• KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00218
  • TJS/USD = 0.10810
  • UZS/USD = 0.00009
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
23 August 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 1477

Kazakhstan’s Role in Pax Silica After WAICO

Kazakhstan became the first Central Asian country to join the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative. It also signed the agreement establishing China’s World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, or WAICO. That dual participation could now become consequential. Reuters reported on August 14 that the State Department had prepared an undated draft letter warning the 35 signatories of the U.S. AI Opportunity Statement that participation in Pax Silica could be incompatible with membership in competing initiatives. Kazakhstan is the only country presently known to have joined both frameworks. The draft could still change, and the State Department has not publicly adopted the position it contains. Kazakhstan’s decision to join both initiatives also reflects its long-standing multi-vector foreign policy. Astana has sought practical relations with competing powers rather than exclusive alignment with any one bloc, an approach its official foreign-policy concept describes as maintaining mutually beneficial relations with states and organizations of practical interest to Kazakhstan. Joining a U.S.-led supply-chain initiative and a China-led AI organization fits that pattern, although it also makes the question of compatibility more consequential. Washington’s concern is understandable. Pax Silica is intended to create trusted supply chains, strengthen investment security and protect sensitive technology and infrastructure from undue access or control. Membership is meant to represent more than attendance at another diplomatic forum. The question is what Kazakhstan has agreed to do through WAICO, how those commitments will be implemented, and whether they create competing expectations or affect specific Pax Silica projects. Kazakhstan’s Role in the Supply Chain Pax Silica spans the AI supply chain from energy and mineral processing to semiconductors, data centers and models. Kazakhstan also has ambitions in digital infrastructure and AI services, but its strongest existing capabilities relevant to Pax Silica are concentrated in energy, mineral production, selected processing and Eurasian connectivity. The framework is designed to combine the different industrial strengths of its participants rather than reproduce the entire technology chain in every country. Kazakhstan produced about 40% of the world’s mined uranium in 2025. Kazakh-origin material accounted for 28% of uranium delivered to U.S. civilian reactor operators that year, second only to Canada. Kazakhstan’s most immediate relevance is not semiconductor production, but its role as an energy, minerals and processing partner. Uranium is the clearest example, providing large-scale fuel supplies for the power systems on which expanding AI infrastructure depends. As TCA recently noted, Kazakhstan sits at the nexus of resources, processing capacity and connectivity, and its role extends beyond raw-material extraction. Ulba Metallurgical Plant produces uranium dioxide powders and nuclear-fuel pellets, along with beryllium, tantalum and niobium products. Kazakhstan also produces copper, titanium, silver, aluminum and zinc used across power, communications, aerospace and advanced manufacturing. Its position on the Middle Corridor also gives it a logistics role connecting Central Asian production with Caspian and European markets. Other contributions remain prospective. Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) plans a 15-tonne-a-year gallium facility backed by a long-term supply agreement with Mitsubishi, while a U.S.-supported tungsten project is moving forward with plans to mine and refine the...

Kazakhstan’s First Kurultai Election Draws Broad Observation

When Kazakhstan goes to the polls on August 23, it will elect the first 145 members of the new Kurultai and set its redesigned parliamentary system in motion. The vote, held less than two months after the new Constitution took effect, will be followed by 777 accredited international observers and a broad range of Kazakh monitoring groups. The foreign contingent spans 42 countries and 13 international organizations. Some are professional election monitors who have been working in Kazakhstan for weeks; others are parliamentarians, foreign election officials, or bilateral guests. Their roles are different: ODIHR provides the detailed technical scrutiny, while the wider contingent gives the election a broad international audience. The most detailed technical assessment will come from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, or ODIHR. Its core team and long-term observers have been in the country since July, and the organization requested 300 short-term observers for election day. They will follow polling station opening, voting, counting, and tabulation, while the wider mission examines election administration, the campaign, political finance, media coverage, and complaints. On the mechanics of election administration, ODIHR reported in its August 7 interim report that preparations were on schedule. Nationwide training and voter education were underway, and the Central Election Commission (CEC) had promptly published its decisions. Most people consulted by the mission expressed confidence in the administration’s technical capacity, although some questioned the impartiality and independence of lower-level commissions. Kazakh organizations are preparing their own observation efforts. By August 3, 13 civil society groups had received national accreditation, and 247 had been accredited through territorial commissions. The El Dauysy Public Foundation says it has trained more than 6,000 observers since 2020, creating an experienced pool that has participated in successive national votes. After uncertainty over new foreign-funding rules, the CEC clarified that foreign support alone would not invalidate accreditation and that cases would be considered individually. The closest recent regional comparison is Uzbekistan’s 2024 parliamentary election. Uzbekistan accredited 851 international observers across 11,028 polling stations, while Kazakhstan has accredited 777 across 10,423. That makes the international observer presence broadly comparable relative to the number of polling stations. The clearer difference lies in domestic monitoring. According to ODIHR, Uzbek law contained no provision for citizen observation, while Kazakhstan has accredited civil society organizations at both national and territorial levels. In Kyrgyzstan’s 2025 election, the election commission accredited only two citizen organizations, each of which appointed one observer. The contrast is wider with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. ODIHR cancelled its planned mission to Tajikistan’s 2025 parliamentary election after the authorities failed to assure that observers would be accredited and allowed to work. In Turkmenistan in 2023, ODIHR sent a small assessment team that did not systematically monitor voting, counting or tabulation. Across the region, Kazakhstan stands out for the combination rather than any one measure: a full ODIHR mission, a large and geographically varied foreign contingent, and legally accredited domestic organizations preparing extensive coverage of the same election. Observer totals cannot determine the quality of...

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers the upcoming tenth anniversary of Shavkat Mirziyoyev becoming the President of Uzbekistan. Special guest: Central Asia journalist and author of Silk Mirage: Through the Looking Glass in Uzbekistan, Joanna Lillis.

Trump’s New Threat Against Iran Collides With Central Asia’s Economic Interests

U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened economic consequences for any country that continues to provide support to Iran, promising Tehran “Economic Warfare and Isolation on an unprecedented scale.” Washington has not yet announced specific new measures. For Central Asia, the warning comes as economic and transport links with Iran are developing. Kazakhstan is building its own terminal at Iran’s largest port, Tajikistan is discussing fuel purchases and new transport routes, Uzbekistan is trying to protect trade that passes through Iran, and Turkmenistan is expanding transport and energy cooperation with Tehran. Each country has its own reasons for developing these ties, but they share one concern: for landlocked Central Asia, Iran provides one of the few overland routes to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Washington’s attempt to tighten Iran’s economic isolation therefore affects not only the region’s relations with Tehran, but also its own plans to diversify trade and transit. None of this means that Central Asian governments are prepared to disregard U.S. sanctions or enter into a political confrontation with Washington on Tehran’s behalf. The threat of secondary restrictions could cause banks, carriers, and private companies to withdraw from individual transactions even without formal decisions by their governments. Trump has not yet explained exactly what instruments he intends to use to enforce the isolation he announced. Kazakhstan Looks to the Persian Gulf Iran intensified its work with Central Asia well before Trump’s latest threat. In mid-June, the Iranian Minister of Roads and Urban Development Farzaneh Sadegh visited Astana. In talks with Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, the two sides noted that bilateral trade had increased by 26.4% in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana and Tehran now want to raise it to $3 billion, using, among other things, the free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union, of which Kazakhstan is a member. The plans go beyond trade. Freight traffic along the International North-South Transport Corridor, which links Russia and Central Asia with Iran and Persian Gulf ports, rose by 12% in 2025 to 3.5 million metric tons. Rail freight between Kazakhstan and Iran also increased by 69%. Astana’s main interest lies even farther south. Iran has allowed Kazakhstan to establish its own transport and logistics terminal at Shahid Rajaee in Bandar Abbas, the country’s largest commercial port. On June 28, the two sides signed a Build-Operate-Transfer agreement. It runs for 27 years, with two years allocated for construction and another 25 for operation. Commercial operations are scheduled to begin in the project’s third year. For Kazakhstan, this is more than simply an overseas terminal. Its Foreign Ministry explicitly links the project to opening access for Kazakh cargo to markets in the Persian Gulf, South and Southeast Asia, and East Africa. In July, Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev again reaffirmed Astana’s interest in the project during a visit to Iran. The ministry also cited a 26.4% increase in bilateral trade in 2025 to $430.2 million. Astana is also considering another Iranian port, Chabahar, on the Indian Ocean....

Kazakh Tenge Rises as Foreign Investors Buy Government Debt

Kazakhstan’s tenge has strengthened by 9.7% against the dollar since the start of 2026, making it the best-performing currency across Europe and Asia, according to the Financial Times. The newspaper points to an influx of foreign capital into Kazakhstan’s government debt: nonresident holdings of tenge-denominated bonds have risen from roughly $2 billion to $5 billion over the past year. The appreciation has come despite serious disruptions to Kazakhstan’s oil exports through Russia. Kazakh data show that foreign interest in government securities did not begin this summer. In July alone, nonresidents increased their holdings by 92.2 billion tenge, about $195 million, to 2.6 trillion tenge, or roughly $5.5 billion. Since the start of the year, their portfolio has grown by 32.9%, while their share of the market has risen from 6.2% to 7.2%. The Association of Financiers of Kazakhstan (AFK) attributes the interest to high real interest rates and relative macroeconomic stability. Why Foreign Investors Are Buying Kazakh Debt During 2025, nonresident holdings of Kazakh government securities rose from roughly 1.1 trillion tenge, about $2.3 billion, to 2 trillion tenge, about $4.2 billion. Growth continued this year. In June alone, foreign investors added 185.1 billion tenge, about $390 million, bringing their total holdings to 2.5 trillion tenge, roughly $5.3 billion. Their share of the market increased from 6.2% to 6.9% by then. The reason for the interest is fairly straightforward: Kazakhstan offers high yields while maintaining an investment-grade credit rating. The base rate remained at 18% through the spring. The National Bank cut it to 17% in June and announced a further cut to 16.75% on July 24. Annual inflation, meanwhile, declined for a ninth consecutive month and stood at 10.3% in June. For foreign investors, the combination of high interest rates and a strengthening tenge creates an opportunity to earn both on bond yields and currency appreciation. For the tenge itself, the same transaction works in reverse: before buying a Kazakh security, a foreign investor has to acquire the national currency. In June, AFK analysts cited nonresident transactions among the factors supporting the tenge, alongside foreign-currency sales by exporters, state-controlled companies, and the National Bank. Market Access Is Becoming Easier High yields alone do not explain the growing interest. Kazakhstan is also trying to make its domestic debt market easier for international investors to access. A primary dealer system has been operating since May 4. Five banks were granted primary dealer status and are expected to support the government securities market, including buying and selling bonds in the secondary market. In April, the National Bank announced that Euroclear had begun a project to make Kazakhstan’s government bonds eligible for settlement through its international system. A direct link with the local market infrastructure is planned for 2027. For foreign investors, this would make it possible to trade Kazakh government debt through a familiar global settlement system, alongside the existing Clearstream channel. Kazakhstan is also seeking eventual inclusion of its tenge-denominated government bonds in JPMorgan’s GBI-EM, one of the main international indexes for emerging-market government...

Push for Kazakhstan Oil Exports Diversification as CPC Disruptions Expose Capacity Gap

Kazakhstan has spent years looking for more ways to export its oil without relying so heavily on Russia. This summer has shown how difficult that remains. Shipments to Germany through the Druzhba pipeline have been suspended since May, disruptions on the Black Sea in July forced Tengiz to more than halve production, and now Russia is rerouting Kazakh crude from Ust-Luga to Novorossiysk to free Baltic capacity for its own oil. The shift comes as exports from Russia’s western ports ran 15% below plan in the first half of August, with Novorossiysk shipments of Russian Urals and Kazakh KEBCO falling to around 400,000 barrels per day. At least two cargoes of Kazakhstan’s KEBCO crude scheduled for loading at Ust-Luga in late August will instead be shipped through the Black Sea. No KEBCO loadings are currently planned at the Baltic port in September. The move will free up about 100,000 barrels per day of export capacity at Ust-Luga for Russian crude. Kazakh producers support the arrangement because shipments through Novorossiysk are currently more profitable. From a commercial standpoint, the decision is understandable. But Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk give Kazakhstan access to two different seas while remaining Russian ports. And Novorossiysk, where the KEBCO cargoes are now being redirected, had itself suspended crude loadings only a few days earlier. On August 14, loadings at the Sheskharis terminal, Novorossiysk port’s main oil-export facility, were halted following a drone attack. The facility handles around 700,000 barrels per day and loads Russian Urals and Siberian Light as well as Kazakhstan’s KEBCO. Operations resumed on August 16, and one of the first tankers to load was carrying Kazakh crude. Another 80,000-ton KEBCO cargo was due to begin loading on August 18. Kazakhstan’s far larger vulnerability, however, is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Its marine terminal near Novorossiysk is separate from Sheskharis. In 2025, the country exported 78.7 million metric tons of oil, of which 64.8 million tons were shipped through CPC. Volumes through the pipeline rose by 18% compared with 2024, largely as production increased following the Tengiz expansion. The July disruptions showed how quickly problems on that route can affect production inside Kazakhstan. After drone attacks near the CPC terminal forced restrictions on loadings, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas condensate production fell by about 21% by July 22 to roughly 1.63 million barrels per day, from a July average of 2.07 million barrels per day. Tengiz output dropped from a July average of around 925,000 barrels per day to about 406,000. A few days later, the situation deteriorated further. On July 26, Kazakhstan produced around 1 million barrels per day of oil and gas condensate, down from an average of 2.16 million barrels per day in June. Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak all had to reduce production. On July 27, CPC resumed loadings after a week-long suspension. CPC accounts for more than 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports, so replacing it quickly with other routes is impossible. The pipeline typically carries around 1.5 million to 1.7 million barrels per day....