Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode – Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Reform – Coming Sunday

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team will take a deep dive into Kazakhstan's new draft constitution with guests Yevgeniy Zhovtis, a Kazakhstan human rights activist and director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and the Rule of Law, and Aiman Umarova, a prominent lawyer in Kazakhstan and a member of the constitutional commission.

B5+1

B5+1 in Bishkek: Business at the Center of Regional Integration Strategy

A two-day B5+1 business forum is underway in Bishkek, bringing together government officials from Central Asian countries, regional business leaders, and a U.S. delegation. Once viewed as a business extension of the C5+1 diplomatic dialogue, participants now describe the format as evolving into an independent and pragmatic economic platform. The forum is organized by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), in cooperation with the Cabinet of Ministers of Kyrgyzstan, under the IBECA program supported by the U.S. Department of State. A defining feature of this year’s forum is the size and prominence of the U.S. business delegation. More than 50 representatives from major corporations, which, according to official documents, include Boeing, GE Healthcare, Nasdaq, Abbott, Pfizer, Honeywell, Coca-Cola Company, Mastercard, FedEx, Apple, Wabtec, and Franklin Templeton, have convened in Bishkek. Discussions are structured around panel sessions and working groups focusing on key sectors: transport and logistics, agriculture, e-commerce, information technology, and critical mineral extraction. U.S. Special Envoy for South and Central Asia Sergio Gor stated he has arrived in Bishkek with a “clear message from Donald Trump.” He emphasized that Central Asia is among the top foreign policy priorities of the current U.S. administration. At a press conference, Gor underlined a strategic shift away from traditional intergovernmental agreements toward support for private enterprise and the development of commercially viable projects. “The U.S. government is ready to expand its tools for supporting investment cooperation, and today's discussion is only the first step toward further joint development,” he said. Focus on Regional Connectivity Transport infrastructure and regional connectivity were major themes on the opening day of the forum. Gor highlighted the U.S.-backed TRIPP initiative, which aims to establish a transport corridor through the South Caucasus linking Central Asia to Western markets. He argued that expanding alternative trade routes would support deeper economic integration within the region and boost its position in global trade networks. Forum participants echoed this sentiment, stressing that major international investors are increasingly evaluating Central Asia not as isolated national markets but as a single economic space. Representatives from Central Asian governments noted that the region’s aggregated potential, in logistics, natural resources, and consumer demand, is what attracts large multinationals. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry, Yersayin Nagaspayev, said over 600 American companies are currently operating in Kazakhstan, with many managing regional operations from within the country. “Our shared goal is to position Central Asia as a reliable, competitive, and attractive region for long-term business cooperation,” he stated. Redefining the Role of Business in Governance Kyrgyzstan’s Minister of Economy, Bakyt Sydykov, emphasized that the B5+1 platform is reshaping the nature of business-state interaction. “Today, business is not just a participant in the process, but a full-fledged co-author of economic reforms,” he said. He noted that the working groups had proposed recommendations in line with Kyrgyzstan’s ongoing reform agenda. These include reducing administrative barriers, digitizing public services, and improving access to finance for small and medium-sized enterprises. Toward a New Geopolitical Self-Image The forum in Bishkek also reflected a broader regional...

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Second Malta-Flagged Vessel Hit in Black Sea as Shipping Risks Rise

The Maltese government has officially condemned recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Black Sea after a second ship flying the Maltese flag was damaged in a missile strike. This marks the second such incident within a week involving Maltese-registered ships. A spokesperson for Malta’s Ministry of Transport confirmed that the latest vessel, a Malta-flagged commercial ship, sustained minor shrapnel damage during a missile strike targeting port infrastructure in the Black Sea. The ship remains seaworthy, although one crew member was injured. The earlier incident involved the Matilda, an oil tanker also registered in Malta and chartered by the Kazakh shipping company Kazmortransflot, a subsidiary of state-owned KazMunayGas. On January 13, according to a statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Matilda was struck by two Ukrainian drones. In 2025, Kazmortransflot increased its transport volumes by more than 15% compared to 2024, reaching 51,400 DFE. The growth was attributed to rising demand for shipping along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. Both incidents occurred near the CPC marine terminal outside Novorossiysk. In a statement, Malta’s Ministry of Transport emphasized that attacks on commercial shipping present a serious threat to civilian seafarers, global shipping safety, and the uninterrupted flow of legitimate international trade. The ministry also noted that commercial vessels operating in conflict zones are increasingly exposed to elevated operational and insurance risks, even when transporting cargo fully compliant with international sanctions. The attacks near the CPC marine terminal have already had a measurable economic impact on shipping and energy exports. As of December 2025, insurance rates for merchant ships operating in the Black Sea had risen to 1% of a vessel’s value, up from 0.75% and 0.25% during more stable periods. Ships operating in areas of active military conflict are typically insured per voyage rather than annually, significantly raising operating expenses. Shipping and insurance analysts say the rise in insurance premiums is reducing profit margins on oil and petroleum product exports in the region. Although Kazakhstan’s export volumes have not yet been directly affected, traders and shippers are increasingly factoring geopolitical and logistical risks into their strategies. Repeated disruptions near one of Eurasia’s critical energy hubs are heightening concerns about the reliability of supply routes, especially given limited alternatives. Kazakhstan has already begun restructuring its oil export network due to disruptions at the CPC, its primary crude oil export channel. Authorities have turned to alternative infrastructure to maintain output and avoid production slowdowns.

Oil Exports

Kazakhstan Restructures Oil Exports Amid Disruptions at CPC

Kazakhstan is rapidly restructuring its oil export routes in response to disruptions affecting the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), a critical channel for the country’s crude shipments. To maintain export volumes and avoid production slowdowns, authorities have turned to alternative infrastructure. According to a statement from KazMunayGas, the national oil company, approximately 300,000 tons of oil were rerouted in December 2025 after restrictions limited the CPC’s intake capacity. In coordination with KazTransOil JSC (KTO), the country redirected oil flows to other export corridors. These rerouted volumes were exported to Germany, China, and via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, with shipments also handled through the ports of Novorossiysk and Ust-Luga. As CPC restrictions remained in place into January 2026, the redirection strategy continued. Amid these challenges, Kazakhstan’s use of alternative routes gained momentum. KazMunayGas reported that oil deliveries to Germany’s Schwedt refinery totaled 2.1 million tons by the end of 2025, with projections indicating a rise to 2.5 million tons in 2026. Exports through the port of Aktau to the BTC pipeline reached 1.3 million tons in 2025 and are expected to grow to 1.6 million tons this year. Shipments to China remained stable, with 1.1 million tons delivered by the end of 2025. These developments reflect a gradual shift aimed at reducing Kazakhstan’s dependency on the CPC which has faced repeated operational setbacks. The CPC disruptions stem from a series of security incidents. In February and March 2025, the Kropotkinskaya station was targeted in drone attacks. On 29 November, a strike on the consortium’s remote mooring device caused damage to its marine terminal. Following the November incident, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy stated that the CPC pipeline is an international energy project and warned that “any forceful impact on its facilities poses direct risks to global energy security.” After another attack on 13 January 2026, when drones targeted three oil tankers near the CPC terminal in the Black Sea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a sharper response. In emergency consultations with European partners, the U.S., and other stakeholders, Kazakhstan called for reinforced protection of hydrocarbon transportation routes and maritime corridors, emphasizing the need for adherence to international law.

Iran

Opinion: Iranian Unrest Creates Opening for U.S., Partners in Central Asia

As protests in Iran enter their third week, nationwide unrest is exerting political strain and societal pressure on the Islamic Republic. The nation’s current escalation reflects a level of sustained mobilization comparable to Iranian demonstrations that erupted in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini. While the outcome of these developments remains uncertain, ongoing unrest in Iran is more likely to impact Central Asia’s existing energy, transit, and security dynamics, rather than alter the broader regional landscape. This moment nonetheless offers the United States and its partners a strategic opportunity to advance long-term objectives in Central Asia while supporting regional resilience at a time when geopolitical alignments are rapidly shifting. Combined with ongoing disruptions caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine, the recent protests in Iran may create a heightened sense of uncertainty or risk perceptions in global energy markets. In particular, the current Iranian unrest may raise concerns regarding potential oil supply disruptions and broader geopolitical tensions. For neighboring producers like Kazakhstan, which maintains an oil-dependent economy, this elevated volatility could translate into higher revenues from existing exports. Increased fiscal flexibility from rising oil revenues may therefore provide Astana with the opportunity to expand its scope for economic cooperation with Western partners. The United States, which maintains long-standing bilateral energy ties with Kazakhstan, could draw on these existing partnerships to deepen its bilateral energy and technical ties. Beyond its impact on energy markets, ongoing instability in Iran may also affect regional connectivity initiatives. For example, disruptions could emerge along the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal network connecting India, Iran, and Russia, with branches that involve the Caspian and Central Asia. Although the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway sits along this route and facilitates the transport of energy resources and critical minerals across the region, the corridor currently plays a more limited role in regional transit across Central Asia. This route nonetheless remains of interest to Central Asia because it offers the region an opportunity to enhance long-term economic diversification through access to new markets in the Persian Gulf. Minor disruptions could therefore underscore the corridor’s growing geopolitical value as a connector for trade and energy transport across multiple countries and regions. This context creates a strategic opening for the United States and its partners to contribute to the region’s long-term trade and connectivity landscape. By supporting Central Asian nations in reducing reliance on Iranian transit, the United States can accelerate investment in alternative routes like the Middle Corridor that bypass both Russia and Iran. During an investors' forum in Tashkent late last year, Europe announced it would increase its investment in the Middle Corridor. However, the United States continues to remain on the periphery of this project. By collaborating with European partners to enhance infrastructure along this route during a critical time, the United States can help Central Asian nations position the Middle Corridor as the region’s most resilient and viable alternative for trade and exports. This would ultimately advance shared interests by enhancing Central Asia’s connectivity and facilitating greater U.S....

U.S.-Kazakhstan Relations

Kazakhstan Elevates U.S. Ties to Presidential-Level

Kazakhstan’s relationship with the United States is entering a more explicitly strategic phase under Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, marked by a shift in how Astana manages its most consequential external partnerships. As economic ties deepen and geopolitical coordination expands across energy, investment, and Eurasian connectivity, engagement with Washington is increasingly being treated as a presidential priority rather than a routine diplomatic file. In this context, Kazakhstan has formally elevated its engagement with the United States by appointing a presidential representative to steer bilateral negotiations on priority issues. By presidential decree, Ambassador Yerzhan Kazykhan—Kazakhstan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office in Geneva and a veteran diplomat with prior postings as ambassador to the United States and the United Kingdom—has been designated as the President’s Representative for negotiations with Washington. The appointment places key aspects of the U.S. relationship under direct presidential oversight from the Akorda, the presidential office. Kazykhan has previously served as foreign minister and assistant to the president, and has held senior roles within both the Foreign Ministry and the presidential administration. His experience in Washington and in multilateral settings provides institutional continuity as the bilateral agenda broadens to encompass investment, energy security, and regional connectivity, while day-to-day execution remains within established diplomatic channels. Drivers Behind the Elevation of U.S.–Kazakhstan Engagement The decision reflects how rapidly the scope of U.S.–Kazakhstan engagement has expanded and how Kazakhstan is positioning itself as a major investment and strategic connectivity hub. The United States is Kazakhstan’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with hundreds of American companies operating across the economy. Chevron, Kazakhstan’s single largest foreign investor, has invested more than $50 billion over time, anchoring long-term U.S. corporate presence in the country’s energy sector. This investment relationship gained further momentum in 2025. At the C5+1 leaders’ summit in Washington, Kazakhstan and U.S. partners announced nearly $17 billion in new commercial agreements and investment commitments across energy, transport, and industrial cooperation. The package was publicly highlighted by U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick, underscoring senior-level U.S. political backing for deeper economic engagement with Kazakhstan. Beyond investment, the bilateral agenda has expanded into strategic and geopolitical domains. Kazakhstan’s decision to join the Abraham Accords marked a notable political alignment with a U.S.-led diplomatic initiative, extending the framework’s reach beyond its original Middle Eastern focus. Connectivity has become central to U.S. policy thinking. The Middle Corridor is increasingly viewed as an eastward extension of the post-Azerbaijan–Armenia Caucasus transit framework, also called the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity’, aimed at reopening and securing east–west routes across the South Caucasus. Extending it through Kazakhstan links Central Asia to Europe while reducing reliance on Russia or Iran. Trade and energy ties reinforce this trajectory. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and a major supplier to the United States, making the U.S. one of its most important export markets for nuclear fuel. As U.S. policy places greater emphasis on secure and diversified supply chains, Kazakhstan’s role in critical energy inputs and transit infrastructure has taken on added strategic...