• KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%
  • KGS/USD = 0.01146 0%
  • KZT/USD = 0.00193 -0%
  • TJS/USD = 0.10153 0%
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008 -0%
  • TMT/USD = 0.28571 0%

Viewing results 49 - 54 of 232

Strategic Cooperation Between Turkey and Turkmenistan Gains Momentum

Turkey and Turkmenistan have accelerated their cooperation in recent years, advancing economic, energy, and diplomatic initiatives that underscore their shared cultural and strategic interests. Their deepening of bilateral ties reflects and expresses both broader regional dynamics and shifts in global energy geopolitics. As The Times of Central Asia reports, the two countries signed a natural gas supply agreement in February 2025 that reinforces Turkey’s ambitions as a regional energy hub while providing Turkmenistan with a new export avenue. Turkmenistan will begin supplying 1.3 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) of natural gas to Turkey on March 1 through a swap agreement. Turkmenistan will send gas to Iran for consumption in the northeast of the country, in return for which Iran will transfer an equivalent amount to Turkey. Various press commentaries and diplomatic declarations touting the “export of Turkmen gas to Turkey” are therefore to be regarded skeptically as political grandstanding, even if such an assessment may be supported from a technical standpoint of how the industry calculates flows. Trade and investment relations between Turkey and Turkmenistan have recently seen steady growth, underpinned by Turkish business engagement in Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and construction sectors. Over 600 Turkish companies are active in Turkmenistan, and Turkish direct investment has surpassed $500 million. Turkish contractors have executed projects worth over $50 billion in Turkmenistan since its independence. In this context, the eighth meeting of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation took place in Ankara on February 25. Following the meeting, a large-scale protocol was signed, including 87 points and covering cooperation over a wide range of issues - areas such as trade and investment, energy, transport and logistics, scientific cooperation, agriculture, and healthcare. The bilateral trade turnover between the two countries reached $2.2 billion in 2024, and Turkey aims to more than double this level to $5 billion. However, reaching that target hinges on further liberalization of Turkmenistan’s economic policies and the expansion of investment-friendly regulations, both of which could be challenging. The two sides also discussed how to integrate Turkmenistan into the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR, “Middle Corridor”) as well as possible cooperation in the field of transport and logistics toward that end. Ankara has successfully positioned itself as a strategic economic partner, but Ashgabat’s tightly controlled economy presents structural barriers that may slow the desired growth. Ankara’s engagement with Ashgabat thus reflects its broader efforts to enhance connectivity across Central Asia. Turkey’s push to integrate Turkmenistan into the TITR aligns with its own ambition to position itself as a logistical bridge between Asia and Europe, complementing its Middle Corridor strategy, which seeks to create an alternative trade route bypassing Russia. However, Turkmenistan’s rigid economic model and cautious foreign policy limit the pace of integration. Practical challenges include regulatory misalignment, infrastructure bottlenecks, and geopolitical sensitivities. Turkey’s Vice-President, Cevdet Yilmaz, affirmed his country’s intention that Turkmen gas and electricity should reach European markets through Turkey. Turkish state-owned companies such as TPAO and BOTAŞ will also seek to develop hydrocarbon fields in Turkmenistan and...

Turkey Proposes Turkmenistan Join the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries

Turkey has proposed that Turkmenistan join the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries (TURKPA). The initiative was put forward by Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş during a meeting with a Turkmen parliamentary delegation in Ankara. During the talks, both sides discussed inter-parliamentary cooperation and ways to strengthen bilateral ties. One of the key topics was Turkmenistan’s initiative to declare 2025 the International Year of Peace and Trust, which was previously approved by the United Nations General Assembly. The Turkmen delegation expressed gratitude to Turkey for its support of this initiative. Following the discussions, the delegations held a press conference, where they emphasized the importance of their accumulated experience in cooperation and the potential for deepening diplomatic relations. As part of their visit, the Turkmen delegation toured several historical sites in Ankara. The cultural program included visits to Turkey’s first parliament building and museum, the Ankara Fortress, and the Hamamönü district. They also participated in a flower-laying ceremony at Anıtkabir, the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first President of Turkey. TURKPA is a parliamentary organization that aims to strengthen inter-parliamentary ties among Turkic-speaking states. Its objectives include harmonizing political positions, facilitating the exchange of information and experience, and implementing joint projects in politics, economics, and culture. Turkmenistan has so far remained outside of TURKPA, but its potential membership could further strengthen cooperation among Turkic-speaking nations.

Eduards Stiprais Appointed New EU Special Representative for Central Asia

The Council of the European Union has appointed Eduards Stiprais as the new EU Special Representative for Central Asia. Stiprais will assume his duties on March 1, 2025, with an initial two-year mandate, succeeding Terhi Hakala. According to the European Council, Stiprais will be responsible for promoting EU-Central Asia relations based on shared values, strengthening regional stability and cooperation, and supporting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, and human rights. A seasoned Latvian diplomat, Stiprais previously served as Latvia’s Permanent Representative to the EU and as Deputy State Secretary - Political Director at the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From 2016 to 2020, he was Head of the EU Delegation to Uzbekistan and has also served as Latvia’s ambassador to the United Kingdom and France. The European Council recently announced that the first-ever EU-Central Asia summit will be held in Uzbekistan on April 3-4. The summit will be attended by European Council President António Costa, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. As EU-Central Asia relations gain strategic significance, the upcoming summit presents a key opportunity for the EU to deepen its engagement in the region. The European Council stated that discussions will focus on enhancing cooperation in transport and digital connectivity, critical raw materials, economic and security collaboration, and energy transition. The EU adopted a new Strategy on Central Asia in 2019. The EU remains Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner and the leading investor, accounting for over 40% of foreign investment in the region.

High Methane Emissions May Hinder Turkmenistan’s Gas Exports to Europe

High methane emissions could pose a significant obstacle to Turkmenistan’s entry into the European gas market, according to an updated report by the U.S. Department of Energy, published on February 6. The main findings of the study were summarized by Eurasia Review on February 19. The report, which examines oil and gas production in the Caspian region, notes that four countries, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, account for 3% of global energy production. Turkmenistan’s Gas Reserves and Export Ambitions According to the report, Turkmenistan ranks fifth worldwide in natural gas reserves, estimated at 400 trillion cubic feet in 2025. In 2023, the country set a record by producing 3.0 trillion cubic feet of dry natural gas, the highest level since official statistics began in 1992. Currently, Turkmenistan’s primary gas exports are directed to China, but Ashgabat is seeking to expand its market reach, including potential supply routes through Afghanistan. However, the U.S. Department of Energy warns that excessive methane emissions from Turkmenistan’s fields could complicate access to the European market via the Trans-Caspian pipeline. In terms of oil reserves, Turkmenistan holds a relatively modest 600 million barrels, with an average daily production of 275,000 barrels in 2024. Diversification Efforts and New Export Deals Meanwhile, Turkmenistan is taking steps to diversify its export destinations. Gas supplies to Turkey are set to begin on March 1. During a phone call on February 10, Chairman of the Halk Maslahaty Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov informed Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian that an agreement had been reached to transit gas through Iran under a swap supply arrangement with Turkish energy company BOTAŞ. Efforts to Reduce Methane Emissions Turkmenistan has also been actively engaging in international initiatives to curb methane emissions. On December 1, 2023, the country joined the Global Methane Pledge (GMP), an initiative aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In November 2024, Bloomberg reported that the state-owned Turkmengaz plans to hire specialists to measure methane emissions more accurately and is preparing a tender for emission monitoring. That same month, the U.S. Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) released satellite data showing that methane leakage from oil and gas fields in Turkmenistan, the U.S., and Venezuela is significantly higher than official ground-based measurements suggest.

Right Place, Right Time: Central Asia Basks in Russia’s Eastern Energy Pivot

On January 1, with the closure of pipelines through Ukraine, deliveries of Russian gas to Europe came to a virtual standstill. Prices across the continent have ratcheted up in the first six weeks of 2025 and have now hit two-year highs. In Central Asia, the effects of the Russo-European decoupling have also been profound. In 2024, Kyrgyzstan posted a 48% year-on-year increase in Russian gas imports, while Uzbekistan’s inbound gas purchases soared over 142% to $1.68 billion. But while Gazprom’s reorientation has been a boon to Central Asia’s economies, this phenomenon appears to be more than short-term supply dumping due to the war in Ukraine. Rather, it is part of a lasting trend that could define the region’s, and the world’s, energy map. Russia’s Supply Glut In 2018, Russia exported a record 201 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas to Europe. The closure of the Yamal and Nord Stream pipelines had already brought these supplies down to 49.5 bcm by 2024 and will be further impacted by the cut in supplies via Ukraine. Despite some gas supplied via Turkstream and a steady trade in liquefied natural gas (LNG), Russian gas supplied to Europe is a fraction of what it once was. The Central Asian market offers both short and long-term solutions to this. “Most likely, Gazprom views its expansion into Central Asia as a partial and immediate solution to the challenge of finding new markets for its gas,” said Shaimerden Chikanayev, a partner at GRATA International, a law firm. “While the region cannot fully replace the volumes or profit margins previously achieved in Europe, it offers a readily accessible and stable outlet for Russian gas exports.” Central Asia is accessible due to old Soviet pipelines that link the region to Moscow. These pipelines, known as Central Asia–Center, were originally built to take gas from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Russia. This system has now been engineered to run in reverse. The pipeline has a capacity of around 50 bcm per year, but there are ongoing efforts to increase it. Still, this is only a quarter of what was once supplied to Europe, nor are the revenues as lucrative. In 2023, the average rate charged by Gazprom to Uzbekistan for gas was $160 per thousand cubic meters (tcm), this compares to European prices that fluctuated between $200-400tcm throughout the 2010s. For Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia sector at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, the price is not a major factor. “Russia of course sells gas to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan lower than the market price. This is a politically motivated decision. And this is not just because it is struggling with [selling to] Eastern Europe. Russia could sell it to Central Asia at market prices, but this is the Russian approach towards its allies in the region,” he said. Central Asian Serendipity For Central Asian states, these new supplies have come at a good time. Countries such as Kyrgyzstan are trying hard to...

Turkey’s Turkic Gambit: Balancing Influence in Post-Soviet States

Despite its superpower ambitions, which have diminished somewhat since February 24, 2022, Moscow views Turkey’s growing geopolitical influence with increasing concern. The Organization of Turkic States (OTS), which includes several Central Asian republics, is perceived by the Kremlin as a rival to its regional blocs, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). However, for Central Asian nations, the OTS is not a political or military alliance but rather a framework for economic, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation. The extent of Turkey’s influence remains limited within these parameters.   A Historical Perspective Russia continues to interpret geopolitical dynamics through the lens of century-old concepts, particularly Pan-Slavism and Pan-Turkism, both of which emerged as nationalist movements against the Russian and Ottoman empires. Pan-Turkism gained traction in the Ottoman Empire but lost momentum following its adoption and subsequent rejection by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The ideology was later revived during the Cold War, when Turkey’s NATO membership positioned it as a force for destabilizing Soviet Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Turkic regions within Russia, such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. Despite Turkish efforts, Pan-Turkic sentiment found limited success, influencing only Azerbaijan, which aligned closely with Turkey after losing the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Azerbaijan formalized this relationship in the early 1990s with the doctrine of “Two Countries, One Nation.” Baku only began to see concrete benefits from its alliance with Ankara after winning the Second Karabakh War in 2020. The Organization of Turkic States: Reality vs. Rhetoric Although the first summit of Turkic states was held in 1992, the OTS’s precursor, the Turkic Council, was only founded in 2009. The agreement, signed in Nakhchivan, Azerbaijan, initially included Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan expressed interest in joining in 2018, and officially became a member in 2019, whilst Hungary (2018), Turkmenistan (2021), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (2022), and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) (2023) hold observer state status. Turkmenistan has frequently been rumored to be considering full membership. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations in Central Asia have often clashed with the ambitions of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan delayed its membership in the Turkic Council until 2019 due to strained relations with Ankara which dated back to the mid-1990s. Turkey, the first country to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics, expected to leverage its Cold War victory over the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region. While Kazakhstan initially welcomed Turkish economic expansion and Pan-Turkic rhetoric, it became increasingly skeptical in the 2000s. Uzbekistan, however, was cautious from the outset and largely resisted Turkish influence. Kazakhstan’s shift in perspective coincided with Ankara’s increased push for deeper Turkic integration. Turkish-backed initiatives in Kazakhstan revealed clear expectations that Ankara would lead such a union, prompting Astana to resist. Kazakhstan, which balances ties with the West, China, and Russia, rejected the notion of falling under Turkish leadership. The Kazakh government neutralized Pan-Turkic voices by integrating key advocates into political positions, redirecting their efforts toward promoting Kazakh nationalism instead. Turkey’s Role in the...