• KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01152 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00191 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09168 -0.11%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28490 0%
05 December 2024

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 358

Kazakhstan, with China’s Help, Plans to Export Green Energy to Europe

Although Kazakhstan is a major producer of all fossil fuels – coal, crude oil, and natural gas – it also has the capacity to secure its energy future by prioritizing renewable energy. Fully aware of that, the European Union – one of the former Soviet republic’s most significant trade partners – aims to strengthen its energy ties with Astana, hoping to begin importing not only “green electricity” from the Central Asian nation, but also green hydrogen. On November 25, at Nazarbayev University in Astana, the “Energy in Transition – Powering Tomorrow” traveling exhibition was held, and one of the major topics discussed by energy experts was green hydrogen – hydrogen produced using renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power. It is unlikely a pure coincidence that the German Federal Foreign Office initiated the event. Over the past few years, Germany has shown interest in the development of the Kazakh green hydrogen sector. The most prominent green hydrogen project in Kazakhstan is currently being developed by Hyrasia One, a subsidiary of the German-Swedish energy company, Svevind. In 2021, the company announced its plans for €50 billion ($55 billion) green hydrogen project in the Mangystau Region in western Kazakhstan. It is expected that Hyrasia One will begin the production of green hydrogen in 2030, and the power plant will reach full capacity by 2032. Meanwhile, the authorities in Astana will need to find a way to export this form of renewable energy to Europe, a major energy market for Kazakhstan. Although Astana and Brussels signed a strategic partnership on the production of green hydrogen in November 2022, several challenges remain in the implementation of the deal. Issues such as the high cost, water scarcity in the largest Central Asian state (with water being the key component of green hydrogen production), and a lack of transport infrastructure, are significant barriers to exporting hydrogen from Kazakhstan to Europe. Using Russian gas pipeline systems for transportation of the Kazakh green hydrogen to Europe is not an option given current geopolitical circumstances. To resolve this transportation issue, the Kazakh authorities and their European partners could build hydrogen pipelines across the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and Turkey to reach southern European countries. The problem is that building such a pipeline infrastructure is very expensive, and it remains uncertain who would be willing to fund such a project. That, however, does not mean that Kazakhstan cannot become Europe’s major green hydrogen supplier. What Astana would have to do, according to experts, is to convert the green hydrogen into green ammonia and then export it to Europe via the Middle Corridor – running through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. On the Black Sea coast, ammonia would be loaded onto ships and transported past the Bosphorus to EU members such as Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria. From there, it would be sent further north, where green hydrogen would eventually be extracted from the ammonia. This is a rather complex process, and it is unclear how feasible and...

Kazakhstan and Taliban Afghanistan: An Overview of Relations

Diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and Afghanistan began more than 30 years ago, on February 12, 1992. However, in April of that year, the republican regime in Kabul fell, and the country plunged into the abyss of civil war after becoming the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Such chaos had never been seen before. The first Taliban Emirate was established and then overthrown by the US-led coalition, after which the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was proclaimed Politics Kazakhstan's first diplomatic mission in Kabul was opened in September 2002, less than a year after America launched Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003, it was transformed into an embassy. From then on, the relationship between the countries became operational. The new starting point of the Kazakh-Afghan relationship was August 15, 2021, when the Taliban seized power in Kabul. Kazakhstan's foreign policy was put to a test, but Astana demonstrated foresight and pragmatism. The Kazakh embassy, unlike most other countries, was not evacuated, diplomats continued to work in the new conditions and began to establish the first contacts with the Taliban authorities. From the very beginning, Kazakhstan took a clear and understandable position and began to promote it at various levels. A month after the Taliban seized Kabul, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev drew attention to the situation in Afghanistan at the SCO meeting in Dushanbe (September 17). As he stated, "Kazakhstan sees future Afghanistan as a truly independent and united state living in peace with itself and its neighbors. At this crucial historical moment, the multinational people of Afghanistan should not be left alone in the face of unprecedented difficulties". A few days later, on September 22, during the UN General Assembly, the Kazakh president detailed the position of his country and was one of the first politicians to point out the current problem of “inclusiveness.” Tokayev reaffirmed that Kazakhstan supports the UN Security Council's call for the formation through negotiations of a new government that would be inclusive and representative. In his words, “It is necessary to create a consensus-based system in which groups with different values or ethnic, religious and gender backgrounds can coexist in one country.” For a better understanding and retrospective assessment of Astana's actions on the “Afghan track,” it is worth citing other theses mentioned by the president in New York at a time when most of the world was still doubting the success of the Taliban campaign. "Afghanistan must continue to fulfill its international obligations and ensure that its territory does not become a springboard for terrorists, drug trafficking, and human traffickers. Regardless of our political or personal convictions, we must not abandon the people of Afghanistan to their fate now. The acute humanitarian situation must be our top priority. UN agencies and other humanitarian organizations must have immediate, safe, and unimpeded humanitarian access. Kazakhstan has provided for the temporary relocation of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and other UN offices in Afghanistan. We are ready to provide a logistical platform for the delivery of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan...

Kazakhstan and Serbia Strengthen Ties Despite Different Geopolitical Paths

Serbian President Vucic (54) might physically resemble Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (71), but the geopolitical positions of Sebia and Kazakhstan could not be more different. While the Balkan nation – a European Union candidate since 2012 – remains in the EU’s “eternal waiting room”, the Central Asian country – a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union – seems to have found a delicate balance between Russia, China, and the West. Those differences, however, have not prevented Serbia and Kazakhstan from strengthening their bilateral ties. Over the past six months, the two countries have been actively preparing for Tokayev’s trip to Serbia. This year, he spoke by phone with Vucic twice, while various Serbian and Kazakh officials held several meetings. On November 18-19, Tokayev finally visited the Southeastern European nation, where he met with his Serbian counterpart. According to the Kazakh leader, they discussed strengthening trade and economic relations and bilateral partnerships between the two nations. “It is essential that we develop cooperation. We had constructive talks and reached important deals,” Tokayev stressed. During his visit to the Balkan country, Serbian and Kazakh ministers signed several bilateral agreements. One of them is a 2025 plan on military cooperation. It is, therefore, no surprise that, following the talks in Belgrade, Vucic and Tokayev attended an exhibition of arms and military equipment at the Batajnica military airport near the Serbian capital. Indeed, military ties seem to be an important aspect of the Serbian-Kazakh relationship. Back in 2017, the two nations signed a memorandum of understanding in the field of military-technical collaboration. Six years later, in November 2023, Kazakhstan and Serbia inked intergovernmental agreements on military-technical cooperation, while in June of this year Serbian and Kazakh defense ministers discussed in Astana military relations between the two countries. Also, in September, Roman Vassilenko, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, announced that Belgrade and Astana plan то expand cooperation in the defense industry. It remains to be seen how Moscow – Astana’s nominal ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – will react to Kazakhstan’s ambitions to deepen military ties with Serbia – a nominally neutral country that has indirectly supplied Ukraine with $885 million worth of weapons. Despite being in different geopolitical positions, Serbia and Kazakhstan seem to share the same approach regarding Ukraine. Both nations support the Eastern European country’s territorial integrity, while trying to preserve relatively good relations with the Kremlin. At the same time, they support each other’s territorial integrity, which is particularly important for Serbia given that Kazakhstan does not recognize the 2008 unilateral independence of Kosovo. In 2022, sitting next to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Tokayev said that if the right to self-determination is put into practice worldwide, then there will be over 600 countries instead of the 193 states which are currently members of the United Nations. “For this reason, we do not recognize either Taiwan, or Kosovo, or South Ossetia, or Abkhazia… This principle will also be applied to quasi-state territories, which, in our opinion, are Lugansk and...

Risk and Reward: Why Savvy Investors Should Dive into Central Asia-Caspian Region

Central Asia-Caspian basin has long been a geopolitical chessboard — fragmented by conflict but dependent on cooperation. In an era of shifting alliances, political instability, and economic uncertainty, multinational corporations (MNCs) must reassess their strategies. While the region's challenges remain considerable, it also presents unique investment opportunities that should not be overlooked. Since the 1990s, operating in post-Soviet Eurasia has been synonymous with political risks. The Central Asian states have sought foreign direct investment (FDI) but face significant obstacles, including weak rule-of-law, inconsistent regulatory frameworks, and entrenched corruption. Yet despite these barriers, the region continues to attract international capital, signaling its long-term potential. Traditionally reliant on oil and gas exports, these countries are now pivoting toward diversification. Nations like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan are strengthening ties with the European Union (EU) to balance their historical reliance on Russia’s energy network. This shift is opening new frontiers for investment, particularly in green energy, infrastructure, and technology. However, geopolitical instability remains a critical risk. The war in Ukraine has intensified uncertainties, with Russia, China, the EU, and the U.S. vying for influence. Energy security, once an afterthought, has become a central issue. The closure of the Novorossiysk terminal in early 2023, halting Kazakh oil exports, underscored how quickly geopolitical disruptions can affect supply chains, prompting companies like ExxonMobil to reassess their regional strategies. Yet this volatility also creates opportunities. The region’s economic shift away from resource dependence toward a knowledge-based economy offers fertile ground for businesses willing to invest in infrastructure, technology, and renewable energy. The Caspian basin’s strategic location, as a transit hub for energy to Europe, only heightens its importance in the EU’s efforts to reduce dependency on Russian supplies. For international businesses, this means new markets, sectors, and investment channels are emerging. The post-Covid landscape adds complexity, with digital transformation accelerating across industries. Countries in the Central Asia-Caspian basin are under pressure to adopt these technologies, which could drive long-term economic growth. Yet the gap between ambitious reform plans and their implementation remains wide. Regulatory inefficiencies and bureaucratic hurdles continue to hamper progress, presenting a challenge for foreign investors looking for stability. For multinational corporations, the region presents both risks and significant upsides. On one hand, border disputes, political unpredictability, and regulatory uncertainty create barriers. On the other, the region’s growing role as an energy transit hub and its emerging sectors, from green energy to infrastructure, offer promising avenues for investment. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, in particular, have been proactive in bolstering energy exports to Europe, positioning themselves as critical players in the global energy transition. If the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate, the region’s geopolitical risks will undoubtedly increase. However, external actors — particularly the U.S., the EU, and China — are also likely to deepen their involvement, further reshaping the region’s economic and political landscape. The rise of Sino-American tensions only adds another layer of complexity to an already volatile environment. Yet, for companies that can navigate these complexities, the rewards are significant. Central Asia-Caspian basin remains...

How Can Central Asian Countries Advance Democratization Efforts Amid Geopolitical Uncertainty?

On October 27, Uzbekistan held parliamentary elections, which, along with the referendum in Kazakhstan and upcoming local council elections in Kyrgyzstan, contributed to a global election year. In the elections in Uzbekistan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party emerged victorious, participating for the first time in elections held under a mixed majoritarian-proportional system. As a result of the vote, the Liberal Democratic Party received 42,7% of the votes, securing 64 out of 150 seats in parliament. Voter turnout was 74.72%, and observers noted the organization and conduct of the elections. Leaders in Central Asia frequently cite the region’s volatile geopolitical landscape as a basis for more cautious internal reforms. This reflects a need to maintain stability in the face of external pressures. Historically and currently, Central Asian countries do not represent homogeneous societies. Additionally, increasing political divisions within society and among political elites are observed in almost all five countries of the region. Against this backdrop, escalating geopolitical conflicts on the global stage may further hinder the realization of major political reforms.   Political Reforms and an Unstable World Order It's challenging to definitively assess political reforms in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as either negative or positive, as both perspectives exist. European and American leaders often note the countries' aspirations for reforms and express readiness to support them. Therefore, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan effectively act as locomotives of political reforms in Central Asia at this stage. Under the leadership of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has undertaken political reforms aimed at modernizing the political system and strengthening democratic institutions. A significant step was limiting presidential powers by introducing a single seven-year presidential term without the right to re-election, which should promote regular changes in political leadership. Kazakh authorities argue that the role of parliament has also been strengthened to increase its influence and accountability to the government, providing a more balanced system of checks and balances. Liberalization of the party system included simplifying the registration of political parties and introducing elections based on single-member districts, which should foster political pluralism. Steps were taken to increase citizen participation in governance, including the introduction of direct elections for village and district mayors and creating mechanisms for open citizen feedback. Additionally, a 30% quota for women, youth, and people with disabilities was introduced in party lists, contributing to strengthening gender equality. Under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, Uzbekistan is also conducting significant reforms aimed at democratizing the political system. These elections were noteworthy for the introduction of a mixed electoral system, representing a significant departure from past practices. Under this system, 150 seats in the Legislative Chamber of the Oliy Majlis should be filled by two methods: 75 seats were elected through single-member districts (majoritarian system), and the remaining 75 were allocated proportionally based on party results (proportional system). This approach aims to enhance political pluralism by allowing both individual candidates and political parties to gain representation. The majoritarian component allows voters to directly elect representatives from their constituencies, fostering a closer connection between elected officials and their constituents....

How Central Asia Is Shifting From Russia Towards Turkey

For Turkey, a NATO member and EU hopeful, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is an instrument that helps Ankara increase its presence in the strategically important region of Central Asia. For Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the Turkish-dominated group seems to be a tool that allows them to achieve their economic goals, while also continuing to distance themselves from Russia. Although Moscow still has a relatively strong foothold in Central Asia, it does not seem able to prevent the growing role of the Organization of Turkic States in the post-Soviet space. This entity – whose members are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, while Turkmenistan, Hungary, and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus hold observer status – has the potential to eventually serve as a counterbalance not only to Russian, but also Chinese influence in the region. Since its foundation in 2009, the OTS has held ten summits of its leaders. Over this period, the intergovernmental organization’s working bodies have also convened dozens of times. On November 5-6 in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek, the OTS heads of states will meet for the eleventh time to discuss the future of the Turkic world. Although the agenda has yet to be announced, it is believed that the OTS leaders will seek to strengthen economic cooperation between its members. Currently, their major trade partners are nations outside the bloc. For instance, Turkey’s largest trading partner is Germany, Azerbaijan’s is Italy, while China has recently become Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner with bilateral trade hitting $31.5 billion. For neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, China and Russia remain the most important economic partners. One of the group’s major problems is the fact that its members, excluding Turkey, are landlocked countries heavily-dependent on Russia and China geographically. Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as major energy exporters, rely on oil and gas pipelines traversing Russian territory to reach their customers in Europe. It is, therefore, no surprise that the Organization of Turkic States governments’ agreed in September to create a simplified customs corridor, aiming at reducing the number of documents required for customs operations and customs procedures between OTS member states. In other words, they plan to increase trade among themselves. According to Omer Kocaman, OTS Deputy Secretary-General, the Turkic nations are also looking to “continue cooperation to stimulate positive changes in their financial systems.” That is why the organization has recently launched the Turkic Investment Fund – the first joint financial institution for economic integration of the Turkic countries, with an initial capital of $500 million. Kyrgyzstan’s Chamber of Commerce and Industry announced on October 17 that, starting in January 2025, the Turkic Investment Fund will begin financing major joint projects in OTS nations. However, in July, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said that the current structure of the Organization of Turkic States does not meet its established goals, and that its budget is insufficient for their implementation. In order to change that, on October 19, ministers of economy and trade of the OTS nations met in Bishkek to...