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Energy Security

Central Asia Rethinks Energy Security After the 2026 Fuel Crisis

The summer of 2026 marked a turning point for energy security in Central Asia. In July, drone strikes temporarily halted crude oil receipts and loadings at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) marine terminal in Novorossiysk. Although CPC resumed normal operations on July 27, the incident exposed the vulnerability of one of the region’s principal export routes to external security risks. Russia, which for decades has been Central Asia’s principal supplier of refined petroleum products, has also faced prolonged pressure in its domestic fuel market. Reduced utilization at some refineries and rising domestic demand have created longer-term challenges. Restrictions on gasoline and diesel exports have added to the pressure, affecting the Russian economy and neighboring states that have traditionally relied on Russian supplies. For three decades, Central Asia’s system for supplying refined fuels remained relatively stable. Russian refineries covered shortages in local markets, providing fuel that was both comparatively affordable and predictable in volume. The events of 2026, however, reaffirmed a basic principle of national security: during large-scale crises, governments tend to prioritize domestic stability over external trade commitments. For Central Asian states, this has prompted a fundamental reassessment of long-established approaches to energy security. Any strategy dependent on a single external supplier ultimately becomes vulnerable to disruptions beyond its control, regardless of their origin. The current crisis has also revealed significant differences in how well prepared the region’s governments are to protect their domestic fuel markets. Kyrgyzstan has proved the most vulnerable. The country consumes around 1.6 million metric tons of fuel annually, with 90-95% of supplies imported from Russia. Faced with a sharp reduction in available supplies during May and June 2026, the Kyrgyz authorities were forced to begin urgent negotiations with alternative suppliers, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Uzbekistan has been in a somewhat stronger position. Until recently, Russian companies dominated the country’s imported gasoline market. During the first five months of 2026, Uzbekistan spent more than $1 billion on imports of crude oil and petroleum products, while spending on motor gasoline imports increased by 85.1% compared with the same period a year earlier. Tashkent has responded by prioritizing strategic fuel reserves. Ahead of the coming autumn and winter season, the government has begun building a 120,000-metric-ton reserve of motor gasoline. Kazakhstan, meanwhile, enjoys a considerably higher degree of energy self-sufficiency thanks to its developed refining sector, centered on the modernized refineries in Atyrau, Pavlodar, and Shymkent. It is therefore unsurprising that Bishkek turned first to Astana when seeking emergency fuel supplies. Kazakhstan’s potential to serve as a regional supplier nevertheless has clear limits. The country’s domestic fuel market periodically comes under structural pressure during the spring and autumn agricultural seasons and when planned maintenance is carried out at its refineries. As a result, Astana must balance support for its regional partners with maintaining stability at home. Although Kazakhstan annually agrees with Russia on duty-free import quotas of up to 1.12 million metric tons of Russian petroleum products under the indicative fuel balance mechanism, the current...

Electricity Shortages

Tajikistan Prepares for Another Winter Power Shortfall

Tajikistan is preparing for another autumn and winter in which electricity demand may outstrip supply. Network losses have fallen, and investment in hydropower continues, but officials say the seasonal imbalance between generation and consumption will persist. Mahmadumar Asozoda, chairman of state-owned power company Barki Tojik, said the imbalance would persist through the colder months. Asked whether electricity rationing would return, he did not rule it out. Tajikistan generates almost all of its electricity from hydropower, leaving supply tied to seasonal river flows. Output rises during the warmer months, when the country can meet domestic demand and export surplus electricity. In winter, river flows decline as electricity use increases for heating, creating a recurring shortfall. To cover part of the winter shortfall, Tajikistan plans to import electricity from Uzbekistan again. The two countries use a seasonal exchange: Uzbekistan supplies power in autumn and winter, and Tajikistan returns an equivalent volume during summer. Tajikistan imported 306 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) last winter, down from 350 million kWh a year earlier. Asozoda said the countries expect to sign a new agreement before the next autumn-winter season. Imports can ease the shortage, but they do not remove Tajikistan's dependence on hydropower or the winter drop in output. The seasonal arrangement with Uzbekistan gives Tajikistan access to power when domestic generation is lowest. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has signed a 20-year agreement to buy electricity from Tajikistan. Deliveries are expected to depend on additional generating capacity at the Rogun Hydropower Plant. The Nurek Reservoir stood at 888.21 meters on July 13, but Energy and Water Resources Minister Daler Juma said Tajikistan was experiencing low water levels. The country has reduced electricity exports and is retaining more water in its reservoirs for winter. Losses in the electricity system fell during the first half of 2026. At Barki Tojik's generating facilities, losses were 0.32% of output, down 0.07 percentage points from a year earlier. Losses in high-voltage transmission networks fell to 2.96%, while distribution losses dropped from 17.93% to 12.42%. Barki Tojik generated 8.89 billion kWh during the period, 2.7 million kWh less than in the first half of 2025. Hydropower plants supplied 7.93 billion kWh, while thermal plants produced 964 million kWh. The utility also bought 2.7 billion kWh from independent producers in Tajikistan and abroad, with Sangtuda-1 supplying 1.48 billion kWh. Rogun and Sangtuda-2 supplied 667.2 million kWh and 474.2 million kWh, respectively. Demand continues to rise as Tajikistan's population grows and industrial production expands, President Emomali Rahmon said in December 2025. The World Bank expects Rogun to help meet domestic needs and reduce recurring winter cuts. Rahmon has said rationing should end in 2027, when the third generating unit is scheduled to enter service, although the World Bank projects full completion in 2033. For the coming winter, Tajikistan is conserving reservoir water and arranging imports from Uzbekistan, but Asozoda's comments leave open the possibility of renewed rationing.

Energy Security

Putin Visit Puts Nuclear Power and Oil Transit at Center of Russia-Kazakhstan Ties

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan is becoming more than a diplomatic event. It is increasingly being seen as a demonstration of how Russia and Kazakhstan are shaping one of Eurasia’s key energy and logistics axes amid the restructuring of global markets, sanctions pressure, and the continued shift of economic flows toward Asia. Symbolically, ahead of the visit, Putin published a programmatic article in Kazakh media titled “Russia-Kazakhstan: An Alliance at the Heart of Eurasia,” in which he outlined a new framework for bilateral relations. The Russian president focused on nuclear energy, oil and gas cooperation, transport corridors, and Eurasian integration, describing the partnership between the two countries as a factor of stability and development for the wider continent. For Moscow, the current visit carries particular significance. It is Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan during a single presidential term. A rare occurrence in international diplomatic practice. Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov said the move was intended to emphasize the “unprecedentedly high level of relations between our two countries.” The main outcome of the talks is expected to be the signing of agreements related to the construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s state nuclear corporation, Rosatom. According to Ushakov, the two sides are expected to finalize “the main parameters for the creation of the nuclear power plant and financing of the project through a Russian state export credit.” For Kazakhstan, the nuclear project is about far more than electricity generation. The country faces growing domestic power demand, aging infrastructure, and the need to ensure long-term energy security. At the same time, the project reflects a broader geopolitical calculation. Nuclear energy has traditionally been one of the most sensitive forms of strategic cooperation. A country building a nuclear power plant enters into a long-term technological partnership involving fuel supplies, engineering maintenance, personnel training, and technical support lasting for decades. Russia’s role in constructing Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant would therefore allow Moscow to preserve a deep technological presence in Central Asia despite its growing international isolation. For Astana, however, cooperation with Russia in the nuclear sector remains a pragmatic choice rather than a purely political one. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest producer of uranium, yet it still lacks its own nuclear power generation sector. Amid intensifying competition between global power centers, Kazakhstan appears less interested in choosing sides than in strengthening its resilience and turning its geography into a strategic advantage. The same logic is evident in the oil and gas agenda surrounding Putin’s visit. Moscow and Astana are discussing increasing the transit of Russian oil to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline from 10 million to 12.5 million tons annually. Ushakov said prospects for the negotiations were “optimistic” and noted that the legal framework for the agreements was already in its final stages. According to KazTransOil, approximately 832,000 tons of Russian oil were transported to China through the route in April alone, while first-quarter transit volumes reached 2.5 million tons. Kazakhstan’s dependence on Russian...

Fuel prices

Kyrgyz Government Considers Countermeasures as Fuel Prices Rise

In recent months, there has been a gradual but steady increase in motor fuel prices in Kyrgyzstan, driven in part by higher import costs from Russia, the country’s main supplier of gasoline and diesel. Analysts have linked pressure on regional fuel markets to higher global crude prices following the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, as well as reduced Russian refinery output after Ukrainian drone strikes on oil-processing facilities. In Bishkek, AI-92, a widely used lower-octane gasoline grade, cost an average of 78.4 soms (about $0.89) per liter as of May 14, making it more expensive than comparable fuel in both Russia and Kazakhstan. On May 21, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers and Head of the Presidential Administration Adylbek Kasymaliev met with the heads of the country’s major fuel trading companies to discuss domestic fuel supplies. Kasymaliev said the latest price increases were linked to instability in the Middle East, which has pushed up international petroleum prices. According to him, the government has so far managed to prevent sharp increases at gas stations through the use of accumulated fuel reserves. Officials also reviewed possible financial and tax support measures for the sector if instability in global markets continues. Among the options under consideration is direct state subsidization of fuel imports. Kasymaliev urged fuel traders to work closely with the government to help maintain supplies and limit pressure on consumers. He also instructed authorities to monitor the market for signs of hoarding, artificial fuel shortages or speculative price increases. Despite rising fuel prices in Kyrgyzstan, the country's fuel market remains relatively stable thanks to guaranteed deliveries from Russia. According to the country’s Antimonopoly Regulation Service, current fuel reserves are sufficient for between one and one-and-a-half months. The agency said that if fuel prices continue to rise, the government could introduce additional stabilization measures. These could include temporary tax cuts for importers of Russian fuel, subsidy programs and preferential lending mechanisms. Officials say such measures could help smooth price fluctuations in the domestic market and maintain stability amid the current geopolitical environment. Kyrgyzstan’s annual demand for motor fuel is estimated at approximately 1.6 million tons. According to First Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers Daniyar Amangeldiev, the country currently imports around 1.2 million tons of fuel annually. The Junda oil refinery in northern Kyrgyzstan is capable of producing up to 800,000 tons per year. However, the facility is currently undergoing large-scale modernization aimed at reducing harmful emissions. On May 19, Kasymaliev met with the Chinese management of the Junda refinery to discuss the progress of modernization work and the timeline for resuming production. Kasymaliev said bringing the refinery back online would be important for Kyrgyzstan as global energy markets remain volatile.

Energy

Uzbekistan Expands Energy Cooperation With SOCAR and BP at Energy Week Forum

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held talks on May 13 with executives from Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR and energy giant BP during the Uzbekistan Energy Week 2026 forum in Tashkent. According to the Uzbekistan's presidency, Mirziyoyev met with SOCAR President Rovshan Najaf, as well as BP representatives Ariel Flores and Giovanni Cristofoli, to discuss expanding cooperation in the energy and oil and gas sectors. The sides noted the growing partnership between Uzbekistan and SOCAR, particularly in the development of hydrocarbon fields on the Ustyurt Plateau in western Uzbekistan. Officials also agreed to open a SOCAR representative office in Uzbekistan as cooperation between the two countries deepens. BP’s participation in the Ustyurt project was also highlighted during the meeting. Discussions focused on joint projects involving oil and gas exploration, hydrocarbon production, deep processing of raw materials, and long-term supplies of oil and petroleum products. The parties also discussed cooperation in training specialists for the energy industry. Najaf also thanked Mirziyoyev for Uzbekistan’s support in preparations for hosting the FIFA U-20 World Cup in 2027, which Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan are set to organize jointly. Najaf also serves as chairman of the Association of Football Federations of Azerbaijan. Energy cooperation between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan has expanded significantly over the past year. In 2025, Uzbekistan’s Energy Minister Jurabek Mirzamahmudov said SOCAR and Uzbekneftegaz had established a joint operating company to oversee the Ustyurt project under a Production Sharing Agreement. Mirzamahmudov said seismic surveys covering more than 3,000 kilometers were expected to begin before the end of the year, followed by the drilling of the first exploration well. Last August, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced that SOCAR had officially begun operations at an oil field in Uzbekistan. Aliyev said at the time that both sides hoped to make a major oil discovery within the next few years.

Asian Development Bank

ADB Annual Meeting in Samarkand Unveils Major Energy, Climate, and Development Initiatives

The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) 59th Annual Meeting concluded in the historic Uzbek city of Samarkand after four days of discussions focused on energy connectivity, climate financing, and economic resilience across Asia and the Pacific. Held from May 3 to 6, the gathering brought together government officials, development institutions, economists, and private sector representatives at a time of growing geopolitical and economic uncertainty. It marked the second time Uzbekistan has hosted the ADB Annual Meeting, following the 43rd edition in Tashkent in 2010. A central announcement at the meeting was the unveiling of a broader $70 billion regional infrastructure program aimed at accelerating energy and digital connectivity across Asia and the Pacific. The initiative is structured around two major pillars: a $50 billion Pan-Asia Power Grid Initiative focused on cross-border electricity systems, and a $20 billion digital connectivity component aimed at strengthening broadband and data infrastructure across the region. Together, these programmes are intended to reduce energy costs, improve reliability, and deepen regional economic integration. The Pan-Asia Power Grid Initiative (PAGI) In his address to delegates, ADB President Masato Kanda noted that PAGI seeks to support more interconnected and resilient infrastructure systems. "To survive and thrive in this new era, we must build deeply connected and resilient systems," he said, adding that stronger regional grids and digital networks can help countries manage rising energy demand whilst also accelerating the transition to cleaner power sources. The initiative seeks to integrate around 20 gigawatts of renewable energy capacity and the develop enough transmission infrastructure to expand electricity access for up to 200 million people. ADB officials said the bank would use its role as a regional convener to bring together governments, regulators, and private investors to overcome barriers that often slow regional infrastructure projects. The bank pointed to earlier success stories, including the Bangladesh-India power grid interconnection and the Monsoon Wind Power Project in Laos, as examples of cross-border cooperation supported through blended finance mechanisms. [caption id="attachment_37211" align="aligncenter" width="1536"] Image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Climate and Food Security Concerns Climate and environmental financing also featured prominently during the Samarkand meetings. On May 5, the ADB announced that the German government had joined the bank’s Nature Solutions Finance Hub with €5.5 million ($6.5 million) in grant co-financing, some of which has been earmarked for sorely needed watershed rehabilitation in Uzbekistan. The discussions also reflected growing concern over global food security and supply chain vulnerabilities linked to the ongoing war in Iran. Qingfeng Zhang, Senior Director of ADB’s Agriculture, Food, Nature, and Rural Development Sector Office, warned that disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz were increasing the cost of everything from energy to insurance, freight to fertilizer – placing additional pressure on food systems across Asia and the Pacific, including Central Asia. Unlike the shock caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which directly disrupted grain and fertilizer exports, Zhang said the current crisis was affecting agriculture primarily through higher operating and transportation costs. The Strait of Hormuz handles roughly one-quarter of global seaborne oil...