Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Economic Diplomacy

Expanding U.S.–Turkmenistan Ties: Envoy and Business Group Visit Ashgabat

Turkmenistan and the United States are working to deepen their economic and diplomatic relationship, with a top American diplomat and a U.S. business delegation visiting Ashgabat this week. The U.S.-Turkmenistan Business Council had announced a semiannual business mission to Ashgabat on November 4–5, a trip that comes amid a wider effort by the United States and Central Asian countries to expand trade and investment ties with each other. The council is a Washington, D.C.-based nonprofit group led by Eric Stewart, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary for Europe/Eurasia at the Department of Commerce who has founded more than a dozen similar groups focusing on other countries and regions. The trip, which was coordinated with the U.S. government, followed a visit to Ashgabat this week by S. Paul Kapur, U.S. assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs. On November 3, Kapur and Turkmenistan's Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov talked about “expanding business ties and identifying new opportunities” for partnership, according to Turkmenistan’s embassy in the U.S. U.S. support for the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline was also discussed, the embassy said. That support was also noted in a Turkmen state media report on Kapur’s meeting with Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, the former president who still has a powerful leadership role in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan recently said there was progress in laying the pipeline in Afghanistan’s Herat province, though the overall TAPI project has faced years of delays and challenges in its implementation. While U.S.-Turkmen trade and investment are relatively small, Turkmenistan’s strategic location on Caspian Sea trade routes and the fact that it has some of the largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world make it a potentially important partner for the U.S. Turkmenistan mainly exports energy to China but is aiming to diversify export options, including through projects such as TAPI and the planned Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline.

U.S.-Central Asia Engagement

U.S. Midterms Hand Democrats a Central Asia Agenda They Helped Build

Democrats have won control of Congress in the November 3 midterms, ending President Donald Trump’s Republican majority. But they inherit a Central Asia agenda their party helped build, backed by substantial orders for American manufacturers. Uzbekistan Airways’ new Boeing deliveries are due to begin in 2031, while Kazakhstan’s $4.2 billion Wabtec agreement covers a decade. For American businesses, the region’s importance is already measured in export orders that outlast a congressional majority. American Jobs Behind the Diplomacy Kazakhstan signed its Wabtec agreement in September 2025. The U.S. Commerce Department said the Pennsylvania-based manufacturer would supply 300 heavy-haul locomotive kits over the next decade. It estimated that the deal would support more than 11,000 American jobs. Uzbekistan Airways initially ordered 14 Boeing 787-9 Dreamliners, with options for eight more. The Commerce Department valued that package at approximately $8.5 billion. The airline subsequently exercised the options, bringing its firm order to 22 aircraft. Those purchases give Astana and Tashkent a direct argument in Washington: engaging with them brings business to American factories. The relationship also gives U.S. manufacturers a reason to support continued engagement, whichever party controls congressional committees. From Biden to Trump The minerals agenda has already survived a change of president. The Biden administration signed a critical minerals cooperation memorandum with Uzbekistan in September 2024, aimed at diversifying global supplies. Under Trump, critical minerals and digital infrastructure remained on the agenda at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. The United States and the five Central Asian republics also backed increased trade through the Trans-Caspian route and closer links between their business communities. Congressional support crosses the same party divide. In October, Democratic Senator Chris Coons and Republican Senator Tim Sheehy introduced legislation to strengthen critical mineral supply chains through mining and processing partnerships with U.S. allies. A bipartisan artificial intelligence (AI) bill, reintroduced in February, similarly aims to strengthen American research and testing capacity. Kazakhstan’s June 2026 agreements with Firebird, a U.S. technology company, cover proposed AI infrastructure and advanced computing capacity. Central Asia offers customers for American technology as well as potential sources of strategic minerals. Both fit priorities Democrats have backed alongside Republicans. The incoming majority has reasons of its own to maintain that engagement. Congress’s Unfinished Business The Democratic majority will take office in January 2027, gaining control of committees and greater influence over legislation and oversight. Central Asian governments will also lose two established advocates. Republican Steve Daines and Democrat Gary Peters, who founded the Senate Central Asia Caucus in 2024, are both retiring that month. Their successors will inherit an unfinished trade agenda. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain subject to the Cold War-era Jackson-Vanik Amendment, despite years of calls to remove its trade restrictions. Republican and Democratic lawmakers introduced repeal legislation in November 2025. While American manufacturers are booking Central Asian business into the 2030s, Congress is still debating whether to lift trade restrictions dating from 1974. At a September 2026 House hearing, lawmakers from both parties heard arguments for removing the restrictions. The discussion...

Trade Routes

Iranian Foreign Minister to Visit Turkmenistan, Seeking Closer Ties

Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi is leading a diplomatic and economic delegation on a visit to Turkmenistan this week, according to Iranian state media. Araghchi will travel to Ashgabat on Monday for talks with Turkmen officials on “areas of mutual interest,” reported the Islamic Republic News Agency, or IRNA. The report didn’t specify the areas, but Iran has been working to develop its relationships in Central Asia as it faces pressure because of conflict in the Middle East, Western sanctions, and disruption to its trade routes. On October 26, Araghchi and Turkmen counterpart Rashid Meredov spoke by phone about “continuing diplomatic consultations and political efforts to de-escalate tensions and establish lasting stability and security in the region,” Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Turkmenistan has a policy of permanent neutrality under which it commits to staying out of military alliances, promoting peaceful relations and not getting involved in other countries’ affairs. In July, it issued an unusually sharp statement after an attack on an Iranian vessel in the Caspian Sea that the Iranian government blamed on Ukraine. The Turkmen government described the attack as unacceptable. The Caspian Sea is critical to Turkmenistan’s efforts to expand its role as a transit point on the Middle Corridor, a trade network linking China and Central Asia to Europe via rail and maritime links. The country’s main port is Turkmenbashi. Iran has a long border with Turkmenistan and is also a Caspian Sea littoral state, with its northern port of Amirabad. The sea is an alternative route for some of Iran’s regional trade, including with Russia to the north. Iran also offers Central Asia a southern route for goods to reach the Persian Gulf and beyond, though that route has been disrupted by blockades, restrictions and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. In another area of collaboration, Iran imports electricity from Turkmenistan to offset shortages in northern Iranian provinces, and the two countries recently discussed expanding and extending the arrangement. They have also worked together on energy swap deals under which Iran would provide natural gas to other countries, including Azerbaijan and Iraq, and receive similar amounts of gas from Turkmenistan in return.

Organization of Turkic States (OTS)

Tokayev Proposes Russian Role in OTS as Aliyev Skips Ankara Summit

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has proposed inviting Russia to cooperate with the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) or granting it observer status. He made the proposal on October 30 at the summit in Ankara, where Türkiye assumed the organization's rotating chairmanship from Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev did not attend, despite a personal invitation from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The participants adopted the Ankara Declaration and appointed Uzbekistan's Mirvokhid Azimov as the new OTS secretary-general. Azerbaijan was represented by Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov. Has Russia Expressed Interest in the OTS? Tokayev proposed two options for Russia's participation: cooperation through the "OTS+" format or observer status. "To enhance the standing of our Organization, it would be a right and fair decision to respond positively to Russia's intention and invite it to join this format or participate in OTS activities as an observer," the Kazakh president said. Tokayev referred to Moscow's intentions, although Russia itself has made no public announcement of plans to participate in the OTS. The Kazakh president justified the initiative by citing Russia's historical ties with Turkic peoples, its Turkic-speaking population, and the "Altai – Cradle of Turkic Civilization" project. The OTS comprises Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan participates as an observer. Russia is not a member, but its population includes Tatars, Bashkirs, Yakuts, and other Turkic peoples. The proposed arrangements differ. OTS+ provides a framework for cooperation with external partners, while observer status allows more regular participation in the organization's activities without the decision-making rights of full members. In the same speech, Tokayev stressed once again that the OTS should not become a military alliance. Among its members, Türkiye belongs to NATO, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Uzbekistan maintains a policy of nonparticipation in military blocs. Aliyev's Absence: Scheduling Conflict or Political Signal? Erdoğan had invited Aliyev to the summit during a telephone conversation on October 21. The Azerbaijani president, however, remained in Baku. Citing sources, an Azerbaijani news agency report attributed his absence to a previously scheduled appearance at an awards ceremony for finalists in an international FIFA U-15 football tournament. Public disagreements have emerged between the two allies in recent months. In Türkiye, critics have raised objections to restrictions on religious clothing in Azerbaijani schools. Baku regarded the criticism as interference in its domestic affairs and barred more than 30 Turkish citizens from entering the country. Another source of disagreement is Azerbaijan's relationship with Israel. Ankara strongly criticizes the Israeli government's actions, while Baku continues to cooperate with Israel in the energy and defense sectors. Azerbaijani political analyst Ilgar Velizade told Daily Europe Online that Turkish efforts to ease tensions had not resolved the disagreements. He cited the dismissal of Erdoğan adviser Oktay Saral following remarks critical of Azerbaijan. In Velizade's assessment, Baku may have regarded the move as a temporary concession ahead of the summit. The analyst also emphasized that Azerbaijan does not intend to change its relationship with Israel because of Türkiye's position....

OTS Summit

OTS Summit in Ankara: Türkiye Looks to Strengthen Its Position as Central Asia Competes for Transit Routes

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev arrived in Ankara on October 28, the day he delivered his annual State of the Nation Address, in which he announced plans to expand transport routes between China and Europe. On October 30, he will attend the 13th summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS). Turkey is preparing to take over the organization's chairmanship from Azerbaijan, and Central Asian countries are seeking to accelerate freight transportation across the Caspian Sea. Behind the shared rhetoric of Turkic unity lie specific economic interests. Kazakhstan is building railways and expanding its capacity to handle transit cargo from China. Azerbaijan is developing Caspian ports and transport infrastructure in the South Caucasus. Turkey wants to attract more freight moving between China and Europe through Central Asia, increasing its role as a transit hub. A unified route looks much simpler on a political map than it does in the daily operations of transport companies. Between China and Europe, cargo crosses several borders, is transferred from trains to ships and back, undergoes customs clearance, and is subject to tariffs set by different operators. Interest in alternative Eurasian transport routes has grown since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but the competition extends beyond freight. Ankara is looking to strengthen its political presence in Central Asia, where Russia and China retain considerable influence. Summit events begin on October 29 with a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, chaired by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. The nation’s presidents will meet on the following day. Participants are expected to adopt the Ankara Declaration, discuss investment, energy, digitalization, security, and appoint a new OTS secretary-general. Tokayev and Kazakhstan's Route to Europe Tokayev's visit to Turkey follows directly after his State of the Nation Address, much of which focused on infrastructure, including plans to open the 272-kilometer Bakhty–Ayagoz railway in 2027. The line is expected to add 20 million metric tons of annual freight capacity between Kazakhstan and China. Tokayev also discussed construction of the Aral–Caspian highway. The project would establish a new transport connection between western and central Kazakhstan. According to government estimates, it could shorten certain freight routes between China and Europe by approximately 1,000 kilometers and reduce delivery times by up to three days. Both projects are part of a broader effort to increase Kazakhstan's revenue from international logistics. The country currently earns a substantial share of its transit revenue directly from freight transportation. Developing warehouses, terminals, processing facilities, and distribution centers could generate additional income. Turkey occupies an important position in this network. An overland branch of the Middle Corridor passes through its territory en route to European markets; the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway connects Azerbaijan to Turkey's rail network through Georgia. On the sidelines of the Ankara summit, Turkish business associations plan to discuss border crossing operations, transportation costs, and the development of the Middle Corridor. Transport geography, however, does not fit neatly within the OTS's political boundaries. Georgia, through which the railway connecting Azerbaijan and Turkey passes, is not a member...

Aid Dependence

Emergency Aid to Afghanistan Is Not Enough, Humanitarian Expert Says

The return of millions of Afghans from Iran and Pakistan is placing fresh pressure on a country already struggling with declining international humanitarian assistance. Closer cooperation with Central Asian countries could help Afghanistan meet its immediate needs while reducing its long-term dependence on emergency aid. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Abdul Wahab Arash, who has more than 17 years of experience working for international humanitarian and development organizations, discusses the challenges facing Afghanistan and the role its Central Asian neighbors could play in the country's recovery. TCA: How have the needs of the Afghan population evolved, and which challenges concern you most today? Abdul Wahab Arash: Having worked in Afghanistan’s humanitarian sector for more than a decade, I have witnessed how conflict, displacement, poverty, economic instability and natural disasters have affected Afghan communities. While emergency needs have persisted, economic hardship, limited employment opportunities and recurring disasters have placed additional pressure on vulnerable families. One of my greatest concerns is the large-scale return of Afghan migrants from neighboring countries, particularly Iran and Pakistan, including people who have been deported or compelled to return. According to the International Organization for Migration, approximately 6.5 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan between mid-September 2023 and Aug. 31, 2026. These movements place additional pressure on Afghanistan’s already limited resources and public services. Many returnee families urgently need shelter, food, employment, healthcare, education and other essential services. Their reintegration requires not only emergency assistance but also sustainable livelihoods, housing support and access to basic services. Another major concern is the widening gap between humanitarian needs and available funding. Funding reductions mean fewer people may receive essential assistance, while humanitarian programs, local organizations and employment opportunities for qualified Afghan professionals are also affected. Economic hardship and limited livelihoods can drive dangerous and irregular migration as people seek safety, work and a more secure future. In my view, Afghanistan needs continued international solidarity alongside a stronger focus on resilience, livelihoods and investment in Afghan people. Emergency assistance remains essential, but wherever feasible it should also help families recover, protect their dignity and build more secure futures. TCA: What are the main obstacles to delivering effective international humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan? What changes would help produce more sustainable results? Arash: In my experience, one of the main obstacles is the growing gap between humanitarian needs and available resources. Other challenges include limited livelihood opportunities, difficulties in coordination, potential duplication across programs and the need to connect emergency assistance more effectively with longer-term recovery. Afghanistan needs assistance to address immediate suffering, but it also needs a humanitarian system that invests in Afghan professionals, strengthens local capacity, creates fair employment opportunities and uses limited resources effectively. International expertise remains essential, but it should complement and strengthen national capacity rather than unnecessarily replace it. International organizations could explore more cost-effective operating models, including leaner offices in Kabul and greater reliance on qualified Afghan organizations to implement activities and monitor assistance at the community level. This could reduce...