Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Trump Confirms New U.S. Tariffs on Kazakhstan Starting August 1

Starting August 1, 2025, the United States will impose a 25 percent customs duty on exports from Kazakhstan. The decision was announced by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross and later confirmed in an official letter from President Donald Trump to Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. The move has prompted mixed reactions, although analysts say the actual economic impact is likely to be limited. Tariffs and Diplomacy In a letter published on Truth Social, President Trump stated that the United States was “forced to correct years of distortions caused by Kazakhstan’s tariff and non-tariff policies.” He added that the 25 percent tariff remains “significantly less than what is needed” to address the ongoing trade imbalance between the two countries. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross clarified that the tariffs were originally scheduled to take effect on July 9 but have been postponed to August 1. Official notifications are already being sent to affected countries, with Kazakhstan’s notice scheduled for delivery on July 7 at 12 p.m. Eastern Time. President Trump also outlined a possible exemption: Kazakhstani companies that relocate production to the United States would not be subject to the new tariffs. Impact on Kazakhstan Earlier this year, Washington announced a 27% tariff on Kazakhstani goods, which was quickly suspended for 90 days pending negotiations. The revised 25% duty now stands as the highest imposed on any Central Asian country. Despite this, Kazakh political analyst Gaziz Abishev points out that the overwhelming majority of Kazakhstan’s exports to the U.S., including oil, uranium, ferroalloys, and silver, are excluded from the new measures. “These commodities represent more than 95% of total shipments and are included in the list of exemptions,” he said. As a result, the tariffs are unlikely to significantly impact trade volumes or foreign investment. Economist Eldar Shamsutdinov added that similar letters were sent to other nations, including Vietnam (40%), Malaysia (25%), Myanmar (40%), and South Africa (30%), framing the move as a continuation of existing trade policy rather than a new set of sanctions. Geopolitical Context The tariffs are part of a sweeping review of trade agreements under Trump’s administration. In April 2025, tariffs were applied to goods from 185 countries, and formal notices began rolling out in July. The administration has prioritized correcting what it deems “unfair trade imbalances.” In 2024, Kazakhstan exported $2.3 billion worth of goods to the U.S., while U.S. exports to Kazakhstan totaled $1.1 billion. Trump has cited this trade deficit as justification for the increased duties. Countries receiving similar letters include Japan, South Korea, Laos, Serbia, Tunisia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia, with tariffs reaching as high as 40%, underscoring the strategic and systematic nature of the U.S. policy shift. Kazakhstan’s Response Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration has announced plans to issue an official response but ruled out reciprocal measures. “In connection with the introduction of a 25% duty on goods from Kazakhstan by the U.S., the Ministry of Trade and Integration is preparing an official response. There is no question of retaliatory measures,” the ministry stated....

Azerbaijan Bilateral Trade Middle Corridor Economic Cooperation Geopolitics State Visit Cultural Ties

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan Forge $1B Trade Vision

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan arrived in Baku on July 2 for a state visit at the invitation of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. He was received at the airport by Deputy Prime Minister Yagub Eyyubov and other senior officials, with an official reception taking place at the presidential residence in Zagulba. A Thirty-Year Economic Partnership During bilateral talks, Presidents Mirziyoyev and Aliyev reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing the strategic partnership between Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan as the two nations mark 30 years of diplomatic ties. “Never in history have our relations been at such a high level as they are today,” said Mirziyoyev. Economic cooperation was a key focus of the discussions. Trade between the two countries has increased by 25% over the past year, and there are now approximately 300 joint ventures with a combined project portfolio valued at $4 billion. The leaders agreed to a new goal of boosting bilateral trade and investment to $1 billion annually by 2030. A comprehensive cooperation program was adopted to facilitate this, covering sectors such as industry, infrastructure, agriculture, healthcare, tourism, and banking. Advancing Transport and Logistics Links Significant progress was reported in the transport and energy sectors. The two presidents welcomed the growth of cargo transit along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the “Middle Corridor.” Uzbek cargo volumes on the route rose by 25% in 2024, surpassing one million tons, a development supported by the launch of a new electronic permit system in March. The leaders also committed to accelerating work on a joint green energy export initiative targeting European markets. Institutionalizing Strategic Ties Several bilateral documents were signed to formalize cooperation. These included a roadmap for implementing the 2023 Treaty on Alliance Relations through 2029, as well as agreements in environmental protection, science, higher education, and industry for the 2025-2026 period. Additional deals addressed agriculture, food security, social protection, maritime navigation, and municipal partnerships. New sister-city agreements were signed between Tashkent and Sumgayit, and between Navoi and Gabala. At a joint press briefing, Mirziyoyev lauded Azerbaijan’s efforts to restore its UN-recognized territorial integrity, stating, “You have fulfilled the long-standing dream of your father and every citizen of Azerbaijan.” He also praised infrastructure development in formerly disputed territories of Nagorno-Karabakh and described Azerbaijan as a “reliable ally and strategic partner.” The two leaders emphasized their shared positions on regional and global issues and pledged continued coordination in international forums. Mirziyoyev reaffirmed Uzbekistan’s commitment to the diplomatic resolution of conflicts. Cultural Diplomacy and Symbolism The visit featured symbolic and cultural highlights. In Baku’s Ag Sheher district, the presidents laid the foundation for Uzbekistan Park, a 4.5-hectare space celebrating Uzbek culture and architecture. They also inaugurated Uzbekistan’s new embassy in Baku, which includes halls named after different Uzbek regions, with Mirziyoyev proposing to name one of the halls after Karabakh as a gesture of friendship. The two leaders later toured the Sea Breeze resort complex on the Caspian coast, part of the broader Caspian Riviera tourism project. A similar development, Sea...

Diplomacy Geopolitics Israel-Iran Escalation

Turkmenistan Attracts Renewed Attention from Washington and Moscow Amid Regional Tensions

Turkmenistan has become the focus of intensified diplomatic engagement from both Russia and the United States, as geopolitical tensions in the broader region escalate, particularly following recent clashes between Iran and Israel. On June 25, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov concluded a two-day visit to Ashgabat, where he emphasized expanding economic ties but also made clear Russia’s intention to preserve its cultural and political influence in Turkmenistan. Lavrov announced plans to open a joint Russian-Turkmen university and called for increased youth exchanges. “We suggest expanding the productive interaction between the Institute of International Relations under Turkmenistan’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MGIMO University under the Russian Foreign Ministry and developing ties between budding diplomats of the both countries with the assistance of our Council of Young Diplomats,” Lavrov said, according to a Russian Foreign Ministry transcript. In parallel, Lavrov took aim at U.S. regional policy. While condemning U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear infrastructure under the Trump administration, he nonetheless praised its “realism and common sense,” in contrast to what he termed the Biden administration’s “neoliberal hegemonic plans.” U.S. Diplomatic Overtures The United States has also stepped up its outreach. On the same day Lavrov arrived in Ashgabat, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio held a phone call with Turkmen Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov. Two days earlier, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau also spoke with Meredov. According to a State Department readout, Rubio thanked Turkmenistan for facilitating the transit of U.S. citizens out of Iran during the recent Iranian-Israeli crisis and expressed interest in expanding economic and commercial cooperation. Though historically neutral and cautious in its diplomacy, Turkmenistan has shown recent signs of greater engagement with Western partners. Earlier this year, it launched a gas-swap deal involving Turkey and Iran to supply natural gas to the European Union, a move some analysts suggest may have raised concerns in Moscow. Strategic Infrastructure and U.S. Interest Adding to speculation over increased Western interest, on June 23, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported the opening of a new airport in Jebel, near the Caspian Sea. The airport, built on the site of a former Soviet military airfield, features a 3,200-meter runway and modern navigation systems. The publication suggested that such infrastructure could be of interest to the U.S. military. Despite recent overtures, Turkmenistan’s relations with Washington have faced challenges. As previously reported by The Times of Central Asia, citizens of Turkmenistan are among those affected by new travel restrictions under an executive order signed by President Donald Trump. The order, which took effect on June 9, aims to curb visa overstays and enhance national security. Critics argue that the measure is overly broad and risks being discriminatory.

International Diplomacy Geopolitics Regional Security Taliban Diplomacy Afghanistan

Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

Central Asian politics International Diplomacy Geopolitics Multi-vector Foreign Policy

Breaking Old Ties: Central Asia’s Delicate Dance Between Russia and the West

Central Asian countries are increasingly asserting their independence in foreign policy, distancing themselves from traditional centers of global influence. Recent developments highlight a nuanced balancing act as states in the region navigate growing tensions between Russia and the West. Kyrgyzstan Pushes Back In Kyrgyzstan, the recent arrest of Natalya Sekerina, an employee of the Russian House in Osh, marked a notable assertion of sovereignty. Sekerina was detained under Part 1 of Article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic, which pertains to the recruitment, financing, and training of mercenaries for armed conflict or attempts to overthrow state authority. Earlier, Sergei Lapushkin, an employee of Osh city hall, and two others were also detained in connection with the case. All suspects were later placed under house arrest. Nevertheless, the arrests are seen by observers as a clear signal that Kyrgyzstan is not simply aligning with Russian policy, despite its economic dependence on Moscow, particularly due to labor migration. The move was reportedly a response to the April 17 detention of over 50 Kyrgyz nationals in a Moscow bathhouse, where Russian security forces allegedly used excessive force. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a formal note of protest. Russia later stated that the detainees were in the country illegally and some were suspected of links to radical groups. At the same time, Kyrgyzstan is scrutinizing Western influence as well. In February, U.S. President Donald Trump announced funding cuts and a wind-down of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The announcement triggered debate in Kyrgyzstan, where some voices argued that while USAID had supported civil society, it also fostered instability and economic dependency. Critics claim the agency promoted Western values and helped establish a network of NGOs that played outsized roles in the country’s politics. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan Seek Equilibrium In Kazakhstan, USAID also came under fire. Parliamentary Deputy Magherram Magherramov criticized the agency for promoting what he described as values alien to Kazakh society, referencing controversial events such as women’s rights marches and LGBTQ+ parades in Almaty. He called for a formal review of foreign-funded NGOs. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan witnessed a diplomatic rift during an April visit by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the “Grieving Mother” memorial in Samarkand. Lavrov commented on the absence of a Russian-language inscription, provoking widespread backlash on Uzbek social media. Sherzodkhon Kudratkhodzha, rector of the University of Journalism and Mass Communications, responded sharply: “We are not their colony.” He also cited ongoing discrimination against Uzbek migrants in Russia, which, he argued, has been met with silence from Russian officials. A More Independent Foreign Policy Central Asian nations are increasingly holding intra-regional and international meetings, often excluding Russia. On April 25, intelligence chiefs from the region gathered in Tashkent to coordinate on regional security threats. The following day, a meeting of foreign ministers from Central Asia and China took place in Almaty. It was attended by Kazakh Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, and counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and a...

Oil Market Geopolitics OPEC Oil

Kazakhstan Weighs OPEC+ Exit, Raising Fears of Global Oil Price War

Kazakhstan is reportedly considering a reassessment of its participation in the OPEC+ alliance, raising concerns among major global oil market players, according to Reuters. Reuters columnist Ron Bousso Thomson noted that recent statements from Kazakhstan’s new Minister of Energy, Yerlan Akkenzhenov, emphasized prioritizing national interests over adhering to the cartel's production quotas. In an interview with Reuters, Akkenzhenov said, "Kazakhstan will proceed from its own interests in determining production volumes". Such rhetoric may signal Kazakhstan's de facto refusal to comply with OPEC+ quotas and could mark the first step toward a formal withdrawal from the alliance, which is led by Saudi Arabia. Since 2022, OPEC+ members had agreed to cut output by 5.85 million barrels per day to stabilize prices within a $70-90 per barrel range. Production Growth Despite Restrictions Kazakhstan has consistently exceeded its production limits. In March 2025, the country produced 1.85 million barrels of oil per day, 26% above its established quota of 1.468 million barrels. This surge is attributed to the expanded development of the Tengiz field. Such non-compliance has reportedly irritated Saudi Arabia, which, according to IMF estimates, needs oil prices above $90 per barrel to balance its national budget. In early April, Riyadh responded by slashing oil prices for the Asian market and accelerating production increases, signaling its displeasure toward undisciplined alliance members. Analysts warn that if tensions escalate further, Saudi Arabia could resort to drastic measures, potentially triggering a global price war. The Danger of a Price War The specter of a repeat of 2014, when Saudi Arabia flooded the market to push out U.S. shale producers, looms large. Should OPEC+ collapse, a supply glut could cause oil prices to plummet. Countries with higher production costs, such as Kazakhstan, would be particularly vulnerable to such a scenario. Risks for Kazakhstan's Budget and the Tenge According to analysts, Kazakhstan faces significant fiscal risks. Economist Arman Beisembayev explained that citizens would not immediately feel the impact of a sharp decline in oil prices due to existing contracts, which typically take three to six months to fulfill. However, he cautioned that economic repercussions could begin to surface by the fall. Financial analyst Andrei Chebotarev predicted that falling oil revenues would necessitate a budget revision. The current state budget is based on an oil price of $75 per barrel and an exchange rate of 470 tenge per U.S. dollar. In reality, oil prices are trending toward $65, and the tenge has depreciated to 518 per dollar. “Most likely, the government will increase withdrawals from the National Fund and revise budget expenditures. Devaluation may also become inevitable to balance the budget under new realities,” Beisembayev added. Global Turbulence and Geopolitical Factors Experts highlight that the policies of U.S. President Donald Trump's administration, particularly the escalation of trade conflicts, have played a significant role in destabilizing global markets. Newly imposed U.S. tariffs have already dampened global oil demand. “For developed countries, cheap oil is a boon. But for Kazakhstan, it poses risks and a threat of recession,” Beisembayev added....