International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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CSTO

CSTO Without Armenia: What Keeps Yerevan From Leaving and What the Summit Means for Central Asia

Armenia has effectively stopped participating in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) but has not formally withdrawn from the military alliance. At the November 11, 2026, summit in Moscow, Armenia lost its voting rights because of unpaid membership dues, while the CSTO's five other members — Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Belarus — agreed to develop collective aviation forces and mobile air defense units. Kazakh political analyst Maksim Kaznacheyev explained to The Times of Central Asia why Armenia's leadership is reluctant to sever ties with the CSTO and what the new military agreements could mean for Central Asian countries. Why Armenia Has Not Left the CSTO Yerevan froze its participation in the organization in February 2024, accusing its allies of failing to ensure Armenia's security during armed clashes with Azerbaijan. Armenia stopped paying membership dues and sending representatives to CSTO bodies. At the November 11 summit, CSTO members decided that Armenia would lose its voting rights and the ability to nominate candidates for senior positions because of unpaid contributions. CSTO Secretary-General Taalatbek Masadykov said, however, that the organization was not considering expelling Armenia. Kaznacheyev attributes Yerevan's reluctance to sever ties with the CSTO to Armenia's domestic political situation. "If Armenia leaves the CSTO or the EAEU, pro-Western actions could trigger an internal crisis and destabilize the country," Kaznacheyev said. He believes Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is seeking to avoid deepening divisions within Armenia as his government pursues closer ties with the European Union. Yerevan, however, has pursued different policies toward the two organizations. Armenia has suspended its participation in the CSTO but continues to operate within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). On November 5, Pashinyan said the country was not preparing to leave the EAEU. The CSTO has experienced the departure of member states before. Uzbekistan signed the Collective Security Treaty in 1992, declined to renew it in 1999, rejoined the CSTO in 2006, and suspended its membership again in 2012. Kaznacheyev believes Armenia's situation is substantially different. "Uzbekistan's experience does not apply to Armenia because Uzbekistan had a unified political elite when it left the CSTO," Kaznacheyev said. He noted that Tashkent also had a bilateral security agreement with Russia, allowing it to maintain military cooperation outside the CSTO. For Kazakhstan, Armenia's dispute with the CSTO does not create an immediate security threat. Kaznacheyev said Astana's restrained position reflects its limited direct interests in Armenia and its growing transport links through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward Turkey. "That is why Kazakhstan maintains a restrained, neutral position," he said. What the New Air Defense Agreements Mean for Central Asia At the Moscow summit, CSTO members agreed to develop the organization's Collective Aviation Forces and approved plans for mobile air defense units to protect joint military formations. Plans call for incorporating combat aviation units alongside transport and special-purpose aircraft. Kaznacheyev believes the agreements could expand Russian military-technical assistance to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. He argues that Russia could help other CSTO members modernize their air forces and air defenses, particularly in Kyrgyzstan...

Cyber Espionage

Kazakhstan-Linked Hackers Used AI to Steal Tajik Defense Documents, Researchers Say

Hackers used AI to steal more than 2,000 documents that passed through Tajikistan’s Defense Ministry, according to cybersecurity firm CloudSEK. The company traced the theft to Silent Lynx, a group researchers have linked to Kazakhstan. The stolen documents included flight clearance requests, records of military personnel transfers, and reports on construction in border areas. In its November 11 report, the Singapore-based company said it had pieced together the operation from records on a server the hackers inadvertently left open to the public. Around mid-August, the group began using Hermes Agent, an open-source AI tool, to scout potential targets. A few weeks later, the hackers gained access to Tajikistan’s electronic document system through a railway employee’s account. Hermes then wrote a program to collect and organize the documents for transfer. The server records included instructions directing the agent to carry out its work in secret. “Instead of typing hacking commands by hand, the attacker told Hermes what to do, and Hermes planned the attacks, wrote the rules, ran them, kept notes, and wrote up reports,” CloudSEK told Reuters. Similarities to tools used in earlier attacks gave CloudSEK high confidence that the server belonged to a Silent Lynx operator. CloudSEK linked the operator to Kazakhstan with medium confidence, citing Russian-language records and a residential internet connection in the country. Earlier researchers had also noted that the group was active during local business hours. The evidence does not establish whether the group acted on behalf of the Kazakh government. In findings published on October 14, researchers from Recorded Future and Cisco Talos described a wider campaign against Central Asian governments. Silent Lynx used hijacked official email accounts to gain access to government computers. Exposed working files helped the researchers trace the group’s interest in agencies holding information on regional diplomacy and natural resources. The Indian cybersecurity company Seqrite named the group Silent Lynx in January 2025. Its researchers found that the hackers had sent an email from the hijacked account of an employee at the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic. The attachment contained a malicious program and what appeared to be a United Nations meeting invitation.

CSTO

Russia Tries to Keep the CSTO Relevant in Central Asia

Russia used the November 11 CSTO summit in Moscow to promote closer military cooperation with allies increasingly looking elsewhere for partners. Plans to develop the collective aviation force and supply equipment for Tajikistan's Afghan border would keep their militaries working with Russia, but Armenia's estrangement shows how far confidence in Russian protection has fallen. The summit barred Armenia from voting and appointing representatives to senior posts in the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced the restrictions, citing its failure to meet its membership obligations. Armenia remains a member, but has withheld contributions and frozen participation after accusing the alliance of failing to defend it. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan continue to participate. They still want military training, cooperation against terrorism, and help securing the region's southern border with Afghanistan. Moscow can offer those services, even as the Ukraine war damages its standing and China, Europe, and the U.S. expand their economic presence. At the previous summit in Bishkek, Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted Russian weapons and closer military integration. The Moscow meeting continued that effort. Equipment and joint operations keep Russia involved in its neighbors' defense planning, while agreed declarations allow it to claim diplomatic support beyond Belarus. The Damage in Armenia Armenia's break with Moscow developed through successive security failures. The CSTO provided no military assistance after Azerbaijani attacks on Armenian territory in 2022, leading Yerevan to freeze its participation in 2024. The dispute over unpaid contributions followed the loss of confidence in the alliance, rather than causing it. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict deepened that rupture. Russian peacekeepers deployed after the 2020 war did not prevent Azerbaijan's September 2023 offensive. More than 100,000 ethnic Armenians fled, leaving Moscow's claim to be a reliable protector badly damaged. Nagorno-Karabakh was internationally recognized as Azerbaijani territory and fell outside the CSTO's collective-defense guarantee. Russia's peacekeeping mission there was separate from the alliance. But that distinction offered little reassurance to an Armenian government that had already failed to obtain military assistance after attacks on Armenia itself. Kazakhstan has a different experience. During the January 2022 unrest, CSTO troops guarded key facilities. Moscow can therefore point to an actual deployment when arguing that membership remains useful, though Armenia's experience makes it harder to promise that help will arrive whenever another member requests it. The Border Program in Tajikistan Tajikistan takes over the CSTO chairmanship in January 2027, and Tajik President Emomali Rahmon used the summit to call for closer attention to carrying out existing commitments. Strengthening the organization should rest on “mutual trust, consideration of the interests of member states and consistent fulfillment of commitments undertaken,” Rahmon said. The Afghan border program has taken years to negotiate. The CSTO decided to develop it in 2013, but leaders approved it only in November 2024. Its published timetable assigned preparations to 2025, priority deliveries to 2026–2027, and further reinforcement through 2029. The border equipment program was still awaiting financing arrangements in April. On October 21, Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said Tajikistan had selected suppliers and...

U.S. Sanctions

U.S. Sanctions Tajik National Over Alleged Role in Iran’s Efforts to Buy Missiles

The United States has imposed sanctions on Alisher Domullodzhanov, a native of Dushanbe whom the State Department accuses of involvement in Iran’s efforts to obtain man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). The November 4 designation falls under Executive Order 13949, which targets individuals and companies involved in Iran’s conventional arms trade. The State Department identified Domullodzhanov as based in Russia but gave no details of his alleged role. According to the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Domullodzhanov was born on November 29, 1989, and is a national of both Tajikistan and Russia. His sanctions listing also gives his full name, Alisher Hairulloevich Domullodzhanov, and an address in Ramensky District in the Moscow region. Washington also applied the order to Mohammed Ali Tolibov, chief executive of the Belarus-based company Armory Alliance LLC, and Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited, a Nigeria-based company. Both were already under U.S. sanctions. The State Department said Armory Alliance sought to broker the purchase of hundreds of MANPADS from companies in China for buyers in Iran. The department accused Vanguard of trying to obtain Chinese-made missiles for Iran by falsely identifying their intended recipients. These portable surface-to-air missiles are designed to strike low-flying aircraft, including helicopters. A single person can operate them, and their proliferation poses a threat to civilian aviation. The November measures followed U.S. sanctions on May 8, June 10, and July 15, 2026, targeting alleged Iranian military procurement networks. Washington said the latest designations also support enforcement of the arms restrictions restored when the United Nations Security Council reimposed sanctions on Iran in September 2025. Under OFAC’s asset-blocking rules, the designated parties’ property and interests in property are blocked if they are in the United States or in the possession or control of a U.S. person. U.S. persons are generally prohibited from doing business with those listed. The restrictions also apply to any entity in which one or more blocked parties hold a combined ownership stake of at least 50%, directly or indirectly.

A formal business roundtable meeting between Kazakhstan and the United States is held in Washington, with delegates seated at a long table in front of a large blue backdrop displaying the两国 flags and event details.

U.S.-Kazakh Partnership

Kazakhstan Brings Largest Foreign Delegation to B20 as U.S. Firms Detail Industrial Expansion

Kazakhstan brought the largest foreign delegation to the B20 summit in Washington, U.S. Chamber of Commerce President and CEO Suzanne Clark said, as American executives outlined expanding industrial operations and new investment opportunities in the country. The B20 is the G20’s business engagement group. At a November 9 business roundtable, discussions ranged from PepsiCo's first locally manufactured Lay's potato chips and Wabtec's growing railway production capabilities to energy processing, AI infrastructure and critical minerals. Senior American and Kazakh officials emphasized the political support behind a commercial relationship built on decades of investment. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said strengthening relations with Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors had been a priority since he entered office, alongside restoring the prominence of economic and commercial matters in American diplomacy. “I think President Tokayev is one of the most impressive world leaders,” Landau said, highlighting the Kazakh president's ability to speak with the leaders of China, Russia and the United States in their own languages. Landau said the region had historically received less attention in U.S. foreign policy than its strategic location and resources warranted. He also emphasized the unusually high level of engagement between Washington and Astana, describing the current relationship as producing results rarely seen in its 35-year history. Yerzhan Kazykhan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev's special representative for cooperation with the United States and honorary co-chair of the U.S.–Kazakhstan Business Council, said dialogue between Tokayev and President Donald Trump had given the relationship additional political momentum. “Our shared task is to translate this momentum into tangible results for our businesses,” he said. Ahead of Tokayev's planned participation in the G20 summit in Miami, Kazykhan identified advanced manufacturing, critical minerals processing and technology transfer as priorities for further cooperation. Manufacturing and Industrial Expansion “We have moved beyond oil and uranium,” said Kanat Sharlapayev, chairman of the presidium of Atameken, Kazakhstan's National Chamber of Entrepreneurs, pointing to PepsiCo and Wabtec as examples of the country's expanding manufacturing base. A PepsiCo representative reported that the company had recently produced its first bag of Lay's potato chips in Kazakhstan using locally grown potatoes. The milestone forms part of an investment that the representative valued at $360 million, in what PepsiCo expects to become one of its largest snack manufacturing facilities globally. The facility is expected to support 900 jobs when fully operational, with an official inauguration planned for April 2027. In railway manufacturing, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport Asel Zhanassova highlighted the progress of Kazakhstan's longstanding partnership with Wabtec, including the $4.2 billion agreement signed in September 2025 covering 300 freight locomotives and long-term servicing. Zhanassova said local production content exceeded 40% and more than 2,000 jobs had been created, including among Kazakh suppliers. Kazakhstan Temir Zholy Chairman Yelzhas Otynshiyev described the next stage of the partnership. Building on an existing engine remanufacturing and overhaul center in Astana, KTZ plans to begin engine production in Kazakhstan in 2027, with the objective of becoming a regional manufacturing and service center for Wabtec. Clay...

Kazakhstan-Tajikistan

Kazakhstan Tajikistan Sign Fuel Supply and Mining Agreements

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have signed a framework agreement on fuel supplies as part of wider plans to expand cooperation in mining and manufacturing. Following talks between Presidents Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Emomali Rahmon in Astana on November 7, Tajikistan's Foreign Ministry reported that 20 cooperation documents were signed, while businesses from the two countries concluded 25 agreements worth a total of $2.5 billion. It is fuel supplies that are particularly important for Tajikistan. The country has substantial hydropower resources but depends on imported petroleum products, primarily from Russia. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Russia accounted for 72.3% of Tajikistan's petroleum product imports in the first half of 2026, while domestic refineries met only about 0.5% of the country's needs. Tajikistan has also held talks with China on importing fuel as it seeks to diversify its suppliers. The agreements also include cooperation in the electricity and metallurgical sectors, while in the mining sector, Tajikistan's Main Department of Geology signed a memorandum with Kazakhstan-registered gold producer Solidcore Resources plc. Bilateral trade reached $1.13 billion in January–September 2026, up 25.6% from the same period a year earlier, according to Tajik government figures. Kazakhstan is among Tajikistan's three largest trading partners. More than 130 enterprises with Kazakh capital are registered in Tajikistan, while over 580 companies with Tajik participation operate in Kazakhstan. Other outcomes of the talks include memorandums on cooperation in artificial intelligence and e-commerce, as well as plans for joint projects in manufacturing, agriculture and transport. Kazakhstan will also participate in training personnel for Tajikistan's border troops.