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New U.S. Anti-Russian Sanctions Could Spell Trouble for Central Asian Economies

On January 10, 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department announced a new package of sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector. The measures, which affect a wide range of organizations and individuals, are set to take effect on February 27. While ostensibly aimed at undermining Russia’s economic interests amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the sanctions are likely to have significant repercussions for Central Asian countries given their close economic ties with Russian energy giants. The sanctions package, viewed by some analysts as a final move by the outgoing Biden administration, could become a potent tool for the incoming administration to exert influence over Russian interests in Central Asia. Sanctions on Gazpromneft Subsidiaries The new sanctions include restrictions on Gazpromneft's subsidiaries operating in Central Asia. Affected entities include Gazpromneft Tajikistan, Gazpromneft Kazakhstan, Gazpromneft Asia (Kyrgyzstan), and Munai Myrza (Kyrgyzstan). According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Gazpromneft and its regional subsidiaries are considered critical sources of revenue that support Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine. In response, Gazpromneft characterized the sanctions as "unfounded, illegitimate and contrary to the principles of free competition." The impact of these sanctions, however, could prove severe for the economies of Central Asia, where Gazpromneft plays a key role in the energy sector. Gazpromneft Asia, for example, is a major supplier of petroleum products in Kyrgyzstan, making it a critical player in the domestic market. Sanctions on the company could disrupt fuel supplies and drive up energy prices in the country. Gazpromneft Kazakhstan LLP, based in Almaty, operates a network of Gazpromneft-branded gas stations in Kazakhstan. While disruptions to fuel supplies in this network might not critically affect Kazakhstan’s economy - the largest in Central Asia - the sanctions carry broader implications. Threats to Joint Projects Beyond direct sanctions on companies, several executives of Russian oil firms actively operating in Kazakhstan have been added to the U.S. sanctions list. Key figures include Vadim Vorobyev, President of Lukoil PJSC and a member of Kazakhstan’s Foreign Investors Council. Lukoil is a strategic partner of KazMunaiGas (KMG) in production and exploration projects; Nail Maganov, CEO of Tatneft, which collaborates with KMG on projects such as Karaton Podsolovaya, Butadiene, and the Saran Tire Plant; Alexander Dyukov, the Chairman of Gazpromneft, and Sergei Kudryashov, CEO of Zarubezhneft, which has signed letters of intent for joint projects with KMG. These sanctions could complicate existing partnerships and delay key projects, undermining Kazakhstan’s energy sector and its broader economic growth. Sanctions on Rosatom and Nuclear Energy Another significant element of the sanctions package is the inclusion of Rosatom executives on the U.S. sanctions list. This development poses challenges to Kazakhstan’s plans to establish an international consortium - including representatives from France, South Korea, China, and Russia - to build a nuclear power plant. With Rosatom facing restrictions, the consortium is now likely to exclude Russia, potentially straining relations between Astana and Moscow. A global leader in nuclear energy, Rosatom was expected to play a central role in the project. Kazakhstan may now explore alternative arrangements, balancing its energy ambitions with the...

Politics Nazarbayev Reforms Interview Tokayev Trump Geopolitics president Foreign Policy

Tokayev on Kazakhstan’s Future: Reforms, Diplomacy, and Global Leadership

In an interview with the Kazakh newspaper Ana Tili, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev discussed pressing domestic and international policy issues shaping Kazakhstan's development. Tokayev highlighted Kazakhstan’s role as a stabilizing force in the international arena during a time of heightened geopolitical tensions. “My main goal is to strengthen the economic potential, sovereignty, and international position of our state. From the very beginning of my presidency, I have taken full responsibility for the decisions I make and their consequences. I cannot and do not want to work any other way,” Tokayev stated. [caption id="attachment_27253" align="aligncenter" width="750"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Reflecting on Qantar - Building a Just Kazakhstan Tokayev addressed the January 2022 unrest - Qantar - describing the upheaval as a consequence of deep-rooted social injustice and political stagnation. “Three years after Qantar, most of our citizens understand that the unprecedented unrest was driven by social inequality, political stagnation, and the self-serving ambitions of the conspirators,” Tokayev said, warning against the spread of misinformation surrounding the events and emphasized that decisive action was necessary to preserve Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. Tokayev reiterated his commitment to creating a fairer Kazakhstan where all citizens are equal before the law. “Justice is not universal equalization. My course on the fair distribution of national wealth does not mean total expropriation or redistribution of property and assets. Such a policy would lead to degradation and chaos. Instead, we aim to eliminate illegal privileges and return unlawfully acquired assets to the state as part of our modernization strategy,” the president said. Relations with Nazarbayev While acknowledging the achievements of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan’s first president, Tokayev also critiqued certain aspects of his leadership. “After resigning but remaining chairman of the Security Council, he often held meetings with key officials, creating confusion and sparking rumors of dual power. This situation led some to claim that the Elbasy Institute should supersede presidential authority,” Tokayev noted. He further revealed that Nazarbayev had considered returning to power in 2021, citing his strong ties to Moscow. Advancing Political Reforms and International Relations Tokayev pointed to the successful implementation of key political reforms, emphasizing greater openness and the activation of public participation. “The concept of ‘Strong President, Influential Parliament, Accountable Government’ best suits Kazakhstan’s political system. However, achieving this fully requires sustained effort,” Tokayev explained, reaffirming his belief that a presidential system remains the optimal governance model for Kazakhstan. Tokayev also elaborated on relations with major powers, including Russia, China, and the United States, underscoring the importance of Kazakhstan’s partnership with Russia, highlighting their shared border and deep economic ties. “President Putin is an experienced statesman who values Kazakhstan’s strategic importance as Central Asia’s largest economy. Our constant communication fosters stability in Eurasia,” Tokayev said. He described Kazakhstan’s cooperation with China as dynamic and multifaceted, elevating their relationship to the level of an "eternal strategic partnership." Tokayev also mentioned his conversation with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, noting Trump’s positive view of Kazakhstan as a strategic partner. Nuclear Power Plans, Middle Powers and Global Stability On nuclear energy, Tokayev...

Politics International Diplomacy Foreign Policy Foreign Affairs president International Relations Government

Diplomacy in Detail: Where Each Central Asian Leader Traveled to in 2024

Central Asia is often synonymous with the term "multi-vector foreign policy," enabling its nations to navigate the competing interests of global and regional powers effectively. This "open door" strategy, grounded in the principle of "my friend's friend is my friend," has consistently granted Central Asian countries a distinctive role on the international stage, aiding them in achieving their foreign policy objectives despite shifting geopolitical dynamics. Drawing from official sources, we analyze the frequency and geography of foreign visits by the leaders of Central Asia in 2024, offering insights into their diplomatic engagements. Turkmenistan President Serdar Berdimuhamedov embarked on eight foreign trips in 2024. Among these, only one - a bilateral visit to Malaysia - was not tied to multilateral events. The other seven engagements showcased Turkmenistan’s participation in global diplomacy: XVI BRICS Summit (Kazan) CIS Heads of State Summit (Moscow) Victory Day Celebration (Moscow) Informal CIS Leaders' Meeting (St. Petersburg) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (Astana) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) This year, Berdimuhamedov visited Russia four times, and Kazakhstan twice, and made single trips to the UAE and Malaysia. In parallel, his father and the previous president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, conducted 10 trips, including four bilateral visits to the UAE and Tajikistan and two to Iran. His international commitments included: One Water Summit (Riyadh) Turkic States’ Council of Elders (Budapest) V World Nomad Games Opening Ceremony (Astana) SCO Summit (Astana) Russia-Islamic World: KazanForum (Kazan) Antalya Diplomatic Forum (Antalya) Tajikistan President Emomali Rahmon undertook 22 foreign trips in 2024, six of which were bilateral, with visits to Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Italy/Vatican, and Qatar (twice). Multilateral engagements included: CSTO Summit (Astana) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) Sixth Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Leaders (Astana) SCO Plus Meeting (Astana) COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit (Riyadh) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) UN General Assembly (New York) Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev made 18 international visits, including state visits to Turkey, China, and Tajikistan. He participated in numerous events: COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Turkic States Informal Summit (Shusha) Arab-Islamic Summit (Riyadh) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) SCO Meeting (Astana) BRICS+ Summit (Kazan) Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev led the region in diplomatic outreach with 23 visits. Eleven of these were state visits to Hungary, Serbia, France, Italy/Vatican, Qatar, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Mongolia, and Singapore. Key multilateral events included: Doha Forum (Doha) One Water Summit (Riyadh) COP29 Climate Conference (Baku) Boao Forum (Boao) Tokayev visited Russia five times, and Azerbaijan three times, and made additional trips to Saudi Arabia, UAE, and other countries in Europe and Asia. Kyrgyzstan President Sadyr Japarov also made 23 foreign visits, including eight state visits to South Korea, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Germany, Austria, and Italy/Vatican. He attended numerous multilateral forums: CSTO Summit (Astana) Central Asia-Germany Summit (Astana) UN COP28 Conference (Dubai) BRICS+ Summit (Kazan) Japarov visited Russia five times, and Kazakhstan four times, and made single trips to several European and Asian countries. In 2024, Tokayev and Japarov led the region in the number of foreign visits. While...

Russia Politics International Relations Chechen Chechnya

Tensions Rise as Uzbek Leaders Respond to Ramzan Kadyrov’s Remarks

Uzbekistan has placed two residents of Chechnya, Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov, on Interpol’s wanted list. The Times of Central Asia has previously reported that the two men are accused of multiple crimes, including a plot to assassinate Komil Allamjonov, the former head of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev's information policy department, and Dmitry Li, head of the National Agency for Prospective Projects (NAPP). Rasayev and Temirkhanov were reportedly offered $1.5 million for the assassinations. Chechnya's leader Ramzan Kadyrov has called the arrest warrants "fabrications". Kadyrov claims that pro-Western media are spreading baseless rumors about divisions within Mirziyoyev’s family as part of a larger effort to destabilize the country’s leadership. The attempt on Allamjonov's life is said to have taken place on October 26 outside his home in Tashkent’s Kibray district. According to Uzbek media, two unidentified individuals fired multiple shots at Allamjonov’s car before fleeing the scene. No injuries were reported. Opposition outlets speculated about a “Chechen connection,” suggesting Kadyrov’s possible involvement in the attack. In an earlier statement, Kadyrov said that “if I had really planned something, I would have completed it with a 100% result.” He also expressed skepticism about the investigation’s timeline, noting that Li was identified as a secondary target only months after the probe began. Kadyrov suggested that the case could be part of internal “behind-the-scenes games” orchestrated by certain groups. In response, Uzbek officials and lawmakers condemned Kadyrov’s statements and threats. Rasul Kusherbayev, a former deputy and adviser to the Minister of Ecology, described Kadyrov’s comments as terrorism. “Open threats to officials in Uzbekistan are terrorism. Those who make such statements or attempt such actions must be held accountable,” he said. Kusherbayev also criticized the Uzbek government for remaining silent in the face of these threats. “Why should the government of Uzbekistan remain silent? How long will we tolerate those who openly threaten us with chauvinistic views? The response should go beyond mere statements - it should involve concrete measures. If necessary, flights to Grozny should be canceled, and every Chechen citizen entering Uzbekistan should be strictly vetted,” he added. Odiljon Tojiyev, a deputy of Uzbekistan’s Legislative Chamber, similarly denounced Kadyrov’s interference in Uzbekistan’s internal affairs and his threats against Uzbek officials. He warned that such actions could harm relations between Uzbekistan and Chechnya. “I call on the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Russian Federation to assess Ramzan Kadyrov’s threats against Uzbek officials. Moreover, Kadyrov should issue a public apology to the people of Uzbekistan. If he is truly a friend, he should assist Uzbekistan’s Prosecutor General’s Office in locating and extraditing Bislan Rasayev and Shamil Temirkhanov,” Tojiyev stated. Kadyrov’s remarks and the allegations surrounding the assassination attempt have brought tensions between Uzbekistan and Chechnya into the spotlight. While Uzbekistan values its friendly relations with Russia and its regions, the controversy has prompted calls for firm action to protect the country’s sovereignty and ensure accountability.

Politics Almaty History Local politics Independence Day

Marked by Tragedy: Why Kazakhstan’s Independence Day Is a Day of Reflection

On December 16, Kazakhstan marks Independence Day, commemorating the adoption of the Law on Independence and State Sovereignty of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1991. Until 2022, the country observed this holiday over two days - December 16 and 17 - but recent legislative changes have reduced the celebration to a single day. The amendments to the Law on Holidays in the Republic of Kazakhstan, adopted in September 2022, redefined the country’s official holidays. Republic Day on October 25 regained its national holiday status, while December 1 - Day of the First President - was removed as a public holiday. Independence Day, while still classified as a state holiday, was given a more somber tone, with official emphasis placed on honoring the sacrifices that paved the way to sovereignty. [caption id="attachment_26631" align="aligncenter" width="1204"] @TCA, Askar KubaizhanovIndependence monument[/caption] From Republic Day to Independence Day The roots of Republic Day lie in Kazakhstan’s Declaration of State Sovereignty, adopted on October 25, 1990, as the Soviet Union was nearing its collapse. The declaration symbolized Kazakhstan’s first step toward independence. However, following the country’s full independence in 1991, December 16 became the primary national holiday. Republic Day lost its significance in 2009 but was reinstated as a national holiday in 2022. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in his proposal to restore Republic Day, emphasized its role as the foundation of Kazakhstan’s independence journey. He suggested that Independence Day, while significant, should serve as a time for mourning and remembrance to honor those who contributed to the country’s sovereignty. [caption id="attachment_26632" align="aligncenter" width="1600"] @TCA, Askar Kubaizhanov[/caption] The Legacy of December 1986: Zheltoksan Protests December 16 carries weighty historical significance for Kazakhstan. On this day in 1986, protests erupted in Alma-Ata (now Almaty) after Moscow appointed Gennady Kolbin - a Soviet official with no prior ties to Kazakhstan - as head of the Kazakh SSR. Young Kazakh protesters demanded the application of the Korenization principle, which advocated for local leadership in Soviet republics. The protests, often viewed as a precursor to Kazakhstan’s independence movement, were violently suppressed by Soviet authorities. The operation reportedly codenamed “Blizzard,” was designed to provoke unrest and then crush it through bloodshed. Controversially, Nursultan Nazarbayev, who would later become Kazakhstan’s first president, was aligned with Soviet power at the time. In his memoir "Without Right and Left, "Nazarbayev claimed he led one of the protest columns during the demonstrations. For many Kazakh citizens, particularly those who participated in or were affected by the events, December 16-17 remain days of mourning. Almaty’s Peace Street was renamed Zheltoksan Street to honor the memory of the victims. December 2011: The Zhanaozen Tragedy The somber tone surrounding Independence Day was reinforced by the events of December 16, 2011, in Zhanaozen. For months prior, oil workers in the Mangystau region had been on strike, demanding better wages. The protests escalated when workers occupied the city’s central square. On Independence Day, clashes broke out between protesters and local officials during holiday celebrations. The situation turned violent when a group of...

Syria Politics

Central Asia, a Possible Winner in Regional Reshuffle Over Syria

There has been talk about who’s up and who’s down since the Syrian rebel offensive that ousted President Bashar Assad this month. Central Asia might end up as a winner on the geopolitical scorecard, according to one theory. For Syrians, the future depends on whether the country can stabilize under a new government or is headed for fresh conflict. But here’s the international fallout so far: Russia, Iran and the Hezbollah group in Lebanon, key backers of Assad during years of civil war, lost power and influence in the region. Turkey, which supported some rebel groups, has more clout in Syria, where it opposes Syrian Kurdish forces. Israel has benefited because its enemy Hezbollah has lost a supply route through Syria from patron Iran, though it says it is striking Syrian military sites because threats remain. There could be economic gains for Central Asia, far from the maneuvers on the ground in Syria. Some analysts believe an ascendant Turkey will call in some favors from Russia, which along with Iran is on the backfoot. One thing that Turkey and Central Asian trading partners really want is the opening of a land route, the so-called Zanzegur corridor, in the South Caucasus, and Russia can possibly help to make that happen. The 43-kilometer corridor, which is expected to make land trade between East Asia and Europe more efficient, would connect Azerbaijan with its enclave of Nakhchivan, passing through Armenia before joining with Turkey and European markets beyond. The transport connection is supposed to open under a 2020 cease-fire agreement following Azerbaijan’s military success against Armenia, with Russia as a security guarantor. But Zanzegur remains contentious because of Armenian concerns over sovereignty and a final peace deal is yet to be signed. Now, the theory goes, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could push Russian President Vladimir Putin for an assist on Zanzegur in exchange for apparently helping Russia evacuate troops from Syria, and for possibly helping Moscow form a relationship with the new Syrian leadership. “What will Turkey demand from Russia? Perhaps lighter terms for the supply of key energy supplies now at threat from US sanctions,” economist Timothy Ash wrote in an analysis. “Russian agreement also perhaps over Azeri and Turkish access to Nakhichevan [through] the Zangezur corridor and on to Central Asia? Putin now owes Erdogan. He will collect.” Ahmad Vakhshiteh, a senior lecturer at RUDN University in Moscow, made a similar argument, saying in an interview with German media outlet DW that Turkey could use Syria leverage to advance wider geopolitical goals such as the Zanzegur corridor. Under the 2020 cease-fire deal, Russian border guards would control transport on the corridor, whose opening could also benefit Russia´s trade connections. But Russian influence has decreased as Armenia has all but withdrawn from a regional, Russian-led security pact and increasingly looks for Western partnerships. There has also been some discussion of bypassing Armenia and building an adjacent land corridor through Iranian territory, though Iran’s own trade and security interests are big factors. ...