• KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
  • KZT/USD = 0.00221
  • TJS/USD = 0.10850
  • UZS/USD = 0.00008
  • TMT/USD = 0.29760
24 October 2026

Viewing results 1 - 6 of 437

Ukraine Says More Than 20,400 Central Asians Signed Russian Army Contracts

More than 20,400 Central Asian citizens have signed contracts with Russia’s armed forces since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, according to the Ukrainian government’s “I Want to Live” project. The new figures come as families in Kazakhstan secure the return of young men who say they went to Russia for civilian work and were forced into military service. The project’s October figures identify 8,207 Uzbek citizens and 5,308 Tajiks, together accounting for about two-thirds of the regional total. Kazakhstan accounts for 3,819. A further 2,219 are from Kyrgyzstan, and 884 from Turkmenistan. The count covers identified contract signers as of October 1, rather than the number currently fighting, and excludes ethnic Central Asians with Russian citizenship. The figures have not been independently verified. “I Want to Live” is a Ukrainian state project that helps Russian servicemen surrender. For some Kazakh families, the immediate struggle has been to get their sons out of the Russian army. Twenty-year-old Ainabek Keldibek went to Russia expecting to work as a security guard. As TCA reported, he and other young Kazakh men later appeared in appeals for help, with some wearing Russian uniforms in or near the combat zone. On October 7, relatives went to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry in Astana to demand help bringing the men home. Lawyer Meirman Shekeyev, who accompanied them, said he knew of at least 21 cases. Families said their relatives had accepted civilian jobs before being pressured to sign military contracts. Keldibek has now returned to Kazakhstan. His sister told RFE/RL’s Kazakh service that he arrived in Shymkent on the evening of October 21. She said others were still waiting to return. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry had earlier asked Moscow to help repatriate the men and opened a hotline for their families. Their accounts fit a pattern documented by the International Federation for Human Rights. Its April study found that migrants in Russia had been offered military contracts as an alternative to detention or deportation. Others were recruited abroad with promises of civilian work, only to find themselves sent to the front. “Many of these men knew in some capacity what they were signing up for. But some were also deceived or coerced,” FIDH President Alexis Deswaef said. The war has also drawn Central Asians to Ukraine’s defense. TCA’s earlier reporting on both sides described volunteers who regarded Ukraine as home and saw Russia’s invasion as a threat to their families. Kazakh national Zhasulan Duysembin joined Ukraine’s armed forces in 2021 after settling there. In a 2022 interview, he told Ukrainska Pravda: “I had two children in Ukraine, and for the first time I started to think that they might be in danger.” Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency has warned citizens that offers of work or help with immigration papers can lead to recruitment into armed conflicts. It has also reminded them that joining foreign armed forces can bring criminal liability at home. For other families, there has been no homecoming. Kiril Nysanbaev went to Russia for work after completing his military...

Central Asia’s Afghan Engagement Faces Persistent Security Risks

Central Asian countries are expanding their trade with Kabul despite concerns about armed groups operating from Afghanistan. Russia has renewed warnings about militants seeking to infiltrate the region and is advocating cooperation with the Taliban authorities to contain them. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are interested in trade, energy, and transport projects connecting the region with South Asia. Tajikistan has traditionally taken a more critical position toward the Taliban and places particular emphasis on securing its lengthy border with Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Russia and China are seeking guarantees from the Afghan authorities against the activities of armed organizations that threaten their security. Speaking on October 16 at a joint conference of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said extremist organizations maintained a significant presence in Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. According to Lavrov, militants intend to use Afghan territory to expand their activities into Central Asia and Russia. Lavrov identified Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State terrorist organization, also known as ISIS-K, as the main threat, citing Russian security agencies. The group opposes the Taliban, carries out attacks in Afghanistan, and has struck beyond its borders. The name Khorasan refers to a historical region encompassing parts of present-day Afghanistan, Iran, and Central Asia. ISIS-K’s reach extends beyond Afghanistan’s border regions through propaganda, recruitment, and cross-border networks. As The Times of Central Asia previously reported, people from Central Asia have been implicated in ISIS-K activities beyond the region itself, including within migrant communities. Lavrov claimed that militants in northern Afghanistan included ethnic Uyghurs, alongside fighters from Central Asia and the North Caucasus. His reference to Uyghurs echoes Beijing’s security concerns over Xinjiang, where China has used counterterrorism policies to justify sweeping repression. A 2022 UN assessment found that arbitrary detention and restrictions on the rights of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim groups could constitute crimes against humanity. The TASS report provided no evidence supporting his claims about the fighters’ origins. Lavrov also called for joint action against weapons and drug trafficking through Central Asia. The Taliban as a Security Partner Lavrov urged engagement with the Taliban authorities, who returned to power during the U.S. military withdrawal in August 2021. Russia formally recognized their government in July 2025. Moscow argues that the Taliban’s control of Afghan territory makes them responsible for security within the country, and is seeking international support for Kabul’s efforts to improve regional security. While relying on the Taliban to contain armed groups, Moscow is simultaneously questioning their ability to do so. ISIS-K has attacked Taliban officials, giving Kabul a direct reason to confront the organization. That conflict, however, offers no assurance that the Taliban will act against other armed groups operating in Afghanistan. China also favors working with Kabul on security, with concerns extending to the safety of Chinese nationals and regional trade routes. Two attacks launched from Afghan territory killed five Chinese nationals...

Central Asian States Set Out Priorities After Rubio Talks in Samarkand

Central Asian governments backed closer cooperation on mineral processing and transport at the October 19 C5+1 meeting in Samarkand. Separate talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio covered possible aircraft purchases for Kyrgyzstan and further diplomatic engagement with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan announced a $12 billion package of agreements and prospective initiatives during the visit. For the other four Central Asian participants, the published accounts centered largely on cooperation priorities and follow-up discussions. The gathering followed the November 2025 White House summit and accompanied Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords. It brought Rubio together with all five Central Asian foreign ministers, combining regional discussions with separate bilateral meetings. Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi discussed implementation of earlier presidential agreements with Rubio. The talks addressed attracting American investment and technology, with energy and critical minerals among the priorities. Washington also expressed interest in cooperation on artificial intelligence and communications infrastructure. According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Rubio expressed interest in visiting Kazakhstan after the December G20 summit in Miami. Kyrgyzstan’s talks included immediate obstacles to closer relations. Foreign Minister Jeenbek Kulubaev raised sanctions policy and visa restrictions with Rubio, alongside opportunities for American investment. The Kyrgyz side sought solutions that would facilitate educational and business exchanges. Presidential special representative Bakyt Sydykov briefed the U.S. delegation on Kyrgyzstan’s sanctions-related efforts, with Bishkek reaffirming its willingness to work with Washington to prevent sanctions circumvention. In a separate meeting, Kulubaev discussed possible Boeing aircraft deliveries to Kyrgyz airlines with company vice president Michael Schnabel. Financing options included possible involvement by the U.S. Export-Import Bank. The discussions also covered aircraft maintenance and aviation infrastructure. Tajikistan’s Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin discussed expanding trade and investment with Rubio. The ministry’s account also described an exchange on regional security and stability in Central Asia. Turkmenistan reported a more specific diplomatic follow-up. Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov and Rubio outlined a schedule of further meetings and political consultations. U.S. special envoy Sergio Gor also attended the talks. The shared C5+1 statement set out the broader economic agenda. The six governments supported further development of the Trans-Caspian Trade Route and more closely aligned customs procedures. They also backed stronger industrial cooperation within Central Asia. On minerals, the statement envisaged expanded extraction and processing, alongside more production of higher-value goods within the region. It also supported exchanging expertise on geological data. These were collective policy intentions, without country-by-country financing allocations or project completion dates. Security commitments covered stronger border protection and counterterrorism cooperation, alongside efforts against transnational crime. The governments also supported practical cooperation on nuclear security and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Uzbekistan Signs Space Accords as Rubio Opens Samarkand Talks

Uzbekistan joined the U.S.-led Artemis Accords on October 19 as Secretary of State Marco Rubio held talks in Samarkand. The signing accompanied the first Enhanced Strategic Partnership Dialogue between the two countries, with critical minerals among the priorities. Foreign Minister Bakhtiyor Saidov announced the signing after bilateral talks with Rubio. He said Uzbekistan had become the 77th country to join the framework for peaceful space exploration. Saidov said accession would support closer cooperation with NASA and other participating space agencies. He identified training for Uzbek specialists and access to space technologies as potential benefits. Established in 2020, the Artemis Accords set out principles for civilian space exploration. Signatories commit to peaceful operations and greater transparency, including sharing scientific data. The framework also addresses interference between missions and the preservation of historic sites in space. NASA describes the accords as nonbinding principles. Posting on X, Rubio confirmed he had met all five Central Asian foreign ministers during the C5+1 gathering. He said cooperation would expand commercial opportunities and strengthen regional security. American businesses also joined the visit as Washington seeks deeper economic ties across Central Asia. The visit follows the November 2025 White House summit, where Trump hosted all five Central Asian presidents. That meeting gave the partnership a stronger commercial focus, with aircraft orders and minerals projects featuring prominently. Samarkand brings ministers and businesses together to advance that agenda. The strategic dialogue focused on implementing agreements reached by the countries’ leaders and expanding economic cooperation. Saidov said the discussions covered energy and advanced technologies, alongside critical minerals. Education and security cooperation were also on the agenda. Rubio said separately that the talks addressed infrastructure and space cooperation, as well as engagement through C5+1, which brings together the United States and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In a separate meeting with Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi, Rubio reaffirmed plans to expand economic and security cooperation. He thanked Kazakhstan for supporting “President Trump’s peace initiatives, including the Abraham Accords.” Speaking to reporters in Samarkand, Rubio said nearly 300 American businesses were represented, and that agreements potentially worth billions of dollars were under discussion. He presented the visit as the start of deeper U.S. economic engagement with Central Asia. “I think we’ll have some concrete deals to announce,” he said, according to Euronews. A final list of agreements and their value had not been circulated at the time of those remarks. Rubio identified critical minerals as a priority, arguing that concentrated supplies created risks for countries dependent on them. "This is not about coming here to say, stop talking to somebody else or stop working with some other country," he said. Days earlier, at the October 15 summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia in Baku, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a transport strategy spanning several international initiatives. His proposal included China’s Belt and Road and the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) through Armenia. It illustrated the region’s pursuit of transport links involving...

Central Asian Leaders Link Trade and Security at Baku Summit

Central Asian leaders called for better transport links and joint action on water shortages at the Baku summit in Azerbaijan on October 15, arguing that practical cooperation could prevent political disputes from turning into conflict. The seventh summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) adopted the Baku Declaration, admitted Laos as a new member, and approved Azerbaijan’s continued chairmanship through 2028. Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for an “infrastructure of trust” based on transparent government actions and the fulfillment of commitments. His proposed concept would connect conflict prevention with joint transport and energy projects, trade, and digital links. He pointed to the damage that conflicts in Asia were causing to economies and security far from the fighting. Mirziyoyev warned, “When dialogue weakens, the risk of misguided decisions increases.” He urged governments to prevent political disagreements from becoming armed confrontations. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed a preventive diplomacy mechanism within CICA, enabling members to contribute before a crisis develops. He told the summit, “Peace is best built before crises emerge.” According to the Azerbaijani state news agency AZERTAC’s account, the Baku Declaration includes provisions on economic ties, transport and digital connections, and energy security. It addresses the opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence. Trade Routes Across the Caspian Sea The meeting came one week after the Avaza summit, where Central Asian presidents and Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev discussed east-west and north-south trade routes. In Baku, those regional priorities entered a wider Asian forum, alongside calls to make commercial relationships more dependable. Tokayev proposed a CICA Transport Connectivity Strategy covering major routes, including the Middle Corridor across the Caspian Sea. He linked Azerbaijan’s rapprochement with Armenia to new opportunities for east-west transport. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon called in his summit address for simpler customs and logistics procedures and better connections between different forms of transport. He presented economic cooperation as a foundation for lasting peace, alongside continued action against terrorism and its financing. On the summit’s sidelines, the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan discussed transport and transit cooperation. Their talks covered improvements to logistics infrastructure and international routes connecting Central Asia with the Caucasus, according to Turkmenistan’s government account. During a separate bilateral meeting, Tokayev and Aliyev inaugurated the Trans-Caspian Fiber-Optic Cable Line remotely, opening an approximately 380-kilometer connection between Aktau in Kazakhstan and Sumgayit in Azerbaijan. The project forms part of the Digital Silk Way initiative, with onward connections intended to carry data between China, Central Asia, and Europe. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and Digital Development gives the cable a design capacity exceeding 400 terabits per second. The ministry says the additional route will provide backup for existing international connections and allow operators to distribute traffic across more channels. It expects the connection to attract investment in data centers and cloud services as Kazakhstan seeks a larger role in carrying international data. Kyrgyzstan’s President Sadyr Japarov similarly called for fiber-optic routes linking Asia and Europe. He invited technology companies to build data centers...

Opinion: Central Asia’s Minilateral Diplomacy and the Limits of Cooperation

In the contemporary, largely fragmented world order, the concept of minilateralism has become increasingly relevant. As less powerful, smaller states are struggling with often ineffective multilateral diplomatic frameworks, cooperation on a smaller scale has been gaining momentum in international relations. Central Asian countries, although with an intrinsic set of strengths and resources, still lack the power to individually address some of their own issues and advocate more proactively for their interests, especially in global forums dominated by major powers and entities. Geopolitical weaknesses of each Central Asian country lie in insufficiently developed domestic economic and military power to compete with much stronger neighbors such as Russia or China. Furthermore, unfavorable geography, where Central Asia, as a landlocked region, has limited access to global trade chains, also dilutes its geopolitical strength. In addition, the transboundary nature of critical resources, especially concerning water flows and supply, often causes tensions among states of Central Asia. In such discouraging circumstances, minilateralism promises more realistic solutions that can place Central Asia on a more equal footing with external partners and enable the region to play a more significant role in regional and, to some extent, international politics. That is why the consultative meetings of the five Central Asian countries (C5), now expanded to include Azerbaijan as C6, and C5+1 dialogues with external partners have become important platforms for Central Asia’s diplomatic standing. Minilateralism and Central Asia Minilateralism represents an international relations concept that implies cooperation of a smaller group of countries (usually three to nine members) in order to resolve shared problems or pursue mutual objectives. While bilateralism remains the main form of cooperation in international politics and multilateralism is necessary for tackling global issues, minilateralism has emerged as a more appropriate response for addressing specific regional issues in a more flexible and efficient manner. One of the main features of minilateralism is prioritizing shared interests over values or ideological principles, which allows collaborating states to focus more on solving issues and avoid being burdened by ideological discrepancies. Take, for example, the Abraham Accords that managed to gather countries with very different ideological views, especially Israel and the United Arab Emirates, but still produced tangible results of cooperation. Another advantage of minilateralism is a quicker response to crises, as well as opportunities, with less of the bureaucratic hassle that often follows multilateral diplomacy. For Central Asia, working together provides a stronger platform for negotiating better outcomes, especially in the economic area. While the current major geopolitical tensions, such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Iran war, continue to shake the international order, the Central Asian countries have become more aware of their opportunities, especially in terms of transit routes and natural resource demand. Central Asia has definitely caught the attention of major powers, and its geographical position along alternative transportation routes, as well as its considerable wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and critical materials, opens doors for the region to gain more influence and power. However, for all of these opportunities to materialize, Central...