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Constitutional Reform

Opinion – Kazakhstan’s New Constitution Sends a Key Signal for Global Partners

In a nationwide referendum on March 15, over 87% of voters approved a new constitution for Kazakhstan. It was a significant victory for President Tokayev and his administration, all the more so because voter turnout exceeded 73%. Kazakhstan’s new constitution is a key signal for global partners. It replaces the old bicameral system with a unicameral legislature, establishes the Halyk Kenesi (People’s Council), an advisory body intended to promote national dialogue, and creates a vice presidency to provide for clearer succession at the top of the state. The new constitution is the outcome of a strategy that has been building for some time. Now, backed by a clear majority, Kazakhstan’s leadership is seeking to strengthen governance by redistributing power, lessening political ambiguity, and grounding politics in shared values—however difficult that may be to accomplish. All of this is being pursued despite—and perhaps because of—the nation’s history of corruption and nepotism. Kazakhstan’s constitutional reforms were deliberate, structural measures designed to reorient the country’s governmental machinery toward what supporters describe as the common good. That, at least, is the stated intention, reflected in a slogan often used by backers of the new constitution: “A strong president, an influential parliament, and an accountable government.” Some outside observers have viewed the new constitution favorably, framing it as an effort to streamline governance and clarify institutional roles, while others have warned that the changes could impede sociopolitical progress and human rights by prioritizing stronger governance. Some also see the reforms as signaling a move toward more restrictive political practices. These alarmist interpretations are overstated. Astana’s constitutional reforms fit into an ongoing political effort, using the law to strengthen civic involvement and the well-being of the community as a whole, not just individual interests. The new constitution did not emerge ex nihilo for the purpose of freezing elite advantages at the expense of the people, as others in Kazakhstan and the broader region have done in the past. That interpretation of constitutional change in Central Asia overlooks the government’s broader reform agenda, whatever its perceived shortcomings. In his March 31 article, A New Constitution for a Just, Strong, and Prosperous Kazakhstan, President Tokayev framed Kazakhstan as a rules-oriented state, emphasizing rights, judicial independence, and impartial institutions—an approach that stands out regionally despite open questions about follow-through. Tokayev emphasized that “The new constitution is about people, not just better government.” The constitution’s largest section is dedicated to protecting freedoms and rights based on common sense and traditional values, including privacy, personal data, private property, and home inviolability. Judicial independence is reinforced to ensure that all citizens receive qualified, impartial defense – at least that’s the intent. Amendments require a public referendum, ensuring that fundamental choices remain popular. Religious liberty is guaranteed in a secular society. The constitution also presents Kazakhstan as a more attractive and predictable place to do business, for both domestic and foreign investors. The constitution, according to Tokayev, “sets clear rules for economic activity.” As such, the reforms create a political culture that aims...

C6+1

Opinion: Trump Has Golden Opportunity to Launch C6+1 on Sidelines of UN

Representatives of the five Central Asian states — Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan — along with Azerbaijan, are expected in New York for the United Nations General Assembly in September. Historically, meetings between the Central Asian states and the United States – the C5+1 – have taken place on the sidelines of the United Nations. It is the most natural and logistically efficient venue for President Donald Trump to re-engage with the C5 partners he hosted at the White House last November. As of now, only foreign ministers are expected to attend the UNGA. But this could change if Trump extends an invitation to the leaders, according to a Central Asian diplomatic source. This time, however, he has the opportunity to add Azerbaijan, transforming the format into a C6+1. Baku has already been invited to participate as a full member in Central Asian gatherings, and Washington should build on that momentum. Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned: close to both Israel and Turkey – two of America’s most important regional partners – it sits astride one of the most important connectivity corridors linking Europe and Asia. Its inclusion would turn the C5+1 into a genuinely trans‑Caspian framework that reflects the emerging realities of Eurasian integration. The move would also link two major diplomatic achievements of Trump’s second term: the launch of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a 43-km strategic transit corridor connecting mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia, and Trump’s elevation of the C5+1 to a White House-level summit. While TRIPP was discussed at the C5+1 meeting in November, bringing Azerbaijan into the next gathering would allow the administration to present itself as the architect of a new Eurasian trade and energy map. Strategically, a C6+1 format carries significant implications for great-power competition with China. This is because Central Asia is so crucial to Beijing’s grand strategy. In its recently adopted 15th five-year plan, neighborhood diplomacy is listed as the top priority — ahead of relations with major powers or developing countries. Beijing seeks to build a “community with a shared future” with 17 neighboring states, including all five in Central Asia, to “create a favorable external environment” for national rejuvenation, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi has stated. For China, Central Asia is a vital “hinterland” for energy and resource security, and a buffer against maritime disruptions. The United States does not need to dominate the Eurasian Heartland or force Central Asian states to choose between Washington and Beijing. It simply needs to ensure that any Chinese westward access runs through a vast landmass of countries that maintain constructive relations with the United States. A C6+1 format helps shape that environment without confrontation. A stable Middle Corridor – the energy and trade route running through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea and through Azerbaijan to Turkey and the Mediterranean – also benefits America's energy-hungry allies in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea. Both increasingly look to Kazakhstan as an alternative oil supplier as they...

Islamic State – Khorasan

Opinion: Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Strategic Risks for Central Asia

In modern Eurasia, threats are increasingly becoming part of the strategic environment. At times, they even turn into political instruments. When discussing terrorism, analysis usually focuses on the level of danger it poses. Far less attention is given to whether such threats are assumed to be manageable. The problem lies not only in the existence of radical groups, but also in the illusion that they can be controlled or used to serve someone’s strategic interests. Iranian analyst Nozar Shafiee, writing for the Tehran-based Institute for East Strategic Studies, describes ISKP as a decentralized and transnational network that can continue operating even after losing territorial control. This perspective is rarely discussed in public analysis of the region, which is precisely why it deserves attention. Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan branch of the Islamic State group operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with demonstrated intent for external operations, has long ceased to depend on localized footholds. Even after losing territorial control, the organization did not disappear. Instead, it transformed. Today, it functions as a flexible network of small cells. It no longer needs to control a city or province to remain dangerous. It relies on the internet for recruitment and propaganda, operates through autonomous groups, and conducts high-profile attacks designed to attract attention and create an atmosphere of instability. However, there is another aspect that receives far less attention. In the context of regional competition, there is sometimes a temptation to view such structures as potential proxy forces, instruments of pressure that could theoretically be restrained or directed in a desired direction. The logic is simple: as long as the threat is not directed at us, it can be treated as part of a broader geopolitical game. History, however, demonstrates that this is a dangerous illusion. Radical networks do not function as controllable instruments. They operate according to their own logic and eventually move beyond the limits within which they were meant to be contained. There are numerous historical examples in which support for radical groups as a temporary strategic tool has “backfired.” Organizations created or supported for tactical purposes eventually began acting autonomously and turned their weapons against their former patrons. As Western analysts often note, supporting proxies who do not share your ideological legitimacy inevitably carries the risk that they will eventually turn against you. This represents a key risk for neighboring regions. Unlike traditional conflicts, networked extremist structures are not confined to a single territory. Their influence spreads through digital platforms, ideological narratives, and transnational connections. Even if attempts to instrumentalize such groups occur far from the region’s borders, the consequences can still affect it directly. This discussion is particularly relevant for Central Asia. First, modern terrorism no longer depends on physically crossing borders. In the mid-2010s, several thousand individuals from Central Asian countries became involved in conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Recruitment did not take place primarily through physical training camps but through online networks. Geographic distance offered little protection. Second, ISKP propaganda materials are distributed in Central...

Board of Peace

Opinion: Mirziyoyev in Washington – New Deals Expected Amidst Peace Diplomacy

The President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has arrived on a working visit to Washington to participate in the inaugural meeting of President Trump’s Board of Peace on February 19, 2026, alongside the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and other heads of state. Against a backdrop of deep geopolitical tensions and raging conflicts across the world, Mirziyoyev’s second visit to the White House in less than four months suggests that U.S.-Uzbekistan relations are at their strongest in decades. Mirziyoyev will be joined by Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister, Minister of Investments, Industry and Trade, and other high-ranking officials. Uzbek Ambassador to the U.S. Sidikov and his team have been working around-the-clock for over two weeks, gearing up for the Trump–Mirziyoyev meeting. President Mirziyoyev’s objective will be to elevate U.S.-Uzbek relations from a constructive relationship to a fully functional, deal-oriented partnership with a focus on capital flows and bilateral trade. In addition to his desire for regional stability in West Asia, his signing up for the Board of Peace should be understood as indicating his desire to advance trade and investment and flows into Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks are keen to nail down new money and capital guarantees to fund infrastructure along the U.S.-brokered “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,” aka, the Zangezur Corridor between Armenia and Azerbaijan (TRIPP) – a roughly 27-mile-long piece of land that links Europe to Central Asia and beyond through the Caucasus. TRIPP matters to Trump because it advances two goals at once: stabilizing the South Caucasus while more fully integrating U.S. trade with Uzbekistan and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR)—a multimodal, 4,000 km transport network connecting China and East Asia with Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. Apart from the issues on the Board of Peace agenda, Mirziyoyev will push for ironclad U.S. commitments and cold, hard cash for transport corridors and their downstream beneficiaries. Two big reasons driving Mirziyoyev ‘s thinking: first, Uzbekistan is one of only two double-landlocked countries in the world, the other being Liechtenstein—and second, Trump’s desire to nail down a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, thereby resolving a long-standing territorial dispute that has taken thousands of lives. Mirziyoyev knows that Trump sees TRIPP as a path to lasting peace and regional prosperity across the broader region, which fits into the Board of Peace narrative. Trump has referenced TRIPP repeatedly over the past year, and Mirziyoyev is well aware of this. At UNGA last September 23, 2025, Trump said: "President Mirziyoyev is a terrific leader, and with this TRIPP corridor, Uzbekistan is going to see massive trade flowing through – it's going to connect them directly to new markets without all the old hassles." And as Trump said on November 7, 2025, at the C5+1 Summit in Washington: "I've got great respect for President Mirziyoyev – he's doing amazing things in Uzbekistan. The Trump Route, i.e., the TRIPP, is perfect for them; it's going to cut transit times and costs, making Uzbekistan a powerhouse in regional trade." Mirziyoyev is paying...

Board of Peace

Opinion – The “Board of Peace” and Afghan Diplomacy: A View from Kabul

A new trend is becoming increasingly apparent in global politics: key decisions are being discussed not only within traditional international institutions but also through more flexible political and diplomatic formats. One such initiative is the announcement of the creation of the “Board of Peace” by U.S. President Donald Trump, a structure that, according to its authors, is intended to provide an alternative mechanism for conflict resolution. Reactions have been mixed. Some states view the new platform as an opportunity to enhance the effectiveness of peace efforts; others warn that it could weaken existing institutions, particularly the United Nations, and contribute to a gradual shift toward closed political groupings in which participants' strategic interests outweigh universal rules. At its core, this debate reflects the possibility of a deeper transformation of the international order. Whereas global security architecture was once built primarily around multilateral mechanisms, flexible coalitions and ad hoc alliances are becoming more prominent. In such a system, the role of states capable not only of adapting to change but also of offering independent diplomatic initiatives is growing. It is in this context that Afghanistan is increasingly asking what role it can occupy in a new international configuration. One of the key questions raised in Kabul’s expert community is straightforward: Will the current Afghan authorities be considered in emerging international mechanisms, including the Board of Peace? There is no clear answer. Despite ongoing global discussions on security and economic cooperation, concrete decisions regarding Afghanistan remain limited. Frozen financial assets, sanctions, and uncertainty over the country’s international status continue to impede economic recovery and complicate integration into regional processes. Against this backdrop, Afghan experts argue that the country should avoid remaining on the periphery of the evolving order and instead seek integration through sustained diplomatic engagement and regional cooperation. Central Asia could play a particularly significant role in this process. The states of the region are potentially capable of mediating to reduce tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan and of facilitating the resolution of a conflict that directly affects broader regional security. Such a role appears logical for several reasons. Many Central Asian countries traditionally pursue pragmatic foreign policies, maintaining working relations with multiple centers of power while avoiding rigid geopolitical alignments. This approach has gradually shaped their reputation as relatively neutral and predictable partners. The element of self-interest is equally important. Stability to the south is directly linked to border security, the development of transport corridors, energy projects, and trade. In this context, mediation is not merely a diplomatic gesture but an element of a long-term regional strategy. Moreover, neutrality may prove to be Central Asia’s principal political asset. The region is not generally perceived as a direct party to the conflict and is therefore potentially well placed to offer a platform for dialogue. At the same time, assuming such a role would require readiness to accept greater responsibility. Effective mediation presupposes regional coordination, institutional maturity, and the political will to engage more actively in security matters. The emergence of initiatives such...

Constitution

Opinion: Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Referendum – Strategic Reset or Institutional Consolidation?

Kazakhstan will hold a nationwide referendum on March 15 to adopt an entirely new constitution – an initiative President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev describes as a decisive break from the country’s super-presidential legacy. The draft, published on February 12 after deliberations by a Constitutional Commission, proposes far-reaching institutional reforms. Among the most notable changes are the replacement of the bicameral parliament with a unicameral body known as the Kurultai; the reinstatement of a vice presidency; and the constitutionalization of commitments to digital transformation, economic modernization, and strengthened sovereignty. The government presents the reform as a necessary modernization of the state in response to global turbulence. Yet the scope and timing of the proposal indicate that the referendum is as much about strategic recalibration as it is about institutional redesign. The Accelerated Timeline The speed of the process has drawn considerable attention. In September 2025, Tokayev advised against rushing constitutional reform and suggested that 2027 would allow sufficient time for public consultation. However, by February 2026, the referendum had been scheduled for mid-March. This abrupt shift suggests a deliberate political calculation rather than simple administrative urgency. One factor under discussion is the legal effect of adopting a wholly new constitution. While reforms in 2022 limited presidents to a single seven-year term, the introduction of a new constitutional order could create ambiguity regarding the continuity of those limits. Even if not explicitly intended as a reset mechanism, such a transformation inevitably introduces flexibility into questions of tenure and succession. Geopolitical pressures also help explain the acceleration. Tokayev has pointed to profound changes in global trade, security alignments, and technological competition. In a world increasingly shaped by sanctions regimes and geoeconomic fragmentation, Kazakhstan seeks to project institutional coherence and responsiveness. Constitutional reform, in this sense, becomes a signal of adaptive capacity. At the same time, the draft completes the political transition that began after the unrest of January 2022. Although earlier amendments removed former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s constitutional privileges, the 1995 framework remained largely intact. The new proposal replaces that structure altogether, extinguishing residual legal ties to the Nazarbayev era and consolidating a distinct political phase under Tokayev’s leadership. Sovereignty as Constitutional Doctrine A defining feature of the draft is the elevation of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and the unitary nature of the state to foundational, effectively immutable principles. This language carries clear geopolitical resonance, particularly in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. While Kazakhstan continues to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy, the constitutional entrenchment of territorial integrity reinforces the state’s insistence on inviolable borders. The draft also expands restrictions on foreign financing of political parties and introduces stricter transparency rules for foreign-funded non-governmental organizations. These provisions reflect a doctrine of symmetrical distance: limiting political influence from any external actor, whether Russia, Western governments, or other international stakeholders. The emphasis is not ideological alignment but institutional insulation. Language and Identity: Managed Ambiguity The most domestically sensitive amendment concerns the status of Russian. The draft alters the phrasing from Russian being used “on an equal...