Kyrgyzstan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Central Asia’s Combined ‘Army of Turan’: Could a Hypothesis Become a Reality?

Kazakhstan will host the military exercise, "Birlestik-2024" in July of this year. Notably, this became known from the press service of the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan. The exercises will be jointly held by the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It is a convenient occasion to refresh the topic of the 'Army of Turan', which is periodically raised by experts both in Central Asia and neighboring countries. The Army of Turan is a hypothetical military bloc of Turkic-speaking countries. Its ideas have become relevant in the context of global geopolitical turbulence. I hear the thunder of cannons... Most military analysts consider Azerbaijan to be Turkey's proxy in the South Caucasus. In general, Baku's rapprochement with the capitals of Turkic states (plus Dushanbe) meets Ankara's interests in creating a unified cultural and economic space: Turan. However, does the integration of Turkic states mean that they will eventually be able to create a NATO-style security pact in Central Asia? Such initiatives have resumed with renewed vigor after the end of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict, during which Turkey has shown the capability of its weapons. Indeed, in 2022, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan - the only country of the participants to share a land border with the Russian Federation - pondered how to protect itself from further expansion of the northern empire's borders. But in the run-up to the summer of 2024, fears have mostly subsided. Many were sobered by the obvious fact that loud declarations of assistance from strong states at best mean the delivery of obsolete weapons, but no more. At worst, your offender will be censured from high podiums, and you will be sympathized with. For example, Turkey, the most likely to defend Central Asia from outsider aggression, did not risk helping the Palestinians, its brothers in faith, and got away with accusing Israel of fascism. So, the 'Army of Turan' exists in the heads of fantasists and pan-Turkics, but in reality, something ordinary is going on — the arms trade. Let's see what the armies of the Central Asian republics are armed with, excluding Turkmenistan, which has declared neutrality. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan The most troublesome neighbors in the region have not been able to complete their border delimitation process. As a result, quarrels periodically erupt, in which border guards from both sides intervene, staging mini-warfare. The cause of discord is usually the same: water. The Tajik and Kyrgyz militaries gain some combat experience in these micro-quarrels. Despite or based on this experience, Dushanbe relies on agreements with other countries -- Russia, China, India, Iran, and CSTO partners -- for its defense capability. Tajikistan's armed forces number only 9,000 men. They have 38 tanks (T-62 and T-72 modifications), 114 armored vehicles (APCs, BMPs, BRDMs), 40 artillery systems, and several short- and medium-range air defense units. The Air Force has four Czechoslovakian L-39 Albatross, combat trainers. Kyrgyzstan does not have much more power in the number of its troops, at around...

Is the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan Railway Project Losing Steam Again?

By Robert M. Cutler The China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan (CKU) railway was first proposed in 1997. There seemed finally to be a prospect for a start to the project after agreements at the Xi'an summit amongst China and the five Central Asian countries in May 2023. Construction on the 523-kilometre route was scheduled to begin several months after, but this has still not happened. Disagreements over the route and—still worse—over the funding risk relegating the project back to the drawing-boards where it has languished for over a quarter-century. After the initial agreement in 1997, it was these essentially unchanging disagreements over financing and the route within Kyrgyzstan that stalled negotiations, and over a final agreement of conditions for its construction in the early 2000s. These disagreements concern the geo-economic strategies of the respective parties, and they have not changed in over two decades. China favors a shorter route, while Kyrgyzstan pushes for a longer one to benefit its domestic infrastructure. Specifically, Kyrgyzstan wants to use the railway's construction to establish better connections between the northern and southern parts of the country, which are separated by a mountain range. Further difficulties in CKU implementation For Uzbekistan, a turning-point was its decision in 2017 to send railway experts to discuss the project with Kyrgyzstan. Then in 2019, Uzbekistan invited Turkey to co-finance the Kyrgyz section. The current cost of the whole project is estimated at $6 billion. A preliminary agreement has been reached on the division of this total, according to which each of the three parties will contribute 30 per cent (but at different stages of the project), with the source of the final 10 per cent including the cost of the feasibility study still to be determined. Despite this progress, public concerns in Kyrgyzstan over several critical practical issues remain unaddressed and continue to complicate a final agreement. These include the anticipated influx of Chinese workers, the professional development of local railway engineers, the allocation of investments for industrial projects along the railway corridor and the facilitation of increased exports of Kyrgyzstan's products to the Chinese market. These elements are essential for the long-term viability and success of the CKU railway initiative. Interestingly, these are very similar to the concerns of Kazakhstan that delayed the construction of the first (i.e., the Atasu–Alashankou) segment of the Kazakhstan–China oil export pipeline in the early 2000s. Moreover, China originally insisted on compensation from Bishkek for its contribution in the form of ownership of Kyrgyz mines, including the world’s second-largest iron-ore reserve at Zhetim Too, which Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov claims is worth at least $50 billion. It does not help matters that this site adjoins a large glacier, the water from which is crucial for irrigation of major Kyrgyz agricultural holdings. Other Uzbek initiatives for infrastructure connectivity On 1 November 2023, at a forum of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) meeting in Tashkent, transportation officials from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed a memorandum to establish a new Kyrgyzstan–Russia trade corridor through Turkmenistan (who, incidentally,...

Kyrgyzstan’s Law on NGOs: What Alarms Human Rights Activists?

In April 2024 Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov signed a law on non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Now all NGOs must submit full financial reports and register with the Ministry of Justice. Despite the authorities' statements about the need for a document regulating the financing of such organizations, the law has numerous opponents. President Japarov himself claims that some NGOs have deceived donors by using foreign funds -- meant for roundtable discussions, training sessions and projects -- for personal purposes. "If you say that this is not true, I can prove it. Why do NGOs in developed countries register with the Ministry of Justice, tax service, open a bank account and do not do the same when they come to us? Or are we a second-rate country? No, we are not. We will not allow such dubious actions anymore," Japarov said after criticism from NGO representatives. Under the new legislation, an NGO that has received foreign aid will be called a "foreign representative". Public activists claim that the rule is consonant with the Russian law on foreign agent status for nonprofits that accept foreign funding. Such a situation will carry certain reputational risks: according to the law, organizations that receive funding from abroad and deal with political issues must be included in a special register and operate under the control of state bodies. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Azisbek Ashurov, head of the NGO 'Lawyers of Fergana Valley Without Borders' and a human rights activist, spoke about the pitfalls of the law. In Ashurov's opinion, the document is designed to limit the activities of the private sector. "We are concerned about the re-registration procedure itself. Either it is just an application procedure, or someone will approve, make decisions. When decisions are made, how transparent and non-corrupt will it be?" he asked. Ashurov gave the example that in Kyrgyzstan there are NGOs providing legal assistance to citizens. If there is a dispute with a government body, the decision is challenged in the courts. However, now such structures will be dependent on the state and will not be able to work fully independently. "State bodies have been authorized to interfere in the activities of NGOs. This is participation in their internal activities. We discuss some of our cases [via] collegiums, when lawyers discuss the strategy for different cases. Now, imagine, a representative of the state will sit and listen to confidential information that in the interest of the citizen we should not disclose. The balance is grossly upset. The adversarial principle is violated if we are preparing for court hearings against state bodies, for example, against the Ministry of Justice," Ashurov added. According to him, the Ministry of Justice was given the opportunity to suspend the activities of NGOs for violations. However, the current legislative framework doesn't specify the violations for which an NGO can be suspended. The law prescribes that state bodies may request information from NGOs -- however, it's not specified what kind of information should be provided. In...

How India is Becoming a Robust Soft Power in Central Asia

The middle-income trap, a pressing issue that has led to the stagnation of many successful developing economies, demands immediate attention. This trap, which occurs when a middle-income country can no longer compete internationally in standardized, labor-intensive goods due to relatively high wages, is a result of various factors, including countries most successful demographic characteristics. For instance, access to education has reduced birth rates due to an almost 100% literacy rate defined by 12 years of education. In the process, importing cheap manufacturing products has made local products uncompetitive. In such a situation, the country should have planned to upgrade current skill-based education to high-tech skills such as ICT, pharmaceuticals, etc. This shift to high-tech education holds immense potential for developing countries, offering a pathway out of the middle-income trap. Unfortunately, poor investment in developing high-tech education has led to an inadequate supply of a high-skilled workforce. Developed economies, such as the U.S. and a few European countries, are in an advantageous position to overcome such a trap due to their highly effective immigration policy. Developing countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, the Philippines, and almost all Central Asian Republics, meanwhile, suffer. This will be further aggravated if the issue is not addressed urgently. Due to its geographic location and natural resource endowments, Central Asia, a diverse region with a mix of upper-middle and low-income countries, holds significant importance in the global economic landscape. Let's look at a specific case, such as Uzbekistan, a country whose population is growing at 1.3% per annum. Regarding age structure, the 0-14 age group makes up 30.1% of the population, the 15-64 age group 64.6%, and the 65-plus group constitutes just 5.3%. The country has achieved a high literacy rate, with 100% of the population completing 12 years of primary and higher secondary education. However, the country’s GDP per capita is relatively low, at US$ 3,209 (nominal term) and US$ 11,316 (PPP). The country's economy is dominated by the services sector, which contributes 48.4% to the GDP, followed by industry at 33.7%, and agriculture at 17.9%. The poverty line is set at less than US$ 3.2 per day, affecting 10% of the population. The country's labor force is distributed across sectors, with 25.9% in agriculture, 13.2% in industry, and 60.9% in services. The unemployment rate is 5.3%, and underemployment is a significant issue, affecting 20% of the population. The low supply of highly skilled workers challenges further increasing per capita income. The country will likely fall into this middle-income trap because it reaches a certain average income and cannot progress beyond that level. It seems helpful to mention some insights from this perspective. During Soviet times, the growth model of states was determined by their available resources, and Central Asia is rich in abundant resources. However, in most cases, primary resources were taken to other non-resource wealthy states for further value addition. So, the workforce was created in the respective states based on the concerned state's requirements. Workforce migration from one state to another was...

Kyrgyzstan’s Debt to China: Another lever of Influence?

Stagnation of the world’s economy, decreasing international trade and growing inflation put the spotlight on the issue of returning Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt, a large part of which is owed to China. The debt is to be repaid sooner or later, but it would make the country sacrifice either its facilities or territory. In both cases, it is a blow on the country’s sovereignty. Historically, China has been a creditor of countries with high corruption levels, unstable political systems, and nontransparent economies. For instance, Brunei, Namibia, Congo, and Papua New Guinea all have a “hidden” debt to China — more than 10 percent of GDP. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign debt now stands at $5 billion, including $4 billion to China. For comparison, in 2008 Kyrgyzstan’s debt to China was $10 million. Unlike international financial organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, China gives loans to Kyrgyzstan on commercial terms that are not disclosed. The existing debt does not prevent the Kyrgyz government from taking new loans, which leads to increasing debt burden. In Kyrgyzstan, China has financed mainly infrastructure projects, showing more interest in the water and energy sector — one of the main economic and strategic resources of the country. It is not surprising, as in today’s world access to water resources gives additional levers of influence. A potential project in this sector is construction of the bypass Chui canal-2 and Buruldai reservoir with a total cost of about $140 million. The project’s economic feasibility, its possible environmental impact and other aspects require a comprehensive analysis. Anyway, the project’s implementation would increase the country’s debt burden and give China yet another lever of influence on Kyrgyzstan. Such projects are not just a matter of money, debts and commitments but also social stability, given the history of relationships between local Kyrgyz population and Chinese investors (for instance, a mass brawl with stoning at Soltan-Sary deposit). A good example of Beijing using its “soft power” is neighboring Tajikistan, 40 percent of whose $3.2 billion foreign debt belongs to China. Beijing also grants payment deferments on its loans. In exchange, Tajikistan has given thanks to China by ceding 1.1 thousand square kilometers (0.77 percent of its territory) to China in a 2011 border demarcation, supporting China at UN votes, and allowing Chinese companies develop nearly 80 percent of Tajik gold deposits. With the above in mind, Kyrgyzstan has to think twice before taking new Chinese loans.

Islamic Extremism in Central Asia: A Threat to Liberal Progress

Afghanistan earned its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” due to the significant toll exacted on foreign powers in their efforts to achieve military success in the country. This challenge was evident in the experiences of the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and, most recently, the United States. The persistent and decentralized nature of the country's tribal insurgency made achieving a definitive victory a formidable task. Furthermore, the adherence of groups harbored by the Taliban, such as Al Qaeda, to an extremist religious ideology spread terrorism globally, including in the 9/11 attacks as well as other deadly acts of violence in various parts of the world. While the United States arguably played a constructive role in modernizing Afghanistan, the establishment of democracy and Western values in the country proved to be an insurmountable challenge, even with over $100 billion in foreign aid. With heightened tensions between the Islamic and Western populations reignited in the Levant after the deadly Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the threat of Afghanistan-based extremists redirecting their focus towards the West has intensified. Often overlooked is the fact that Salafists jihadists and other radical groups also pose a challenge to the emerging democracies in Central Asia as these Muslim-majority secular republics are seen as areas to spread their undemocratic and potentially violent influence. In this context, policies that may even inadvertently help promote illiberal religious movements threaten the region’s secular identity and the security of its peoples. We should assess Central Asia’s unique position on religious freedoms but also on jihadist threats For the large part, Western countries come from a privileged position of being able to resist the widespread influence from Islamic extremist movements at home thanks mainly to generations of democratic institution building as well as decent geographic distance to areas that would fall under pan-jihadist aspirations. Consider that there is no apparent threat of jihadists entirely displacing Western democratic institutions or imposing a pan-Islamist state encompassing parts of Western nations; most Western lands do not fall on areas some of these groups want to conquer to create an Islamic Caliphate. On the other hand, many other places, including Central Asia, still risk misconstruing the line between defending individual freedoms and combatting religious extremism. Here, the coexistence of extremist Islamic ideologies and democracy remains somewhat precarious. Islamic radicalism continues to pose a serious challenge to the emerging democracies of the region, where the secular republics are trying to keep a lid on certain hostile ideologies. Militant groups spilling over from Afghanistan and infiltrating post-Soviet countries want to spread jihad to the region and create an Islamic Khaganate stretching from Egypt to China. Pan-Islamist Salafists, such as Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Al Qaeda, have a clear goal to overthrow Central Asia’s secular regimes. Moreover, the determination of Salafists jihadists and other groups to spread their illiberal and violent struggle to Central Asia (including from neighboring Afghanistan) has become apparent through their growing presence in the region’s schools and other spheres of public...