• KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00222
  • TJS/USD = 0.10840
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
21 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 453

German Spy Scandal Puts Central Asian and Caucasus Espionage Cases in Focus

The arrest of former German intelligence chief August Hanning has drawn attention to Azerbaijan. German journalists reported that he allegedly had contacts with Azerbaijan's intelligence service. Baku rejected the allegations, while German prosecutors have not confirmed any Azerbaijani involvement. In recent years, citizens of Central Asia and the South Caucasus have repeatedly been implicated in espionage and treason cases. The accused and suspects include former intelligence chiefs, military personnel, officials, scientists, and foreign nationals. Some have received lengthy prison sentences, while others remain under investigation. In many cases, information about alleged foreign intelligence connections is limited to media reports. German Scandal and Ties to Baku On October 6, 2026, the German authorities detained 80-year-old August Hanning, who headed the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) from 1998 to 2005. Former BND employee Manfred D. was also taken into custody. Hanning is suspected of attempted treason, obtaining state secrets, and acting on behalf of a foreign intelligence service. Manfred D. is suspected of assisting in the alleged offenses. Both were placed in pretrial detention on October 7. According to federal prosecutors, in the spring of 2010, Hanning reached an agreement with his former subordinate to obtain intelligence documents in exchange for money. By June 2022, Manfred D. had allegedly provided him with approximately 2,000 documents, including classified materials. By then, Hanning was working as a private consultant and, investigators believe, used the information for commercial purposes. According to German media reports, the documents included materials on Iran's nuclear program, Russia's armed forces, and information received from partner intelligence agencies. Investigators also allege that Hanning prepared an analytical memorandum for an officer of a foreign intelligence service. It remains unknown whether the intended recipient received it. Der Spiegel reported alleged contacts between Hanning and a representative of Azerbaijani intelligence. The investigative outlet CORRECTIV examined his longstanding ties to Baku, including his participation in the German-Azerbaijani Forum. German prosecutors have not identified the foreign intelligence service involved in the investigation. Azerbaijan rejected reports of its involvement and warned of damage to relations with Berlin. An Azerbaijani official also claimed that German intelligence representatives had assured Baku that the investigation was unrelated to Azerbaijan, although this has not been publicly confirmed by the German authorities. The classified documents were discovered during a separate investigation. In September 2025, police searched Hanning's premises in connection with the alleged abduction of the children of German businesswoman Christina Block from Denmark. The discovery led to a separate criminal investigation opened in May 2026. Hanning's lawyer acknowledged that his client possessed confidential documents, but rejected allegations he had passed on information to Germany's detriment or received payment for doing so. Kazakhstan’s Espionage and State Secrets Cases In Kazakhstan, one of the best-known treason cases of recent times involved the prosecution of China expert Konstantin Syroyezhkin, who worked for many years at the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the president. Syroyezhkin was detained in February 2019 and sentenced to ten years in prison in October. The trial was held behind closed...

Kyrgyzstan Expands Domestic Drone Production

A private research center near Bishkek is expanding production of unmanned and robotic systems as Kyrgyzstan invests more heavily in drones, robotics, and military modernization. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces have expanded alongside sharp increases in defense spending, with drones receiving particular attention since Bishkek acquired its first combat drones in late 2021. The Nanospace Research Center, which operates with private funding, was established with support from Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, who allocated land for the facility and helped its founders establish cooperation with the country’s armed forces. According to Nanospace Director Ulan Salamatov, the center now holds a license to manufacture military-grade unmanned systems. “We assemble FPV drones, long-range reconnaissance drones, and ground robotic systems here. These machines can provide fire support or place explosives under enemy tanks,” Nanospace Director Ulan Salamatov told The Times of Central Asia. “Of course, we hope there will be no war, but in any case, we must be prepared.” Salamatov said the center initially copied foreign drone models before developing its own long-range reconnaissance drone, the SAARA-02. He claimed the drone was tested in Batken and used to support Kyrgyz forces during the 2021 Kyrgyz-Tajik border clashes. He said the center is now capable of independently producing high-altitude reconnaissance drones, with most parts manufactured in-house using 3D printers. Only chips and microprocessors are imported, while circuit boards and electronic systems are assembled at the facility. The center also produces FPV drones, though Salamatov said mass production remains limited by a lack of industrial machinery and equipment. In addition to aerial drones, Nanospace is building small, unmanned ground vehicles designed to deliver ammunition and supplies to frontline positions or evacuate wounded soldiers. Salamatov said the center is also working under contract with the Kyrgyz special forces to build the Kabylan combat vehicle, a robotic platform that can be equipped with machine guns or serve as a mobile drone-launching base. [caption id="attachment_50418" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] @TCA[/caption] Salamatov said the center plans to begin training students this autumn, opening its facilities to young engineers interested in robotics. The program will combine theoretical classes in the morning with practical training alongside the center’s engineers. Rocket engineering is another focus for the facility. Several prototype rockets developed by the team have already reached altitudes of two kilometers, Salamatov said. Engineers are now working on a rocket capable of reaching the stratosphere. If successful, he said, the center plans to launch a dedicated rocket engineering faculty next year.

Kyrgyzstan Says 31 Suspected KTJ and Islamic State Members Detained in Southern Operation

Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security, or GKNB, said it detained 31 suspected members of Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Islamic State during an overnight counterterrorism operation in the southern Osh and Batken regions. The operation took place on the night of June 8-9. Authorities imposed a legal counterterrorist-operation regime in Osh, Kyzyl-Kiya, Kara-Suu district, and Uch-Korgon village in Kadamjay district. The GKNB said the suspects had planned attacks against law enforcement officers and religious figures. Security officers detained 11 people in Osh region and 20 in Batken region. During searches, officers seized religious extremist literature, electronic storage devices with extremist materials, four unregistered firearms, symbols of terrorist groups, and money that the GKNB said was intended to finance terrorist structures abroad. The GKNB said its chairman, Jumgalbek Shabdanbekov, directed the operation in real time from a situation center. Operational headquarters included staff from the Interior Ministry, Border Service, Defense Ministry, Emergency Situations Ministry, Health Ministry, presidential envoys in the regions, and Osh city officials. “The special operation was carried out in strict accordance with the law,” the GKNB said in a statement carried by local media. The committee said its Main Investigation Department was checking the detainees’ links, possible accomplices, and financing channels. The suspects were not named, and the GKNB statement did not give their ages, citizenship, or the legal articles under which the case is proceeding. The detainees were placed in the GKNB’s temporary detention facility. Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad appears on the UN Security Council’s ISIL and Al-Qaida sanctions list as Khatiba al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, or KTJ. The UN added the group to the list on March 7, 2022, for its association with Al-Qaida-linked groups. The UN entry says KTJ was formerly known as Jannat Oshiklari and operated under Al-Nusrah Front in Syria. It also says the group had about 500 fighters. The UN entry says KTJ organized the 2016 attack on the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek. In that attack, a suspected suicide car bomber rammed the embassy gates, killing himself and wounding at least three other people, Reuters reported. Reuters later quoted the GKNB as saying, “The investigation established that the terrorist act was ordered by Uighur terrorist groups active in Syria.” U.S. sanctions records list Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity. Kyrgyzstan’s official list of banned organizations includes Islamic State, Jannat Oshiklari, and Jamaat at-Tawhid wal-Jihad. Islamic State was declared a terrorist and extremist organization by Bishkek’s Oktyabr District Court on February 13, 2015, and the ruling entered into force on March 16, 2015, 24.kg reported. No convictions have been announced in the June 9 case. The case remains under investigation.

China to Supply Tajikistan With Intelligence and Counterterrorism Equipment

China will provide Tajikistan with intelligence, police, and counterterrorism equipment worth more than $7.6 million under a grant assistance program approved by the two governments. The governments of the two countries signed the corresponding memorandum of understanding on May 8. The agreement provides for the transfer of equipment by China for the needs of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the terms of the deal, the Chinese side will deliver 34 intelligence devices along with additional police and counterterrorism equipment. The shipment is expected to enter Tajikistan through the Karasu border crossing. China will also dispatch eight specialists to Tajikistan to install and configure the equipment and train Tajik personnel. Their mission is expected to last 45 days. The total value of the equipment and services amounts to 52 million Chinese yuan, or approximately $7.64 million. All associated costs will be fully covered by the Chinese side. Tajikistan, for its part, has agreed to handle customs clearance, transportation and storage of the equipment once it arrives in the country. Authorities will also exempt the deliveries from taxes and customs duties and provide the necessary conditions for the Chinese specialists, including visas, accommodation, and security arrangements. A special working group will be established to coordinate with Chinese engineers during installation and personnel training. The document separately emphasizes that after delivery the two sides will jointly inspect the quality, quantity and technical specifications of the equipment before signing a formal acceptance certificate. Future operation and maintenance costs will then become the responsibility of the Tajik side. China remains one of Tajikistan’s largest strategic partners. Following President Emomali Rahmon’s recent state visit to China, Tajik officials said more than 80 cooperation documents were signed as a result of high-level talks and business meetings, while China’s Foreign Ministry referred separately to more than ten state-level cooperation documents. Earlier, Tajikistan’s parliament also approved an agreement under which China would finance the construction of nine border facilities along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The new grant comes amid renewed scrutiny of China’s expanding role in Tajikistan’s security sector. Reports and speculation about a possible Chinese military facility in Gorno-Badakhshan have surfaced periodically, including in 2021 and again in 2024. However, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied the existence of a Chinese military base on the country’s territory.

Syrian Security Forces Detain Uzbek Fighters During Operation in Idlib

Syrian security forces have detained a group of Uzbek fighters during a security operation in the country’s northwest, according to two Syrian security officials cited by Reuters. The arrests followed unrest in Idlib province after the authorities attempted to detain an Uzbek militant accused of opening fire in Idlib city. According to Reuters, the incident escalated when armed Uzbek fighters gathered outside a government security facility demanding the release of the suspect. The protests later triggered a broader security sweep in several parts of the countryside, including the towns of Kafriya and al-Foua. Locals and Syrian officials said security forces deployed military convoys and reinforcements to the area, where sporadic gunfire was heard during the operation. It remains unclear how many Uzbek fighters were detained. The Syrian Interior Ministry did not immediately comment on the reports. The latest incident highlights ongoing tensions between Syria’s Islamist-led authorities and foreign militants who traveled to the country during the civil war that began in 2011. Many foreign fighters, including Uzbeks, fought alongside factions linked to current Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa before he formally severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016. Reuters previously reported, citing a Syrian security source, that around 1,500 Uzbek fighters were believed to be living in Syria, some accompanied by their families. The Syrian government has attempted to integrate thousands of foreign fighters into the country’s newly reorganized military structures following the December 2024 ouster of former President Bashar al-Assad. Some foreign militants have assumed senior state roles, including a Jordanian commander of the Republican Guard and an Australian head of a newly established sovereign fund. Others, however, have resisted joining state institutions, creating continuing security concerns for Damascus. The recent operation marks the second major confrontation in Idlib involving foreign militants in recent months. Last year, Syrian government raids targeting foreign fighters near the Turkish border drew in Uzbek militants after clashes erupted around a compound linked to French jihadist Omar Diaby, also known as Omar Omsen. At the time, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said Syrian transitional authorities were conducting “a low-level effort to target foreign fighters in Syria who have not integrated into the Ministry of Defense.” The institute reported that Uzbek militants had deployed to reinforce foreign fighters during clashes in Harem, a city near the Turkish border. The same report stated that Syrian authorities had arrested two prominent Uzbek foreign fighters in August 2025, contributing to growing dissatisfaction among Central Asian militant groups operating in Syria.

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...