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Labor Migrants

Turkmen Migrants Face Deportations as Russia Escalates Crackdown

Russian authorities are intensifying their deportation of foreign nationals under a sweeping crackdown on irregular migration, with Turkmen citizens increasingly targeted, according to Turkmen News. Deportation Without Trial Under new rules introduced in February 2025, Russian police and migration officials can summarily expel foreign nationals without awaiting court decisions. The measures coincide with a significant uptick in Turkmen migration: nearly 90,000 Turkmen citizens entered Russia in 2023, triple the number recorded in 2022. Now, reports of deportations are mounting. In July alone, media outlets across several Russian regions reported hundreds of foreigners, many of them from Turkmenistan, being forcibly removed. Key figures include: Astrakhan Region: 200 people Nizhny Novgorod Region: 518 people Republic of Dagestan: 260 people Stavropol Krai: 127 people Raids have also been carried out in other areas, though officials often refrain from disclosing detainees’ nationalities. For example, in early July, Moscow police raided hostels and prayer houses, detaining over 500 foreigners. More than 30 were later expelled for immigration violations, according to Kommersant. A recent case in Saratov Region highlighted the situation. On July 30, the Federal Bailiff Service (FSSP) announced the deportation of three Turkmen citizens for violating migration laws. Among them: a 27-year-old former student who overstayed his registration in Kazan, a 55-year-old man whose legal stay had expired in 2024, and a 47-year-old businessman who failed to obtain a work permit. All three cited lack of funds to return home. They were escorted to a Moscow-area airport and deported, receiving five-year re-entry bans. According to Turkmen News, they will also be placed on a "no-exit" list upon return, barring them from leaving Turkmenistan in the near future. Tougher Migration Regulations Millions of Central Asians live and work in Russia, forming the backbone of the country's migrant labor force. Official figures indicate that nearly 4 million citizens of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan currently reside in Russia. An additional 670,000 foreigners are believed to be in the country without legal status. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan account for the largest share of migrant laborers. In 2023, over one million Tajik citizens entered Russia for work. However, the overall number of Central Asian migrants has been declining, driven by tighter restrictions, growing xenophobia, and fears of forced conscription. In 2024 alone, Russian authorities expelled around 15In 2025, Moscow introduced a new set of migration regulations aimed at curbing irregular migration. These measures authorize law enforcement to carry out deportations without judicial review, establish a centralized registry of undocumented foreigners, and set a deadline of September 10, 2025, for migrants to legalize their status. Those who fail to comply will face deportation and multi-year bans on re-entry. These efforts build on previous policies, including mandatory fingerprinting and photographing of all incoming migrant workers, reducing visa-free stays from 180 days to 90, and expanding the list of deportable offenses. The crackdown intensified following the March 2024 terrorist attack at Crocus City Hall in Moscow, which was allegedly carried out by suspects of Central Asian origin. The incident sparked a...

Oil

What Will Kazakhstan Make of the Novorossiysk Constraint?

Russia’s July decree requiring FSB approval for foreign vessels entering Novorossiysk introduces a new procedural constraint into the regional export environment. Modest in scope, the measure nevertheless grants Moscow a latent mechanism for influencing Kazakhstan’s primary oil export route via the CPC pipeline, and by extension, its westward orientation. The CPC terminus, long treated as infrastructurally neutral, has been “recoded” as a site of discretionary oversight. This development coincides with the gradual erosion of the energy governance model inaugurated by foreign concessions at Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan, where Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) created juridical islands largely external to domestic legal and fiscal regimes. It is possible that a new phase is emerging whereby infrastructural flows are re-anchored in sovereign discretion, as an accumulation of procedural instruments favors regional currencies and reduces Western intermediation. Kazakhstan’s energy model was built on upstream Western capital and downstream Russian transit. The fragility of that erstwhile equilibrium has now been revealed, even though the disrupter is not a single actor but a convergence of pressures. This dual-dependency now appears more vulnerable, unsettled by converging geopolitical and institutional pressures. The superficial continuity of physical infrastructure masks deeper shifts in logistical autonomy, fiscal sovereignty, and international alignment. Structural Exposure and Strategic Compression The fiscal layer exposes the shifts. Revenues from Western-operated concessions are routed into the National Fund, which reinvests them into foreign debt instruments, often issued by the same economies that operate Kazakhstan’s extractive infrastructure. Kazakhstan’s export of physical assets and reinvestment into external liabilities constitutes a structural contradiction. The state’s constitutional control over subsoil resources is not matched by operational authority. The CPC pipeline, though formally multinational, is routed entirely through Russian territory. The new decree does not immediately alter its function, but it inserts a potential instrument of political leverage. The bargaining terrain has consequently already shifted: what was previously a matter of contractual detail is now entangled with external discretion. For the present, the decree’s practical impact is limited, but it reveals the current system’s embedded asymmetry. Moscow’s move signals a readiness to formalize political leverage. It lays the groundwork for a possible reconfiguration of Eurasian energy flows under post-conflict conditions. In this vision, transactions would be conducted through sovereign institutions, denominated in rubles, tenge, or other regional currencies. The intent is clear: to reduce reliance on Western frameworks and to re-anchor Russia’s “peripheries” within its institutional orbit. The maneuver unfolds within a broader context of strategic adjustment. Europe is searching for non-Russian energy inputs. Turkey is expanding corridor-based integration. China’s Belt and Road Initiative continues to institutionalize long-term infrastructural absorption. Kazakhstan has become a contested node within overlapping geopolitical networks that pull it in different vectorial directions. Against this backdrop, the once legal-technical re-negotiations over Tengiz, Karachaganak, and Kashagan are situated within a tectonically shifting geopolitical matrix. Trans-Caspian connectors, digital corridors, and regulatory frameworks are coalescing into a new infrastructural logic. The decree has little practical effect for now, but it points to a deeper condition where sovereignty is declared but not...

Kazakhstan-Turkey Partnership

The View From Ankara – President Tokayev’s Working Visit to Turkey

The official visit of President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to Turkey on July 29, 2025, carries a multidimensional and strategic significance that extends far beyond the boundaries of diplomatic protocol. This engagement stands out as part of an ongoing multidimensional process of transformation marked by deepening regional alliances in the fields of science, energy, and logistics. Invited by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Tokayev co-chaired the fifth meeting of the Turkey-Kazakhstan High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council. As a result of this summit, 20 bilateral agreements were signed, encompassing new frameworks of regional integration, especially in the fields of mining, energy, transportation, and higher education. Energy Diplomacy and Resource Geopolitics One of the most striking dimensions of the visit was the negotiation of new cooperation mechanisms aimed at transporting Kazakh oil to global markets via Turkey. According to President Tokayev, currently 1.4 million tons of Kazakh oil are transported annually through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. Under the newly signed memoranda of understanding, the parties aim to increase this volume. This development not only strengthens Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub but also holds critical importance for Kazakhstan’s strategy to diversify export routes and secure access to safe ports. Furthermore, the expressed intent of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to operate in Kazakhstan signals that the collaboration may extend beyond transport into production processes as well. Kazakhstan's reserves of rare earth elements and strategic minerals are of considerable value to both European and Asian economies prioritizing green energy transitions. In this context, the agreements signed in the mining sector may herald a new phase — one that mandates not only commercial but also technological and scientific R&D collaborations. Strategic Dimensions of the Middle Corridor Another key agenda item during the visit was the development and activation of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, commonly referred to as the ‘Middle Corridor.’ According to data shared by Tokayev, approximately 85% of road freight transported between China and Europe passes through Kazakhstan. This positions Kazakhstan as the backbone of the region’s logistics infrastructure. Turkey’s central role in the Middle Corridor makes it a decisive actor in the route’s integration with Europe. In this regard, Kazakhstan’s efforts to modernize its rail and road infrastructure, alongside its revival of maritime transport on the Caspian Sea, when combined with Turkey’s port capacity and transportation infrastructure, offer significant synergistic potential. These developments also underscore the strategic importance of the Zangezur Corridor and reinforce the value of uninterrupted transportation from China to Europe via Turkey, bypassing the Iranian route. Education and Academic Diplomacy The visit also drew attention for its scientific and cultural dimensions, in addition to its economic focus. Joint initiatives such as Gazi University’s planned establishment of a branch within the South Kazakhstan Pedagogical University can contribute to aligning the Turkish higher education model with Kazakhstan’s ongoing education reforms. Moreover, the Turkish Maarif Foundation’s new school initiatives in Kazakhstan signify a broadening and institutionalization of bilateral cooperation in education. These efforts may extend beyond student exchange programs to encompass joint research...

Natural Gas

Outdated Infrastructure Threatens Central Asia’s Energy Security

Central Asia’s natural gas sector is facing mounting pressure as population growth and rising consumption outpace production, SpecialEurasia reports. The region’s population now exceeds 70 million, with annual growth rates surpassing 2% in many republics. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan together account for more than 95% of Central Asia’s gas reserves. Combined, they hold approximately 3.5 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of proven reserves. Turkmenistan alone possesses an estimated 17 tcm, giving it the world’s fourth-largest proven gas reserves outside the Middle East and Russia. Despite these substantial reserves, aging infrastructure and insufficient investment continue to hamper production capacity. Kazakhstan produces around 59 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas annually, Uzbekistan 45 bcm, and Turkmenistan 81 bcm. However, surging domestic demand has outstripped supply, compelling Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to import gas from Russia, a dependency that dates back to the 1990s but is becoming increasingly fraught amid current geopolitical tensions. Much of the region’s pipeline infrastructure remains from the Soviet era and lacks the capacity to meet contemporary needs, according to SpecialEurasia. Turkmenistan remains heavily reliant on a single pipeline route to Russia, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend on Russian energy giants Gazprom and Rosneft for imports and infrastructure maintenance. Efforts to diversify export routes beyond Russia have encountered difficulties due to limited infrastructure and geopolitical uncertainty. China has emerged as a dominant player in the region, funding pipeline and transportation projects through the Belt and Road Initiative. These investments have enhanced connectivity with Chinese markets but have also increased Central Asia’s economic dependence on Beijing. Meanwhile, the European Union has advocated for green energy and digitization, though its financial commitments remain modest compared to those of Russia and China. Iran is positioning itself as a potential transit corridor, offering Central Asia access to seaports. However, international sanctions and persistent geopolitical tensions continue to limit broader cooperation. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has further strained Moscow’s regional relationships, diminishing its capacity to provide the kind of support it once did. Central Asian governments now face the challenge of maintaining a strategic balance among Russia, China, and Western powers to ensure both economic resilience and political autonomy. SpecialEurasia concludes that without substantial investment in infrastructure, greater economic diversification, and a more balanced approach to foreign partnerships, Central Asia will remain vulnerable despite its abundant natural gas resources.

Kazakhstan-Turkey Partnership

Kazakhstan and Turkey Reshape Their Eurasian Partnership

President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s visit to Ankara consolidated bilateral ties, but it also marked a deeper strategic inflection. The visit marks a broader regional convergence between two major Eurasian actors as they coordinate a strategic regional architecture. Thus, Tokayev’s language emphasized an “expanded strategic partnership,” signaling a move beyond traditional trade or cultural diplomacy. Ankara, for its part, went well beyond symbolic gestures in its response, with binding institutional agreements and substantive infrastructural commitments. The timing of the visit underscores its significance against the current geopolitical backdrop, where Central Asia is once again the object of keen attention from external actors vying for footholds and influence. In this context, the Kazakhstan–Turkey axis appears not as a knee-jerk reaction to outside machinations but as a deliberate autonomous regional vector that enhances the agency of both countries. Strategic Depth of the Tokayev Visit Tokayev’s trip to Turkey represents an assertion of multidimensional regional agency: Kazakhstan’s long-standing multi-vector foreign policy was once a balancing act among great powers, but it has now entered a phase of selective consolidation. This bilateral intensification indexes a shift in the configuration of Eurasian geoeconomics, as strategic weight disperses across an increasingly differentiated agentic field. The Astana–Ankara alignment means that both countries can act with diminished external dependence, even as global architectures become more unstable and contested. Tokayev’s diplomacy suggests the emergence of an equilibrium strategy anchored in regional connectivity rather than bloc affiliation. Ankara’s perspective is equally structural. The shared vocabulary — “coordination,” “deepening,” “integration” — signals a logic of long-horizon strategic cooperation. Complementarities Across the Bilateral Core The current Kazakhstan–Turkey relationship exhibits a structurally complementary relationship rarely sustained at this depth between two regional powers so geographically distant from one another. On one side, Kazakhstan brings economic scale, resource depth, and transit centrality to the Middle Corridor. On the other, Turkey brings not only industrial experience and defense sector credibility but maritime access, NATO membership, and a flexible political reach into Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean basin. The evolution of mutual strategic trust based on converging structural interests binds these capacities of the two sides together. For Kazakhstan, Turkey provides logistical continuity and downstream industrial expansion; Ankara also diversifies Astana's international geoeconomic network. For Turkey, Kazakhstan provides resource access, eastward corridors, and meta-regional relevance beyond the Black Sea. These structural interests converge across multiple material economic sectors: energy, defense-industrial cooperation, agrotechnology, education, and digital logistics. Nor is this convergence driven solely by state policy: both countries’ private sectors increasingly perceive each other as entry points into economic systems adjacent to one another. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS) as an Institutional Amplifier The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), now maturing into an institutionalized platform for regional legitimacy with a shared symbolic and infrastructural vocabulary, enables Kazakhstan–Turkey cooperation to transcend the limits of bilateralism while maintaining its coherence. Joint positions on transport, trade, education, and foreign policy are advanced and discussed within a common multilateral setting where proposals are negotiated horizontally with other Turkic states. Through...

Ukraine

Ukraine Eyes Central Asia: Can War-Weary Kyiv Forge New Regional Alliances?

Despite the ongoing war with Russia, Ukraine is attempting to intensify its diplomatic and economic ties with Central Asia. Kyiv is seeking the region’s de facto political support against Moscow, and aiming to rebuild trade relations with the former Soviet republics. But how do the Central Asian nations view Ukraine’s regional ambitions? Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently launched a new department focused on Central Asia – a region that has traditionally been in Russia’s zone of influence. The move comes as no surprise, given that Kyiv is also actively seeking to make diplomatic inroads in Africa, a continent where the Kremlin harbors significant geopolitical ambitions. But unlike in Africa, which represents relatively new ground for Ukraine — and where it struggles to compete with Russia’s growing influence — Kyiv appears to be in a stronger position in Central Asia. Ukraine and the countries of Central Asia share a common Soviet past, which has left its mark on their relations in various areas, including the economy, culture, and education. A Ukrainian diaspora also lives in all of the Central Asian states and serves as an important link between the nations. That, however, does not mean that Kyiv’s diplomatic initiative will go flawlessly. Besides the ongoing war, geography is one of the biggest obstacles to Ukraine’s efforts to increase its presence in Central Asia. As a result of the conflict, the Eastern European nation can no longer use its old transport and trade routes to Central Asia through Russia. Since 2022, trade between Ukraine and the regional countries has dropped significantly, as sending goods back and forth has become more expensive. To bypass Russian territory, products from Ukrainian manufacturers are now transported to Central Asia through countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Although these routes are functional, their profitability remains questionable. Moreover, statistics show that Ukraine’s industrial production index collapsed from 101.7% in December 2021 to 69.3% in December 2024, which is why the war-torn nation is no longer among Central Asia’s major trading partners. In 2012, long before the war, trade turnover between Ukraine and Kazakhstan – Central Asian largest economy – amounted to $5.5 billion, while in 2023 it was only $391 million. At the end of 2023, Ukraine ranked 35th in Kazakhstan’s list of trading partners, while before the war, in 2021, it was the energy-rich nation’s 15th largest trade partner. Economic ties between Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan are faring no better. According to Idris Kadyrkulov, Kyrgyzstan’s Ambassador to Ukraine, trade between the two countries has “mostly stopped” because many Ukrainian businesses have been hurt by the war, and shipping goods between Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan has become “at least three times more expensive than before the Russian invasion.” That is why, under the current circumstances, strengthening economic ties between Ukraine and the Central Asian states does not seem realistic. Fully aware of this, Kyiv is counting on the regional nations’ economic support in the post-war era – an area in which Kazakhstan has already shown...