Central Asia previously reported, with the sector’s strategic value increasing, members of parliament have called for tighter regulation of rare earth exports to safeguard national interests.

QazTrade Opens Office in Tianjin to Strengthen Kazakhstan-China Trade Ties

Kazakhstan’s QazTrade Center for Trade Policy Development has opened a new office, Kazakhstan Hall, at the International Trade and Shipping Service Center in Tianjin, one of northern China’s leading industrial and port cities. Spanning 100 square meters, the office is designed primarily to showcase Kazakhstani food products and facilitate trade promotion in the Chinese market. It is currently operating in pilot mode, with an expanding exhibition area and ongoing preparations to formally register QazTrade’s representative office. The official opening ceremony is expected later this autumn. According to QazTrade, trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Tianjin reached $347.9 million in 2023 and rose to $474 million in 2024, a sign of steady growth in bilateral commerce. Tianjin serves as a key logistics and trade hub for Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member states. It offers Kazakhstan access to a “green-light corridor” for SCO countries, multimodal transport links between Asia and Europe, and a variety of investment and financial services. “The opening of the QazTrade office in Tianjin is an important step for us,” said QazTrade Director General Aitmukhammed Aldazharov. “Through the Tianjin port, we will be able to deliver Kazakhstani goods to any country in the world faster and more efficiently.” Growing Bilateral Trade Kazakhstan-China trade continues to gain momentum. During a meeting with Kazakh Minister of Trade and Integration Arman Shakkaliyev on August 20 in Beijing, Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao stated that bilateral trade reached $43.8 billion in 2024, a 9.2% increase compared to the previous year. In the first half of 2025 alone, trade turnover totaled $21.8 billion. Kazakhstan and China have set a joint target to double bilateral trade by 2030, with expanded cooperation in logistics, agriculture, energy, and manufacturing forming the core of future initiatives.

Gasoline Prices Rise in Kyrgyzstan Amid Heavy Dependence on Russian Imports

Gasoline prices in Kyrgyzstan have continued to rise in recent months, despite official assurances that fuel reserves remain sufficient. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Energy reports that domestic supplies and ongoing fuel imports from Russia are currently adequate to meet national demand. According to the ministry, Kyrgyzstan consumes approximately 1.6 million tons of fuel annually, with over 90 percent of its gasoline imported from Russia. Each year, export volumes are negotiated between Moscow and Kyrgyz oil traders. When those volumes are exhausted, prices typically begin to increase. “The agreed volumes for 2025 have not yet been fully met, but oil products are being supplied as usual and without interruption. At the same time, work is underway to agree on new volumes for 2026,” the ministry stated. Officials attribute the recent price hikes to global market trends and disruptions in Russian refinery operations. Several refineries have undergone scheduled maintenance, while others were forced to halt operations following drone attacks linked to the conflict in Ukraine. Despite a recently announced gasoline export ban by Russian authorities, the restriction does not apply to countries within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), including Kyrgyzstan. Industry Concerns About Future Supply Kanat Eshatov, head of the Kyrgyz Oil Traders Association, told The Times of Central Asia that local traders remain cautious, anticipating further price increases by the end of September. “The first half of the year was fairly calm on the fuel market, with only a slight increase in prices. But in June and July, prices rose sharply due to scheduled repairs at refineries in Russia. A total of 20 plants were shut down for repairs. Five of them underwent unscheduled repairs due to attacks by Ukrainian drones. Some Russian regions are experiencing a shortage of fuel. The Russian government is now redistributing its reserves,” Eshatov said. The association is concerned about Kyrgyzstan’s limited fuel buffer. Major oil companies in the country reportedly hold only two months’ worth of gasoline reserves. Any significant supply interruption from Russia could quickly lead to a national shortage. Comparative Prices in the Region Eshatov noted that, due to Kyrgyzstan’s exemption from export duties on Russian gasoline, fuel prices remain lower than in neighboring countries. For example, in Tajikistan, gasoline prices have increased by $0.27 per liter this year, and diesel by $0.22. In Uzbekistan, gasoline is up by $0.26 per liter and diesel by $0.11. To ensure continued supply stability, Kyrgyz oil traders are also exploring alternative import routes and are currently in negotiations with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.