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Pink Tax

Gender Pricing and Tax Policy in Kazakhstan: Does a “Pink Tax” Exist?

Women often pay more for everyday goods, from hygiene products to personal care services. In public discourse in Kazakhstan, this phenomenon is often referred to as the “pink tax.” But does such a tax exist, or are these differences the result of market pricing strategies? Is a “Pink Tax” Recognized Under Kazakhstan’s Tax Code? If understood literally as a separate levy established in the Tax Code, the so-called “pink tax” does not exist in Kazakhstan. The country’s tax system includes corporate and individual income taxes, value-added tax (VAT), excise duties, social tax, property taxes, and other mandatory payments. There is no gender-based category. In Kazakhstan, the term is generally used to describe a potential “gender markup,” where products marketed to women are priced higher than comparable versions aimed at men, even when their features are largely the same. These differences are most often observed in items such as razors, shower gels, and other personal care products, where variation may be limited to packaging or branding. However, Kazakhstan lacks large-scale, representative studies on the issue. Most claims are based on retail observations and isolated price comparisons rather than comprehensive market research. How Tax Policy Affects Essential Hygiene Products: VAT and the “Tampon Tax” Public debate increasingly uses the term “tampon tax” to describe situations where menstrual hygiene products are subject to the standard VAT rate rather than a reduced rate applied to essential goods. Starting January 1, 2026, Kazakhstan’s base VAT rate increased to 16%. Reduced VAT rates of 5% (from 2026) and 10% (from 2027), apply only to goods and services, including specific medicines and medical devices that meet established criteria. These benefits do not apply broadly to all health-related goods, only to items included in officially approved lists. If sanitary pads, tampons, and other menstrual hygiene products are not included in the approved lists, they are subject to the standard VAT rate, like most other consumer goods. The law does not treat “women’s” products as a separate taxable category. As a result, Kazakhstan does not levy a distinct “pink tax” but applies uniform VAT rules. The broader policy debate centers on whether menstrual products should be classified as essential goods for tax purposes. The social dimension is significant. According to the World Bank and UNFPA, menstrual poverty refers to limited access to hygiene products and related services such as water, sanitation, healthcare, and education. A survey conducted in Kazakhstan by Umai Cup and SOAS (2,116 participants) found that 25% of respondents had no access to hygiene products during their first menstruation, 66% used improvised materials, and 10% missed school due to an inability to purchase sanitary pads. When a recurring monthly product is taxed at the full VAT rate and rises in price along with inflation, the financial burden falls disproportionately on low-income women. For students, single mothers, and mothers of large families, this may translate into restricted access to basic hygiene. Why the “Pink Tax” Has a Greater Impact at Lower Income Levels Even without normative judgments, the economic...

Agriculture

Farmers, Courts, and Investors: Examining Recent Land Disputes in Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan’s agricultural sector is once again in the spotlight following a recent report by Human Rights Watch and the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights, which raised concerns about the treatment of cotton and wheat farmers under what it describes as a coercive state production system. At the same time, local agricultural representatives argue that the situation is more complex and that recent legal and institutional changes have improved farmers’ ability to defend their rights. The debate intensified earlier this year after complaints from farmers in parts of the Syrdarya region, particularly in the Xovos district, regarding land seizures linked to failure to meet so-called “normative yield” requirements. Komoliddin Ikromov, head of the Agrobiznes Association, has been among the most vocal local figures commenting on these developments. State Plan Abolished, but Normative Yields Remain According to Ikromov, it is important to distinguish between the former state production plan and the current regulatory framework. “There is no state plan now,” he said. “The state order was abolished in 2020. What exists today is the concept of rational land use. If a farm’s yield falls below the normative level for three consecutive years, then the land may be withdrawn, but only through a court decision.” While cotton state procurement was abolished beginning with the 2020 harvest, reforms affecting wheat and grain procurement were phased in and linked to the 2021 harvest. Ikromov referred to Article 36 of the Land Code, which sets out the procedure for termination of land-use rights where land is used irrationally or in violation of law. Detailed criteria — such as persistent underperformance relative to normative yield levels — are established in related regulatory acts rather than in the Land Code text itself. “Under current legislation, the khokim (local governor) cannot independently seize land,” Ikromov said. “The case must be submitted to the court. Only a court can decide.” Ikromov cited reforms adopted beginning in 2022 and subsequently strengthened by presidential measures in 2024, which expanded electronic auction procedures and curtailed direct administrative land allocation. Complaints from Farmers Beginning in January, the Agrobiznes Association started receiving complaints from farmers, mainly in Syrdarya. “I personally received about 50 to 60 appeals,” Ikromov said. “In total, there were more than 100 messages, mostly through Telegram.” According to him, many complaints concerned pressure to voluntarily surrender land leases through notarized statements. Farmers alleged that they were being encouraged or pressured to go to a notary and sign documents relinquishing their land. “These were not isolated cases,” he said. “In some districts, it was widespread. But after the issue was raised publicly, the process shifted. Now cases are going through courts.” Ikromov noted that unusual weather conditions contributed to the problem. Heatwaves and water shortages in 2024 made it difficult for some farmers to meet normative yield levels. In areas like Xovos, where soil fertility is relatively low, he said, agricultural production is already more challenging. Legal Process and Court Outcomes Following public attention, including Ikromov’s interview with the Uzbek outlet Kun.uz, land disputes increasingly...

Water Management

Kazakhstan’s Reservoirs Prepared for Spring Flooding

Kazakhstan’s authorities have announced that the country’s water management infrastructure is prepared for the spring flood period. According to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, the total available storage capacity in the country’s large reservoirs exceeds the projected volume of snowmelt inflows, with the highest water levels currently recorded in the eastern regions. Flood preparedness has remained a priority for the government since 2024, when Kazakhstan experienced its most severe spring flooding in 80 years. The disaster affected dozens of settlements and forced the evacuation of more than 120,000 people, drawing sharp criticism of local authorities. In response, the central government intensified coordination efforts and preventive measures. As of February, the ministry reported that the total available storage capacity in large reservoirs exceeds 14.3 billion cubic meters. Projected spring inflows are estimated at between 9.1 billion and 13.9 billion cubic meters. The ministry also announced inspections of hydraulic infrastructure and ongoing repair work at 39 facilities. Major repairs have been completed at the Charske Reservoir in the Abai region, the Akzhar Reservoir in Shymkent, the Sholak Dam in the Aktobe region, and the reconstructed dam in the village of Stepnoye in the Kostanay region. In addition, riverbed preparation measures are underway. Under the 2025-2027 Roadmap for River Rehabilitation, nearly 167 kilometers of riverbeds in western, central, and northern regions have already been cleaned and deepened. In 2026, similar work is planned across six additional regions, covering approximately 193 kilometers. Kazakhstan has also strengthened coordination with neighboring countries. In 2025, a joint working group was established with Russia to address flooding and elevated water levels, including along the transboundary Ural River. The final forecast for water levels in the basin is expected in early March. According to Kazakh officials, the Russian side has stated that water discharges from the Iriklinskoye Reservoir during the flood period will not exceed 200 cubic meters per second. An emergency notification and monitoring system for transboundary water flows along the Irtysh River is also in operation with China, including regular exercises and communication checks. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that in 2025 Kazakhstan began releasing water from key reservoirs as early as January to increase available storage capacity ahead of the spring flood season.

War in Ukraine

Why Tajikistan Does Not Prosecute Individuals for Participation in the War in Ukraine

Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has been ongoing for nearly four years, and media outlets have repeatedly reported that citizens of Tajikistan are participating in the fighting. However, Tajikistan’s authorities state that no criminal cases have been initiated against citizens on these grounds. The country’s top law enforcement officials have explained their position. At a press conference, Khabibullo Vokhidzoda said that over the past year no citizen of Tajikistan had been prosecuted for participation in Russia’s war in Ukraine. He noted that many of those involved hold Russian citizenship. According to Vokhidzoda, such individuals are legally obligated to fulfill the military duties of the country whose citizenship they possess. “Under Tajikistan’s legislation, we do not have the right to initiate criminal proceedings against citizens who also hold Russian citizenship and who participated in the conflict with Ukraine under an agreement with that country,” he said. At the same time, he clarified that if a Tajik citizen who does not hold Russian citizenship takes part in hostilities abroad, a criminal case will be opened. “The provisions of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan will definitely be applied to such actions. This is Article 401, Part 1 of the Criminal Code, which concerns illegal participation in armed clashes abroad,” the prosecutor general emphasized. He added that the agency currently does not have verified official data on such cases. Vokhidzoda expressed a similar position in the summer of 2025. Interior Minister Ramazon Rahimzoda confirmed that no criminal cases have been initiated in this category. “We do not keep records of how many of our citizens are participating in the war in Ukraine, and we have no obligations in this regard,” he said. For several years, media outlets have reported that thousands of Tajik nationals are involved in the conflict, with some estimates suggesting that the number of fatalities has reached into the hundreds. No official Tajik government body has confirmed or denied these figures. On February 12, reports emerged of the death of 26-year-old Karomatullo Odinaev. His body was returned to his native village of Basmand in Devashtich district for burial. In 2025, the remains of other deceased Tajik nationals were also repatriated. Tajikistan’s legislation prohibits the illegal participation of citizens and stateless persons in armed formations or military operations abroad. Article 401, Part 1 of the Criminal Code provides for a prison sentence of between 12 and 20 years for such offenses. However, individuals who voluntarily cease participation in armed groups before the end of a conflict and who have not committed other crimes may be exempt from criminal liability. Approaches to the issue differ across Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, a 38-year-old citizen was sentenced to three years in prison for participating in the war against Ukraine. According to the State Security Service, between 2022 and mid-2025, 338 criminal cases were opened over citizens’ participation in armed conflicts abroad. In Kazakhstan, authorities reportedly opened around 700 criminal cases in 2025 involving citizens conscripted into Russian military service, with several convictions handed down. Criminal...

TCA Interviews

Kyrgyzstan Between the Russian World and Global Chaos: An Interview With Deputy Prime Minister Edil Baisalov

Edil Baisalov is a politician who began his career as a civil-rights activist, became a prominent member of Kyrgyzstan’s non-governmental organization (NGO) sector, and is now serving as the country’s Deputy Prime Minister. In an exclusive interview with The Times of Central Asia, he explained not only how his views have changed over the years, but also how Kyrgyzstan is seeking to find its place in what he described as a rapidly changing global landscape. In Baisalov’s assessment, the global system is facing a crisis of democracy. “The world order, as we know it, is collapsing – or at least is under attack from both within and without,” Baisalov told TCA. “The era of global hypocrisy is over, and the people of Kyrgyzstan have woken up. “What various international institutions have taught us over the years – their lectures on how to develop an economy, how to pursue nation-building, and so forth – has been proven wrong. Throughout the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was one of the most diligent students of the liberal policies promoted by the “Chicago Boys.” We followed their instructions to the letter. Kyrgyzstan was the first post-Soviet country to join the World Trade Organization in 1998, and we were the first to receive normalized trade relations with the U.S. with the permanent repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. All of our previous governments followed IMF conditionality dictates to the letter, especially in deregulation, mass privatization, and all the austerity programs and budget sequestrations. We were promised prosperity; that the free markets and the invisible hand would take care of everything. But it did not work. “I remember it well: at the time, U.S. President Bill Clinton laughed at China, saying that Beijing needed to adopt certain policies, to liberalize, or that science could not prosper in a closed society. He claimed the Chinese model was doomed to fail, arguing that scientific and technological breakthroughs could only occur in a Western-style society with minimal state intervention. Yet today, we witness the triumphant rise of the People’s Republic of China. This is not only an emergence but also a return to the rightful place of a great civilization that has, for millennia, contributed enormously to humankind.” TCA: Does this mean you now see China, rather than the West, as a model for Kyrgyzstan to follow? Baisalov: It’s not about the Chinese model or any particular foreign template. What we understood is that as a nation, we are in competition with other nations. Just like corporations compete with each other, nations must look out for themselves. If our state does not actively develop industries and sciences, there is no formula for success. All those ideologies promoting the “invisible hand” – the idea that everything will naturally flourish on its own – are simply false. TCA: When did Kyrgyzstan stop taking orders from outside forces and begin making independent national decisions? Baisalov: We used to be naive about wanting to be liked by others. But not anymore. In the last five years of...

Power Struggle

Japarov Breaks the Kyrgyz Tandem

When Kamchybek Tashiyev returned to Bishkek from medical travel abroad after losing his post as Chairman of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB), as well as the deputy chairmanship of the Cabinet of Ministers, he returned to a system already being disassembled. Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov dismissed him on February 10, ending a five-year arrangement in which the presidency and the security apparatus were closely fused. The decision deliberately dismantled the governing tandem that had defined Kyrgyzstan’s power structure since 2020. The immediate question was whether this was a closing of an episode or the opening of a new one. The first wave of moves suggests the latter: a transition toward a more personalized presidency, with the internal-security bloc fractured and its succession logic unsettled. Japarov publicly framed the decision as preempting an institutional split. He explicitly pointed to parliamentary groupings that began sorting deputies into “pro-president” versus “pro-general” camps. Russian-language coverage has tended to present the episode as an effort to end a dual-power configuration, not merely to remove one official. This narrative implies that the state’s operative center of gravity had already begun drifting away from predictable office-holding and toward informal allegiance tests. Once such a dynamic becomes evident, according to such a telling, the preservation of regime coherence often requires rapid, coercive re-centering. Domestic Political Configurations The first domestic signal was indeed speed. Along with Tashiyev, senior security officials were removed, and an acting head was installed pending parliamentary procedures. The point here was not just about personnel but about the timing: the presidency moved first, then moved again, so that no alternative pole could consolidate inside the security institutions. If the system had been built around a Japarov–Tashiyev tandem, then the immediate dismantling of Tashiyev’s proximate layers was also a message to the broader stakeholder society that the presidency would decide who inherits the southern security networks and clan linkages. Japarov was clearly conveying a signal of dominance that ruled out negotiation. A second signal came through parliament. Speaker Nurlanbek Turgunbek uulu resigned shortly after the dismissal, amid reporting that he was politically close to Tashiyev and vulnerable once the security bloc shifted. Russian reporting treated the speaker’s resignation as part of the same chain reaction set off by the February 10 decree. This was part of a pattern whereby institutional actors in Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics reorient quickly toward whoever appears to be winning in the short term. Loyalty is anticipatory because the penalty for backing the wrong camp can arrive through law enforcement, prosecutorial pressure, or reputational destruction. A third signal emerged through the revived early-election debate. The open-letter campaign and talk about a “snap election” did not arise in a vacuum; it built on a preexisting argument about constitutional timing and mandate renewal. That development provided a political vocabulary for testing whether the tandem’s first stage had ended. The credible possibility of early elections has destabilized patronage, compelling every member of the political class at every level to recalculate expectations. Every political actor...