• KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01149 0.87%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00201 0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.09176 0.33%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28573 -0.14%

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 370

Opinion: What the Loss of RFE/RL Would Mean for Central Asia

The decision to terminate the federal grant agreement funding for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a crushing blow for hundreds of millions of people. These people know their governments are not telling them the full truth about what is happening in their countries or in the world outside. The objective information provided by RFE/RL has been important to people such as these. Perhaps as important, since the end of the Cold War, was the platform RFE/RL provides, whenever possible, for people in these countries to explain their views to the outside world. I know, because I worked at RFE/RL for 25 years covering Central Asia. RFE/RL was founded in 1950, and I didn’t show up there until 1997. I can only speak about what I saw and heard when I was an RFE/RL employee. My understanding of my tasks as an RFE/RL employee was that we were supposed to keep close track of what was happening in Central Asia, cover as many of the important topics of the region as possible, and make objective and accurate information on these topics available to the people in Central Asia. During Tajikistan’s 1992-1997 civil war, for example, RFE/RL’s Tajik service, Radio Ozodi, was the most trusted source of information for the people of Tajikistan. During the Coronavirus pandemic, the Turkmen government would not even allow the word COVID to be spoken and denied there were any cases of the virus in the country, leaving RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, Azatlyk, as one of the only sources of information for Turkmenistan’s people about the illness. I lived in Central Asia before joining RFE/RL, so I had some idea of what was important to people there. Calling for respect for fundamental rights is a big part of RFE/RL’s work. Read the constitutions of any Central Asian country and you will see enshrined there the right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, the right to freely receive or disseminate information, and much more. In practice, these rights are not always observed in Central Asia. In such a situations RFE/RL’s Central Asian services are a voice for those who, with good reason, are afraid to speak out publicly, or more importantly, for those who did speak out and are punished for that. At RFE/RL we looked for “impact stories,” testimony from people of the region about unfulfilled government promises, abuses, or state mismanagement that were hurting communities and individuals. Central Asian government officials are among the most faithful RFE/RL listeners, and often RFE/RL reports that raised social issues led officials to rectify the situation. Ramshackle buildings or schools were suddenly repaired, electricity or running water became accessible to city districts and rural areas, sufficient food became available to communities. The pleas of average citizens too often fell on deaf ears in government halls, but the criticism of an international organization such as RFE/RL, which was broadcasting to the entire country and Central Asian region, was too embarrassing for officials to ignore. This made RFE/RL unpopular with Central...

Kazakhstan’s Geoeconomic Rise and Why the U.S. Must Act Now – Opinion

The recent call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu highlights an evolving but structurally inevitable dynamic: the growing convergence of interests between Washington and Astana. Kazakhstan has been explicit about its priorities — independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and balanced external relations. The U.S. has strategic imperatives that align directly with what Kazakhstan can offer, particularly in the domains of supply chain diversification, energy security, and critical minerals. The two countries now have the opportunity, reinforced by shifts in global economic and security networks, to establish a substantive and resilient bilateral relationship. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has pursued an adaptive strategy of multi-vector diplomacy. This balancing mechanism is not merely a preference but rather an intrinsic requirement for preserving its sovereignty in a structurally asymmetric regional environment that is dictated by its geostrategic positioning. U.S. policymakers should recognize that Kazakhstan’s entanglements with Russia through security frameworks and its economic cooperation with China are not exclusionary choices. They are stabilizing counterweights that act to sustain Kazakhstan’s agency. The U.S. must embed itself within this framework. This means serving as a complementary pillar of economic and strategic equilibrium and not supplanting those existing ties. That means Washington’s approach has to pivot. For too long, U.S. engagement with Kazakhstan has been episodic and reactive, lacking internal logic and conditioned by external crises. Diplomatic rhetoric on democratic values and governance, while relevant, cannot substitute for material economic and strategic interdependence. For the U.S. to secure a meaningful place in Kazakhstan’s geopolitical architecture, it must offer tangible incentives through structured economic integration that reinforces Astana’s sovereignty. The two countries’ geoeconomic interests coincide most strongly in the issue areas of energy security, critical minerals, and telecommunications infrastructure. Vulnerabilities exposed by recent global shocks have forced the U.S. to recalibrate toward supply chain resilience. In this context, redundancy and diversification are no longer inefficiencies but have become security imperatives. Kazakhstan’s relevance to these concerns is a direct consequence of its resource endowments and logistical positioning. Energy security is the first pillar of stabilization. Kazakhstan, one of the world’s foremost uranium producers and a major oil and gas supplier, has continually expanded non-Russian export corridors westward to reduce its dependence on Russian transit routes. The U.S., having maintained a legacy of investment in Kazakhstan’s energy sector, should now move toward embedding its involvement within these diversified export pathways. This win-win solution would ensure that Kazakhstan’s resource flows are not beholden to Russian infrastructure bottlenecks. Critical minerals represent the second pillar. The U.S. legislative push under the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS Act mandates a diversification of supply chains for rare earth elements (REEs) and other critical materials. Kazakhstan’s reserves of REEs, copper, and other industrial inputs logically make it an important node in a decentralized, resilient industrial network. However, investment must not remain exclusively extractive in nature. The objective must be to integrate Kazakhstan into midstream processing and value-added production, again producing...

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance. However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security. Historical context: dependence through the ages Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, "Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?" “As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”. Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country's state budget came from foreign aid. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies. Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged. This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers. In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan. Afghanistan's adaptation As the global order shifts, the key players on the "Afghan track" are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis. United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following...

Opinion: Washington Needs a Stronger Policy for the Middle Corridor

The inauguration of President Donald Trump marks a new phase in U.S. foreign policy with direct implications for the Middle Corridor, a key trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has been gaining increasing strategic importance as global trade patterns shift and great-power competition intensifies. During Trump’s first term, U.S. engagement in the region was sporadic and lacked a comprehensive strategy. While some policy initiatives were undertaken to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia, these efforts remained piecemeal. The Biden administration attempted to address this gap by allocating limited funding for infrastructure development and engaging in regional negotiations aimed at fostering greater connectivity. However, Biden’s approach ultimately fell short of a coherent, long-term policy, allowing Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their positions in the region. The significance of the Middle Corridor has been underscored by increased international investment. Beyond economic concerns, the Middle Corridor plays a critical role in Europe’s energy security. The corridor facilitates the westward flow of Caspian resources, providing an alternative to Russian energy exports. The development of the Middle Corridor offers a strategic means of achieving this goal, reinforcing the EU’s energy independence while simultaneously strengthening economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan has emerged as a central player in the development of the Middle Corridor. As a crucial transit country, Baku has actively pursued infrastructure investments to bolster the corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan’s role is further magnified by its growing energy exports to Europe, solidifying its position as a strategic partner in regional energy security. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, a vital component of the corridor, has received continued investment, underscoring Azerbaijan’s commitment to enhancing trade and transit connectivity. However, Azerbaijan’s increasing importance also intersects with ongoing geopolitical complexities, particularly its relationship with Armenia. The absence of Armenian participation in the Middle Corridor remains a notable gap, one that is directly tied to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes. The prospect of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty has gained traction in recent years, supported by Western diplomatic efforts. U.S. policymakers have recognized that sustainable peace between the two nations would not only stabilize the South Caucasus but also unlock Armenia’s potential role in the corridor. Armenia’s geopolitical realignment presents both opportunities and challenges. While Yerevan has signaled its interest in deepening ties with the West, it remains economically dependent on Russia, particularly in energy and financial sectors. Increased Armenian exports to Russia, some of which analysts suspect may involve re-exports of sanctioned goods, further complicate efforts to shift its economic orientation. Recent discussions within U.S. policy circles indicate a growing recognition of the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance. American policymakers have begun exploring ways to expand support for infrastructure development in the region, recognizing that a proactive approach could yield multiple geopolitical and economic benefits. By investing in the Middle Corridor, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties with key partners, and counterbalance Russian...

Does the European Parliament Judge Central Asia Fairly?

In 2024, European Parliament (EP) resolutions on Central Asia emphasized its increasing significance in a world that is being reshaped by Russia’s war on Ukraine and China’s growing assertiveness. They focused on strengthening the EU’s partnerships with Central Asia while seeking to advance democratic values and human rights. These Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements aim to support economic reforms, foster sustainable development, and encourage regional cooperation. At the same time, reflecting the EU’s strategic focus on stability and resilience in the region, the EP’s resolutions urged the Central Asian states to decrease their dependency on Russian energy and avoid facilitating sanctions evasion. For the Central Asian countries, all these initiatives present opportunities to address pressing challenges and pave the way for growth. Advancing democratic governance and protecting fundamental rights, for example, can foster more inclusive and stable societies. Deeper engagement with the EU also offers access to advanced technologies and investments (as well as global markets), which are necessary for innovation and infrastructure upgrades. Likewise, the diversification of energy sources enhances regional self-reliance, reducing vulnerabilities that are tied to over-dependence on a single partner. Alignment with EU priorities, including resistance to autocratic pressures, gives Central Asia a better chance to develop its resilience and interconnected future. Some voices in the region, however — particularly among government officials and more traditionally-minded citizens — view the European Parliament's 2024 resolutions as overly critical, indeed influenced by special interests that fail to take into account the region’s unique challenges and priorities. From a Central Asian perspective, the criticisms contained in the EP’s resolutions lack essential context, focus narrowly on perceived shortcomings, and fail to give adequate consideration to the complex situation underlying governmental decisions. Such a one-sided approach, they suggest, overlooks essential cultural, historical, socio-political, and geopolitical factors. The result is a significant gap between the EU’s expectations on the one hand, and, on the other, what is reasonable to expect given the realities on the ground. The drafters of these documents often focus excessively on identifying deficiencies in democratic processes. They report violations without contextualizing the governments’ choices and often omit any mention of the views of the general public. The unfortunate consequence is that such criticisms vitiate good-faith attempts to build cooperation and partnership. The ideal becomes the enemy of the possible. Most Europeans still have a poor understanding of Central Asia. Many MEPs lack the time or resources to grasp the region’s complexity. Instead, their decisions are too often informed by resolutions that are drafted by a small group of “experts”. The language of these resolutions often reflects the drafters’ personal biases, which in turn risk deforming Europe’s strategic relationships with the region. A lack of proper scrutiny is all the more alarming in light of the Qatargate scandal, which exposed how state-funded lobbyists can distort human rights narratives to advance specific agendas. Maria Arena, the former head of the European Parliament's Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), played a central role in shaping judgments on democratic practices in Central Asia,...

Kazakhstan Ends Era of Cheap Fuel: Price Controls Set for Abolition

On January 17, the Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan published a number of draft orders on the Open NLA (normative legal acts) portal, which were to be discussed within five days. In total, the Ministry proposed the abolition of eleven orders regulating wholesale and retail prices for petroleum products, which have been under price control since 2014. In addition, it intends to change the calculation formulas and price ceilings for wholesale and retail sales of liquefied and natural gas. I have been writing about the need for price liberalization since 2018, as seen in articles such as “#Kazneft, part 2: The Bermuda Gasoline Triangle - Why Prices Will Rise” and “#Kazneft, part 4: We Rank Seventh in the World for the Cheapest Gasoline. Is It Sold at a Loss?” This is a landmark event for the Government of Kazakhstan, which has long maintained not only the lowest fuel prices in the region but some of the lowest globally. The country consistently ranks among the top ten nations with the cheapest energy resources, including fuel, natural gas, coal, and electricity.   Cheap and Even Cheaper According to Global Petrol Prices, as of January 20, 2025, fuel prices per liter in dollar terms across the EAEU, CIS, and neighboring countries are as follows: (Table 1) Country RON-95 Diesel Turkmenistan 0,43 0,29 Kazakhstan 0,47 0,55 Russia 0,61 0,71 Azerbaijan 0,65 0,59 Belorussia 0,75 0,75 Kyrgyzstan 0,81 0,81 Afghanistan 0,83 0,83 Uzbekistan 0,99 0,95 Georgia 1,09 1,06 China 1,15 1,02 Ukraine 1,39 1,37 Mongolia 1,49 1,19 Kazakhstan ranks seventh globally for the affordability of RON-95 gasoline, trailing behind Angola, Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait, Turkmenistan, and Malaysia. At the same time, there are “throwaway” prices in Iran, Libya, and Venezuela, but these price indicators do not reflect the actual availability of fuel in these countries. Turkmenistan also shows relatively low fuel prices, primarily due to the use of alternative fuels, such as methane, in transportation. Kazakhstan has historically had nearly double the price gap compared to its neighboring countries, which has facilitated the shadow export of fuel despite an official ban on exporting petroleum products.   A Leaky Bucket I have described Kazakhstan's domestic fuel market as a "leaky bucket"— no matter how much fuel is produced, it is constantly in short supply. In 2024, the country processed about 18 million tons of oil, with its three major refineries — Atyrau: 99% owned by the national company KazMunayGas (KMG), Shymkent: 51% owned by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and 49% by KMG, and Pavlodar: 100% KMG — accounting for approximately 17 million tons. Mini-refineries produced an additional one million tons. The production of petroleum products (excluding fuel oil) amounted to around 14.5 million tons.   The balance of petroleum products for 2025 is as follows, million tons: (Table 2) Product Production in the Republic of Kazakhstan Import from Russia Import to production, % RON-92, RON-95, RON-98 5,0 0,29 6 % Diesel fuel 5,1 0,45 9 % Jet fuel 0,75 0,3 40 % Bitumen/tar 1,1 0,50 45 % For 2025,...