Kyrgyzstan Opinions - The Times Of Central Asia

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Organization of Turkic States

How Central Asia Is Shifting From Russia Towards Turkey

For Turkey, a NATO member and EU hopeful, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an instrument that helps Ankara increase its presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the Turkish-dominated group seems to be a tool that allows them to achieve their economic goals, while also continuing to distance themselves from Russia. Although Moscow still has a relatively strong foothold in Central Asia, it does not seem able to prevent the growing role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-Soviet space. This entity – whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status – has the potential to eventually serve as a counterbalance not only to Russian, but also Chinese influence in the region. Since its foundation in 2009, the OTS has held ten summits of its leaders. Over this period, the intergovernmental organization’s working bodies have also convened dozens of times. On November 5-6 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the OTS heads of states will meet for the eleventh time to discuss the future of the Turkic world. Although the agenda has yet to be announced, it is believed that the OTS leaders will seek to strengthen economic cooperation between its members. Currently, their major trade partners are nations outside the bloc. For instance, Turkey’s largest trading partner is Germany, Azerbaijan’s is Italy, while China has recently become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner with bilateral trade hitting $31.5 billion. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, China and Russia remain the most important economic partners. One of the group’s major problems is the fact that its members, excluding Turkey, are landlocked countries heavily-dependent on Russia and China geographically. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Organization of Turkic States governments’ agreed in September to create a simplified customs corridor, aiming at reducing the number of documents required for customs operations and customs procedures between OTS member states. In other words, they plan to increase trade among themselves. According to Omer Kocaman, OTS Deputy Secretary-General, the Turkic nations are also looking to “continue cooperation to stimulate positive changes in their financial systems.” That is why the organization has recently launched the Turkic Investment Fund – the first joint financial institution for economic integration of the Turkic countries, with an initial capital of $500 million. Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced on October 17 that, starting in January 2025, the Turkic Investment Fund will begin financing major joint projects in OTS nations. However, in July, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the current structure of the Organization of Turkic States does not meet its established goals, and that its budget is insufficient for their implementation. In order to change that, on October 19, ministers of economy and trade of the OTS nations met in Bishkek to...

Fergana Valley

The Ferghana Valley: Navigating Complex Challenges in Central Asia’s Most Volatile Region

The Ferghana Valley is one of Central Asia’s most fertile and densely populated areas, but it is also among the most volatile. Spanning Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, this landlocked region has long been a hotbed of ethnic tension, water disputes, and political instability. These challenges are deeply rooted in the geography, history, and sociopolitical landscape, making the valley a key focal point for understanding broader regional dynamics in Central Asia. Geographical Importance and Ethnic Diversity Nestled between the towering Tien Shan and Pamir Mountain ranges, the Ferghana Valley covers over 22,000 square kilometers. It is fertile land nourished by the Syr Darya River, making it a critical area for cultivating cotton, fruits, and vegetables. These natural resources have historically drawn diverse populations, creating a vibrant ethnic mosaic. The valley is home to Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks, as well as smaller ethnic groups. While ethnic Uzbeks form the majority, significant Kyrgyz and Tajik minorities inhabit border regions. The ethnic diversity of the Ferghana Valley is both a strength and a source of tension. Soviet-era border policies exacerbated these divisions by creating artificial boundaries that crisscrossed the valley, leaving behind ethnic enclaves — pockets of one nationality surrounded by the territory of another. These enclaves have complicated governance and territorial integrity, making border management a persistent challenge. The Soviet Legacy and Border Disputes During Soviet rule, the Central Asian republics were organized under Stalin’s divide-and-rule strategy, which deliberately created complex borders to weaken local identities and prevent regional unity. The Ferghana Valley, divided among three Soviet republics, is a prime example of this approach. After the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, the administrative boundaries became international borders overnight between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The lack of clearly defined borders has sparked numerous conflicts over territory, water, and land. A notable clash between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in 2021 resulted in over 40 deaths and the destruction of homes and infrastructure. Many disputes revolve around access to scarce resources like water and arable land. These issues have escalated into violent confrontations, leading to casualties and the displacement of local populations. Water: A Scarce and Contested Resource Water is the lifeblood of the Ferghana Valley, but disputes over its allocation are a major source of tension. The valley depends heavily on irrigation for its agricultural productivity, and the Syr Darya River, along with its tributaries, plays a crucial role in supplying water to the region. However, the division of the valley among the three countries complicates water management. Uzbekistan, the most populous of the three, relies on the valley’s water resources for its cotton industry, a cornerstone of its economy. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which control the headwaters of the Syr Darya, often use their upstream position to leverage water access. This dynamic has led to frequent disagreements over water usage. For instance, Kyrgyzstan has at times threatened to withhold water unless it receives compensation, either through payments or electricity. Ethnic Tensions and Political Instability Ethnic tensions further complicate the Ferghana Valley’s already volatile...

Kyrgyzstan Railway

Bridging Continents: The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway – A Tale of Opportunities, Challenges, and Controversies

On June 6, 2024, an agreement was signed in Beijing to begin the construction of a railway between China and Uzbekistan which will pass through Kyrgyzstan, a strategic infrastructure project designed to create a new land transport corridor between Central and East Asia. For 27 years, this project remained a pipe-dream. Now, the presidents of the three countries have confidently declared that this railway, with a length of 523 kilometers, is extremely necessary and will be highly profitable for the entire region. However, such sentiments were not always the case, and doubts have long lived in the heads of multiple Kyrgyz presidents. Both Askar Akayev, who ruled the country from 1990 until the revolution in 2005, his successor Kurmanbek Bakiyev, also overthrown as a result of revolution in 2010, and Almazbek Atambayev, were not sure of the benefits of this project. Until 2017, that is, shortly before Atambayev’s resignation and the transfer of power to his, as it seemed to him at that time, reliable friend Sooronbay Jeenbekov, Atambayev was more or less consistent in defending the interests of his country, but later his focus shifted towards China. Why was there such a turn from Atambayev towards Beijing? This later became clear. On January 26, 2018, an accident occurred in the old part of the Bishkek Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHP), which was supposed to have been modernized by that time. This incident served to reveal large-scale corruption and financial violations at the CHP. The contract for implementation of the modernization was signed on July 16, 2013 between the owner of the CHP, Electric Stations OJSC, and the Chinese company, TBEA, in the amount of $386 million dollars. The financing was provided as a loan by a state fund of China, the Export and Import Bank of China (Eximbank), and Kyrgyzstan had to return approximately $500 million including interest. However, after the accident and the transfer of the case to court, it transpired that the real cost of the subhead modernization was a maximum of $250-260 million. Hence, the cost was hugely inflated; as an example, a pair of pliers was invoiced for $640, and fire extinguishers for $1,600. A similar situation occurred with the Datka-Kemin power line, the construction of which began in 2012, when Atambayev was president. The project was implemented by the same Chinese company, TBEA, which carried out work on modernization of the CHP, and the amount cited for the project was the same, $386 million. Again, the loan was issued by Eximbank. As a result of corruption scandals which were revealed in 2019, Atambayev was deprived of presidential immunity and paid with his freedom. Kyrgyzstan’s accumulated debt since its independence in 1991 is estimated at $6.2 billion - 45% of GDP - around $1.7 billion of which is owed to Eximbank. After Sadyr Japarov came to power in November 2020, issues surrounding the Kumtor Gold Mine came to the fore. Discovered by geologists in 1978, the largest open pit gold mine in Central Asia,...

Migrant Workers

Central Asians Beaten and Deported from Russia

The punishment for many Central Asians in Russia whose work or residency documents are not in order is pain and humiliation, and then possibly deportation. Xenophobia targeting Central Asians in Russia has been on the rise since the March 22 terrorist attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall that left more than 140 people dead. Russian authorities apprehended a group of ethnic Tajiks who allegedly carried out the attack and after that the level of prejudice against Central Asians in Russia, which has always existed, dramatically worsened. The treatment of Central Asians at the Sakharovo migration center on the outskirts of Moscow is an example. Moscow courts are likely to send Central Asians caught with document problems to the Sakharovo center. Radio Free Europe’s Kyrgyz Service interviewed several people who passed through the Sakharovo center. Their descriptions shed light on the conditions inside. One man who spent 18 days in the center said, “The day we entered there, they intimidated us, forced us to walk in single file, run fast… then they examined us and beat us with a stun gun.” That jibes with another man’s description. “They call your last name, then you go out into the corridor and run. There they hit you on the back of the head and tell you to ‘run.’” Then, the man continued, “They made me face the wall, forced me to raise my arms up, spread my legs, and started hitting me with a stun gun.” There is an anti-Islamic element to the treatment of detainees at Sakharovo. A different person remembered this about his detention. “They fed us food with pork. Since we were hungry, we removed the meat and ate what was left.” He said there were some people who recited their daily prayers in their rooms. “When one guy was saying namaz, the guards entered. Then one of them (the guards) hit him in the face twice.” When the person continued saying his prayers, the guards said, “Let him go to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and read his prayer there.” Some of the detainees with beards were forcibly shaved. Batygul Moldobayeva is from Kyrgyzstan. She was detained in Moscow this summer with an expired work permit and sent to Sakharovo. Moldobayeva said the guards yelled at women detainees and were rude to them. She added that sometimes the guards “asked them to be their ‘temporary wives.’” Moldobayeva said there were pregnant women in the center, some as far along as six months, and the guards did not pay any attention to their condition. According to Moldobayeva, there were some Kyrgyz citizens at Sakharovo who had been there for three or four months. Askar Uskenbayev is another Kyrgyz citizen who was detained in Moscow in mid-June and sent to Sakharovo. He said he met fellow Kyrgyz citizens who had been there six months. After being deported back to Kyrgyzstan, Moldobayeva posted about her experience on social media and warned Kyrgyz citizens to be sure all their documents were in order if they...

SCO and Afghanistan on the Cusp of a New Relationship

The hype surrounding the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Council of Heads of State in Astana has died down, and the expert community has offered differing takeaways, with some experts optimistic and others cautious. Few, however, have considered what new this summit delivered on Afghanistan. In general, what is the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in resolving the political issues around long-suffering Afghanistan and rebuilding its economy? Despite the SCO’s previous hands-off approach to Afghan affairs, the issue of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was raised for the first time at the highest level of the SCO in Astana, which gives hope that the organization will expand its role. In their remarks, almost every SCO head of state touched on Afghanistan in essentially the same vein, stating the need for peace, stability and security, while underlining the fact that Afghanistan is an integral part of Central Asia. Indeed, Afghanistan was mentioned in the final declaration of the Astana summit, with Member States “reaffirming their commitment to asserting Afghanistan as an independent, neutral and peaceful state free from terrorism, war, and narcotic drugs [and voicing] their readiness to support the international community’s efforts to facilitate peace and development in that country.” At the same time, there was a clear message to the Taliban that “the establishment of an inclusive government involving multiple representatives of all ethnic and political groups of Afghan society is the only way toward attaining lasting peace and stability in that country.” These statements represent a rather big step, considering that previously the SCO failed to find a consensus on Afghanistan and develop its own mechanisms to interact with Kabul. The creation of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group back in 2005 was rather a spontaneous reaction to the US-led coalition's Operation Enduring Freedom in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. The SCO itself says the contact group was created because of the "concerns of the SCO countries about the negative development of the situation in Afghanistan and the intention of the SCO to establish a specific consultative dialogue with Kabul." While the contact group included the members’ permanent representatives to the SCO, only a few events were ever held. Indeed, interest in the contact group was only really apparent from the Afghan side, which was looking for SCO assistance in rebuilding the Afghan economy and SCO participation in implementing various energy and transport infrastructure projects and creating favorable conditions for Afghan goods to access the markets of SCO countries. However, none of this was realized. The SCO states preferred, as they still do, to conduct relations with Afghanistan bilaterally, and did not support the efforts of the SCO Secretariat to intensify the work of the contact group. In 2010, Uzbekistan directly indicated its interest in building relations with Afghanistan exclusively on a bilateral basis and stated that it would no longer take part in the contact group. In June 2012, Afghanistan’s application for SCO observer status was granted. Yet this step was more symbolic and failed to...

Saudi Islamic Development Bank Increasing Its Presence in Central Asia

The Saudi-based Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has been particularly active in Central Asia so far in 2024. The growing IDB role is part of Central Asian region’s foreign policy shift toward the Arab world as financial backers to replace Russia, which is devoting huge attention and resources to its war in Ukraine, and China, which is increasingly reluctant to spend large sums of money in Central Asia after pouring in tens of billions of dollars there during the last 25 years. Some of the Central Asian governments owe China substantial amounts of money that they are unlikely to be able to pay for possibly decades. The Central Asian states have been members of the IDB for many years. Kyrgyzstan was first, joining in 1993, followed by Turkmenistan in 1994, Kazakhstan in 1995, Tajikistan in 1996, and Uzbekistan in 2003. One of the IDB’s three regional offices is in Almaty, Kazakhstan (the other two are in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Rabat, Morocco). The IDB has been dealing individually with the five Central Asian countries on a wide range of projects and programs in recent months. Energy Resources In February, Tajik Minister of Economic Development and Trade Zavqi Zavqizoda announced a deal was reached for the IDB to provide $250 million to Tajikistan. Zavqizoda said $150 million of that would go toward construction of the Rogun hydropower plant (HPP). The Rogun HPP was a Soviet-era project. Construction started in 1976 but was discontinued shortly after the Soviet Union collapsed. Tajikistan restarted work on the HPP in 2008. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has repeatedly said that building the HPP with a planned 3600 MW capacity will make the country energy independent and even allow Tajikistan to bring in extra revenue exporting electricity to neighboring countries. In its 28 years as an IDB member, Tajikistan had received some $620 million from the IDB, so the $250 million announced in February 2024 represents a significant jump in IDB financial help. Not surprisingly, when IDB President Muhammad Al-Jasser visited Kyrgyzstan in June, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov sought IDB investment in the Kambar-Ata-1 HPP, another decades-old project with a multi-billion-dollar price tag that has barely made any progress in being realized during the 33 years Kyrgyzstan has been independent. Al-Jasser did not commit to IDB financing for the Kyrgyz HPP. However, less than a week after Al-Jasser was in Kyrgyzstan, the IDB was one of several international financial organizations that signed on at a conference in Vienna to be a members of a coordination donors’ committee for the Kambar-Ata-1 projects. At a meeting in Istanbul in February, the IDB reaffirmed its support for the Central Asia-South Asia-1000 (CASA-1000) project that aims to export electricity from HPPs in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kyrgyz Energy Minister Taalaybek Ibrayev met with Al-Jasser in June during the latter’s visit to Kyrgyzstan to discuss funding for Kyrgyzstan’s section of CASA-1000. Not Only Energy In June, the IDB pledged up to $2 billion in funding for improvements to water management...