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Regional Integration

Opinion: Central Asia Is Consolidating Its Role as a Full-Fledged Actor in Global Processes

The seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent, was far more than a routine regional gathering. It marked a pivotal moment with the potential to shape the political and economic architecture of the region for the next decade or two. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s keynote address stood out for articulating a forward-looking and comprehensive strategic vision. Notably, he proposed redefining the format itself from a loose “consultative mechanism” into a more cohesive and institutionalized “Central Asian Community.” At the summit, leaders endorsed several landmark documents: the Concept for Regional Security and Stability in Central Asia, the Catalogue of Threats to Central Asia’s Security and measures for their prevention for 2026-2028 and its implementation plan, a joint appeal supporting the Kyrgyz Republic’s candidacy for the UN Security Council, and the decision to admit Azerbaijan as a full-fledged participant. Taken together, these steps signal that Central Asia increasingly sees itself not as a passive bystander amid global geopolitical turbulence, but as an emerging regional actor capable of shaping its own trajectory. Two broader trends deserve special emphasis. First, the region is moving beyond reactive engagement with external initiatives and power blocs. Rather than relying solely on structures created by outside actors, Central Asia is beginning to develop its own institutions. This shift mirrors a global pattern: as the international order becomes more fragmented and unpredictable, regional communities are strengthening their internal mechanisms as a means of resilience. Second, the format envisioned in Tashkent diverges from “Brussels-style integration.” It does not require the transfer or dilution of sovereignty. Instead, it relies on soft integration, consultation, consensus-building, and phased convergence. As President Mirziyoyev noted, having a shared and realistic sense of “what we want our region to look like in 10-20 years” is essential. Without such a vision, Central Asia risks remaining the object of great-power competition rather than an autonomous participant in it. One of the summit’s most consequential developments was the decision to welcome Azerbaijan as a full-fledged member of the format. The emerging political and economic bridge between Central Asia and the South Caucasus is quickly becoming not only a transit nexus but also a cornerstone of a broader geopolitical space. The strengthening of Trans-Caspian corridors, the advancement of the “China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan” railway, the Trans-Afghan corridor, and the alignment of Caspian Sea transport routes will significantly expand the region’s strategic and economic potential. A further nuance is worth highlighting: Azerbaijan’s long-standing ties with the Western political and security architecture, through NATO partnership mechanisms and energy corridors, as well as its membership in the Organization of Turkic States, introduce new layers of connectivity. Its inclusion repositions the “Central Asian Community” from a post-Soviet platform into a wider geopolitical constellation spanning Eurasia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East. For Central Asian states, this new configuration opens additional room for multi-vector diplomacy and reduces the risks of unilateral dependence. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not...

Geopolitics

Opinion: Multi-Vectorism 2.0 – Kazakhstan Seeks Balance in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape

The world is reverting to the logic of bloc confrontation. Sanctions regimes, technological barriers, and deepening mistrust between major powers are compelling medium-sized states to chart independent courses. Kazakhstan stands at the center of this evolving geopolitical matrix. While Moscow remains a vital partner in defense and energy, Astana is simultaneously cultivating strong ties with other global power centers, including China, the U.S., Turkey, the European Union, and the Gulf states. Yet Kazakhstan refuses to align with any single bloc, adhering instead to a strategy of "flexible autonomy", cooperating broadly while preserving its sovereignty. Russia: Alliance with Strategic Boundaries On November 11-12, 2025, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. The two leaders signed a declaration on a comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance, reaffirming cooperation on security, energy, and logistics projects. Key discussions included the gasification of border regions, the modernization of energy infrastructure, and the transit of Russian energy via Kazakhstan. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan’s interest in a stable and prosperous Russia, calling Putin a “statesman of global stature.” Still, this alignment does not supplant Kazakhstan’s multi-vector policy. The Moscow visit directly followed Tokayev’s talks in Washington, underscoring that Astana views relations with Russia as one of several strategic pillars. The U.S.: Investment and Critical Minerals Diplomacy During Tokayev’s visit to the U.S. in early November 2025, he and President Donald Trump oversaw the signing of 29 agreements totaling approximately $17 billion. The deals spanned industry, energy, digitalization, education, and innovation. Highlights in recent collaboration between Kazakhstan and the U.S. include a $2.5 billion John Deere production facility in Kostanay and Turkestan, a $1.1 billion development of tungsten deposits, and over $1 billion in digital infrastructure cooperation with companies such as Hewlett Packard Enterprise, Oracle, and Starlink. Leading global funds also pledged roughly $1 billion in new investments. These agreements reflect growing trust and a shared commitment to investment-driven, high-tech cooperation. China: Strategic Synergy and Technological Convergence China remains Kazakhstan’s largest trading partner and a cornerstone of its eastern vector. During Tokayev’s October 17, 2023 visit to Beijing, he and President Xi Jinping reaffirmed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” built on political trust and economic cooperation. In June 2025, Xi Jinping visited Astana for the second China-Central Asia Summit, where he and Kassym‑Jomart Tokayev reinforced their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership”, oversaw deals spanning energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and digital technology. Later that year, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin, the two leaders used the platform to deepen cooperation within a multilateral framework, promoting connectivity and regional trade under the Belt and Road Initiative. Turkey: Civilizational Ties and Strategic Growth Ties between Kazakhstan and Turkey are underpinned by shared cultural and historical foundations. At the fifth High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting in Ankara on July 29, 2025, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Tokayev, reaffirming Turkey’s role as a major investor and educational partner. More than 12,000 Kazakh students are enrolled in Turkish universities. Defense cooperation is expanding under the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), and tourism and...

Regional Integration

Opinion: The Integration of Afghanistan into Central Asia

Shared rivers and joint water management can shape a new regional partnership Central Asia and Afghanistan sit on the same rivers, yet often behave as if they belong to different regions. Water ties them together more firmly than any border, but the politics of the past have kept Afghanistan outside the regional system. Today, as climate pressures intensify and development accelerates on both sides of the Amu Darya, the case for integrating Afghanistan into Central Asia has never been stronger. And the path to that integration begins with water. The debate around the Qosh Tepa Canal makes this evident. Afghanistan was never part of the agreements that govern the Amu Darya River (Protocol 566 of the Soviet Union and the Almaty 1992 agreement). It did not sign allocation protocols and never joined regional basin institutions. Still, it was expected to follow rules it had no hand in shaping. Now, that old arrangement has reached its limit. The canal will bring new agriculture to the north of Afghanistan, but downstream states depend on the same river. The real question is not whether Afghanistan should develop, but how to shape that development jointly so the river can sustain all sides. Central Asia already has cooperative models that Afghanistan could join. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have shown how two neighbors can jointly manage a transboundary river through their collaboration in hydropower on the Zarafshan. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have signed a similar mechanism with the KambarAta-1 project, which will generate energy and regulate seasonal flows for downstream agriculture. These experiences show that once countries share responsibility for a river, trust can grow and benefits expand. Afghanistan can become part of this regional architecture. The 161-meter-high planned dam on the Kokcha River, set to generate 445 megawatts of electricity, offers a clear entry point. A jointly governed dam on this river would give Afghanistan energy, while downstream states would benefit from its flow in terms of agriculture. When operations are transparent and agreed upon, water becomes a field of cooperation rather than tension. Energy trade adds another layer of opportunity. Central Asia has a long record of exchanging electricity and gas in return for upstream releases. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have done this with Kyrgyzstan for many years through a joint water and energy agreement. The same model can work with Afghanistan. The country needs power, and it can offer coordinated water management in return. A structured energy for water arrangement would give Afghanistan an incentive to cooperate and offer Central Asia predictability. Agriculture is another arena where cooperation promises immediate gains. Uzbekistan’s policies on water-saving technologies offer a strong example. They subsidize drip, sprinkler systems, canal improvement, land levelling, efficient pumps, and even solar-powered irrigation. These investments reduce water losses while increasing yields only if their rebound effect, such as further expansion of agriculture, is controlled. The same approach could be applied in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, including in the area under the Qosh Tepa Canal. With similar financial support and technical guidance, Afghan...

Abraham Accords

Opinion: Kazakhstan Joins Abraham Accords – More Than a Symbolic Gesture

Kazakhstan has officially agreed to join the Abraham Accords during a C5+1 summit, giving another green flag of legitimacy to Israel for its policies and actions in West Asia, especially in Palestine. Reportedly, not only Kazakhstan but also Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan are set to follow this step. The Normalization process, brokered by the United States to advance the culture of peace among the three Abrahamic religions, was initiated by President Donald Trump during his first term. Since then, four Muslim-majority countries - the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan - have joined the Abraham Accords. However, other Muslim-majority countries have previously followed the stand taken under the Arab Peace Process of 2002, which emphasizes the resolution of the Palestine issue before starting the normalization of ties with Israel. The joining of the Abraham Accords by Kazakhstan and the quest by other Caucasus and Central Asian Muslim-majority countries are distinctive in multiple aspects. As per the official definition, the Abraham Accords encourage the establishment of relations between Israel and its neighbors in the region. In this context, the extension of the Abraham Accords, originally designed to broker regional peace and stability in West Asia, to other regions and securing legitimacy by Muslim-majority countries outside West Asia reflects the pan-Abrahamic outlook of the U.S.-brokered deal. Moreover, Kazakhstan is a country that has established diplomatic ties with Israel since 1992, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. So, the question is, what does the joining of the Abraham Accords by Kazakhstan signify for the Central Asian country, which shares a long border with Russia and already has substantial military and economic ties with it? The significance of the Abraham Accords for Kazakhstan can be comprehensively understood from the point of view of Kazakhstan, the United States, and Israel, the major participants of the agreement. Kazakhstan’s attempt to balance regional and global pressure Firstly, for Kazakhstan, the joining of the Accords with the perspective of enhancing ties with Israel can be taken more as a symbolic move, as Kazakhstan already fulfils 25% of Israel’s energy needs. The countries share a strong diplomatic relationship, with Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu visiting Kazakhstan in 2016; the two countries have signed several bilateral agreements. Kazakhstan has significant relations with Israel in the fields of irrigation and healthcare, and has also pursued discussions on visa-free travel, tourism, and technology. Kazakhstan and Israel have launched the Israel-Kazakhstan Irrigation Demonstration Centre in the Almaty region. Kazakhstan also hosts the largest Jewish population in Central Asia, which lives in peace and harmony with other ethnic groups. Considering the strong ties already in place, the lingering question is why Kazakhstan had to formally sign an agreement that appears to be a symbolic gesture from the outside. To this question, Adil Husain, PhD scholar of Central Asian Studies at Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI), New Delhi, says that “though the decision to formalize the normalization ties with Israel may appear as a formality, the move carries a strategic significance for the Central Asian country...

U.S.-Central Asia Summit

Opinion: A Trump Visit to Central Asia Would Deliver Results and Anchor a Corridor Strategy

On November 6, Washington will host the C5+1 leaders’ summit, marking the format’s 10th anniversary and signaling a rare alignment of political attention and regional appetite for concrete outcomes. The date is confirmed by regional and U.S.-focused reporting, with Kazakhstan’s presidency and multiple outlets noting heads-of-state attendance in the U.S. capital. This timing is decisive. Russia’s bandwidth is constrained by the war in Ukraine, China’s trade weight in Central Asia has grown, and European demand for secure inputs and routes has intensified. All these developments together create a window where a visible United States presence can meaningfully alter the deal flow. A visit sequenced off the November C5+1 will attach U.S. political attention to minerals, corridors, and standards that regional governments already prioritize, confirming the conversion of the summit's symbolism into leverage. Washington already has the instruments but has lacked a synchronized presence. Development finance, export credit, and C5+1 working groups exist, yet announcements have too often outpaced commissioning. A targeted tour could unveil named offtakes, corridor slot guarantees, and training compacts. This would move from the dialogue to bankable packages if paired with financing envelopes, posted schedules, and third-party verification. Deals, dates, and delivery would make operational signals clear to partners and competitors alike. Strategic Rationale and Operating Concept The United States has three clear goals. These are to diversify critical minerals away from single-point dependency on China, de-risk trans-Eurasian routes that connect Asian manufacturing to European demand, and reinforce the sovereignty of the states in the region without pressuring them to choose sides in great-power competition over other issues. These imperatives already guide the national-security strategies of Central Asian governments, which implement them according to multi-vector doctrines. A presidential visit that treats minerals, corridors, and standards as a single package would show that Washington is prepared to move forward on the same problem set that the region has defined for itself. The ways to do that are through finance-first diplomacy and an end-to-end corridor approach, including the Caspian crossing. Finance-first diplomacy pairs every political announcement with insurance, offtake letters, and term sheets (short non-binding summaries of key commercial and legal terms for a proposed deal). These signal the intention to convert declarations into commissioning. An end-to-end corridor approach accepts the physical reality that Central Asian outputs move west through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and across the South Caucasus, with Azerbaijan functioning as the hinge that makes Europe reachable at scale. Each element of the “minerals–corridors–standards” triad reinforces the others when the whole is pursued as a single program. Reliable customs and traceability raise corridor credibility, which raises project bankability, which in turn attracts the private capital required for mineral processing. The instrumentalities for this already exist. The C5+1 framework can be tasked to track deliverables; the Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) can cover risk and long-term debt; aid and technical programs of the Department of State and Commerce can align standards, procurement integrity, and traceable supply chains; U.S. universities and labs can...

SCO Summit

Opinion: China’s Diplomatic Power Play Unfolds in Tianjin

On August 31, the next SCO Plus summit will begin in the Chinese city of Tianjin and run through to September 1. Judging by the list of participants, China, under Chairman Xi Jinping, is positioning itself to challenge the United States for influence over the global geopolitical agenda. As part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Xi will host a formal banquet for the attending heads of state, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry. Xi is also scheduled to chair the 25th meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State and lead the expanded SCO Plus session - the largest since the establishment of the organization - where he will deliver a keynote address. Clues to the themes of Xi’s speech can be found in the diverse array of leaders expected to attend. Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Bin confirmed at a Beijing press conference that among the SCO member states, participants will include Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, Tajik President Emomali Rahmon, and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Several leaders from non-member states will also join, including Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh; Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev; Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto; and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov, whose participation suggests Ashgabat’s cautious but growing interest in regional dialogue. Also in attendance will be the prime ministers of Armenia (Nikol Pashinyan), Cambodia (Hun Manet), Nepal (Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli), Egypt (Mostafa Madbouly), Malaysia (Anwar Ibrahim), and Vietnam (Pham Minh Chinh). The summit will also host key international institutional leaders, including UN Secretary-General António Guterres; SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev; CIS Secretary-General Sergey Lebedev; ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn; CSTO Secretary-General Imangali Tasmagambetov; EAEU Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintayev; and AIIB President Zhou Ji. Kazakhstan will be prominently represented. In addition to President Tokayev, three high-profile Kazakhs mentioned above - Yermekbayev, Tasmagambetov, and Sagintayev - will attend in their capacities as heads of international organizations. Their presence signals Astana’s growing diplomatic weight and reflects the strategic outreach led by Tokayev, himself a former UN Deputy Secretary-General. This background likely contributes to the rapport between Kazakhstan and Guterres. The summit will also inevitably draw attention due to the presence of the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders, figures central to the ongoing realignment in the South Caucasus. Both Baku and Yerevan have increasingly distanced themselves from Moscow, favoring closer ties with Turkey and the United States. The recent peace agreement between Aliyev and Pashinyan, signed in the presence of President Trump, underscored the growing American role in the region and the diminishing influence of Russia. While Moscow appears willing to tolerate this shift, Tehran views it with deep concern, especially after its recent 12-day conflict with Israel. Russia, for its part, seems to be signaling disengagement from the region. Its silence in response to Baku and Yerevan’s Western overtures suggests strategic apathy, if not withdrawal. Beijing, of course, is...