• KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01143 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00216 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10633 -0.28%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 865 - 870 of 2196

EU Sanctions Envoy’s Kazakh Visit Signals Rising Stakes

On January 30, David O’Sullivan, the European Union’s Special Envoy for Sanctions, made his fourth visit to Kazakhstan. Following the visit, he gave a briefing in Astana, where he discussed the new sanctions package, which could theoretically include Kazakh companies that assist Russia in circumventing restrictions. What O’Sullivan Said  According to O'Sullivan, only companies with indisputable evidence against them of involvement in violations will added to the sanctions list. “We are currently working on preparing a new, 16th package of sanctions. It is possible that Kazakh companies may be added to the list, but no decision has been made yet. We conduct a detailed analysis of companies, examine their trade relations, and review the goods they have previously traded. Of course, we prefer to work with governments to find a systematic solution rather than simply adding individual companies to the list. However, when there is no other option, we do add them,” O’Sullivan explained. The EU Sanctions Envoy reiterated that the EU remains one of Kazakhstan’s key economic partners, with mutual trade turnover reaching nearly 40 billion euros per annum. The EU accounts for 38% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 55 billion euros in direct foreign investments. Highlighting the importance of economic ties, O’Sullivan stated that the EU fully respects Kazakhstan’s position on sanctions, but urged authorities to take strict measures against third-party entities using the country’s trade channels. “We have concerns that unscrupulous actors may try to use Kazakhstan as a platform to circumvent our sanctions,” O’Sullivan warned, pointing to the import of high-tech goods such as microchips, sensors, and circuits, which have been found in Russian drones, missiles, and artillery shells. O'Sullivan noted that these goods, listed in an open “common high-priority list” of 50 codes, are not produced in Kazakhstan but are allegedly being re-exported from EU and G7 countries through Kazakh intermediaries. While they make up less than 1% of Kazakhstan’s total trade volume, O’Sullivan emphasized that these are “lethal products that kill innocent Ukrainian civilians.” The special envoy recalled that in 2024, the EU blacklisted two Kazakh companies and issued a warning that this list could be expanded. He noted that particular attention is being given to companies that emerged immediately after the invasion of Ukraine and the start of the new sanctions regime. “These are usually not well-established, well-known companies with a long history of trading. The fact that a company was created right after the invasion and the imposition of sanctions suggests that its sole purpose may be to evade sanctions,” he stated while stressing that merely registering after 2022 is not sufficient grounds for inclusion on the sanctions list. Strategically Important Central Asia Given the statistics cited by O’Sullivan, there was no pressing need for his fourth personal visit to Kazakhstan. The blacklisting of two Kazakh companies last year went largely unnoticed by the country’s general public. However, his visit highlights the mechanisms of international politics set in motion following Donald Trump’s return to the White House and the opening gambits of his administration,...

Kazakhstan Trains a Thousand Specialists for Future Nuclear Power Plants

Six universities in Kazakhstan are currently training personnel for the nuclear and atomic industries. According to Gulzhan Dzharasova, Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Higher and Postgraduate Education at the Ministry of Science, approximately 1,000 students are pursuing engineering degrees related to the nuclear sector. Kazakhstan’s decision to build its first nuclear power plant (NPP) was made last fall following a referendum, in which more than 70% of the population voted in favor of nuclear energy. The first plant is set to be built in the Almaty region and is expected to be operational by 2035, as the country anticipates an energy shortage by that time. The plant will require a workforce of at least 2,000 employees, and the Ministry of Energy aims to train specialists domestically to meet this demand. To support this initiative, local colleges will introduce training programs for key technical roles, including dosimetrists, steam turbine equipment repair specialists, nuclear power plant maintenance and mechanical repair specialists, and IT professionals specializing in nuclear energy. Currently, 921 students are enrolled in nuclear engineering programs at Kazakhstan’s higher education institutions, with nearly all (96%) receiving government-funded scholarships. “As part of a strategic partnership in this field, branches of leading foreign universities are being established. The National Research Nuclear University has been created at the Kazakh National University (KazNU). Additionally, a consortium of German technical universities has launched a new training format for engineers in the electric power industry. In 2024, a branch of Anhalt University opened at the Almaty University of Power Engineering and Communications, where specialists in electrical and power engineering are being trained,” Dzharasova said. Kazakhstan’s Growing Need for Nuclear Energy Experts Kazakhstan’s Minister of Energy, Almasadam Satkaliyev, addressed concerns about the demand for nuclear energy specialists. He stated that the country will need at least three nuclear power plants, which would require a workforce of 5,000 to 6,000 trained professionals. “The sites for all three plants will be selected based on a comprehensive plan. It is not feasible to plan one station first and then another separately. We must first analyze the network configuration, power distribution schemes, cross-border energy flows, grid voltage levels, the necessary number of substations, and the feasibility of using direct current (DC) technology for long-distance transmission,” Satkaliyev explained. Accelerating Nuclear Power Plant Construction At a recent briefing, Satkaliyev also stated that the first nuclear power plant unit in Kazakhstan could be completed within eight years. “Even considering the average global timeline for such projects, we will push vendors to explore the possibility of expediting construction so that we can have the first unit operational within eight years,” he said. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kazakhstan plans to select a contractor for the construction of its first nuclear power plant in the first half of this year.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan’s High-Stakes Race for Pakistan

In recent years, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have embarked on distinct yet complementary paths to enhance their connectivity with Pakistan. Kazakhstan has embedded itself within such institutionalized frameworks as the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or TITR). In this context, it has also sought to align with trans-Eurasian logistics designed to integrate South Asian trade routes into established infrastructural regimes. Uzbekistan, by contrast, marginalized from World Bank-backed corridors, has adopted a more adaptive and tactical approach by advancing alternative linkages such as the Termez–Karachi transport corridor and the Trans-Afghan Railway. Both strategies reflect the imperative to reduce dependence on Russian-controlled northern routes while leveraging Pakistan’s maritime infrastructure to reposition Central Asia within the matrix of regional and global trade. Thus, a few days ago, at a meeting with Uzbekistan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Pakistan, the prospect of developing the Termez–Karachi transport corridor was discussed. Termez is on Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan; the goods would travel via Kabul and Kandahar to Quetta, then to the Karachi port. The possibility of establishing an advanced logistics terminus in Termez with the assistance of Pakistan's National Logistics Corporation was explored. The two sides noted the need to create a permanent platform for business communications between them, such as an Entrepreneurs' Council coordinated by their respective Chambers of Commerce. This road route should not be confused with the Trans-Afghan Corridor (TAC, also called the Trans-Afghan Railway Project or the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan Railway Project), a $4.8 billion project to connect the three countries via 573 kilometers of rail. This rail route would run from Termez through Mazar-e-Sharif and Logar in Afghanistan, reaching Pakistan at the Kharlachi border crossing and extending to Kohat District, where a rail link southward already exists. In August 2024, the governments of Kazakhstan and Pakistan agreed to extend the TAC's route into northeast Kazakhstan to create the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Transport Corridor: multimodal because goods would arrive from Kazakhstan at Uzbekistan's Termez terminus by truck, for transshipment by rail to Pakistani ports. From there, they can reach a broad range of countries from Southeast Asia to South Asia to the Middle East. Kazakhstan, pursuing its goal to diversify its export pathways and reduce dependence on traditional northern routes, has explored several connectivity projects that have either direct or indirect implications for trade routes to Pakistan. Of these, the three most significant are the Trans-Afghan Multimodal Transport Corridor (TMTC), the Middle Corridor, and the Quadrilateral Traffic in Transit Agreement (QTTA). The Middle Corridor is the best-known of the three. Seeking to connect China to Europe via the Caspian region, it is not directly pertinent for Pakistan, but it would offer the potential to integrate with Pakistani trade routes, offering an alternative pathway for goods. The QTTA includes China, Kyrgyzstan, and Pakistan along with Kazakhstan. This transit deal aims to facilitate Kazakhstan's foreign trade by providing it with access to Pakistani ports via the Karakoram Highway, which connects Pakistan and China, thereby bypassing Afghanistan. It was agreed in 2017 and...

Hidden but Brave: The LGBTQ+ Fight for Acceptance in Kazakhstan

The LGBTQ+ community in Kazakhstan remains largely invisible, but that does not mean it does not exist. While homosexuality is not criminalized in the country, public perception remains mixed. In major cities, particularly Almaty, the situation is relatively tolerant, but in the regions, LGBTQ+ people still face significant discrimination and fear. The Times of Central Asia spoke with Arsen, a resident of Almaty (who requested anonymity due to safety concerns), about the realities of being gay in Kazakhstan, the challenges he faces, and why, despite the difficulties, he chooses to stay there. Arsen lives and works in Almaty, widely regarded as Kazakhstan’s most open-minded city. Here, he can attend LGBTQ+ gatherings and has a supportive circle of friends. However, even in this relatively accepting environment, complete openness remains a risk. “In Almaty, you don’t feel completely alone. There are places to relax, like gay clubs, and there’s a sense of community. But holding hands with another man on the street? No, that’s still dangerous. I wouldn’t even risk prolonged eye contact with someone,” he says. “The risk of aggression is always there, especially in remote parts of the city. I’ve heard of people facing hostility just because they ‘look different.’ And it’s not even about dressing brightly - it's just the prevailing mentality. I’m always surprised that, despite life being so difficult here, some people still believe being gay is a choice.” Despite these challenges, Arsen sees progress. He believes younger generations are becoming more accepting, largely thanks to the internet, which provides exposure to alternative viewpoints. “I notice more open-minded people among my generation. In Almaty, many don’t care about someone’s orientation. People here usually don’t mind what you wear or whether you have piercings, for example. Even those who don’t support LGBTQ+ rights tend to be indifferent rather than aggressive,” he says. However, outside of Almaty and Astana, the situation is far more difficult. In smaller cities and rural areas, conservative values dominate, and LGBTQ+ individuals often conceal their identities — even from close friends. “I know guys from small towns who moved to Almaty because they were terrified back home. They hid every hint of their orientation. Coming out could mean harassment or even violence. Many don’t even consider dating or using LGBTQ+ apps because it’s simply too dangerous.” A particularly painful issue within Kazakhstan’s LGBTQ+ community is internalized homophobia - self-directed negativity toward one’s own identity or others in the community. “I’ve always been surprised by how some gay people openly dislike other gay people. They want to be seen as ‘normal,’ so they try to blend in with the crowd. But in doing so, they reinforce harmful stereotypes and make things worse for everyone.” The situation is especially difficult in Kazakhstan’s southern cities, where traditional values often take precedence over personal freedoms. “Even though Almaty is in the south, I think it’s much harder to be gay in places like Shymkent, Taraz, or Turkistan. In those cities, you could get beaten up for it,” Arsen...

USAID Freeze Leaves Central Asian NGOs in Limbo

On January 20, U.S. President Donald Trump signed an executive order suspending funding for most foreign aid programs for 90 days. The move has raised concerns among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, which has long benefited from U.S. assistance. The order reads: “All heads of departments and agencies responsible for United States foreign development assistance programs shall immediately suspend new commitments and disbursements of development assistance funds to foreign countries and non-governmental implementing organizations, international organizations, and contractors pending a review of such programs for effectiveness and consistency with United States foreign policy to be conducted within 90 days of this order.” Following this directive, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio instructed all diplomatic and consular agencies to issue “stop-work orders” for nearly all active foreign assistance programs. Impact on Kazakhstan and Central Asia According to reports, the funding freeze is expected to affect university grant programs, entrepreneurial initiatives, gender diversity projects, and environmental efforts. The Trump administration has justified the decision by citing the need to reassess spending priorities. Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries have received U.S. aid for decades. USAID, in particular, has played a significant role in regional development. The agency’s website states: “In Kazakhstan, USAID promotes the U.S. government's Central Asia Strategy, which supports and strengthens the sovereignty and independence of Central Asian countries, both individually and collectively. It also promotes regional connectivity between Central Asia and Afghanistan, advances the rule of law and respect for human rights, and improves the climate for U.S. investment to foster greater regional stability and prosperity.” Since 1992, USAID has funded projects in Kazakhstan focusing on economic diversification, energy, environmental protection, healthcare, and support for media and NGOs. In addition to funding NGOs, USAID collaborates with KazAID, Kazakhstan’s foreign aid agency operating under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Reactions from NGO Leaders Denis Dzhivaga, director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (KIBHR), told The Times of Central Asia that the aid suspension had been anticipated. “Such a measure was expected," said Dzhivaga. "Even during the election campaign and Trump’s previous presidency, it was clear that he prioritized domestic policy over foreign influence. All NGOs working with USAID and receiving State Department assistance have received letters to halt projects.” However, Dzhivaga noted that KIBHR has limited cooperation with U.S. agencies, so the impact on his organization will be minimal. “In any case, this will negatively affect the NGO sector. The suspension is for three months pending an audit, but even USAID does not seem to know what will happen afterward. I don’t think U.S. assistance to Kazakhstan and Central Asia will stop entirely, but certain projects may be reconsidered - especially those related to discrimination, gender issues, and LGBT rights, as President Trump has already expressed opposition to such initiatives.” Replacing U.S. funding with alternative grants will be challenging, he added. “European donors are already struggling to finance Ukraine, so they are unlikely to allocate substantial funds elsewhere. Many U.S.-backed...

Tokayev Outlines Economic Reforms and Calls for Revised Energy Contracts

On January 28, Kazakhstan's capital Astana hosted an expanded government meeting led by President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The event focused on the country's socio-economic development in 2024, but this year’s discussion carried broader implications, addressing both domestic and international concerns. Addressing Budget Constraints From the outset, Tokayev made it clear that a key issue for his government is the state budget’s financial shortfall. Analyst Gaziz Abishev noted on his Telegram channel that the problem is not just a lack of funds but a long-standing habit - dating back to 2003 - of addressing challenges by simply increasing spending. “There is no longer an oil windfall to revitalize the dry economy as there was 20 years ago,” Abishev wrote. Adding to the uncertainty, Kazakhstan’s oil revenues face potential disruption from Donald Trump’s stated intention to drive down global hydrocarbon prices. Tokayev outlined a range of measures to fill budget gaps, urging his government to take bold, unconventional steps. He called on officials to act in the country’s best interests without fear of pressure from the Anti-Corruption Service or public opinion. He also stressed the importance of depoliticizing economic partnerships, particularly with Russia and China, cautioning against allowing Russophobic or Sinophobic rhetoric to interfere with business deals. “Money must be attracted from abroad, and this is more important than ever. Without investment, we cannot sustain ourselves. Money doesn’t smell, but it disappears. We need to attract investment from all sides - within the law - without falling into populism. The future of the national economy, and to some extent the country as a whole, is at stake,” Abishev commented. Public Reaction to Tax Reforms Although tax reform was only the sixth of eight key points in Tokayev’s speech, it quickly became the most widely discussed issue among the public. Kazakhstan’s value-added tax (VAT) is currently 12%, with a sufficiency threshold of 78 million tenge ($150,937). The government is considering raising the VAT rate to 20% and lowering the sufficiency threshold to 15 million tenge ($29,026). If implemented, nearly all small businesses would become VAT payers, while the increased tax rate is expected to drive inflation. The government maintains that inflation will not exceed 4.5%, but Tokayev’s mention of “belt-tightening” has already led many to expect rising retail prices. To offset the burden on businesses, the government proposes eliminating mandatory employer pension contributions and reducing the social tax. However, Tokayev himself expressed reservations about cutting the social tax, emphasizing that regional governors (akims) need financial incentives. “Think again. I believe it would be wrong to deprive akims of incentives, especially financial ones. After all, the regions are the country. Find a solution. We will meet again to discuss these issues,” he told the government. The tax reforms will also be debated in Parliament, where the lower house is currently reviewing the draft of the new Tax Code. The government will have to negotiate with members of the Majilis and Senate over the VAT rate, sufficiency threshold, and other sensitive issues. Messages to Foreign Partners...