Geopolitics - The Times Of Central Asia

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Russia's War in Ukraine

Why Tokayev Urged Putin to Freeze the War in Ukraine

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has delivered his most direct public appeal to Vladimir Putin for an end to Russia's war in Ukraine. Speaking alongside the Russian president during the 22nd Kazakhstan-Russia Interregional Cooperation Forum in Omsk on July 25, Tokayev called for freezing the war and returning to what he described as the "Istanbul Formula 2.0." For many observers, the statement marked a significant departure from the cautious language traditionally used by leaders across the post-Soviet region. Although Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly criticized the war and reaffirmed support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, Tokayev's intervention was notable because he advanced a concrete proposal directly to Putin on Russian territory. Tokayev's remarks were consistent with Kazakhstan's long-standing foreign policy, which has emphasized negotiated settlements and diplomatic conflict resolution. While Russia remains one of Kazakhstan's largest trading partners and a crucial infrastructure partner, Astana has not recognized Moscow's annexation of Ukrainian territory. The war has also become a direct economic concern for Kazakhstan. More than 80% of the country's crude exports move through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), whose Black Sea export route has recently been affected by attacks on tankers and related security incidents. Those disruptions have highlighted Kazakhstan's continued dependence on the CPC corridor and the risks posed by an expanding conflict zone. Tokayev's Proposal According to the Kremlin transcript, Tokayev told Putin that he had been receiving “many signals” from Europe and the United States regarding the current state of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and had already discussed them with the Russian president by telephone. Tokayev also stressed that he regarded the conflict as an interstate war rather than a civil war. He added that Kazakhstan had always treated the Ukrainian people, their culture and their language with respect. He further said Putin had demonstrated “maximum diplomatic flexibility” during his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Anchorage, Alaska. “This is simply my humble opinion, since people keep asking me: perhaps the conflict should already be frozen, and we should return to the ‘Istanbul Formula 2.0,’ because significant results had been achieved there. Then, naturally, under guarantees from the major powers, including Russia, it would be possible to move toward long-awaited peace,” Tokayev said. Tokayev also made clear that he did not intend to serve as an official mediator in any future negotiations. Tokayev did not define the formula in detail. Russia and Ukraine held talks in Istanbul in 2022 and resumed direct negotiations there in 2025, but neither round produced a settlement. It remains unclear whether he envisaged a ceasefire along the current front line, how occupied territory would be treated, or what guarantees any major powers would provide. Planned or Spontaneous? Major strategic decisions in the post-Soviet space have traditionally been shaped behind closed doors. That is one reason why Tokayev's remarks, delivered while sitting beside Putin, immediately attracted the attention of political analysts. Several experts argue that such a proposal was unlikely to have been made spontaneously. Tokayev's call to freeze the fighting and resume negotiations...

Russia's War in Ukraine

Tokayev Calls for Ukraine War Freeze as Black Sea and Caspian Risks Grow

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called for Russia and Ukraine to freeze the war and return to negotiations, delivering one of his clearest public appeals for an end to the conflict while seated beside Russian President Vladimir Putin. "Perhaps this conflict should already be frozen and we should return to the Istanbul Formula 2.0, since significant results were achieved there," Tokayev said during talks in Omsk on July 25. He said major powers, including Russia, should provide security guarantees before the sides moved towards a lasting peace. Russia and Ukraine held talks in Istanbul soon after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022 and resumed direct negotiations there in 2025, though neither round produced a settlement. Moscow and Kyiv dispute how close the 2022 talks came to an agreement and why they collapsed. Tokayev described the war as an "interstate conflict," and said that Kazakhstan respects the Ukrainian people, their culture and language. He also expressed concern over the deaths of young Russians and Ukrainians. Tokayev declined any formal role for Astana, but stated that he had received proposals and appeals concerning mediation, including from Europe and the United States. He said Kazakhstan was not an outsider, but that Russia was capable of resolving the issue without an intermediary. He also reaffirmed Kazakhstan's strategic partnership and allied relationship with Russia, praising what he called Putin's diplomatic flexibility during the Russian president's August 2025 meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump in Anchorage. The Kremlin rejected the idea of a freeze. Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said it was impossible under Kyiv's current position. He repeated Moscow's claim that fighting could stop if Ukraine made what Russia considers the necessary decisions. Russia's stated terms include Ukrainian withdrawal from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions, including areas Moscow does not control. Putin also wants Kyiv to renounce its aim of joining NATO. Ukraine has rejected those conditions. Tokayev's position has developed publicly, but has remained centered on negotiations. In September 2024, he said Russia was "militarily invincible" and argued that continued escalation could bring about a wider disaster. He called for hostilities to stop before negotiations moved to territorial issues. Kazakhstan has also kept its distance from several central Kremlin claims. In June 2022, Tokayev refused to recognize the Russian-backed entities in Donetsk and Luhansk, describing them as "quasi-state territories." Astana has continued to cite the UN Charter, state sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The latest appeal came as the war reached shipping routes close to Kazakhstan and disrupted the country's main oil export corridor. On July 25, Iran accused Ukraine of attacking an Iranian commercial vessel in the Caspian Sea. Tehran said an explosion killed one sailor and injured another, summoning Ukraine's chargé d'affaires and describing the strike as hostile and criminal. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said his forces had achieved "very strong results" with long-range strikes in the Caspian, and that targets included a Russian warship and vessels used for military cargo shipments involving Iran. Zelensky did not identify the vessels, and Iran did not name...

Black Sea Tanker Attacks

Kazakhstan Oil Output Falls 21% as CPC Halt More Than Halves Tengiz Production

Kazakhstan's oil and gas condensate output fell by about 21% on July 22 after the Caspian Pipeline Consortium stopped receiving Kazakh crude and suspended loadings at its Black Sea terminal. Output dropped to 1.63 million barrels per day from a July average of 2.07 million, Reuters said, citing an industry source. The sharpest reduction came at Tengiz, Kazakhstan's largest oilfield. Production fell by 56%, from an average 925,000 barrels per day in July to about 406,000 on Wednesday, reflecting how quickly a halt at Novorossiysk can force cuts at a field more than 1,500 kilometres away. Kazakhstan's Energy Ministry confirmed the reduction, stating that producers had cut output because CPC had restricted intake and their storage tanks were nearing capacity. "The adjustment was a technical measure intended to keep production operations stable," the ministry said. It added that CPC’s production facilities remained operational and could resume shipments when conditions allowed. Consultations were continuing with the consortium, producers, shipowners, and state agencies. No timetable was given. Tengiz Bears the Brunt Chevron began production from the $48 billion Future Growth Project in January 2025. The expansion was designed to add 260,000 barrels of crude per day and raise total Tengiz output to about one million barrels of oil equivalent per day at full capacity. Chevron owns 50% of Tengizchevroil, while ExxonMobil holds 25%, KazMunayGas 20%, and Lukoil 5%. The field provides a large share of Kazakhstan's oil production and export income. After the tanker ASIA was struck on July 19, Chevron told The Times of Central Asia that the crew was safe and the vessel was stable. "There has been no impact to TCO operations or exports," the company said. However, by July 22, the export halt had forced cuts at Tengiz. Chevron did not immediately comment on the new production figures cited by Reuters. The cut compounds a difficult year for the sector. Kazakhstan produced 45.7 million tonnes of oil in the first half of 2026, down 8.4% from a year earlier. The Energy Ministry still expects 98 million tonnes for the full year, after lowering its previous target because of Tengiz outages and earlier CPC disruption. Kazakhstan's OPEC+ crude quota rose to 1.608 million barrels per day for July. The national output figure includes gas condensate and cannot be compared directly with the crude allocation. The latest reduction removes barrels Kazakhstan intended to export. The timing adds to the revenue loss. Brent rose above $100 on July 23 after attacks on Saudi tankers in the Red Sea added to disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. Tanker Attacks Halt CPC Loadings The production cuts followed a series of attacks on tankers near CPC's marine terminal. The Chevron-chartered Yasa Polaris was hit on July 7 while empty and waiting offshore. Its crew was safe, and no pollution or major hull damage was reported. Nordic Zenith was struck on July 17 while empty and approaching the terminal. ASIA and NISSOS IOS were hit on July 19 while loading Kazakhstan-produced crude. Loading briefly resumed...

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

When the War Reaches Kazakh Oil

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine unleashed the war now expanding across the Black Sea, but it did not erase the distinction between Russian military logistics and the lawful commerce of other states. Kazakhstan is not a party to the war, yet its principal oil export route passes through an expanding maritime target zone. The attacks near the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal therefore raise a larger question: can civilian trade carrying Kazakh crude be treated as part of Russia’s war economy simply because geography places its outlet on the Russian coast? Four vessels were attacked near CPC’s Black Sea terminal on July 17, 19, and 20. Nordic Zenith, chartered by ExxonMobil according to Reuters, was empty and approaching the terminal when it was hit on July 17. Two days later, ASIA and NISSOS IOS were struck at single-point moorings off Novorossiysk while loading Kazakhstan-produced oil. ASIA was taking Tengizchevroil (TCO) crude; NISSOS IOS was loading oil from Kashagan B.V. and Maten. A fire on ASIA was extinguished; no one was injured, both vessels remained afloat, and no oil entered the sea. Chevron told The Times of Central Asia that the crew was safe, the vessel was stable, and there had been “no impact to TCO operations or exports.” Loading briefly resumed that evening, but on July 20 a drone struck NELSA while it was loading at SPM-1. The impact on the tanker’s starboard side caused a fire on deck and in several compartments. Its 22-member international crew was evacuated except for the captain and chief officer; the vessel remained afloat, the fire was extinguished, and no oil spill occurred. CPC suspended loadings again. Ukraine’s General Staff said separately that its forces had struck two tankers used to transport Russian oil, petroleum products, and fuel for the Russian military in the Black Sea. It did not identify the vessels or connect the claim to the attacks at the CPC terminal. Russia’s Foreign Ministry blamed Kyiv, while CPC itself did not publicly attribute the attacks. Astana’s response to the attacks has remained measured and legalistic. The Foreign Ministry called the attacks an infringement on Kazakhstan’s economic interests and a threat to lawful international trade. It said an agreed mechanism for sharing information on civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded, endangering crews. It reserved Kazakhstan’s right to seek compensation under international law. Following the strike on NELSA, the Energy Ministry said it remained in constant contact with CPC while the tanker’s technical condition and the consequences of the attack were assessed. The statements focused on Kazakhstan’s rights. That is the distinction Astana is asserting: Kazakh cargoes, revenues, crews, and commercial partners should not be treated as extensions of Russia’s war economy merely because they use a terminal on Russian territory. Kazakh Crude and the Western Stake Russia’s invasion created the maritime battlefield in which these incidents occurred, and Ukraine has a legitimate interest in weakening the military logistics that sustain Russia’s campaign. But Kazakhstan is not Russia,...

Energy Security

Kazakhstan’s Main Oil Route Remains Vulnerable. It Is Expanding Alternatives

Kazakhstan’s prosperity has been built largely on oil, much of which still reaches world markets through infrastructure crossing Russian territory. That would be a strategic exposure for any country; for a landlocked state bordering Russia during the largest war in Europe since 1945, it is impossible to ignore. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium route to the Black Sea remains Kazakhstan’s most important oil artery, carrying about 80% of its crude exports. Three tankers were struck near the terminal on July 17 and 19, two while loading Kazakh oil. Loadings briefly resumed before a fourth tanker, NELSA, was hit on July 20, forcing another suspension. No casualties or oil spill were reported, but the attacks repeatedly interrupted Kazakhstan’s main export route. Kazakhstan treated the attacks as a direct threat to its own economic interests, not as an incident confined to Russia. Its Foreign Ministry condemned the July 17 and 19 strikes as unacceptable, said an agreed mechanism for sharing information about civilian vessels entering the Black Sea to load CPC oil had been disregarded, and demanded an immediate halt. Ukraine’s General Staff said it had struck two tankers overnight on July 19 as part of its campaign against Russian oil and military-fuel logistics, but did not identify them. CPC said the vessels at its terminal were loading Kazakh crude. The episode exposed Kazakhstan’s dependence on infrastructure beyond its control. That exposure reflects geography and inherited infrastructure, not Kazakhstan’s foreign policy alignment. It is a serious strategic vulnerability that Astana is trying to reduce. Kazakhstan did not choose its geography, and its export system was not designed for the rupture that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is the world’s largest landlocked country, bordered by Russia and China, and sits on the Middle Corridor linking China and Central Asia with the South Caucasus and Europe. No government in Astana can alter those facts. The relevant question is how it has responded to them. Under President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan remains highly exposed to oil, but it is not an oil economy standing still. KAZENERGY’s 2023 National Energy Report put the hydrocarbon sector at about 23% of GDP in 2019 and about 20% in 2022. Kazakhstan’s Bureau of National Statistics put the oil and gas sector at 16.3% of GDP in 2024. The series are not directly comparable, but both indicate that hydrocarbons remain central even as non-oil sectors expand. Oil dependence has not disappeared. UNCTAD notes that oil exports still account for more than half of total exports and remain central to foreign exchange earnings and public finances. Kazakhstan has made more progress in reducing oil’s share of GDP than its weight in exports and state revenue. Any serious assessment has to account for both. Kazakhstan’s position on Ukraine also needs to be judged in context. Binary judgments obscure the constraints facing a country that shares a long border, trade channels, energy infrastructure and significant security exposure with Russia. Kazakhstan has not recognized Russia’s attempted annexations. In 2022, its Foreign Ministry said it would...

Podcast

Pannier and Hillard’s Spotlight on Central Asia: New Episode Out Now

As Managing Editor of The Times of Central Asia, I’m delighted that, in partnership with the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, from October 19, we are the home of the Spotlight on Central Asia podcast. Chaired by seasoned broadcasters Bruce Pannier of RFE/RL’s long-running Majlis podcast and Michael Hillard of The Red Line, each fortnightly instalment will take you on a deep dive into the latest news, developments, security issues, and social trends across an increasingly pivotal region. This week, the team covers a heatwave sweeping across Central Asia, anti-Taliban forces briefly seizing a district headquarters in a worrying sign of cracks in the Taliban's control, a shootout between different branches of Kyrgyzstan's security forces near the Uzbek border, promising new talks between Turkmenistan and Georgia, and a major shake-up inside Uzbekistan's presidential security services. Before then turning to our main story this week, where a growing number of countries are working with Central Asian governments to forcibly return Central Asian nationals, often into incredibly dangerous situations. - Steve Swedlow (Associate Professor of the Practice of Human Rights) - Bakhtiyor "Bakh" Safarov (Central Asia Consulting)