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Critical Minerals

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Critical Minerals Promise Is Running Out of Time

Kazakhstan has long been defined by what lies beneath its soil. Oil, uranium, copper, zinc, lead, chromium, gold, and other minerals have shaped the country’s post-Soviet economy and supplied the budget, export revenues, and industrial base that supported three decades of state-building. That model is now entering a more complex phase. In the first quarter of 2026, Kazakhstan’s industrial output slipped as mining and quarrying fell by 11.4%, with crude oil production down 19.8%, natural gas output down 20%, and other mineral extraction down 15.1%, according to figures reported from the Bureau of National Statistics. The oil decline also reflected specific disruptions. Kazakhstan’s energy minister said oil and gas condensate production fell 20% year-on-year in the first quarter, while production at Tengiz had only recently resumed after an outage linked to a fire at a power unit. Reuters reported that the field’s restart was gradual. Those short-term shocks should not be confused with the whole story. They expose a deeper vulnerability: Kazakhstan has been highly successful at extracting known deposits, but far less successful at replacing them. The World Bank’s mining sector diagnostic put the problem plainly. Kazakhstan is underexplored, greenfield exploration has been almost non-existent for about 30 years, and much of the geological data inherited from the Soviet period is incomplete or outdated. This is not a story of geology alone. It is a story of institutions, incentives, and time. Deposits deplete whether governments plan for it or not. The difference between a mature resource economy and a vulnerable one is whether exploration, processing, regulation, and regional diversification keep pace with extraction. The Arithmetic of Depletion Kazakhstan still has one of the strongest mineral endowments in Eurasia. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has described rare and rare-earth metals as having “essentially become new oil,” and told the government to expand geological and geophysical exploration from 1.5 million square kilometers to at least 2.2 million by 2026, according to Akorda. OECD analysis published in 2026 underlines why the stakes are high. Kazakhstan’s metals mining sector accounted for 12.1% of GDP in 2024. The country is the world’s largest uranium producer, can currently export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials on the European Union’s official list, and has some of the world’s largest reserves of chromium, zinc, and lead. Yet reserve strength on paper does not remove the operational pressure at existing mines. In 2022, Kazakhstan’s prime minister warned that reserve growth for many minerals had not been compensated and that major metal deposits in eastern Kazakhstan, including Orlovskoye, Maleyevskoye, Tishinskoye, and Ridder-Sokolnoye, could be mined out within the next decade, according to the government’s own account of its 2023-2027 geology concept. Gold shows a similar tension between headline potential and mine-level pressure. Industry reporting has linked a fall in Kazakhstan’s 2025 mining output targets partly to changes at Vasilkovskoye, one of the country’s largest gold deposits, where operations are shifting from open-pit to underground mining as easily accessible ore becomes harder to extract. MINEX Forum reported that the transition reduced...

Brain Drain

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Human Capital Problem – How State Scholarships Are Building a Talent Pipeline for the West

Kazakhstan spends millions of dollars every year sending its brightest students to the world's best universities through two flagship programs: the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools (NIS) and Bolashak. For NIS, the state invests millions with no public record of what becomes of its graduates once they enter foreign educational institutions. For Bolashak, the return figures look reassuring on paper, but only until one asks what happens the moment the obligation expires. For Kazakhstan’s economy, heavily reliant on oil and gas exports, human capital is what can bring the country to its goal of economic diversification through the ideas and skills that no natural resource can replicate. Students from Kazakhstan studying abroad, with access to the world’s best professors and cutting-edge technologies, are exactly the human capital the country cannot afford to lose. However, they are also the ones the government has been paying to send away without a sustainable retention strategy in place. Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools Founded in 2008, the Nazarbayev Intellectual Schools network offers an internationally recognized 12-year curriculum, directly compatible with many foreign university admissions systems. It also provides some of its students with grants covering the full cost of attendance. The state funds NIS generously: in 2023 alone, more than $37 million was invested into the network. The results are extraordinary: from 2010 to 2024, 654 students received offers from the top 100 universities in the world, with 32 of them from the Ivy League. However, which country these graduates end up in is a different question, and the available statistics offer no public answer to. One former NIS student, who received a full scholarship to study abroad, says, "I'm extremely grateful for all the resources that the NIS provided me with. However, after my graduation from the university, I will be moving to San Francisco to work as an AI engineer. It would take me at least seven years to make the same salary I'll be earning here in a year." Another says, "It is not only about the higher wages in the U.S. It’s about the opportunities and autonomy one gets. The research lab I've joined since graduation has far more funding and resources for the work I'm actually passionate about." Bolashak Program Unlike NIS, the Bolashak program, established in 1993 and widely regarded as one of the most generous scholarship programs in the world, does require its recipients to return. Graduates must work in Kazakhstan for up to four years or face financial penalties. On paper, this looks like a solution to the human capital problem. In practice, it is only a delay. While the state at least partially recovers its investment, it is developed markets that eventually inherit the talent. "After completing my requirement back home, I was able to get an American company to sponsor my visa," says one Bolashak recipient. "I moved to the U.S. shortly after." "I was offered a transfer to the European branch of my company," says another, one year after fulfilling their obligation. The Solution to the Brain...

China

Opinion: Expect China to take its 2+2 diplomacy to Central Asia

China does not do military alliances. Its declared posture is one of non-interference in other nations’ internal affairs. Yet Beijing has long understood that commercial ties alone cannot anchor strategic relationships; only security partnerships can. China’s recent experiments with 2+2 security dialogues – bringing together foreign and defense ministers – signal that it is seeking to move beyond an economics-first approach. The most likely next candidates for this format are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which share borders with China. For Central Asian governments, a 2+2 with China may hold appeal, particularly as they seek to manage instability spilling over from Afghanistan at a time when Russia’s security role is being strained by its war in Ukraine. After years of hoping that engagement could stabilize Afghanistan, Central Asian states have largely shifted to a policy of containment – seeking to insulate themselves from cross-border militant threats, narcotics flows and refugee movements rather than attempting to reshape Afghanistan’s internal trajectory. For Beijing, the objective would be to consolidate partnerships across the Eurasian heartland – an outcome Washington would prefer to counter. China shares Central Asia’s risk-management approach toward Afghanistan. Like its neighbors, Beijing has little appetite for deep involvement inside the country itself, focusing instead on preventing instability from spilling northward toward Xinjiang or disrupting Belt and Road corridors that run through the region. A 2+2 format offers China a way to institutionalize security coordination without violating its long-standing aversion to formal alliances. Last week, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun traveled to Phnom Penh to hold China’s first-ever 2+2 dialogue with Cambodia. Wang told reporters that China is willing to develop the mechanism into a “strategic platform” for enhancing political and defense security cooperation. He described it as a key instrument for cementing mutual assistance and solidarity, and for advancing the construction of a China-Cambodia “community with a shared future.” Wang also said China was prepared to work with Cambodia to build an “Asian security model” based on shared security and on seeking common ground while reserving differences. China’s deepening security engagement with Cambodia comes as the Southeast Asian nation remains locked in a border dispute with Thailand. Although Wang’s itinerary took him next to Bangkok, Beijing chose to hold a 2+2 only with Cambodia – notably the non-U.S. ally in this pairing. China is new to the 2+2 format. Last April, Beijing hosted its first ever 2+2 with a foreign country – with Indonesia. The trajectory suggests further 2+2 engagements ahead, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – the three Central Asian states that border China. In several aspects, Central Asia may be a more conducive environment for this diplomacy than Southeast Asia: there are no maritime disputes, and the countries are not embedded in U.S. alliance structures. Instead, there is a convergence around defensive security priorities – particularly border control and crisis management linked to Afghanistan – making the 2+2 format a natural fit. China under President Xi Jinping has always had an eye...

Constitutional Reform

Opinion – Kazakhstan’s New Constitution Sends a Key Signal for Global Partners

In a nationwide referendum on March 15, over 87% of voters approved a new constitution for Kazakhstan. It was a significant victory for President Tokayev and his administration, all the more so because voter turnout exceeded 73%. Kazakhstan’s new constitution is a key signal for global partners. It replaces the old bicameral system with a unicameral legislature, establishes the Halyk Kenesi (People’s Council), an advisory body intended to promote national dialogue, and creates a vice presidency to provide for clearer succession at the top of the state. The new constitution is the outcome of a strategy that has been building for some time. Now, backed by a clear majority, Kazakhstan’s leadership is seeking to strengthen governance by redistributing power, lessening political ambiguity, and grounding politics in shared values—however difficult that may be to accomplish. All of this is being pursued despite—and perhaps because of—the nation’s history of corruption and nepotism. Kazakhstan’s constitutional reforms were deliberate, structural measures designed to reorient the country’s governmental machinery toward what supporters describe as the common good. That, at least, is the stated intention, reflected in a slogan often used by backers of the new constitution: “A strong president, an influential parliament, and an accountable government.” Some outside observers have viewed the new constitution favorably, framing it as an effort to streamline governance and clarify institutional roles, while others have warned that the changes could impede sociopolitical progress and human rights by prioritizing stronger governance. Some also see the reforms as signaling a move toward more restrictive political practices. These alarmist interpretations are overstated. Astana’s constitutional reforms fit into an ongoing political effort, using the law to strengthen civic involvement and the well-being of the community as a whole, not just individual interests. The new constitution did not emerge ex nihilo for the purpose of freezing elite advantages at the expense of the people, as others in Kazakhstan and the broader region have done in the past. That interpretation of constitutional change in Central Asia overlooks the government’s broader reform agenda, whatever its perceived shortcomings. In his March 31 article, A New Constitution for a Just, Strong, and Prosperous Kazakhstan, President Tokayev framed Kazakhstan as a rules-oriented state, emphasizing rights, judicial independence, and impartial institutions—an approach that stands out regionally despite open questions about follow-through. Tokayev emphasized that “The new constitution is about people, not just better government.” The constitution’s largest section is dedicated to protecting freedoms and rights based on common sense and traditional values, including privacy, personal data, private property, and home inviolability. Judicial independence is reinforced to ensure that all citizens receive qualified, impartial defense – at least that’s the intent. Amendments require a public referendum, ensuring that fundamental choices remain popular. Religious liberty is guaranteed in a secular society. The constitution also presents Kazakhstan as a more attractive and predictable place to do business, for both domestic and foreign investors. The constitution, according to Tokayev, “sets clear rules for economic activity.” As such, the reforms create a political culture that aims...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...