• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00202 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10599 -0.19%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28575 0%
14 February 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 2099

Astana to Host UEFA Congress in 2027

The Union of European Football Associations has announced that the 51st UEFA Congress, at which a new president and members of the organization’s Executive Committee will be elected, will take place on March 4, 2027, in Astana. The decision was announced at the 50th anniversary UEFA Congress in Brussels. Kazakhstan was represented at the event by David Loria, Secretary General of the Kazakhstan Football Federation (KFF). The KFF confirmed the selection of the Kazakh capital as the venue for the next congress. UEFA brings together 55 national football associations and is responsible for organizing major international tournaments for clubs and national teams, as well as distributing revenue from media rights and sponsorship contracts. Kazakhstan has been a UEFA member since 2002, despite its geographical location in Central Asia. The UEFA Congress is the highest governing body of European football. It convenes annually and brings together representatives of all national associations. The congress approves strategic, financial, and organizational decisions and elects the organization’s leadership. The 2027 Congress will be an electoral session, with delegates set to elect the UEFA president and the new composition of the Executive Committee. UEFA is currently headed by Aleksander Čeferin, who has held the position since 2016 and was re-elected for another term in 2023. According to the KFF, the right to host the Congress is granted to member associations as a sign of institutional trust and recognition of their contribution to the development of football. The federation stated that the event will be the largest international football business gathering ever held in Kazakhstan and will strengthen the country’s position within the European football community. UEFA will finance the organization of the Congress. No funding from Kazakhstan’s state budget is envisaged. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the Almaty-based club FC Kairat reached the main stage of the UEFA Champions League for the first time in its history.

TRIPP and the Middle Corridor After Vance

U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s Armenia and Azerbaijan tour is being sold as a “peace dividend” for the South Caucasus, but for Central Asia, the significance is the infrastructure potential of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). Vance’s trip is another move in positioning the new Caucasus transit route for the Middle Corridor. His visit necessarily focuses on the Armenia–Azerbaijan fix, but recent diplomatic context makes clear that it is at least equally a Central Asia to Europe proposition. Current constraints on Trans-Caspian connectivity have been the shortage of dependable shipping capacity across the Caspian, port access, and border processing times. As the European Commission pointed out last week, traffic has surged since 2022, but the next jump depends on targeted investment and practical fixes along the route. The Middle Corridor’s Central Asian Axis through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Kazakhstan’s recent moves treat the bottlenecks as practical engineering and scheduling problems. The dredging project at Kuryk aims to deepen the port approach channel to five meters to support year-round navigation. Work is scheduled for early 2026 and backed by ERSAI Caspian Contractor LLC, a joint venture between Saipem and the Kazakhstan-based business group ERC Holdings. ERSAI is a major industrial port and fabrication yard operator specializing in offshore construction, logistics, and port services in the Caspian Sea. The dredging project is tied to broader terminal and shipyard expansion designed to create a key industrial hub. Shipping capacity is the other half of that story. A plan reported late last year envisages six ferries on the Kuryk–Alat line, with the first two entering service in the first half of 2026 and additional vessels added through 2028. Even if timelines slip, the point is to create a predictable schedule. Uzbekistan’s connectivity push has been running on two tracks at once: east to west via the Caspian, and southward toward ports beyond Central Asia. In Washington, a delegation from Tashkent, led by Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov, a week ago signed a memorandum with the United States on critical minerals and rare earths. This move treats extraction and processing as a supply-chain partnership rather than a one-off investment pitch. At the same time, Uzbekistan has been pushing rule-making with corridor partners, not waiting for outsiders to do it. On February 10, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Georgia signed a protocol covering digitalization and freight development along the Middle Corridor, including shared methods for tracking delays and pinch points. This is in line with the necessary streamlining of paperwork. TRIPP as the South Caucasus Link for Central Asia TRIPP is meant to make the Caucasus segment less fragile by adding a second path, other than the recently renovated and expanded Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway route. The U.S-backing and institutional presence are meant to create confidence and reliability. Armenia’s own published implementation framework describes a TRIPP Development Company with an initial 49-year development term and a proposed 74% U.S. share, while stating that Armenian sovereignty, law enforcement, customs, and taxation authority remain intact. This satisfies domestic Armenian...

Uzbekistan Approves Feasibility Study for Trans-Afghan Railway

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has approved an intergovernmental agreement on the joint development of a feasibility study for the construction of the Trans-Afghan railway, which will link Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. According to the presidential resolution, the agreement between Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Transport, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Works, and Pakistan’s Ministry of Railways provides for the preparation of technical and economic documentation for a new railway line from Naibabad to Kharlachi. The document formalizes cooperation on the next stage of the long-discussed regional transport corridor. Under the resolution, Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been instructed to notify the Afghan and Pakistani sides that all necessary domestic procedures required for the agreement’s entry into force have been completed. The Trans-Afghan railway project was first proposed by Tashkent in December 2018 as a strategic initiative to provide Central Asia with direct access to Pakistani seaports. The original concept envisaged extending Afghanistan’s rail network from Mazar-i-Sharif through Kabul and Logar province before crossing into Pakistan. An earlier proposed route was expected to pass through Nangarhar province and the Torkham border crossing into Peshawar. In July 2023, however, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan agreed on a revised alignment. The updated route will run from Termez to Naibabad, then through Maidan Shahr and Logar to Kharlachi, excluding the previously discussed Torkham crossing. Once connected to Pakistan’s railway network, cargo will be able to reach the Pakistani ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. The railway is expected to stretch approximately 647 kilometers. According to recent statements by Uzbek officials, the estimated construction cost is $6.9 billion, although earlier projections ranged from $4.6 billion to $7 billion. The project is regarded by the participating countries as a key component of efforts to strengthen regional connectivity and expand trade routes between Central and South Asia.

Kazakhstan Ratifies Agreement to Modernize Four Resort Facilities on Issyk-Kul

Kazakh investors are set to modernize four resort facilities on Lake Issyk-Kul in Kyrgyzstan after the Senate ratified an intergovernmental agreement regulating property rights and project implementation, Senator Nuria Niyazova has said. On February 12, the upper house of Parliament approved the agreement between the governments of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan on the settlement of Kazakhstan’s property rights to resort and recreational facilities in the Issyk-Kul region. The document had previously been endorsed by the Mazhilis. Under its terms, Kazakhstan undertakes to upgrade the facilities to the standards of three- and four-star hotels operating year-round by the end of 2029. Kyrgyzstan will lease land plots totaling 58.8 hectares to Kazakhstan for 49 years. The Kyrgyz side has guaranteed the inviolability of the facilities and committed not to initiate their seizure for state ownership. The largest project involves the reconstruction of the Kazakhstan sanatorium, overseen by the Presidential Administration of Kazakhstan. The facility is scheduled for commissioning in the fourth quarter of 2026. Plans include preserving the historic building known as Dacha No. 1 of Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who led the Kazakh SSR until 1986, as a house-museum. The Samal resort renovation is being carried out under a joint activity agreement between Satbayev University and a private investor. Initial data are being collected to prepare design and cost documentation, with construction scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter of 2026. Al-Farabi Kazakh National University is drafting technical specifications for the reconstruction of its sports and recreation camp. Once calculations are finalized, the project’s budget and projected payback period will be determined. According to the senator, alternative funding sources, including extrabudgetary funds, are being considered. The fourth facility, the Olymp Sports and Health Center, is being prepared by the Ministry of Tourism and Sports of Kazakhstan, which is developing design documentation and investment agreement parameters for the project. Following approval by both chambers of Parliament, the agreement will be submitted to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev for signature. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have established a joint working group to explore a shorter road route from Almaty to Issyk-Kul, a project that could significantly reduce travel time between the two destinations.

Opinion: Afghanistan and Central Asia – Security Without Illusions

Over the past year, Afghanistan has become neither markedly more stable nor dramatically more dangerous, despite how it is often portrayed in public discourse. There has been neither the collapse that many feared, nor the breakthrough that some had hoped for. Instead, a relatively unchanged but fragile status quo has persisted, one that Central Asian countries confront daily. For the C5 countries, Afghanistan is increasingly less a topic of speculative discussion and more a persistent factor in their immediate reality. It is no longer just an object of foreign policy, but a constant variable impacting security, trade, humanitarian issues, and regional stability. As such, many of last year’s forecasts have become outdated, based as they were on assumptions of dramatic change, whereas the reality has proven far more inertial. Illusion #1: Afghanistan Can Be Ignored The belief that Afghanistan can be temporarily “put on the back burner” is rooted in the assumption that a lack of public dialogue or political statements equates to a lack of interaction. But the actions of Central Asian states show that ignoring Afghanistan is not a viable option, even when countries intentionally avoid politicizing relations. Turkmenistan offers a clear example. Ashgabat has maintained stable trade, economic, and infrastructure ties with Afghanistan for years, all with minimal foreign policy rhetoric. Energy supplies, cross-border trade, and logistical cooperation have continued despite political and financial constraints, and regardless of international debates over the legitimacy of the Afghan authorities. This quiet pragmatism stands in contrast to both isolationist strategies and symbolic or ideological engagement. Turkmenistan may avoid making public declarations about its relationship with Afghanistan, but it nonetheless maintains robust cooperation. This calculated calmness reduces risks without signaling disengagement. Importantly, this approach does not eliminate structural asymmetries or deeper vulnerabilities. But it dispels the illusion that distancing reduces risk. On the contrary, sustained economic and logistical ties foster predictability, without which attempts to “ignore” a neighboring country become a form of strategic blindness. In this sense, Turkmenistan’s experience affirms a broader regional truth: Afghanistan cannot be removed from Central Asia’s geopolitical equation by simply looking away. It must be engaged pragmatically or dealt with later, in potentially more destabilizing forms. Illusion #2: Security Is Achieved Through Isolation Closely related to the first is the illusion that security can be ensured by building walls. Security in Afghanistan, and in the broader Afghan-Pakistani zone, is often seen as an external issue, something that can be kept out by sealing borders or minimizing engagement. Yet in practice, security is determined less by geography and more by the nature of involvement. This is reflected in the recent decision by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to participate in U.S. President Donald Trump's “Board of Peace” initiative. While the initiative focuses on resolving crises outside Central Asia, both countries have framed their participation as essential to their own national and regional security interests. As Abdulaziz Kamilov, advisor to the President of Uzbekistan, explained, Tashkent’s involvement stems from three factors: its own security needs, its foreign policy principles,...

Ukrainian Ambassador to Kazakhstan: “The War Will End This Year. I Truly Believe In That.”

As the war between Russia and Ukraine approaches its fifth year, diplomatic efforts to reshape trade routes, energy flows, and regional partnerships are intensifying far beyond the battlefield. For Ukraine, Central Asia has emerged as an increasingly important economic and logistical partner, particularly as Kyiv seeks alternatives to disrupted transport corridors and supply chains. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Viсtor Mayko, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Kazakhstan, about the prospects for deeper economic cooperation with Central Asia, the role of the Middle Corridor, energy transit challenges in the Caspian region, Kyiv’s expectations for international support, and a possible path toward ending the war. Trade and Economic Prospects in Central Asia TCA: Mr. Ambassador, what are the prospects for deepening trade and economic partnerships between Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and wider Central Asia? Which sectors offer the greatest potential for cooperation? Ambassador Mayko: Deepening trade and economic ties between Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and other Central Asian countries is not merely a prospect; it is a necessity dictated by global economic trends. Kazakhstan leads the region economically, with a GDP exceeding $300 billion. It is on a trajectory to join the G20 within 5 to 10 years. The United States, recognizing this potential, has invited Kazakhstan to the upcoming G20 meeting in the U.S., demonstrating Kazakhstan’s rising global significance. Ukraine and Kazakhstan’s economies are complementary. Ukraine brings experience in agricultural technology, mechanical engineering, IT, and processing, while Kazakhstan contributes resource strength, industrial capacity, and logistics. Promising areas for cooperation include agro-industrial development, from crop production to digitalized processing; industrial cooperation through equipment supply and joint production; logistics and infrastructure aimed at strengthening transport corridors; and energy and IT projects focused on efficiency and network modernization. We are already transitioning from theory to action. A major business delegation from Ukraine will visit Kazakhstan this year. We also anticipate another meeting of the Joint Ukrainian-Kazakh Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation, which is crucial for removing barriers and initiating new projects. Ukraine’s presence in Kazakhstan’s economy has historically been significant. If not for the war and resulting transport disruptions, I believe our mutual trade could have reached $10 billion. Ukrainian machinery still accounts for a substantial portion of Kazakhstan’s industrial base, especially in regions such as Karaganda, Aktau, and Pavlodar, though much of this equipment now requires modernization. Another promising area is mineral resource development. Ukraine has the scientific and practical base to contribute meaningfully to this sector. Turkmenistan’s earlier collaboration with Ukrainian firms in revitalizing depleted wells illustrates our potential. Wells deemed exhausted by older technologies yielded hundreds of thousands of tons of oil under Ukrainian management. This successful model can be applied in Kazakhstan, one of the EU’s top three oil suppliers. Transport Infrastructure and the Middle Corridor TCA: How is cooperation in the transport sector developing, especially regarding the Middle Corridor? Are there any potential plans for joint infrastructure projects? Ambassador Mayko: Russia’s full-scale aggression disrupted Ukraine’s previous logistics routes. Today, we prioritize alternatives like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, the “Middle Corridor”, as a...