Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Iran

How an Incident on the Azerbaijan-Iran Border Became a Test for Diplomacy in the Region

The drone strike on Azerbaijan's Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic on March 5 has become one of the most serious incidents in relations between Baku and Tehran in recent years. Azerbaijani authorities described the incident as a terrorist act and demanded explanations and an apology from Iran. Tehran, in turn, rejected the accusations, suggesting the possibility of a provocation by “third forces.” Following the drone incident, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held a phone call with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss regional security. According to the Azerbaijani presidency, Aliyev thanked Tokayev for condemning the attack on Nakhchivan and for voicing support for Azerbaijan. What began as a local security incident has raised concerns about regional stability in the South Caucasus. Terrorist Act Against the State Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev issued a statement strongly condemning "this despicable terrorist act. Those who committed it must be brought to justice immediately,” Aliyev said. According to Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one drone hit the terminal building of Nakhchivan International Airport, while another crashed near a school in the village of Shekerabad. Two civilians were reportedly injured. Baku stressed that the attack, allegedly launched from Iranian territory, violated international law and could lead to a dangerous escalation of tensions in the region. Diplomatic Escalation Despite the harsh rhetoric in the first hours after the incident, Baku opted to rely primarily on diplomatic tools. The Iranian ambassador was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry and handed a formal note of protest requesting official explanations. Azerbaijan said on Friday that it was evacuating staff from its embassy in Tehran as well as its consulate in the city of Tabriz. At the same time, Azerbaijani security forces were placed on high alert. According to Aliyev, the country’s armed forces were instructed to prepare possible countermeasures. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke by phone with Aliyev, condemning the attack and expressing support for Azerbaijan, according to official statements. Reports of alleged Iranian-linked sabotage plots also surfaced, with the Azerbaijani authorities stating that several terrorist attacks had been prevented on the country’s territory. According to the State Security Service, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps was behind the plots. Among the alleged targets was the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, a strategic energy corridor linking the Caspian region with Turkey and one of the main routes for exporting Azerbaijani oil. According to Azerbaijani sources, other potential targets included the Israeli embassy, a synagogue in the capital, and a leader of the local Mountain Jewish community. The security service reported that three explosive devices had been brought into the country but were discovered and defused before they could be delivered. The development of the crisis has prompted increased diplomatic contact between world leaders. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian amid the growing regional tensions. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s Foreign Ministry called on both sides to exercise restraint and emphasized the need for a thorough investigation into the drone strike. On March 7, the foreign ministers of all the Central...

Iran

OTS Faces Security Test from Turkey to Central Asia

Iran's widening war has now reached the institutional space linking Turkey, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Turkey said on March 4 that NATO air defenses destroyed an Iranian ballistic missile entering Turkish airspace, while Azerbaijan said the next day that four Iranian drones crossed into Nakhchivan, injuring four people, and damaging civilian infrastructure at the exclave’s airport. Iran denied targeting Nakhchivan; in the Turkish case, the missile’s intended target has not been fully clear in public reporting. Even so, the combined effect was unmistakable. By March 7, the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) had become more than a bystander to a Middle Eastern war that had earlier seemed outside its main agenda. This is what gave the OTS foreign ministers’ meeting in Istanbul its significance. The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced on March 6 that the informal meeting of the OTS Council of Foreign Ministers would be held in Istanbul on March 7, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan hosting. After the meeting, the ministers adopted a joint statement declaring that threats to the security of any OTS member are a matter of concern for the whole organization. That language does not make the OTS a military alliance. It does, however, show the organization moving more openly into collective political-security signaling when member states come under attack. Why Nakhchivan Matters Nakhchivan is central to the logic of this story. The exclave is an integral part of Azerbaijan, but is separated from the rest of the country. It borders Armenia, Iran, and Turkey, making it significant out of proportion to its size. A military strike there is not a routine border incident. It reaches one of the most sensitive nodes in the wider Turkic political space: it is a meeting point for Azerbaijani sovereignty, Turkish strategic concern, and Iranian proximity. Until recently, Nakhchivan’s special status and borders were anchored in the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties, which gave Turkey and Soviet Russia a formal say over the exclave’s autonomy and, it could be argued, its external security. But last year, Baku folded Nakhchivan more tightly into Azerbaijan’s domestic legal order by removing those references (along with other changes) from the constitution of the exclave, which has suddenly become a target in a much wider regional confrontation. Baku’s response to the Iranian attack showed that it saw the incident in political as well as tactical terms. President Ilham Aliyev said Azerbaijan would prepare retaliatory measures. Reuters later reported that Azerbaijan had ordered the evacuation of its diplomats from Iran, citing safety concerns. This is understandable, particularly in light of the January 27, 2023, incident when an armed attacker entered Azerbaijan’s embassy in Tehran and opened fire, killing the head of the embassy’s security and wounding two other staff. Baku called this a terrorist attack, evacuated most of its diplomatic personnel, and suspended embassy operations. Azerbaijani officials also said the March 5 attack on Nakhchivan violated international law, rejecting any implication that it could have been a technical mishap. The stakes widened further after...

Iran

Iran War Highlights Central Asia’s Vulnerable Southern Trade Corridors

The widening war centered on Iran is reverberating far beyond the Middle East, exposing a structural vulnerability in Central Asia’s economic geography: the region’s reliance on transport corridors that pass through or near Iran and the Persian Gulf. As fighting escalates and shipping risks spread across the region, insurers, shipping companies, and logistics firms are reassessing operations across the Gulf. War-risk insurance premiums have surged while some commercial carriers have scaled back bookings to parts of the region amid growing security concerns. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz have already pushed shipping costs higher as governments and logistics firms weigh the risks of operating in one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. For Central Asia’s landlocked economies, the crisis highlights how much regional connectivity strategies still depend on southern access routes linking the region to global markets. The conflict has also edged closer to the transport routes linking Central Asia with Europe after what were alleged to be Iranian drone strikes on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan region, damaging facilities at the exclave’s airport and prompting diplomatic protests from Baku. While the strike did not directly disrupt trade corridors, it underscored how quickly the conflict could spill over into the South Caucasus, a key segment of the Middle Corridor. Nakhchivan is a landlocked Azerbaijani exclave bordering Iran and Turkey, separated from mainland Azerbaijan by Armenia, and lies at the frontier where Iranian territory meets the transport networks of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus also hosts energy infrastructure with wider geopolitical significance. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline transports mostly Azerbaijani crude through Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, from where it is shipped to global markets. In 2025, Azerbaijani oil accounted for 46.4% of Israel’s crude imports, most of it moving through this supply chain before being shipped onward by tanker. The pipeline also carries limited volumes of Kazakh crude - 2-3% of Kazakhstan’s overall exports - making it far more significant for Israel’s energy supply than for Kazakhstan’s export system. Iran’s armed forces have denied responsibility for the drone incident, instead accusing Israel of attempting to provoke tensions and disrupt relations between Muslim countries. The Geography of Connectivity Since independence, Central Asian governments have sought to overcome the constraints of geography. Landlocked and long dependent on Soviet-era transport networks running north through Russia, the region has spent three decades developing alternative corridors in multiple directions. Routes leading south have held particular appeal, offering the shortest overland access to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Iran sits at the heart of several connectivity initiatives designed to connect Central Asian rail networks to ports on the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The Ashgabat Agreement — a multimodal transport framework linking Iran, Oman, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and designed to connect Central Asia with ports on the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — was created specifically to facilitate international trade and transit between Central Asia and global shipping routes. For countries such as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, rail routes...

Iran

Evacuation Through Turkmenistan: Dozens of Foreigners Leave Iran as Assistance Conditions Vary

Amid the ongoing military conflict involving Iran, foreign nationals have begun leaving the country by land. One of the main evacuation routes has been through neighboring Turkmenistan, although the conditions for departure and the level of assistance provided to citizens of different countries have varied. Foreign citizens began leaving Iran after strikes were launched on its territory. With Iranian airspace closed, evacuation has only been possible by land. According to diplomatic sources in Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and South Korea, about 60 foreign nationals have already left Iran via Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Transport, Nurlan Sauranbayev, said that on March 2, 18 Kazakh citizens were successfully evacuated from the northern Iranian city of Gorgan. The closest available route was through the Turkmen border. According to the minister, Turkmen authorities granted permission for the group to cross the border, although the specific checkpoint used was not disclosed. Serakhs remains the main transit crossing in this direction, while other checkpoints remained closed until March 2. On the same day, a group of eight Russian citizens crossed the border through the Serakhs checkpoint. According to Igor Samoshkin, head of the consular department of the Russian Embassy, Turkmen officials met the arrivals at the border and arranged transportation to Ashgabat as well as hotel accommodation. Russian diplomats later assisted the group with further travel arrangements. On March 3, the group flew home on an S7 Airlines flight. On March 3, 13 citizens of Uzbekistan crossed the border in an organized manner through the same Serakhs checkpoint. According to the Dunyo news agency, they were met by Uzbek embassy staff in official vehicles. After the Gaudan-Bajgiran crossing opened, diplomats also began meeting their citizens there. However, the subsequent route taken by the Uzbek nationals was not specified. There are currently no direct flights between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the distance from Serakhs to the nearest land crossing between the two countries, Farab-Alat, is about 460 kilometers. On the same day, a group of 23 South Korean citizens entered Turkmenistan. According to The Korea Times, they were accompanied by South Korean diplomats throughout their transit in the country before departing from Ashgabat on individual flights. Representatives of the South Korean embassy noted the prompt response of Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as assistance with immigration procedures, consular support, accommodation, and flight reservations. Foreign citizens require a visa to transit through Turkmenistan, and this requirement has not been completely waived even during the evacuation. As Russian diplomat Igor Samoshkin explained, those seeking to leave Iran through Turkmenistan must first contact their country’s embassy in Iran and submit documents for a visa. The diplomatic mission then sends a request to the Turkmen authorities, after which further coordination takes place between Ashgabat and the relevant embassies accredited in Turkmenistan. Turkmen authorities directly accompanied only the Russian citizens. For other foreign nationals, their respective diplomatic missions were responsible for organizing further travel arrangements. The reasons for the differences in the level of assistance have not been publicly explained. It...

CA5+UK

Central Asia and Britain Launch CA5+UK Ministerial Track

On February 26, 2026, the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan met in London with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper at Lancaster House for the inaugural “Central Asia–UK” (CA5+UK) ministerial. Official statements described it as the first time since independence that all five Central Asian foreign ministers have met jointly with a UK foreign secretary in a single forum. They also presented the meeting as the start of a structured ministerial channel, intended to convene regularly, that can carry regional priorities while leaving bilateral agendas in place. The United Kingdom is framing the new CA5+UK channel as a replacement for scattered bilateral visits: a single ministerial venue can set shared priorities and route them into investment and services work. For the five Central Asian states, it adds another external track, widening options without forcing institutional choices. Public statements point to a practical agenda focused on trade and investment, transport connectivity, energy transition, and critical minerals, with security present chiefly as background context. The enabling layer of finance, standards, education, and professional services is also included. How the London Program Unrolled On February 25, meetings took place at the British Parliament as part of the London schedule. The five ministers met with House of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle and held a session with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Central Asia, chaired by Pam Cox. The meetings in Parliament complemented the ministerial session at Lancaster House by widening contact beyond foreign ministries. The discussion emphasized committee-to-committee contacts, visits, and exchange of legislative practice as a complement to intergovernmental diplomacy. Parliamentary relationships and staff channels can carry attention between ministerial sessions, assisting with follow-up after cooperative contacts have been publicly established. They represent a second continuity layer: implementation often turns on routine access and working familiarity rather than on formal statements alone. Between the parliamentary program and the ministerial delegations, they also met with the United Kingdom business community at a reception in London. This was a practical companion to the new format, aiming at the conversion of diplomatic intent into projects that can be financed and executed. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Yermek Kosherbayev cogently highlighted the Astana International Financial Centre (AIFC), which operates under English common law with an independent court and arbitration system and British judges in the AIFC Court. Beyond the plenary session, a ministerial working lunch provided a venue to follow up on such initiatives. Early deliverables were not multilateral but bilateral. Kazakhstan and the United Kingdom signed a strategic roadmap on critical minerals through 2027 and paired it with education moves, including a licensed Coventry University campus in Almaty and plans involving British secondary and higher education institutions. Uzbekistan reported a Memorandum of Understanding on healthcare services that it presented as a platform for building pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity, alongside separate discussions with investment and finance counterparts in London. Turkmenistan cited a 2026–2027 cooperation program between foreign ministries, and Tajikistan continued to emphasize investment and cooperation in science and education. CA5+UK Launches with Bilateral Packages...

Iran

Middle East Conflict Tests Central Asia’s Trade Routes and Energy Security

The escalating conflict between Iran, the United States, and their regional partners is raising economic concerns across Central Asia. Turkmenistan shares a long border with Iran, while other Central Asian economies depend on energy markets and trade routes that pass through or around the Persian Gulf. A wider conflict there could ripple across Central Asia through higher fuel prices, disrupted logistics, and pressure on key transport corridors. For countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the most immediate risk is rising fuel prices. Both depend heavily on imported fuel. Kyrgyz security expert Taalaibek Jumadylov has warned that Kyrgyzstan could face rising prices for food, clothing, and other essential goods. For Tajikistan, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would significantly increase import costs. Tajik media reports that trade between Tajikistan and Iran has grown rapidly over the past five years. Tajik-Iranian trade turnover increased from $377.7 million in 2024 to approximately $484 million in 2025, a rise of around 28%. Tajikistan’s exports totaled about $113 million, while imports from Iran exceeded $371 million, giving Iran a 4.5% share of Tajikistan’s total foreign trade turnover. If global oil prices rise significantly, Tajikistan could also face additional pressure on its budget. There are indirect risks as well: a slowdown in the economies of Russia, China, or other major partners could affect Tajikistan through trade, investment flows, and remittances. In Uzbekistan, analysts note that in recent years Iran has actively pursued transport diplomacy with Central Asia, seeking to strengthen its position as a regional logistics hub. Uzbek analyst Nargiza Umarova says this trend aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Iran and China signed a 25-year cooperation agreement in March 2021, a deal widely described as deepening Iran’s role in Belt and Road-linked connectivity. Kazakh economist Almas Chukin highlighted the logistical advantages of transport routes through Iran. “If we take the point where the Turkmenistan railway connects with Iran and the route to the Persian Gulf, it is about 1,200-1,500 kilometers. This is comparable to the distance from Astana to Almaty. Once you cover this distance, you reach the Persian Gulf and its major ports, where you can handle anything from oil transshipment to grain shipments. From there, sea transport to Rotterdam takes about three to four weeks,” he stated. Chukin added that such routes could simplify exports compared with transporting oil through Russia to Novorossiysk and then via the Black Sea, the Bosphorus Strait, and the Mediterranean. According to his estimates, a rail route to Europe through Iran would be about 3,500 kilometers from the Turkmen border. The economist suggested that if Iran’s political system changes and sanctions are lifted, Central Asia could benefit significantly. “This would be a huge shift for Central Asia: a region with a population of 80 million, abundant resources, and a young workforce, but constrained by geography, suddenly gaining direct access to global markets,” Chukin argued. Some analysts also point to emerging competition among regional transport corridors. In the South Caucasus, a proposed Zangezur corridor has been promoted...