Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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South Caucasus

As Azerbaijan Pushes Back Against Moscow, Central Asia Watches

The recent diplomatic escalation between Azerbaijan and Russia appeared to have run its course in April, after Moscow agreed to pay compensation over the Azerbaijan Airlines crash in Kazakhstan. Instead, the dispute has entered a new phase, and its implications now reach beyond the South Caucasus. On July 6, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov and handed him a formal note of protest over what Baku described as a Russian drone strike on a fuel station owned by Azerbaijan’s state energy company SOCAR in Ukraine’s Mykolaiv region on the evening of July 5. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry said the attack on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine was not an isolated incident. It cited previous strikes on the company’s gas distribution compressor station and oil depot in Odesa, which caused material damage and injured employees. Baku also pointed to earlier damage to the Azerbaijani embassy building in Kyiv and the honorary consulate in Kharkiv, calling on Moscow to investigate and comply with its obligations to protect civilian infrastructure and diplomatic missions. At the same time, Shusha — known to Armenians as Shushi, retaken by Azerbaijan during the 2020 Karabakh war, and still regarded by many Armenians as occupied — hosted an international conference devoted to what participants described as Russia’s “colonial policy,” the “Circassian genocide,” and the situation of non-Russian peoples within the Russian Federation. The conference declaration called on Moscow to “recognize its historical crimes, abandon its chauvinistic policies, and end the forced recruitment of ethnic minorities into the war against Ukraine.” Experts from Azerbaijan, the United States, France, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Israel, Türkiye, and Georgia attended the conference. None of the Central Asian republics was represented. That absence was telling. Central Asian governments may be distancing themselves from Moscow in certain areas, but they remain reluctant to participate in openly anti-Russian political initiatives. For Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Ashgabat, the question is not whether Russia’s position has weakened, but how far they can move without provoking pressure from Moscow. For Central Asia, the dispute is not a distant quarrel in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan is now a central link in the westward routes that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are trying to strengthen as alternatives to Russian territory. The Middle Corridor runs from China through Central Asia, across the Caspian Sea, and onward through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye to Europe. Any deterioration in Azerbaijan-Russia relations therefore has practical implications for Central Asian transit, energy, and diplomatic room for maneuver. The first major rupture in relations between Baku and Moscow came after Azerbaijan Airlines Flight J2-8243, traveling from Baku to Grozny, was damaged by Russian air-defense fire over Russian territory on December 25, 2024. The aircraft later crashed while attempting an emergency landing near Aktau, Kazakhstan, killing 38 people. Azerbaijan blamed Russia and demanded an apology, accountability, and compensation. Relations deteriorated further in June 2025 following the detention of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg and reports of torture. The most prominent victims were the...

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a new election date being set in Kazakhstan, with the country's largest party staying off the ballot, rare protests in Turkmenistan over blackouts and economic frustration, the removal of one of Ashgabat's most important religious figures, renewed clashes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, fuel shortages hitting much of Central Asia, and border swap deals that have seen thousands of people suddenly finding themselves in a new country. Before then turning to our main story this week, where the dramatic end to the Kamchybek Tashiev trials has delivered one of the biggest moments in Kyrgyz politics this year. Special guest: Medet Tulegenov (Director of the Silk Road Research Center).

Middle East Crisis

The Fragile U.S.–Iran Truce: What Central Asia Stands to Gain and Lose

The preliminary memorandum signed in mid-June between the United States and Iran, followed by renewed talks between Washington and Tehran, has extended a U.S.–Iran truce and opened a 60-day window for negotiations on a final agreement. The nuclear terms remain unresolved, while Israel’s continued military presence in southern Lebanon, despite U.S. pressure for a withdrawal, underscores how fragile the broader regional de-escalation remains. At the end of this period, the parties may sign a final agreement, return to hostilities, or mutually agree to extend the interim arrangement. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, along with neighboring Azerbaijan, have welcomed efforts to de-escalate the conflict between the United States and Iran. The fighting briefly boosted demand for alternative routes through Central Asia, but prolonged instability would disrupt trade, raise transport and insurance costs, and increase security risks. The question now is what the region could gain if the pause holds. Those effects would vary across the region. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan stand to benefit most directly from safer southern rail access through Iran to the Persian Gulf and Türkiye. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are less directly connected to these corridors and less exposed to oil price swings, would feel the consequences mainly through freight costs, fuel prices, and wider regional trade. For Azerbaijan, a sustained pause would reinforce its role as the Caspian link between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Türkiye, while renewed instability would push more freight toward Trans-Caspian alternatives. That interest is not merely theoretical. Tajik-Iranian trade reached $119.6 million in the first quarter of 2026, while Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are developing access to Iranian maritime infrastructure through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The opportunity, however, is conditional. A truce can reduce military risk, but it does not by itself remove the banking, insurance, and compliance problems that have long complicated trade through Iran. For Central Asian exporters and logistics companies, the question is not only whether routes are physically open, but whether carriers, lenders, insurers, and buyers are prepared to use them during a temporary 60-day window. Analysts interviewed by Deutsche Welle said the framework leaves several important provisions unresolved, making a final agreement uncertain. For Central Asia, the most immediate economic variable is the Strait of Hormuz. Kazakh historian and political analyst Sultan Akimbekov identifies its reopening as the key to easing global supply fears. A durable reopening, combined with the temporary U.S. waiver allowing Iranian oil sales through August 21, could put downward pressure on global energy prices. The effects would vary across Central Asia: weaker prices could strain hydrocarbon revenues, while lower fuel, fertilizer, and freight costs could ease imported inflation in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. For Kazakhstan, lower global oil prices would have significant implications. National Bank Governor Timur Suleimenov has said oil generates more than 50% of the country’s export revenues and over 30% of the state budget and National Fund revenues. That would reverse one of the conflict’s few short-term economic benefits for Kazakhstan. Higher crude prices had briefly improved the outlook for export revenues,...

EAEU

Putin’s Astana Visit Shows What Russia Still Wants From Kazakhstan

The Eurasian Economic Union summit in Astana gave Vladimir Putin's state visit a wider stage. The summit produced technical documents and familiar language about integration. The bilateral Russia-Kazakhstan package around it was more concrete. It showed what Moscow still wants from Kazakhstan, and what Astana expects in return. The detail lies in infrastructure, where contracts can last for decades. The setting echoed history. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed the treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana on May 29, 2014, with Armenia joining in January 2015, and Kyrgyzstan in August of the same year. In 2026, the bloc returned to Astana for the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the V Eurasian Economic Forum. The theme of the forum was artificial intelligence, digital regulation, and the EAEU's place in the global technology race. Its website said 14 integration documents were signed on the sidelines, including memoranda, agreements, protocols, and joint action plans. Those documents gave the visit a regional frame. The larger result came on May 28, when Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Putin oversaw a broad set of bilateral agreements. Akorda listed nuclear power, Russian export credit, expanded oil-sector cooperation, a tenge-ruble currency swap, education projects, financial monitoring, transport digitalization, and nuclear safety regulation. That package points to the real agenda: energy, transit, payments, industrial production, and public-facing alliance language. For Moscow, Kazakhstan’s primary value is geographic: it sits between Russia and China, and across routes that connect Central Asia to Europe, the Caspian, and South Asia. Russian crude already crosses Kazakhstan on the Priirtyshsk-Atasu-Alashankou route to China. A KazTransOil contract keeps transit at 10 million tons a year until the end of 2033. The tariff is $15 per ton, excluding VAT. The Atasu-Alashankou pipeline has a design capacity of 20 million tons a year and belongs to Kazakhstan-China Pipeline LLP, a 50-50 venture between KazTransOil and China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Company. Reuters has reported that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed last year to raise that flow by 2.5 million tons, although the extra volume had not started flowing before Putin’s visit. The new agreement on oil-sector cooperation gives the issue a political push. For Moscow, the route strengthens access to China as Western sanctions keep pressure on Russian exports and payments. For Kazakhstan, it brings fees and gives Astana a useful position in Russia-China energy flows. The nuclear agreement, meanwhile, gives Russia a long-term role in Kazakhstan’s shift to nuclear power. Kazakhstan and Russia signed a $16.5 billion agreement for the Balkhash nuclear power plant at Ulken, near Lake Balkhash. The project covers two VVER-1200 III+ reactors. Kazakhstan held a groundbreaking ceremony for the plant in August 2025, with the active construction phase expected to begin in 2027, and the first reactor expected in early 2034. Russia will provide export credit for the first plant, with Rosatom leading the Balkhash project after competition with China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), France’s EDF, and Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. But Kazakhstan has not handed the wider program to Moscow....

EAEU

EAEU Summit in Astana: Is Moscow Pushing Armenia Toward the Exit?

Russian President Vladimir Putin is due to arrive in Astana on May 27 for a state visit, while the Eurasian Economic Forum and a meeting of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council will take place in Kazakhstan’s capital on May 28-29. Against the backdrop of increasingly strained relations between Moscow and Yerevan, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will not attend the summit. Armenia will instead be represented by Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan. Kazakhstan’s presidential administration has already outlined the agenda for the visit. Putin is expected to receive full state honors. After the official welcoming ceremony, Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will hold bilateral talks. On May 28-29, Tokayev, Putin, and other EAEU leaders are expected to take part in the Eurasian Economic Forum and the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council meetings. Strategic Partnership and Growing Pressure Political analyst Andrey Chebotarev said the agenda of the Tokayev-Putin talks is likely to focus on implementing the declaration signed during Tokayev’s state visit to Russia in November 2025, which raised Kazakhstan-Russia relations to the level of a “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance.” The declaration envisioned expanded cooperation in politics, security, economics, integration, high technology, and humanitarian affairs. According to Chebotarev, the two presidents now need to define concrete mechanisms for implementing those agreements. Among the most sensitive issues is the planned construction of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant with the participation of Russia’s Rosatom. Astana, Chebotarev argued, is particularly interested in ensuring the continuity of the project as Western sanctions against Moscow tighten. Another key issue is the uninterrupted transit of Kazakh oil exports to Europe through Russian territory. “This issue is especially relevant given, first, the suspension of oil deliveries through the Druzhba pipeline, which the Russian side explains as being due to technical reasons, and second, the continuing Ukrainian drone attacks on the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga on the Black and Baltic seas,” Chebotarev said. Other likely topics include logistics linked to the North-South transport corridor and the worsening decline in the Caspian Sea’s water level, particularly ahead of the planned seventh summit of Caspian littoral states later this year. Information Wars and the Golden Horde Debate The Putin-Tokayev meeting is taking place against an increasingly difficult information backdrop shaped by several Russian media outlets and commentators. Russian public discourse has continued to react strongly to the recent international symposium in Astana dedicated to the legacy of the Golden Horde, as well as to Tokayev’s remarks during the event. Kazakh political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev, commenting ahead of Putin’s visit, argued that Kazakhstan-Russia relations were being subjected to “attacks and information provocations.” He described this as part of a campaign to turn Kazakhstan into “a platform for confrontation with Russia” amid the broader Russia-West conflict. He added that similar efforts were visible in attempts to inflame tensions between Kazakhstan and China. At the same time, Ashimbayev avoided publicly criticizing Russian opinion leaders, many of whom have become increasingly vocal in questioning the alliance between Moscow and Astana. Armenia’s Growing...

Counterterrorism

China to Supply Tajikistan With Intelligence and Counterterrorism Equipment

China will provide Tajikistan with intelligence, police, and counterterrorism equipment worth more than $7.6 million under a grant assistance program approved by the two governments. The governments of the two countries signed the corresponding memorandum of understanding on May 8. The agreement provides for the transfer of equipment by China for the needs of Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under the terms of the deal, the Chinese side will deliver 34 intelligence devices along with additional police and counterterrorism equipment. The shipment is expected to enter Tajikistan through the Karasu border crossing. China will also dispatch eight specialists to Tajikistan to install and configure the equipment and train Tajik personnel. Their mission is expected to last 45 days. The total value of the equipment and services amounts to 52 million Chinese yuan, or approximately $7.64 million. All associated costs will be fully covered by the Chinese side. Tajikistan, for its part, has agreed to handle customs clearance, transportation and storage of the equipment once it arrives in the country. Authorities will also exempt the deliveries from taxes and customs duties and provide the necessary conditions for the Chinese specialists, including visas, accommodation, and security arrangements. A special working group will be established to coordinate with Chinese engineers during installation and personnel training. The document separately emphasizes that after delivery the two sides will jointly inspect the quality, quantity and technical specifications of the equipment before signing a formal acceptance certificate. Future operation and maintenance costs will then become the responsibility of the Tajik side. China remains one of Tajikistan’s largest strategic partners. Following President Emomali Rahmon’s recent state visit to China, Tajik officials said more than 80 cooperation documents were signed as a result of high-level talks and business meetings, while China’s Foreign Ministry referred separately to more than ten state-level cooperation documents. Earlier, Tajikistan’s parliament also approved an agreement under which China would finance the construction of nine border facilities along the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The new grant comes amid renewed scrutiny of China’s expanding role in Tajikistan’s security sector. Reports and speculation about a possible Chinese military facility in Gorno-Badakhshan have surfaced periodically, including in 2021 and again in 2024. However, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs have denied the existence of a Chinese military base on the country’s territory.