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EAEU

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...

EAEU

New Russian Trade Controls Add Friction to Central Asian Trade

Russia is tightening trade procedures in ways that could reshape how goods move across Central Asia. The changes are technical, but their impact could be significant. The clearest sign is Russia’s new SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from Eurasian Economic Union countries on April 1. Under the new rules, importers must file a document on an expected shipment two days before the truck reaches the border. The Russian authorities will assign a QR code, and from July 1, the system is due to move into full operating mode, including a security payment. Moscow says the measure is designed to improve tax compliance and reduce fraud. In practice, it introduces additional control over trade flows before goods reach the border. For transport companies and exporters, that means higher upfront costs, longer planning cycles, and greater uncertainty over delivery times. Even small delays at the border can disrupt supply chains, particularly for perishable goods. The changes are part of a broader pattern in which Moscow is relying more heavily on administrative controls to manage trade within its closest economic partners, and the timing is notable. Central Asian economies have been expanding trade with China and the European Union, while also seeking alternative transit routes that reduce dependence on Russia. The introduction of tighter Russian controls comes as those efforts gain momentum. Over time, such measures may also push Central Asian businesses to accelerate efforts to diversify trade routes and partners. The system may also create new internal barriers within the EAEU. The requirements for advance documentation and financial guarantees could, in some cases, exceed procedures applied to imports from outside the bloc. That would mark a significant shift for a union that was designed to simplify trade among its members. It also underlines a familiar problem within the EAEU, where commitments to free movement often sit alongside recurring administrative barriers. Similar disputes have surfaced repeatedly over the past decade, particularly in relation to agriculture and food, suggesting that the gap between formal integration and practical trade conditions remains unresolved. Russia dominates the union’s economic geography. According to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, mutual trade with EAEU countries reached almost $2.16 billion in January 2026, with 15.4% year-on-year growth. Russia accounted for the vast majority of that total. Kazakhstan’s imports from EAEU partners rose significantly faster than its exports; Russia supplied close to one-third of Kazakhstan’s total imports in January. That imbalance leaves Kazakhstan particularly exposed to changes in Russian trade procedures. For Kazakh businesses, that exposure is most visible at border crossings, where delays and extra checks quickly add to costs. Tensions over regulatory controls have also resurfaced. On March 2, Russia suspended certification for high-fat dairy products from all Kazakh suppliers, affecting butter, cream, cheese, and milk powder. Kazakhstan responded with its own measures, strengthening veterinary controls and imposing temporary restrictions on the import and transit of livestock and animal products from several Russian regions because of a worsening disease situation. Even when such steps have a...

Labor Market

Kazakhstan Sets 2026 Quota for Foreign Workers

Kazakhstan has set its 2026 quota for the employment of foreign workers at 0.25% of the country’s total labor force, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. The annual quota is part of the government’s policy to regulate labor migration and safeguard the domestic job market. The 2026 quota includes specific allocations across several categories of foreign workers: 726 permits for senior managers and their deputies (first category), 3,402 for heads of structural divisions (second category), 5,893 for specialists (third category), and 3,131 for skilled workers (fourth category). An additional 4,994 permits have been allocated for seasonal labor. Separately, the quota for foreign labor employed in private households has been set at 2.9% of Kazakhstan’s total labor force for the year. The new quotas mark an increase from 2025, when the initial foreign labor cap was 0.2%, equivalent to 14,800 permits. In March 2025, that figure was raised to 16,500 following requests from regional authorities grappling with labor shortages. As of December 1, 2025, 14,103 foreign nationals were officially employed in Kazakhstan. The largest contingents came from China, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and India, underscoring the country’s continued dependence on migrant labor in construction, industry, and other specialized sectors. The quota-based system reflects Kazakhstan’s broader strategy to meet economic labor demands while prioritizing employment for domestic workers, particularly amid ongoing infrastructure expansion and industrial development.

Labor migrants

Russia Announces ‘Deportation Regime’ for Migrant Laborers

It has been more than a month since the deadline for migrant laborers working in Russia to complete their registration documents or face expulsion. The anticipated mass deportations have not happened, but Russian State Duma Chairman, Vyacheslav Volodin, indicated on October 13 that could change soon. Volodin warned, “A new migration regime is now in effect… the deportation regime.” The Final Bell Several months ago, Russian officials announced the September 10 deadline for all migrant laborers to legalize their status to work and live in Russia. Russia’s Federal Migration Service created a list in the summer of 2024 of “controlled persons,” those who still did not have all the required documentation to remain in Russia. The list was posted on the service’s website in February 2025. Volodin said those on the list lacked one or more of the following: “documents or certificates required for obtaining migration status or citizenship, registration of a place of stay or residence.” Volodin said the list also included those who failed to complete mandatory procedures such as “annual medical examinations for [their] presence… as well as fingerprinting and photographing” or have failed to show that their “patent, work permits, or employment contract” was renewed. The Duma Chairman said some 35,000 “foreign citizens” had already been expelled between January and August of this year. September 10 arrived, and in the days that followed, there were no reports of Russian law enforcement rounding up migrants and sending them back to their homelands. However, it was clear the Russian government was not bluffing. In his remarks to the Duma, Volodin explained that as of September 1, there were still some 770,000 migrants on the register of controlled persons, and that one-third of them were women and children. If these people have not taken care of their requirements, Volodin said, “They need to leave our country, informing [us] of the date, place, and route of their departure.” The Dwindling Number of Central Asian Migrant Laborers in Russia There are several million foreign workers in Russia, and the largest group is those from Central Asia, though fewer of them work there than was previously the case. The terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 that left more than 140 people dead was blamed on citizens of Tajikistan. It sparked a wave of xenophobia in Russia aimed at Central Asians, and prompted a raft of new laws and regulations for migrant laborers. Uzbekistan’s citizens have long been the largest group of Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia, numbering between 4 to 6 million, depending on the season, during 2016. Figures vary for how many Uzbek citizens are working in Russia now, but Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency said at the start of October that it was about 1.3 million, noting the figure fluctuates depending on the time of the year, and that during the warmer months of 2025, it was closer to 2 million. During his recent visit to Tajikistan for a CIS summit and a separate meeting with...

Central Asia-Russia Summit

Russia–Central Asia Summit in Dushanbe Tests Putin’s Grip

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Tajikistan on October 8 for a three-day state visit that includes a Russia–Central Asia summit in Dushanbe, and a larger Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting. His arrival comes at a time of geopolitical flux in Central Asia, with Russia seeking to reaffirm its waning influence amid migration tensions, economic pressures, and security challenges on its southern flank. The Visit and Summit: What Has Happened So Far Putin was greeted at Dushanbe airport by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who has governed the country since 1992. Upon his arrival, the two leaders conducted a private meeting and later presided over expanded talks with their delegations. In his opening remarks, Putin told Rahmon that Russia and Tajikistan are “reliable allies” and pledged that Moscow would fulfil its obligations to Dushanbe, particularly in terms of security. In the first seven months of 2025, bilateral trade rose by more than 17%, a figure Putin cited to underscore that relations are developing “very positively.” Following the meeting, the two leaders signed a joint statement on “deepening the strategic partnership and alliance” between their countries. Alongside Rahmon, on October 9, Putin met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of the Russia–Central Asia summit. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the summit agenda includes cooperation in trade, transport, energy, security, migration, and environmental policy. A concluding communiqué is expected to lay out joint priorities for 2025–2027 in these fields. Following the Russia–Central Asia gathering, a broader CIS head-of-state meeting is scheduled for October 10. Alongside Russia and the Central Asian states, representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus will also attend. Draft agendas suggest the adoption of a military-cooperation concept through 2030, counterterrorism and border security strategies, efforts to fight transnational crime, and discussions on a “CIS Plus” format that would allow third-party countries and international organizations to participate in selected CIS events. Russia’s Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held talks in Dushanbe with his Tajik counterparts on October 8, stating that “cooperation between our two military institutions” is key to regional stability. Tajikistan hosts Russia’s largest foreign military base and shares a long, porous border with Afghanistan, which makes the security relationship central to both sides’ calculus. Historical and Geopolitical Context Russia has long viewed Central Asia as its strategic backyard, but since 2022, its dominance has been challenged. Sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine have constrained its economic leverage, while China has expanded its presence via Belt and Road investments. At the same time, the European Union has elevated its engagement with Central Asian states through trade, infrastructure funding, and diplomatic outreach. Central Asian governments have shown increasing boldness in balancing their relations between Moscow, Beijing, and the West. None of the Central Asian governments has openly backed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Surveys in Kazakhstan show that only 15% of respondents explicitly support Russia, while a larger share leans toward Ukraine or nonalignment. Kazakhstan has refused to recognize the...

Economy

World Bank Warns Tajikistan on Limits of Migration-Driven Growth

Tajikistan has made notable strides in reducing poverty over the past decade, but sustaining this progress will require a shift away from reliance on labor migration and remittances, according to a new World Bank report. The Poverty and Equity Assessment in Tajikistan notes that the share of people living in poverty fell from 56 percent in 2010 to around 20 percent in 2024. During the same period, the middle class expanded from 8 percent to 33 percent of the population, with 35 percent of households joining its ranks between 2021 and 2023. However, these gains have largely been driven by remittances, which consistently account for more than 30 percent of GDP, rather than domestic job creation. Job Creation Remains Weak Employment generation, however, remains limited. As of 2022, only 40 percent of the working-age population was employed, the lowest rate in the region, while female labor force participation stood at just 21 percent. Inequality has also worsened. The Gini coefficient rose from 32 to 38 between 2021 and 2023, with rural and remote areas most affected due to poor infrastructure and weak market access. Education poses an additional constraint. In 2023, 31 percent of children were not attending school, especially at higher grade levels. Contributing factors include financial hardship, distance to schools, and low parental education. Many university graduates either take low-paid jobs or emigrate. World Bank Recommendations The World Bank urges Tajikistan to transition from a remittance-dependent model to one grounded in domestic employment and economic resilience. Key recommendations include: modernizing agriculture with climate-resilient technologies; promoting labor-intensive private sector growth, particularly in agricultural processing, services, and small enterprises; expanding access to education, vocational training, and digital infrastructure, especially in rural areas; strengthening targeted social support for vulnerable households. “Tajikistan’s progress in poverty reduction is impressive, but sustaining and deepening these gains requires a rebalancing of priorities,” said Wei Winnie Wang, the World Bank’s Acting Country Manager in Tajikistan. She emphasized that improving domestic job creation, reducing spatial inequality, and investing in human capital would help build a more inclusive and sustainable economy. Government Response Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade acknowledged that the report’s findings align with national development priorities. Deputy Minister Ahliddin Nuriddinzoda highlighted the role of the Poverty and Middle Class Expansion Council, established with World Bank support, as a platform for monitoring poverty and shaping related policy. According to the ministry, the World Bank’s current portfolio in Tajikistan includes 26 projects worth $1.9 billion, focused on infrastructure, human capital, and institutional reforms. The International Finance Corporation has also invested more than $70 million in the private sector.