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Armenia

Pashinyan Victory Points to New Transport Options for Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev congratulated Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan on June 8 after Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party won Armenia’s parliamentary election. The message came through Akorda. Tokayev said the vote, in the preliminary view of most international observers, was open, followed Armenian election law, and allowed citizens to express their will. Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission has released preliminary results from all 2,005 polling stations, giving Civil Contract 727,160 votes, or 49.81%. Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia bloc took 23.29%, while former President Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance took 9.94%. Turnout stood at 59%. Pashinyan is on course to form another government, but doesn’t have the two-thirds strength needed to change the constitution without a referendum. That limits his room for maneuver on a final peace agreement with Azerbaijan, since Baku still wants Yerevan to alter constitutional language it sees as a claim to Nagorno-Karabakh. [caption id="attachment_50178" align="aligncenter" width="1535"] A stall in Tsaghkadzor, Armenia, selling Nikol Pashinyan paraphernalia. Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Kazakhstan has built a close political track with Armenia over the past two years. In November 2025, Tokayev and Pashinyan elevated ties to a strategic partnership during Pashinyan’s official visit to Kazakhstan. The two sides discussed trade, transport, agriculture, digitalization, education, and culture. Armenian government readouts from the visit also linked Kazakh wheat shipments to regional route openings through the South Caucasus. This is the practical Central Asian stake in Pashinyan’s victory: a durable Armenia-Azerbaijan peace settlement would add another layer to westward routes from the Caspian. In October 2025, Azerbaijan removed all restrictions on cargo transit to Armenia. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev told Tokayev in Astana that a shipment of Kazakh grain through Azerbaijan to Armenia was the first such consignment since transit stopped in the late Soviet period. Kazakhstan already uses the Caspian and South Caucasus to reach Turkey and Europe, but that network depends on a limited number of crossings, ports, and rail links. If Armenia and Azerbaijan reopen transport ties, Astana gains another way to reduce chokepoints and strengthen its position. Pashinyan’s victory also sends a political signal. The vote tested whether Russian pressure could set the limits of Armenia’s domestic politics. International observers said the June 7 election offered voters a genuine choice in a well-run process. They also cited pressure from abroad through trade restrictions and security threats aimed at pushing voters toward the opposition. The same assessment warned of uneven campaign opportunities and perceptions of selective justice inside Armenia. However, Pashinyan still won in a “landslide” despite years of public anger over the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, a split with old security partners, and strong pressure from opposition groups with better ties to Moscow. The two main pro-Russian opposition forces won a combined 31%. The election came against a backdrop of Armenia’s break with Russian security organizations. When Azerbaijan took full control of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 as Russian peacekeepers stayed on the sidelines in the breakaway territory’s dormant airport, Armenia concluded that Moscow would not protect it. In February 2024, Pashinyan said...

C5+1

From Culture to Critical Minerals: C5+1 Opens Busy U.S. Week in Central Asia

The United States and Central Asia moved another part of the C5+1 agenda into a working-level form on June 5, when culture officials from the five Central Asian states and Washington met in Tashkent. The meeting came just days before a separate C5+1 critical minerals session in Astana, giving the week a wider agenda: cultural heritage, public diplomacy, mining, investment, and supply chains are now moving forward in the same regional format. The Tashkent meeting brought together Uzbekistan's Minister of Culture Ozodbek Nazarbekov, Kazakhstan's Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balayeva, Kyrgyzstan's Minister of Culture, Information and Youth Policy Mirbek Mambetaliev, Tajikistan's Minister of Culture Matluba Sattoriyon, Turkmenistan's Deputy Minister of Culture Gurbanmurad Miradaliev, and Sarah Rogers, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The agenda covered cultural and humanitarian cooperation, joint cultural projects, creative exchanges, and the protection and promotion of cultural heritage. Participants discussed a permanent C5+1 Working Group on Culture, a C5+1 Culture and Innovation Forum, closer cooperation in the creative industries, and more places for Central Asian cultural professionals in U.S. education and exchange programs. Uzbekistan also proposed joint English for Culture centers with U.S. partners at cultural education institutions. In practical terms, that could mean joint training for museum staff, touring exhibitions, film and music exchanges, English-language programs for curators and cultural managers, and U.S.-backed workshops for people working in heritage, tourism, and the creative industries. For Uzbekistan, the proposed centers would give the agenda a physical base inside cultural education institutions rather than leaving it at the level of declarations. The meeting ended with a protocol, which reaffirmed the parties' commitment to the cultural heritage agenda adopted after the Washington summit in November 2025. The International Institute for Central Asia said it covered cooperation through joint events and festivals in art, literature, theater, cinema, and music. Kazakhstan's side also tied the discussion to museum partnerships, digitization of heritage, professional exchanges, tourism routes, and digital projects. The Tashkent talks grew out of the C5+1 leaders’ meeting in Washington, where culture joined a wider list of priorities. That summit marked ten years of U.S. engagement with the region through the format, which began in 2015 and has since expanded from foreign-minister meetings to expert groups and presidential-level summits. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that the November 2025 summit shifted the format from broad diplomacy toward deliverable agreements, with critical minerals, aviation, supply chains, and business ties among the main areas of focus. Culture fits into that agenda, as Central Asian governments see heritage, tourism, film, music, museums, and the creative industries as economic sectors as well as identity markers. For the United States, public diplomacy gives Washington a way to stay active in the region outside security and energy talks. It also gives the C5+1 a soft-power layer, using language programs, museum links, heritage projects, and creative exchanges to build influence without framing the relationship only around security or resources. Heritage protection has a security side as well. Trafficking...

Cooperation

China Tajikistan Financial Cooperation Talks Focus on Banking Links

China and Tajikistan have discussed expanding financial cooperation, as Dushanbe looks to deepen banking links with one of its most important economic partners. The discussions took place on June 2 during a meeting between Firdavs Tolibzoda, chairman of the National Bank of Tajikistan, and Gu Shu, chairman of the Agricultural Bank of China, one of China’s largest lenders. The talks focused on practical banking links between the two countries, including easier settlement of trade payments, support for Chinese-backed investment projects, and the use of digital tools in Tajikistan’s financial sector. Tolibzoda described China as one of Tajikistan’s key strategic and economic partners and said cooperation has continued to grow. He noted that long-standing cooperation between Chinese banks and Tajik financial institutions has helped facilitate trade and investment flows between the two countries. The two sides also discussed the possibility of opening branches of Chinese banks in Tajikistan, a move Tajik officials said could further expand bilateral cooperation. The Chinese finance sector's role in Tajikistan has expanded alongside its wider economic presence. In 2025, China overtook Russia as Tajikistan’s largest trading partner for the first time, with bilateral trade reaching $964 million in January-May, up nearly 30% year-on-year. China’s share of Tajikistan’s foreign trade stood at 24.8%, compared with Russia’s 23.2%. During the meeting, Tajik officials presented an overview of the country’s economic performance, highlighting strong growth, stable inflation, and a banking sector they said had become more resilient. According to Tolibzoda, recent reforms have improved the performance of financial institutions, increased deposits, expanded lending to the real economy, and strengthened overall financial stability. Gu Shu welcomed the prospects for Tajikistan’s economic development and expressed the Agricultural Bank of China’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the National Bank of Tajikistan. Potential areas of cooperation include professional training and knowledge exchange, support for green finance initiatives, digital transformation projects, cybersecurity, compliance systems, and workforce development, he said. The meeting concluded with both sides reaffirming their interest in expanding financial cooperation and exploring new opportunities to strengthen economic ties between Tajikistan and China.

Water Security

Megaprojects Instead of Quotas: How Central Asia’s Water Diplomacy Is Changing

Central Asia’s water politics are moving beyond Soviet-era quotas. As glaciers in the Tien Shan retreat and climate pressure increases, river management has become a question of energy security, food production, and regional stability. The Soviet-era system of river-water allocation has reached its limits, forcing Central Asian states to look beyond traditional negotiations and toward joint ownership of strategic water infrastructure. Even as regional governments learn to cooperate more closely, a new challenge is emerging on Central Asia’s southern frontier, one that could disrupt the region’s hydrological balance. The Illusion of Control Formally, Central Asia’s water resources are governed through a network of interstate institutions. The principal mechanisms are the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination (ICWC) and the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS). On paper, the system appears effective. Twice a year, ahead of the spring-summer irrigation season and the autumn-winter period, representatives of the region’s countries meet to approve water-withdrawal quotas from the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. At the end of 2025, for example, officials meeting in Ashgabat agreed on water allocations for 2026, setting total withdrawals from the Amu Darya at nearly 55.4 billion cubic meters. This framework has helped prevent open interstate conflicts by providing a permanent forum for dialogue. However, its foundation remains the 1992 Almaty Agreement, which essentially preserved a Soviet-era quota system designed for a single centrally planned state rather than a group of independent countries with competing interests. The greatest weakness of the system is the absence of any meaningful enforcement mechanism. If one country exceeds its agreed allocation during a drought year, there are no legal or economic penalties. Disputes are instead resolved through emergency negotiations between ministries or, in some cases, direct interventions by heads of state. A system dependent on political goodwill and personal relationships is increasingly fragile in an era of climate stress. Turning Water Disputes Into Joint Investments As the quota system shows signs of strain, Central Asian countries have begun experimenting with a more pragmatic approach: shared ownership of infrastructure. The central paradox of the Syr Darya basin is that upstream and downstream countries need water at different times of the year. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the river’s headwaters, require releases in the winter to generate electricity and heat their cities. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, meanwhile, need that same water in summer to irrigate millions of hectares of farmland. Winter releases often flow downstream when demand is low, while shortages emerge during the peak agricultural season. The proposed solution is the Kambarata-1 hydropower plant on Kyrgyzstan’s Naryn River, a project now estimated to cost around $4.2 billion. What makes the project unusual is its ownership structure. Under a 2024 agreement, Kyrgyzstan will hold a 34% stake, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will each own 33%. By investing billions of dollars in infrastructure located outside their territory, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are effectively purchasing seats at the decision-making table. As shareholders, they gain a direct role in determining reservoir operations, helping ensure water is...

Termez Dialogue 2026

Opinion: Building Bridges Across Eurasia – Termez Dialogue 2026 Opens in Tashkent

The second meeting of the Termez Dialogue on Connectivity between Central and South Asia opened on June 4 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, bringing together senior representatives from Central Asia, South Asia, China, Russia, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran and Afghanistan for a high-level exchange on the future of regional connectivity and cooperation under the theme: “Peace, Connectivity, and Resilience: Shaping the Foundation for Shared Prosperity”. Eldor Aripov, director of the Institute for Strategic and Regional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan, opened the forum and highlighted its role in strengthening Central–South Asia connectivity. Under his leadership, it has become a respected venue for promoting regional cooperation and sustainable development. Aripov said Eurasia needs “not new dividing lines but spaces of trust, joint development, and open dialogue.” The agenda covered geopolitics, security, trade, investment, culture, climate resilience, and sustainable development. Aripov began by emphasizing the origins of the Termez Dialogue and its strategic purpose, which reflects Uzbekistan’s vision of fostering stronger ties between neighboring regions through cooperation and mutual benefit without sacrificing sovereign autonomy “The Dialogue’s essence lies in consistently building interstate relations on the principles of mutual benefit, good-neighborliness, and preventive diplomacy. What makes this platform unique is its inclusiveness — its ability to bring together not only government officials and diplomats, but also leading experts, scholars, business representatives, and civil society institutions.” This statement positioned the Termez Dialogue as a cornerstone of Uzbekistan’s vision for regional diplomacy. The idea was reinforced in 2022, when the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/76/295, “Strengthening Connectivity between Central and South Asia.” A recurring theme throughout Aripov’s remarks was inclusivity – understood in a non-ideological sense. He argued that lasting regional partnerships require participation from a diverse range of stakeholders. Reflecting on the platform’s progress, Aripov pointed to its rapid evolution into a recognized forum for regional engagement. He acknowledged the need to continue to build trust across sectors and borders. “In just one year, our platform has established itself as an effective venue for discussing transregional connectivity, developing practical initiatives, and strengthening trust among governments, experts, and international organizations,” Aripov said. This achievement demonstrates the Dialogue’s growing influence across Eurasia. The Chairman also made clear that the forum is entering a new phase. The focus, he said, must now shift from ideas to implementation. “Today’s meeting is intended to mark a qualitative transition — from conceptual discussions to practical implementation and the development of concrete mechanisms for transregional cooperation.” The statement reflects a commitment to delivering tangible outcomes and lasting partnerships. Aripov outlined that shared prosperity is one of the strongest foundations for regional stability: “When states are interconnected through shared economic interests and value chains, the risks of confrontation and instability naturally decrease.” This vision places trade, investment, and infrastructure cooperation at the heart of regional peacebuilding. “Alongside economics and climate issues,” Aripov argued, “culture remains an important pillar of our dialogue. Strong connectivity is not measured only in material terms. Very often, it is rooted in shared historical memory and common...

UN Security Council

Opinion: Beyond Multivectorism – What Kyrgyzstan’s UN Security Council Win Really Shows

Kyrgyzstan's election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term is more than a diplomatic milestone. It is a case study in how a small state can create political weight without possessing a large economy, military power, or a dominant regional position. On June 3, Kyrgyzstan won its first-ever seat on the Security Council after a competitive four-round contest with the Philippines for the Asia-Pacific Group vacancy. Bishkek led from the first round, with 105 votes against Manila's 85, and increased its support through each subsequent ballot. It finished with 142 votes to 49. The result is significant because this was not an uncontested regional rotation. Kyrgyzstan had to assemble a qualified two-thirds majority across the wider UN General Assembly. That required more than support from its immediate neighbors. Bishkek had to build support across regions, institutions, and political blocs. The deeper lesson is that small-state agency should not be measured only by material resources. It should also be measured by the ability to assemble coalitions. A Campaign Larger Than Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan's campaign was not presented simply as a request for national recognition. President Sadyr Japarov framed the bid as a question of representation. When Kyrgyzstan intensified its campaign in 2024, he drew attention to the number of UN member states that had never served on the Council and argued for broader representation, particularly for African countries. Bishkek also positioned itself as a voice for small, developing, landlocked, and mountainous states facing security, climate, and connectivity challenges. That framing gave the vote wider political weight. Kyrgyzstan could not outspend larger states; it could not offer a large domestic market or a major security umbrella. But it could translate its limitations into a broader political language: underrepresentation, sovereign equality, regional balance, and the need for smaller states to have a voice in global decision-making. The campaign also received visible regional backing. In December 2025, all five Central Asian presidents endorsed Kyrgyzstan's candidacy, presenting the bid as a regional effort rather than a purely national one. That was the first layer of the coalition. The second was broader. In May 2026, the African Group at the United Nations received a dedicated briefing on Bishkek’s candidacy from Edil Baisalov, Kyrgyzstan’s newly appointed ambassador to the United States and a special envoy of the president. This followed Kyrgyzstan's public support for wider African representation in the Security Council. Because the UN ballot was secret, it would be impossible to claim that African votes delivered Kyrgyzstan's victory. Nor would it be accurate to reduce the campaign to a simple exchange of support. But the African track was an observable part of a wider coalition strategy. Bishkek aligned its own candidacy with an issue that mattered to a much larger group of states: the imbalance of representation inside the Security Council. From Multivectorism to Coalition Brokerage Central Asian foreign policy is often described through the language of multivectorism. The term usually refers to balancing among Russia, China, the West, Turkiye, and other external powers...