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Obituary

Obituary – Kristopher White: The Gentle Giant Who Inspired a Generation of Central Asian Scholars

Kristopher Dodge White, known to his friends simply as “Kris”, was a distinguished scholar, mentor, and friend, who dedicated two decades of his life to academia in Kazakhstan. Kris was a gentle giant, someone people naturally gravitated toward. Respected and loved by friends, colleagues and students alike, his personality left an indelible mark on everyone he met. In terms of professional discipline, Kris was a geographer, having conducted undergraduate studies at Clark University and an MA and a PhD at the University of Connecticut. He established himself as a leading interdisciplinary scholar of Central Asia, advancing our understanding of post-Soviet transitions, environmental crises, and the interplay between human societies and their landscapes. Kris’s life work is a testament to the power of geography as a lens for understanding complex regional challenges. Future scholarship will undoubtedly build upon his illuminating insights into the interdependencies of nature, economy, and identity. [caption id="attachment_28957" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Kristopher White in his office at KIMEP, 2023[/caption] Kris was a prolific writer and researcher, devoting much of his work to the study of the Aral Sea and highlighting the ecological and social challenges of the region. His work excelled in weaving environmental and economic themes with cultural analysis. For example, he explored how the endangered snow leopard has become a symbolic linchpin for Kazakhstan’s national identity, ecotourism marketing, and international conservation agendas. As an educator at KIMEP University since 2004, Kris helped shape a generation of Central Asian scholars through courses like Oil Geopolitics and The Aral Sea Crisis: A Geographical Perspective. His pedagogical approach—rooted in regional case studies —exemplified his commitment to place-based learning. [caption id="attachment_28958" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Back in Almaty[/caption] Beyond his professional work, Kris had an adventurous spirit. His love for travel took him across the globe, capturing the beauty of the world through his keen eye for photography. Whether exploring the vast Kazakh steppe, documenting the remnants of the Aral Sea, or wandering through historic cities, he found joy in sharing stories through his lens. He later developed and taught a course on photojournalism at KIMEP. Kris and I overlapped at KIMEP for four years (2004-08). I always appreciated that irrespective of the challenges of any given day, he was an oasis of calm and fun, liking nothing better than to unwind over a glass of Kazakh beer or Georgian wine. Kris was the epitome of a true friend who would never let you down, someone who always had your back and you had his ear. We made several unforgettable road trips throughout Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. [caption id="attachment_28959" align="aligncenter" width="2560"] Kristopher White with Donnacha Ó Beacháin, 2023 [/caption] Kris passed away while visiting his family in Florida. Today, the 21st February, would have been his 56th birthday. He had so many plans for the future, and it’s heartbreaking that he won’t see them come to fruition. Those who knew him will forever remember his kindness and wisdom. His legacy lives on in the minds he inspired, the friendships he nurtured, and the body of...

Energy

Ukrainian Drone Strike Disrupts Kazakhstan’s Oil Exports

On February 17, Ukrainian drones struck the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station, a key component of the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) in Russia’s Krasnodar region. The CPC, a 1,500-kilometer pipeline, transports crude from Kazakhstan’s Tengiz field to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a crucial hub for global exports. The attack, confirmed by CPC operators, resulted in the temporary shutdown of the Kropotkinskaya station, the largest such facility on Russian soil. No casualties or oil spills were reported. Ukrainian sources, including the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and Special Operations Forces (SOF), claimed responsibility, citing the pipeline’s role in supporting Russia’s military-industrial complex. The strike reportedly involved seven drones armed with high-explosive warheads, significantly damaging energy infrastructure, including a gas turbine unit and a substation. Russian authorities estimated a 30–40 percent reduction in CPC throughput for the next six to eight weeks, affecting global supply chains. While CPC pipeline operators have not disclosed a precise timeline for repairs, the anticipated disruptions will inevitably place additional pressure on global energy markets. The degree of damage inflicted raises questions about the vulnerability of Russian energy infrastructure and the efficacy of existing defense systems in preventing such attacks. The CPC pipeline handles a substantial share of Kazakhstan’s oil exports. In 2023, it transported 63.5 million tons, or approximately 1.27 million barrels per day (bpd), with 90 percent of that volume originating in Kazakhstan. This pipeline disruption translates into a projected drop in Kazakh oil flows from 1.143 million bpd to an estimated range of 0.69 to 0.80 million bpd. Consequently, Kazakhstan’s total crude exports—including volumes transported via alternative routes such as the Trans-Caspian corridor and rail—are expected to decline by up to 28.6 percent. The revenue impact could be severe given oil’s centrality to Kazakhstan’s economy. Even a short-term disruption will reverberate across multiple sectors, affecting fiscal revenues and potentially leading to a recalibration of investment strategies within the country’s energy sector. Although Kazakhstan has sought to diversify its oil export routes since 2022, alternatives remain limited. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), connecting Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan via the Caspian Sea and then onward through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, carried just 1.8 million tons in 2023. This is but a fraction of CPC’s capacity. Other options, such as the Druzhba pipeline to Europe and rail transport, are constrained by infrastructure bottlenecks and geopolitical risks. Given these constraints, Astana has increasingly prioritized the expansion of maritime oil exports, including investments in new tankers and port facilities. However, logistical challenges, cost considerations, and geopolitical uncertainties continue to complicate Kazakhstan’s ability to execute a seamless transition away from Russian transit routes. The attack underscores the vulnerability of Russia’s energy infrastructure amid the ongoing war. Unlike previous Ukrainian strikes targeting refineries and storage depots, this is a direct hit on a critical transit corridor with transnational implications. The disruption may accelerate Astana’s long-term push for diversification, including investment in new tankers and expanded partnerships with U.S. and European firms. In light of these developments, Kazakhstan...

Transport

Kazakhstan Fears Electric Cars Will Strain Energy Infrastructure

Kazakhstani lawmaker Nauryz Saylaubai has raised concerns over the country’s ability to support the growing number of electric vehicles (EVs), citing infrastructure challenges and regulatory gaps. In a request to First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar, the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament) member called for urgent measures to address these issues. Growing Number of Electric Vehicles According to the Bureau of National Statistics, the share of electric-powered vehicles in Kazakhstan remains relatively small. As of February 1, 2025, the country had 12,655 registered electric cars, 350 electric trucks, and 189 electric buses. In contrast, there were 4.45 million gasoline-powered cars, 91,100 diesel-powered vehicles, 10,100 gas-powered cars, and 400,300 hybrid vehicles running on a mix of gasoline, gas, and electricity. Despite the low overall share, EV adoption has been accelerating. A year ago, on February 1, 2024, Kazakhstan had only 8,366 electric cars, 277 electric trucks, and 38 electric buses. This represents a 25% increase in electric cars and a fivefold rise in electric buses over the past year. Energy Infrastructure Concerns The rapid growth of EVs has raised concerns among lawmakers about the ability of Kazakhstan’s aging power grid to handle the additional demand. "It is well known that an increase in the number of electric vehicles puts additional pressure on power grids. Given that our grid infrastructure is already outdated, won't this lead to future accidents? What measures are being taken to address this issue?" Saylaubai asked. Kazakhstan’s EV market is expected to keep expanding, as electric vehicles are exempt from the country's scrappage tax and import registration fees, making them approximately 15% cheaper than conventional cars. Charging Infrastructure and Service Gaps Saylaubai also highlighted the country’s insufficient charging infrastructure. "According to international standards, the optimal ratio of electric vehicles to public charging stations should be 10 to 1. In Kazakhstan today, there is just one charging station for every 43 electric cars," the lawmaker noted. State-owned road infrastructure operator KazAutoZhol had planned to install 40 new charging stations along intercity highways in 2024, but by the end of last year, only 23 had been completed. Another major issue is the lack of service centers for EV repairs and maintenance, particularly in rural regions. Owners outside major cities struggle to find specialists and spare parts, while logistical challenges further complicate EV accessibility in remote areas. Saylaubai urged the government to develop a nationwide network of service stations and ensure the availability of spare parts. Legal Uncertainty Over Autopilot Systems The lawmaker also pointed to regulatory gaps regarding the use of autopilot features in electric vehicles. "The vast majority of electric cars are equipped with autopilot functions, but it remains unclear whether drivers are legally allowed to activate them within city limits or who would be held responsible in the event of an accident," he said. Additionally, he warned that electric cars can reach high speeds within seconds, potentially posing risks to road safety. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, Kazakhstan’s car market set a new record for...

Oil and Gas

Right Place, Right Time: Central Asia Basks in Russia’s Eastern Energy Pivot

On January 1, with the closure of pipelines through Ukraine, deliveries of Russian gas to Europe came to a virtual standstill. Prices across the continent have ratcheted up in the first six weeks of 2025 and have now hit two-year highs. In Central Asia, the effects of the Russo-European decoupling have also been profound. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan posted a 48% year-on-year increase in Russian gas imports, while Uzbekistan’s inbound gas purchases soared over 142% to $1.68 billion. But while Gazprom’s reorientation has been a boon to Central Asia’s economies, this phenomenon appears to be more than short-term supply dumping due to the war in Ukraine. Rather, it is part of a lasting trend that could define the region’s, and the world’s, energy map. Russia’s Supply Glut In 2018, Russia exported a record 201 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Europe. The closure of the Yamal and Nord Stream pipelines had already brought these supplies down to 49.5 bcm by 2024 and will be further impacted by the cut in supplies via Ukraine. Despite some gas supplied via Turkstream and a steady trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Russian gas supplied to Europe is a fraction of what it once was. The Central Asian market offers both short and long-term solutions to this. “Most likely, Gazprom views its expansion into Central Asia as a partial and immediate solution to the challenge of finding new markets for its gas,” said Shaimerden Chikanayev, a partner at GRATA International, a law firm. “While the region cannot fully replace the volumes or profit margins previously achieved in Europe, it offers a readily accessible and stable outlet for Russian gas exports.” Central Asia is accessible due to old Soviet pipelines that link the region to Moscow. These pipelines, known as Central Asia–Center, were originally built to take gas from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. This system has now been engineered to run in reverse. The pipeline has a capacity of around 50 bcm per year, but there are ongoing efforts to increase it. Still, this is only a quarter of what was once supplied to Europe, nor are the revenues as lucrative. In 2023, the average rate charged by Gazprom to Uzbekistan for gas was $160 per thousand cubic meters (tcm), this compares to European prices that fluctuated between $200-400tcm throughout the 2010s. For Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, the price is not a major factor. “Russia of course sells gas to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan lower than the market price. This is a politically motivated decision. And this is not just because it is struggling with [selling to] Eastern Europe. Russia could sell it to Central Asia at market prices, but this is the Russian approach towards its allies in the region,” he said. Central Asian Serendipity For Central Asian states, these new supplies have come at a good time. Countries such as Kyrgyzstan are trying hard to...

Organization of Turkic States

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters. A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...

Oil and Gas

Ukraine’s Drone Strike on Russian Oil Hub Sparks Concerns Over Kazakhstan’s Energy Security

On February 17, seven Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacked an oil transportation facility of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), targeting the Kropotkinskaya oil pumping station in Russia. Following the attack, reports emerged that the volume of oil pumped from Kazakhstan through the CPC could decrease by 30% for a period of one and a half to two months. Conflicting Reports on the Impact On February 18, Ukraine officially confirmed the strike. "Yesterday, the Ukrainian defense forces carried out a pinpoint strike on strategic facilities of the military and fuel and energy infrastructure of the Russian Federation... The Kropotkinskaya and Andriapol oil pumping stations, which played a key role in transporting fuel for the occupiers, were hit. After the strike, they were put out of action, significantly complicating the logistics of fuel supplies to the aggressor," the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine stated. Shortly after, Transneft, the Russian shareholder in the CPC, warned that oil pumping volumes from Kazakhstan could drop by approximately 30% due to the damage. Meanwhile, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak provided an even bleaker assessment. During a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, he stated: "We see a decrease in pumping volumes by about 30 - 40% compared to levels before the drone attack." Novak estimated that restoring the CPC infrastructure would take "several months, at least," citing the need to replace damaged Western-made equipment, including Siemens gas turbines. However, later that day, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy issued a statement disputing these claims. "Currently, there are no restrictions on Kazakh oil shipments via the CPC, and acceptance is proceeding as scheduled," the ministry said. Despite this, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov framed the attack as a direct assault on Kazakhstan’s energy infrastructure. Expert Perspectives: Overreaction or Serious Threat? While officials issued conflicting statements, financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov urged against panic. Writing on his Telegram channel ArtFinanze, he dismissed talk of a 30% reduction in pumping volumes as an "overreaction." However, he acknowledged that the attack exposed the risks of Kazakhstan’s reliance on foreign transit routes. "Geopolitical and other risks when exporting through third countries can easily double. It’s too early to panic; there are few catastrophic scenarios at this stage. But if attacks on infrastructure continue, it will become increasingly difficult to protect the underwater pipeline system, especially considering the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s recent losses. Kazakhstan’s oil facilities have been largely spared so far, but there’s no guarantee this will continue. Contrary to popular belief, the fact that companies like Chevron are involved won’t deter anyone; on the contrary, such infrastructure can be used to exert pressure on entire countries," he warned. Kazakhstan’s Dilemma: Dependence on Russian Routes While experts downplay immediate consequences, Kazakhstan’s vulnerability is undeniable. Calls to boost domestic petrochemical production to reduce dependence on foreign pipelines remain largely aspirational. Meanwhile, efforts to diversify oil export routes have yielded little progress. Currently, 93% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports pass through Russian territory, leaving the country with limited alternatives: Caspian Pipeline Consortium...