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Labor migrants

Russia Announces ‘Deportation Regime’ for Migrant Laborers

It has been more than a month since the deadline for migrant laborers working in Russia to complete their registration documents or face expulsion. The anticipated mass deportations have not happened, but Russian State Duma Chairman, Vyacheslav Volodin, indicated on October 13 that could change soon. Volodin warned, “A new migration regime is now in effect… the deportation regime.” The Final Bell Several months ago, Russian officials announced the September 10 deadline for all migrant laborers to legalize their status to work and live in Russia. Russia’s Federal Migration Service created a list in the summer of 2024 of “controlled persons,” those who still did not have all the required documentation to remain in Russia. The list was posted on the service’s website in February 2025. Volodin said those on the list lacked one or more of the following: “documents or certificates required for obtaining migration status or citizenship, registration of a place of stay or residence.” Volodin said the list also included those who failed to complete mandatory procedures such as “annual medical examinations for [their] presence… as well as fingerprinting and photographing” or have failed to show that their “patent, work permits, or employment contract” was renewed. The Duma Chairman said some 35,000 “foreign citizens” had already been expelled between January and August of this year. September 10 arrived, and in the days that followed, there were no reports of Russian law enforcement rounding up migrants and sending them back to their homelands. However, it was clear the Russian government was not bluffing. In his remarks to the Duma, Volodin explained that as of September 1, there were still some 770,000 migrants on the register of controlled persons, and that one-third of them were women and children. If these people have not taken care of their requirements, Volodin said, “They need to leave our country, informing [us] of the date, place, and route of their departure.” The Dwindling Number of Central Asian Migrant Laborers in Russia There are several million foreign workers in Russia, and the largest group is those from Central Asia, though fewer of them work there than was previously the case. The terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March 2024 that left more than 140 people dead was blamed on citizens of Tajikistan. It sparked a wave of xenophobia in Russia aimed at Central Asians, and prompted a raft of new laws and regulations for migrant laborers. Uzbekistan’s citizens have long been the largest group of Central Asian migrant laborers working in Russia, numbering between 4 to 6 million, depending on the season, during 2016. Figures vary for how many Uzbek citizens are working in Russia now, but Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency said at the start of October that it was about 1.3 million, noting the figure fluctuates depending on the time of the year, and that during the warmer months of 2025, it was closer to 2 million. During his recent visit to Tajikistan for a CIS summit and a separate meeting with...

Central Asia-Russia Summit

Russia–Central Asia Summit in Dushanbe Tests Putin’s Grip

Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in Tajikistan on October 8 for a three-day state visit that includes a Russia–Central Asia summit in Dushanbe, and a larger Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) meeting. His arrival comes at a time of geopolitical flux in Central Asia, with Russia seeking to reaffirm its waning influence amid migration tensions, economic pressures, and security challenges on its southern flank. The Visit and Summit: What Has Happened So Far Putin was greeted at Dushanbe airport by Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, who has governed the country since 1992. Upon his arrival, the two leaders conducted a private meeting and later presided over expanded talks with their delegations. In his opening remarks, Putin told Rahmon that Russia and Tajikistan are “reliable allies” and pledged that Moscow would fulfil its obligations to Dushanbe, particularly in terms of security. In the first seven months of 2025, bilateral trade rose by more than 17%, a figure Putin cited to underscore that relations are developing “very positively.” Following the meeting, the two leaders signed a joint statement on “deepening the strategic partnership and alliance” between their countries. Alongside Rahmon, on October 9, Putin met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan as part of the Russia–Central Asia summit. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, the summit agenda includes cooperation in trade, transport, energy, security, migration, and environmental policy. A concluding communiqué is expected to lay out joint priorities for 2025–2027 in these fields. Following the Russia–Central Asia gathering, a broader CIS head-of-state meeting is scheduled for October 10. Alongside Russia and the Central Asian states, representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus will also attend. Draft agendas suggest the adoption of a military-cooperation concept through 2030, counterterrorism and border security strategies, efforts to fight transnational crime, and discussions on a “CIS Plus” format that would allow third-party countries and international organizations to participate in selected CIS events. Russia’s Defense Minister Andrei Belousov held talks in Dushanbe with his Tajik counterparts on October 8, stating that “cooperation between our two military institutions” is key to regional stability. Tajikistan hosts Russia’s largest foreign military base and shares a long, porous border with Afghanistan, which makes the security relationship central to both sides’ calculus. Historical and Geopolitical Context Russia has long viewed Central Asia as its strategic backyard, but since 2022, its dominance has been challenged. Sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine have constrained its economic leverage, while China has expanded its presence via Belt and Road investments. At the same time, the European Union has elevated its engagement with Central Asian states through trade, infrastructure funding, and diplomatic outreach. Central Asian governments have shown increasing boldness in balancing their relations between Moscow, Beijing, and the West. None of the Central Asian governments has openly backed Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Surveys in Kazakhstan show that only 15% of respondents explicitly support Russia, while a larger share leans toward Ukraine or nonalignment. Kazakhstan has refused to recognize the...

Economy

World Bank Warns Tajikistan on Limits of Migration-Driven Growth

Tajikistan has made notable strides in reducing poverty over the past decade, but sustaining this progress will require a shift away from reliance on labor migration and remittances, according to a new World Bank report. The Poverty and Equity Assessment in Tajikistan notes that the share of people living in poverty fell from 56 percent in 2010 to around 20 percent in 2024. During the same period, the middle class expanded from 8 percent to 33 percent of the population, with 35 percent of households joining its ranks between 2021 and 2023. However, these gains have largely been driven by remittances, which consistently account for more than 30 percent of GDP, rather than domestic job creation. Job Creation Remains Weak Employment generation, however, remains limited. As of 2022, only 40 percent of the working-age population was employed, the lowest rate in the region, while female labor force participation stood at just 21 percent. Inequality has also worsened. The Gini coefficient rose from 32 to 38 between 2021 and 2023, with rural and remote areas most affected due to poor infrastructure and weak market access. Education poses an additional constraint. In 2023, 31 percent of children were not attending school, especially at higher grade levels. Contributing factors include financial hardship, distance to schools, and low parental education. Many university graduates either take low-paid jobs or emigrate. World Bank Recommendations The World Bank urges Tajikistan to transition from a remittance-dependent model to one grounded in domestic employment and economic resilience. Key recommendations include: modernizing agriculture with climate-resilient technologies; promoting labor-intensive private sector growth, particularly in agricultural processing, services, and small enterprises; expanding access to education, vocational training, and digital infrastructure, especially in rural areas; strengthening targeted social support for vulnerable households. “Tajikistan’s progress in poverty reduction is impressive, but sustaining and deepening these gains requires a rebalancing of priorities,” said Wei Winnie Wang, the World Bank’s Acting Country Manager in Tajikistan. She emphasized that improving domestic job creation, reducing spatial inequality, and investing in human capital would help build a more inclusive and sustainable economy. Government Response Tajikistan’s Ministry of Economic Development and Trade acknowledged that the report’s findings align with national development priorities. Deputy Minister Ahliddin Nuriddinzoda highlighted the role of the Poverty and Middle Class Expansion Council, established with World Bank support, as a platform for monitoring poverty and shaping related policy. According to the ministry, the World Bank’s current portfolio in Tajikistan includes 26 projects worth $1.9 billion, focused on infrastructure, human capital, and institutional reforms. The International Finance Corporation has also invested more than $70 million in the private sector.

Labor migrants

Russia’s Crackdown Forces Central Asia to Rethink Labor Migration

The most recent World Bank study on labor migration highlighted the immense scale of the issue, describing it as "an ongoing development challenge in Europe and Central Asia, which is currently home to 100 million migrants," roughly one-third of all migrants globally. Historically, Russia has been the primary destination for Central Asia's mobile labor force. However, since March 2024, Moscow’s increasingly restrictive migration policies have forced Central Asian states to confront a dual challenge: managing displaced workers and rethinking the logistics of cross-border labor flows. As of 2023, more than 80% of labor migrants from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were working in Russia. Migration from Uzbekistan was more diversified, with 57% of migrants heading to Russia, 15% to Kazakhstan, and 10% to Ukraine. For millions across the region, labor migration remains a vital economic lifeline. According to the World Bank report, The Journey Ahead: Supporting Successful Migration in Europe and Central Asia, remittances in 2024 accounted for 45% of Tajikistan’s GDP, the highest ratio globally. In Kyrgyzstan, remittances made up 24% of GDP, while in Uzbekistan the figure was 14%. A 2025 update increased the figure for Tajikistan further still, noting that domestic consumption was "supported by large remittance inflows - peaking at 49% of GDP in 2024." Since the start of the war in Ukraine, rhetoric in the Russian media and among some politicians toward Central Asian migrants has increasingly shifted toward overt hostility. Following the March 2024 terrorist attack at Moscow’s Crocus City Hall, in which Tajik nationals were named among the suspects, Russia began implementing harsher measures. This included widespread street inspections of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik citizens, alongside new, more restrictive legal frameworks. While certain steps, such as mandatory biometric data collection, were officially justified by security concerns, other policies have further complicated daily life for foreign nationals. For example, since January 2025, all foreign-owned SIM cards in Russia have been deactivated. Foreign citizens must now register with government agencies to obtain new mobile services, a policy framed as a response to telecom fraud. Another measure, introduced on June 30, requires citizens of visa-free countries to register in the “Gosuslugi RuID” app before entering Russia. They must obtain a digital code to pass border control, effectively instituting a pre-entry surveillance mechanism. Kazakhstan was the first to publicly respond, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov refusing to rule out reciprocal measures against Russian citizens. “We are studying this issue very carefully. It requires consultations with our government agencies,” Smadiyarov said. Yet, despite these developments, none of the Central Asian countries currently maintains a comprehensive migration strategy equipped to handle these shifting dynamics. In Kazakhstan, the issue came to the fore in 2025 with a noticeable influx of Tajik nationals, the group most affected by Russia’s new rules. At a government meeting in late July, officials noted that Kazakhstan had recorded a positive migration balance for the second consecutive year, as well as a 1.5-fold increase in the number of foreign citizens permanently residing in the country. “The importance...

Russia

Attack on Uzbek Migrants in Vladivostok Prompts Diplomatic Response

An attack on Uzbek migrants in the Russian city of Vladivostok has drawn an official response from Uzbekistan’s diplomatic mission, following reports of violence and online footage showing the assault. On September 13, a group of local youths reportedly attacked several migrants from Uzbekistan on the city's Khabarovskaya street, according to Russian media outlet Vladivostok1. Eyewitnesses said the altercation began when the group began throwing stones at cars carrying the migrants. When the drivers got out to confront them, they were physically assaulted. Several people sustained injuries in the incident. Videos circulated online show the assailants laughing, shouting, and encouraging each other to “hit” the migrants. In one clip, a driver attempts to defend himself with a scooter while demanding that one of the attackers drop a knife. Another migrant was pursued into a store and struck in the face. The individual recording the video acknowledged the presence of surveillance cameras but continued filming. According to Vladivostok1, local police have launched an investigation. While no victims or witnesses initially came forward to file complaints, authorities believe the majority of the attackers were minors. Uzbekistan’s Consul General in Vladivostok, Yusuf Qobiljonov, confirmed that the consulate had promptly contacted the injured citizens and provided legal support. Uzbek nationals have since submitted an official complaint to the Vladivostok Interior Department. Diplomatic notes have also been sent to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s regional office and the Prosecutor’s Office of Primorsky Krai, requesting appropriate legal action. Qobiljonov stated that the case remains under the direct oversight of both Uzbekistan’s consulate and Russian law enforcement agencies. He urged media outlets to rely solely on official information from the Foreign Ministry and diplomatic representatives to prevent misinformation. The incident follows a similar controversy earlier this year, when a video circulated showing a Russian citizen calling an Uzbek immigrant a “slave of the Russians.” That case also prompted Uzbekistan to issue a diplomatic note to the Russian government.

Russia's War

Central Asians in Putin’s War: Fighting for Ukraine, Forced for Russia

As the war in Ukraine continues to drag on, fighters from across Central Asia have found themselves on both sides of the frontlines. In Kyiv, Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin has traded his past life as a sales agent for a rifle, sporting a tattoo of Kazakhstan’s flag on his back as he battles to defend his adopted home. He now fights, he says, to protect his children and believes that “Russia will not stop in Ukraine, it will go further. We must make every effort to ensure that our Kazakhstan does not suffer.” Alan Zhangozha, an ethnic Kazakh who grew up in Kyiv and now serves as a public relations officer in the Ukrainian Army, echoes this sentiment. “Ukraine’s victory will also be a victory for my Motherland,” he told The Diplomat. But as the war drags on, in Kazakhstan, families mourn men like 22-year-old Kiril Nysanbaev - a labor migrant in Russia coerced into signing up for the war who only came home in a coffin. His sister recalls how her brother told her that Russian officers beat and forced him to enlist while he was detained on dubious charges in Chelyabinsk. Nysanbaev was killed in Ukraine’s Donetsk region in March 2024, news that only reached his family three months later. Citizens of all five Central Asian countries have been pulled into the conflict since Russia’s invasion in 2022. Some have volunteered to fight for Ukraine, driven by personal ties or ideals, while others, mostly labor migrants, have been recruited, enticed, or pressured into fighting for Russia. These parallel currents reflect the complex impact of the war on a region that remains officially neutral but was historically deeply entwined with Moscow. While a handful of Central Asians now wear the blue-and-yellow insignia in Ukraine’s defense, far more have ended up in Russia's ranks, often as expendable foot soldiers. From Bishkek to Bucha In November 2022, a Kyrgyz former labor migrant, Almaz Kudabek uulu, announced the creation of the Turan Battalion, a volunteer unit of Turkic-speaking fighters formed to assist Ukraine. “Kyrgyzstan is my homeland; I will always love it. But Ukraine is my home now; I am fighting for Ukraine,” he told reporters. The battalion, joined by volunteers from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, operates as a semi-autonomous unit supported by private donations and allied Ukrainian brigades. Back in Kyrgyzstan, however, the authorities opened a criminal case against Kudabek, punishable by up to eight years in prison, and local media that covered his story faced pressure. Others have supported Ukraine in tangible, humanitarian ways. Early in the war, members of Ukraine’s Kazakh diaspora erected traditional yurts in cities like Bucha and Kyiv as heated shelters dubbed “Yurts of Invincibility.” These spaces provided food, tea, and electricity during blackouts, a gesture of solidarity that irritated Moscow but drew only a muted response from Kazakhstan’s government. Moscow’s Migrant Recruits: Coercion and Casualties Far greater numbers of Central Asians have ended up fighting for Russia, which hosts millions of migrant workers from...