Labor migrants - The Times Of Central Asia

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Russia's War in Ukraine

Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts

More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military...

Migrants in Russia

They Went to Russia for Work and Ended Up at War: How Central Asians Enter the Russian Military

Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. Relatives of other young Kazakh men say they had taken jobs at a sausage factory and a poultry farm. But according to reports aired in early October on Kazakhstan’s KTK television channel, the men later ended up in or near the combat zone in Ukraine. Some appeared in videos wearing Russian military uniforms and asked Kazakhstan to help bring them home. On October 7, relatives of Kazakh citizens who had reportedly ended up in Russia’s military visited the Foreign Ministry in Astana to seek help bringing them home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied the families, said his list had grown from eight to 21 people as more relatives contacted him. The same day, ministry spokesperson Zhanbolat Ussenov said officials were checking appeals and would send Russia a list of citizens after verification. Negotiations over their return were underway, he said. Exactly how the men ended up in the Russian military remains unclear. One family said their relative had already been wounded, while KTK reported that the circumstances surrounding the signing of the military contracts have not been independently established. For now, much of what is known comes from the men themselves and their relatives. Their stories raise a broader question that neither Moscow nor the capitals of Central Asia have fully answered: how many people from the region have ended up in the Russian military, and under what circumstances did they get there? Nearly 13,000, According to a Ukrainian Database Russia does not publish comprehensive statistics on foreign contract soldiers. Central Asian governments have only fragmented data from criminal cases, consular appeals, and reports from relatives. The most detailed country-by-country breakdown comes from the Ukrainian government project I Want to Live. By May 2026, the project said it had identified 12,919 citizens of the five Central Asian states who had signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense: 4,955 citizens of Uzbekistan, 3,489 of Tajikistan, 2,420 of Kazakhstan, 1,474 of Kyrgyzstan, and 581 of Turkmenistan. These figures cannot be regarded as complete or independently verified. I Want to Live operates within Ukraine’s Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and Ukraine is a party to the war. In addition, 12,919 is a cumulative figure, not the number of Central Asians currently at the front. Some may have been killed or captured, completed their service, returned home, or obtained Russian citizenship. Another major estimate comes from the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Truth Hounds, and the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law. Their report estimates that Russia recruited at least 27,000 foreign nationals from more than 130 countries after February 2022. More than 10,000 of them, according to the study, came from Central Asia. The study is based on open sources, consultations with Ukrainian authorities and experts, and interviews with 16 prisoners of war and former Russian servicemen. There are no comparable publicly available Russian statistics, meaning it is impossible to...

Labor migrants

Uzbekistan Repatriates Bodies of Eight Citizens Killed in Drone Attack

The bodies of eight Uzbek construction workers who were killed in a drone strike in the Russian region of Tatarstan were repatriated on Wednesday, according to Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Uzbekistan’s ministries for emergency situations, internal affairs and health, as well as migration authorities, were also involved in the repatriation, the press service of the foreign ministry said. It posted photos of the operation, including a wooden coffin being carried onto an Uzbek Air Force plane. The ministry said it was coordinating with Russian officials to help injured Uzbek citizens who were hospitalized after the August 10 attack in the industrial city of Nizhnekamsk, which Russia blamed on Ukraine. Rustam Minnikhanov, head of Tatarstan, had said 25 people were hospitalized, although he didn’t provide their nationalities. Minnikhanov said some people were killed at a hostel, describing them as “ordinary workers, having breakfast before the start of their workday.” Many labor migrants from Central Asia travel to Russia to seek work, filling job shortages and sending money back to their home countries. They often live in cheap hostels and other communal living arrangements. Citing Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Asia-Plus news agency reported that a Tajik citizen also died in the attack on Nizhnekamsk. Asia-Plus later quoted the ministry as saying two Tajik nationals were injured. A total of 13 people, including a child, died, according to Russian officials. Russia said Ukraine carried out the attack on several locations, including residential areas and industrial facilities. The Ukrainian military said it struck an oil refinery in Nizhnekamsk and caused a fire, in what was part of a campaign to target Russian energy infrastructure in the war against Moscow.

EAEU

EAEU Trade Frictions Deepen Despite Shymkent Integration Push

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) met in Shymkent on March 26-27 with a long agenda and a familiar promise: deeper integration, smoother trade, and a more modern common market. Kazakhstan, which holds the bloc’s 2026 chairmanship, used the meeting to push artificial intelligence, digital logistics, industrial cooperation, and the removal of internal barriers. Twelve documents were signed, covering areas including industrial cooperation, transport, and digital integration. “Kazakhstan aims to become a fully-fledged digital country. We have built a modern ecosystem, including Astana Hub and the Alem.ai AI center, and are ready to share experience with EAEU partners on digital regulation and economic transformation,” Kazakh Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov stated. That sounds ambitious, but it also highlights the bloc’s central weakness. The EAEU has no shortage of plans; it has a shortage of trust between its members, and that matters more. The dynamics extend across the bloc, but are most visible in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The EAEU was built to ensure the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor across Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. But the reality keeps drifting away from the treaty. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship agenda calls for a barrier-free internal market, yet the bloc is entering a new phase of tighter controls, retaliatory measures, and disputes over who really benefits. Shymkent made that contradiction impossible to miss. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov promoted an AI-based system to coordinate cargo flows across the union and speed up transit. He also backed the full electronic handling of veterinary and phytosanitary checks, all of which are practical ideas. Central Asia needs faster, cheaper, and more predictable logistics, but digital tools do not solve a political problem. A system becomes more efficient only if its members want it to be open. When they want leverage instead, technology can only make the controls smarter. [caption id="attachment_46024" align="aligncenter" width="1920"] Image: primeminister.kz[/caption] Kazakhstan’s priorities already show where the friction lies. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev opened his chairmanship by calling for digital transformation, better transport links, and the elimination of internal trade barriers. He also pushed a stronger external profile for the EAEU, with wider links across Asia, the Arab world, and the Global South. That is a serious agenda for a bloc trying to present itself as a Eurasian logistics hub. That push for external expansion comes at a time when internal frictions are becoming harder to manage. It sits uneasily beside everyday trade practice inside the union, where growing trade disputes have become part of the EAEU’s normal life, not an exception to it. The clearest recent example is Russia’s SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from EAEU countries on April 1. Importers must submit shipment information two days before trucks reach the border and receive a QR code. Moscow has presented the change as a tax-compliance and anti-fraud measure, with additional financial guarantees expected in later phases of its implementation. In practice, it adds cost, time, and uncertainty before goods even reach the border, the opposite of what a customs union...

EAEU

New Russian Trade Controls Add Friction to Central Asian Trade

Russia is tightening trade procedures in ways that could reshape how goods move across Central Asia. The changes are technical, but their impact could be significant. The clearest sign is Russia’s new SPOT import-control system, which takes effect for road shipments from Eurasian Economic Union countries on April 1. Under the new rules, importers must file a document on an expected shipment two days before the truck reaches the border. The Russian authorities will assign a QR code, and from July 1, the system is due to move into full operating mode, including a security payment. Moscow says the measure is designed to improve tax compliance and reduce fraud. In practice, it introduces additional control over trade flows before goods reach the border. For transport companies and exporters, that means higher upfront costs, longer planning cycles, and greater uncertainty over delivery times. Even small delays at the border can disrupt supply chains, particularly for perishable goods. The changes are part of a broader pattern in which Moscow is relying more heavily on administrative controls to manage trade within its closest economic partners, and the timing is notable. Central Asian economies have been expanding trade with China and the European Union, while also seeking alternative transit routes that reduce dependence on Russia. The introduction of tighter Russian controls comes as those efforts gain momentum. Over time, such measures may also push Central Asian businesses to accelerate efforts to diversify trade routes and partners. The system may also create new internal barriers within the EAEU. The requirements for advance documentation and financial guarantees could, in some cases, exceed procedures applied to imports from outside the bloc. That would mark a significant shift for a union that was designed to simplify trade among its members. It also underlines a familiar problem within the EAEU, where commitments to free movement often sit alongside recurring administrative barriers. Similar disputes have surfaced repeatedly over the past decade, particularly in relation to agriculture and food, suggesting that the gap between formal integration and practical trade conditions remains unresolved. Russia dominates the union’s economic geography. According to Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics, mutual trade with EAEU countries reached almost $2.16 billion in January 2026, with 15.4% year-on-year growth. Russia accounted for the vast majority of that total. Kazakhstan’s imports from EAEU partners rose significantly faster than its exports; Russia supplied close to one-third of Kazakhstan’s total imports in January. That imbalance leaves Kazakhstan particularly exposed to changes in Russian trade procedures. For Kazakh businesses, that exposure is most visible at border crossings, where delays and extra checks quickly add to costs. Tensions over regulatory controls have also resurfaced. On March 2, Russia suspended certification for high-fat dairy products from all Kazakh suppliers, affecting butter, cream, cheese, and milk powder. Kazakhstan responded with its own measures, strengthening veterinary controls and imposing temporary restrictions on the import and transit of livestock and animal products from several Russian regions because of a worsening disease situation. Even when such steps have a...

Labor Market

Kazakhstan Sets 2026 Quota for Foreign Workers

Kazakhstan has set its 2026 quota for the employment of foreign workers at 0.25% of the country’s total labor force, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. The annual quota is part of the government’s policy to regulate labor migration and safeguard the domestic job market. The 2026 quota includes specific allocations across several categories of foreign workers: 726 permits for senior managers and their deputies (first category), 3,402 for heads of structural divisions (second category), 5,893 for specialists (third category), and 3,131 for skilled workers (fourth category). An additional 4,994 permits have been allocated for seasonal labor. Separately, the quota for foreign labor employed in private households has been set at 2.9% of Kazakhstan’s total labor force for the year. The new quotas mark an increase from 2025, when the initial foreign labor cap was 0.2%, equivalent to 14,800 permits. In March 2025, that figure was raised to 16,500 following requests from regional authorities grappling with labor shortages. As of December 1, 2025, 14,103 foreign nationals were officially employed in Kazakhstan. The largest contingents came from China, Uzbekistan, Turkey, and India, underscoring the country’s continued dependence on migrant labor in construction, industry, and other specialized sectors. The quota-based system reflects Kazakhstan’s broader strategy to meet economic labor demands while prioritizing employment for domestic workers, particularly amid ongoing infrastructure expansion and industrial development.