Security - The Times Of Central Asia

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Counterterrorism

China to Supply Tajikistan With Intelligence and Counterterrorism Equipment

China will provide Tajikistan with intelligence, police, and counterterrorism equipment worth more than $7.6 million under a grant assistance program approved by the two governments. The governments of the two countries signed the corresponding memorandum of understanding on May 8. The agreement provides for the transfer of equipment by China for the needs of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the terms of the deal, the Chinese side will deliver 34 intelligence devices along with additional police and counterterrorism equipment. The shipment is expected to enter Tajikistan through the Karasu border crossing. China will also dispatch eight specialists to Tajikistan to install and configure the equipment and train Tajik personnel. Their mission is expected to last 45 days. The total value of the equipment and services amounts to 52 million Chinese yuan, or approximately $7.64 million. All associated costs will be fully covered by the Chinese side. Tajikistan, for its part, has agreed to handle customs clearance, transportation and storage of the equipment once it arrives in the country. Authorities will also exempt the deliveries from taxes and customs duties and provide the necessary conditions for the Chinese specialists, including visas, accommodation, and security arrangements. A special working group will be established to coordinate with Chinese engineers during installation and personnel training. The document separately emphasizes that after delivery the two sides will jointly inspect the quality, quantity and technical specifications of the equipment before signing a formal acceptance certificate. Future operation and maintenance costs will then become the responsibility of the Tajik side. China remains one of Tajikistan’s largest strategic partners. Following President Emomali Rahmon’s recent state visit to China, Tajik officials said more than 80 cooperation documents were signed as a result of high-level talks and business meetings, while China’s Foreign Ministry referred separately to more than ten state-level cooperation documents. Earlier, Tajikistan’s parliament also approved an agreement under which China would finance the construction of nine border facilities along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The new grant comes amid renewed scrutiny of China’s expanding role in Tajikistan’s security sector. Reports and speculation about a possible Chinese military facility in Gorno-Badakhshan have surfaced periodically, including in 2021 and again in 2024. However, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied the existence of a Chinese military base on the country’s territory.

Syria

Syrian Security Forces Detain Uzbek Fighters During Operation in Idlib

Syrian security forces have detained a group of Uzbek fighters during a security operation in the country’s northwest, according to two Syrian security officials cited by Reuters. The arrests followed unrest in Idlib province after the authorities attempted to detain an Uzbek militant accused of opening fire in Idlib city. According to Reuters, the incident escalated when armed Uzbek fighters gathered outside a government security facility demanding the release of the suspect. The protests later triggered a broader security sweep in several parts of the countryside, including the towns of Kafriya and al-Foua. Locals and Syrian officials said security forces deployed military convoys and reinforcements to the area, where sporadic gunfire was heard during the operation. It remains unclear how many Uzbek fighters were detained. The Syrian Interior Ministry did not immediately comment on the reports. The latest incident highlights ongoing tensions between Syria’s Islamist-led authorities and foreign militants who traveled to the country during the civil war that began in 2011. Many foreign fighters, including Uzbeks, fought alongside factions linked to current Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa before he formally severed ties with al-Qaeda in 2016. Reuters previously reported, citing a Syrian security source, that around 1,500 Uzbek fighters were believed to be living in Syria, some accompanied by their families. The Syrian government has attempted to integrate thousands of foreign fighters into the country’s newly reorganized military structures following the December 2024 ouster of former President Bashar al-Assad. Some foreign militants have assumed senior state roles, including a Jordanian commander of the Republican Guard and an Australian head of a newly established sovereign fund. Others, however, have resisted joining state institutions, creating continuing security concerns for Damascus. The recent operation marks the second major confrontation in Idlib involving foreign militants in recent months. Last year, Syrian government raids targeting foreign fighters near the Turkish border drew in Uzbek militants after clashes erupted around a compound linked to French jihadist Omar Diaby, also known as Omar Omsen. At the time, the U.S.-based Institute for the Study of War said Syrian transitional authorities were conducting “a low-level effort to target foreign fighters in Syria who have not integrated into the Ministry of Defense.” The institute reported that Uzbek militants had deployed to reinforce foreign fighters during clashes in Harem, a city near the Turkish border. The same report stated that Syrian authorities had arrested two prominent Uzbek foreign fighters in August 2025, contributing to growing dissatisfaction among Central Asian militant groups operating in Syria.

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

Security

Global Terrorism Index: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan Show Zero Risk of Terrorism

The countries of Central Asia are among those least affected by terrorism globally, according to the newly published Global Terrorism Index 2026 report. However, the report suggests that the region’s stability is increasingly influenced by external factors, particularly its proximity to Afghanistan. Country scores are a composite measure made up of four indicators: incidents, fatalities, injuries and hostages. To measure the impact of terrorism, a five-year weighted average is applied. The main concentrations of terrorist activity remain in Africa and South Asia. The overall level of terrorism worldwide declined in 2025, although the nature of the threats became more complex and less predictable. The report indicates that no terrorist incidents were recorded in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Turkmenistan, who all scored 0 for terrorism risk, placing them all joint 163rd out of the 163 nations researched. Uzbekistan (95th) remains in the minimal-risk category. Tajikistan is the only country in the region with a higher threat level, ranking 41st globally. Central Asia’s relative stability is attributed to several factors, including robust security measures, the absence of active armed conflicts, and the limited presence of international terrorist organisations. Despite relative internal stability, risks to Central Asia are increasingly emerging from outside the region. The report highlights growing activity by extremist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as worsening relations between the two countries, which could potentially escalate into open conflict by 2026. Particular concern is focused on the Tajik-Afghan border, where structural vulnerabilities persist. In addition to external pressures, experts are drawing attention to internal dynamics. The report notes an acceleration of radicalisation, particularly among young people, with digital platforms and online content playing a significant role.

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

U.S.-Turkmenistan Relations

Behind Turkmenistan’s Neutrality, Quiet U.S. Military Ties Endure

In late January, U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia, Sergio Gor visited Turkmenistan. Accompanying Gor was U.S. Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll. Driscoll’s presence in Turkmenistan, a country with a roughly 1,150-kilometer border with Iran, sparked some speculation that his visit was related to escalating tensions between Washington and Tehran. But while it is unusual for any top foreign military officials to visit Turkmenistan, U.S. military officials have stopped by Turkmenistan relatively often over the course of the last 30 years. Neutral Turkmenistan A good trivia question about Central Asia is, which country was the first to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program? The answer is Turkmenistan, in May 1994, and NATO had just created the PfP program in January of that year. However, in December 1995, the UN approved giving Turkmenistan official status as a neutral country. Turkmenistan’s president at the time, Saparmurat Niyazov, said as part of that neutral status, Turkmenistan would not join any military blocs or join in aggression against another country. Then came the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and U.S. President George Bush Jr’s remark that “you’re either with us or against us.” Central Asia, with its nearly 2,400-kilometer border with Afghanistan, suddenly became a frontline in Washington’s campaign against terrorist groups inside Afghanistan. The other Central Asian countries, which had watched with dread as the Taliban advanced toward Central Asian borders, quickly expressed their support. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan offered the use of military bases to the U.S. and NATO forces that were rapidly being assembled. Turkmenistan took a different position on events in Afghanistan. Remaining true to its UN-recognized neutrality status, Turkmenistan engaged with the Taliban and with the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani, whom the Taliban had ousted from power. A round of peace talks between the two Afghan parties was held in the Turkmen capital, Ashgabat, in March 1999. After 9/11, Turkmenistan agreed to allow U.S. planes carrying non-lethal cargo to transit through Turkmen airspace and to refuel at Ashgabat airport. But officially, that was as far as the Turkmen government was willing to become involved. The U.S. had already established a military connection with Turkmenistan. The head of the U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks, visited Turkmenistan in September 2000 and again in May 2001. U.S. Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld visited Turkmenistan in April 2002. General Franks followed in August that year, promising to help Turkmenistan fight the illegal narcotics trade. The United States gave Turkmenistan two small naval patrol boats for use in the Caspian Sea in 2002, and in 2003, gave 40 Russian-made off-road vehicles to Turkmenistan’s border guards. Reports started to appear stating that Turkmenistan’s military cooperation with the United States was quietly deepening. The Turkmen government had said when agreeing to allow overflights and refueling that no foreign troops would be stationed in Turkmenistan. But it turned out that a small U.S. Air Force team, only about seven servicemen, was stationed in Ashgabat to help refuel U.S....