Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Visa

The Silk Visa Deadlock: The Long Road to a Borderless Central Asia

The year 2025 will likely be remembered as a milestone in Central Asian diplomacy. Regional leaders signed landmark agreements on water and energy cooperation and launched major investment projects. At high-level meetings, Central Asian presidents emphasized a new phase of deeper cooperation and greater unity, highlighting strategic partnership and shared development goals. But at ground level, at border crossings such as Korday between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, or the congested diversion routes replacing the closed Zhibek Zholy checkpoint, the picture is far less seamless. Long queues, heightened scrutiny, and bureaucratic delays remain the norm. While political rhetoric celebrates unity, the reality on the ground tells a different story. The region’s physical borders remain tightly controlled. A key symbol of unrealized integration is the stalled “Silk Visa” project, a proposed Central Asian version of the Schengen visa that would allow tourists to travel freely across the region. The project has made little headway, with experts suggesting that, beyond technical issues, deeper concerns, including economic disparities and security sensitivities, have played a role. Silk Visa: A Stalled Vision Launched in 2018 by Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the Silk Visa was envisioned as a game-changer for regional tourism and mobility. Under the scheme, tourists with a visa to one participating country could move freely across Central Asia, from Almaty to Samarkand and Bishkek. Seven years on, the project has yet to materialize. Official explanations point to the difficulty of integrating databases on “undesirable persons.” But as Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister acknowledged earlier this year, the delay stems from the need to harmonize security services and create a unified system. Experts also cite diverging visa policies and resistance from national security agencies unwilling to share sensitive data. As long as each country insists on determining independently whom to admit or blacklist, the Silk Visa will remain more aspiration than policy. Economic Imbalance: The Silent Barrier The most significant, albeit rarely acknowledged, hurdle to regional openness is economic inequality. Kazakhstan’s GDP per capita, at over $14,000, is significantly higher than that of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, which hover around $2,500-3,000. This disparity feeds fears in Astana that full border liberalization would trigger a wave of low-skilled labor migration, putting strain on Kazakhstan’s urban infrastructure and labor market. While Kazakhstan is eager to export goods, services, and capital across Central Asia, it remains reluctant to import unemployment or social tension. Migration pressure is already high: according to Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, the number of Uzbek workers in Kazakhstan reached 322,700 in early 2025. Removing border controls entirely could exacerbate this trend, overwhelming already stretched public services. Security Concerns and Regional Tensions The geopolitical landscape further complicates the dream of borderless travel. A truly open regional system would require a strong, unified external border, something unattainable given Afghanistan’s proximity. The persistent threats of drug trafficking and extremist infiltration compel Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to maintain tight border controls. Kazakhstan, while geographically removed, remains cautious about loosening controls along its southern frontier. Moreover, despite recent agreements on delimiting the Kyrgyz–Tajik border, tensions in...

U.S. Sanctions

U.S. Waiver of Sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port is Good News for Central Asia

U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port on the Gulf of Oman have been on again/off again since 2013, when the U.S. Congress passed the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) to curb Iran’s regional influence and strategic capabilities through targeted economic pressure, aka sanctions. In the decade following IFCA’s passage, Washington’s sanctions on Chabahar had a negative impact on Central Asia, largely by complicating its efforts to deepen economic ties with South Asia and the Gulf. But geopolitics are shifting. Washington is increasing its involvement in Central Asia and India, and is doing the same in Afghanistan. These factors may well induce the U.S. Department of State to keep the waiver in place. Washington first waived its sanctions on Chabahar in 2018—a strategic move to support India's role in Afghanistan's post-war development and to provide a crucial trade route for that landlocked country. Six years later, India's Indian Ports Global Limited secured a 10-year deal with Iran to manage Chabahar port, in part, to offset Pakistan’s Gwadar port at the end of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a mere 100 miles from Chabahar. For all the fanfare, Central Asia held little real priority in Washington in those years. Seven years later, the U.S. changed course. It announced on September 16, 2025, much to Central Asia’s surprise and concern, that “the State Department has revoked the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the IFCA”, making individuals involved in Iran’s Chabahar port operations subject to penalties, resulting in another snag in Central Asia’s desire for a southern breakout route. And then, in a swift reversal, the U.S. restored India’s sanctions waiver some six weeks later, on October 30. Whatever might explain the sudden change, Central Asia breathed a sigh of relief, and, by all accounts, now feels confident that the waiver will be evergreened. Time will tell if this confidence is justified. The U.S. waiver enables India to work to enhance Chabahar’s infrastructure and functionality, offering Central Asian exporters a more direct and profitable trade route than those via China, Russia, or the Middle Corridor, which stretches from East Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. As a result, goods like minerals, cotton, and energy products can reach regional and global markets faster. Central Asian capitals are quietly reveling in Washington’s flexible realpolitik in the face of convulsive U.S.-Iranian relations and heated Indo-Pakistan tensions. Without fear of punitive measures, India can now continue its work at Chabahar. To be sure, the waiver affirms India’s rising global presence and accelerates New Delhi’s drive into Central Asia, including Afghanistan. Washington’s decision signaled to traders, investors, and think tankers that it has no intention of spoiling India’s export ambitions and Central Asia’s desire for north-south economic integration. The waiver shows Washington’s pragmatism—and is welcomed by those who have little or no use for Washington’s penchant for foreign policy moralism. Chabahar Port complements not only the Trans-Caspian corridor—a multimodal trade route connecting Asia and Europe by linking China to Europe through Central...

Regional Integration

Opinion: Central Asia Is Consolidating Its Role as a Full-Fledged Actor in Global Processes

The seventh Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia, held in Tashkent, was far more than a routine regional gathering. It marked a pivotal moment with the potential to shape the political and economic architecture of the region for the next decade or two. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s keynote address stood out for articulating a forward-looking and comprehensive strategic vision. Notably, he proposed redefining the format itself from a loose “consultative mechanism” into a more cohesive and institutionalized “Central Asian Community.” At the summit, leaders endorsed several landmark documents: the Concept for Regional Security and Stability in Central Asia, the Catalogue of Threats to Central Asia’s Security and measures for their prevention for 2026-2028 and its implementation plan, a joint appeal supporting the Kyrgyz Republic’s candidacy for the UN Security Council, and the decision to admit Azerbaijan as a full-fledged participant. Taken together, these steps signal that Central Asia increasingly sees itself not as a passive bystander amid global geopolitical turbulence, but as an emerging regional actor capable of shaping its own trajectory. Two broader trends deserve special emphasis. First, the region is moving beyond reactive engagement with external initiatives and power blocs. Rather than relying solely on structures created by outside actors, Central Asia is beginning to develop its own institutions. This shift mirrors a global pattern: as the international order becomes more fragmented and unpredictable, regional communities are strengthening their internal mechanisms as a means of resilience. Second, the format envisioned in Tashkent diverges from “Brussels-style integration.” It does not require the transfer or dilution of sovereignty. Instead, it relies on soft integration, consultation, consensus-building, and phased convergence. As President Mirziyoyev noted, having a shared and realistic sense of “what we want our region to look like in 10-20 years” is essential. Without such a vision, Central Asia risks remaining the object of great-power competition rather than an autonomous participant in it. One of the summit’s most consequential developments was the decision to welcome Azerbaijan as a full-fledged member of the format. The emerging political and economic bridge between Central Asia and the South Caucasus is quickly becoming not only a transit nexus but also a cornerstone of a broader geopolitical space. The strengthening of Trans-Caspian corridors, the advancement of the “China – Kyrgyzstan – Uzbekistan” railway, the Trans-Afghan corridor, and the alignment of Caspian Sea transport routes will significantly expand the region’s strategic and economic potential. A further nuance is worth highlighting: Azerbaijan’s long-standing ties with the Western political and security architecture, through NATO partnership mechanisms and energy corridors, as well as its membership in the Organization of Turkic States, introduce new layers of connectivity. Its inclusion repositions the “Central Asian Community” from a post-Soviet platform into a wider geopolitical constellation spanning Eurasia, the South Caucasus, and the Middle East. For Central Asian states, this new configuration opens additional room for multi-vector diplomacy and reduces the risks of unilateral dependence. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not...

Tashkent Summit

Azerbaijan Joins Central Asia to Build a C6 Corridor Core

Central Asian leaders met in Tashkent on November 15–16 for the seventh Consultative Meeting of Heads of State. Azerbaijan attended as a guest with full rights, as it had done at the meetings last year and the year before. This time, the leaders agreed that Azerbaijan would sit as a full participant in future meetings, transforming the C5 into the C6. In his opening remarks, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev proposed turning the loose consultative mechanism into a formal regional body under the working title, the “Community of Central Asia.” Mirziyoyev went further and suggested extending the mandate from economic integration to include security and environmental cooperation for the region as a whole. The Uzbek President called the decision to admit Azerbaijan “historic,” as the leaders framed the welcoming of Azerbaijan not as a courtesy to a neighbor but as part of a wider integration project that already runs across the Caspian and that is now seeking to bring a South Caucasus transit and energy hub directly into the frame. The consultative format is thus being asked to carry a heavier load than when it was created in 2018 as a careful space for political dialogue and security confidence-building. For governments and external partners, the practical question is whether this emerging “Central Asia plus Azerbaijan” geometry can evolve into a corridor community with its own regional rules, or whether it will remain largely declaratory while decisions continue to track external finance and great-power projects. Azerbaijan and Central Asia Begin to Co-Author the Agenda From the start, the consultative meetings of the Central Asian heads of state were conceived as a modest, leader-level forum to ease regional tensions and reopen direct dialogue after a decade of drift. The first gathering in Astana in March 2018 focused on borders, water management, and security issues that had festered since the 1990s, and that format’s agenda had mainly remained focused on political reconciliation and crisis management. The seventh meeting in Tashkent was different in kind. By bringing Azerbaijan formally into the room on a continuing rather than one-off basis, and by placing corridor and digital questions at the center of proceedings rather than on the margins, it reframed the forum from an inward-looking confidence-building device into a platform that aspires to shape external connectivity. Azerbaijan’s presence at earlier summits in 2023 and 2024 created a transitional phase in which Baku could test how far its own transit and energy agenda resonated with Central Asian priorities. In Tashkent, that ambiguity effectively ended. President Ilham Aliyev’s speech, delivered after the leaders had agreed that Azerbaijan would participate in future meetings as a full member, described Central Asia and Azerbaijan as forming “a single geopolitical and geo-economic region whose importance in the world is steadily growing.” He tied that claim to concrete developments along the Middle Corridor segment through Azerbaijan, the Alat port complex, upgraded customs procedures, and cross-Caspian energy and data links. For Kazakhstan, the Tashkent meeting offered a complementary opportunity. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev used his speech...

Regional Integration

Central Asian Leaders Welcome Azerbaijan’s Accession at Tashkent Summit

The leaders of Central Asia convened in Tashkent on November 16 for a high-level Consultative Meeting, marking a significant step toward deeper regional integration. The summit welcomed Azerbaijan as a full participant and endorsed a roadmap to formalize cooperation in trade, infrastructure, security, and water management. Hosted by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the summit brought together the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, alongside a United Nations representative. Ahead of the meeting, Tashkent’s central streets were adorned with national flags and floral installations, underscoring the political and symbolic significance the Uzbek government placed on the event. Mirziyoyev hailed Azerbaijan’s accession as “a truly historic day,” as the country became a full member of the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia. He proposed forming a “Community of Central Asia,” establishing a rotating Secretariat, appointing special presidential envoys for coordination, and creating a Council of Elders to promote cultural and humanitarian dialogue. [caption id="attachment_39410" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Regional Economic and Connectivity Agenda Economic cooperation dominated the multilateral agenda. Leaders agreed to develop a Comprehensive Regional Program for Trade and Economic Cooperation through 2035 and to draft a Declaration on a Common Investment Space. “In essence, we will build a strong bridge between Central Asia and the South Caucasus and pave the way for the formation of a single space of cooperation, which will undoubtedly strengthen the strategic interconnectedness and stability of both regions,” said Mirziyoyev. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev also highlighted deepening bilateral ties with Uzbekistan. Trade between the two countries has reached $4 billion in 2025, with plans to increase it to $10 billion through expanded industrial cooperation and import substitution. Over 6,500 joint enterprises now operate between the two countries, with new projects worth more than $8 billion under development. Several initiatives, such as the Silkway Central Asia logistics center, new industrial facilities, and cultural programs, were launched in Tashkent during the visit. [caption id="attachment_39411" align="aligncenter" width="1280"] Image: president.uz[/caption] Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon met with Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the summit. The two leaders noted the steady growth in political dialogue and agreed to expand cooperation in energy, industry, agriculture, and innovation. Bilateral trade surpassed $440 million in the first nine months of 2025. They also discussed regional security, including collaboration against terrorism, extremism, cybercrime, and drug trafficking. Security, Water, and Cultural Cooperation To advance regional integration, Tashkent also hosted the first meeting of the Council of Ministers of Trade and Investment of Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan on November 13. Ministers discussed boosting trade, investment, and industrial cooperation, with the goal of increasing regional trade turnover to $20 billion. Plans were also made to develop joint production platforms under a “Made in Central Asia” label. Uzbekistan’s trade with Central Asian partners rose from $3.2 billion in 2017 to $6.9 billion in 2024, while trade with Azerbaijan has grown by 13% this year. Connectivity remained a focal point. Participants reaffirmed their commitment to the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway and the Trans-Afghan corridor. Azerbaijan’s President...

Regional Integration

Opinion: The Integration of Afghanistan into Central Asia

Shared rivers and joint water management can shape a new regional partnership Central Asia and Afghanistan sit on the same rivers, yet often behave as if they belong to different regions. Water ties them together more firmly than any border, but the politics of the past have kept Afghanistan outside the regional system. Today, as climate pressures intensify and development accelerates on both sides of the Amu Darya, the case for integrating Afghanistan into Central Asia has never been stronger. And the path to that integration begins with water. The debate around the Qosh Tepa Canal makes this evident. Afghanistan was never part of the agreements that govern the Amu Darya River (Protocol 566 of the Soviet Union and the Almaty 1992 agreement). It did not sign allocation protocols and never joined regional basin institutions. Still, it was expected to follow rules it had no hand in shaping. Now, that old arrangement has reached its limit. The canal will bring new agriculture to the north of Afghanistan, but downstream states depend on the same river. The real question is not whether Afghanistan should develop, but how to shape that development jointly so the river can sustain all sides. Central Asia already has cooperative models that Afghanistan could join. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have shown how two neighbors can jointly manage a transboundary river through their collaboration in hydropower on the Zarafshan. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan have signed a similar mechanism with the KambarAta-1 project, which will generate energy and regulate seasonal flows for downstream agriculture. These experiences show that once countries share responsibility for a river, trust can grow and benefits expand. Afghanistan can become part of this regional architecture. The 161-meter-high planned dam on the Kokcha River, set to generate 445 megawatts of electricity, offers a clear entry point. A jointly governed dam on this river would give Afghanistan energy, while downstream states would benefit from its flow in terms of agriculture. When operations are transparent and agreed upon, water becomes a field of cooperation rather than tension. Energy trade adds another layer of opportunity. Central Asia has a long record of exchanging electricity and gas in return for upstream releases. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have done this with Kyrgyzstan for many years through a joint water and energy agreement. The same model can work with Afghanistan. The country needs power, and it can offer coordinated water management in return. A structured energy for water arrangement would give Afghanistan an incentive to cooperate and offer Central Asia predictability. Agriculture is another arena where cooperation promises immediate gains. Uzbekistan’s policies on water-saving technologies offer a strong example. They subsidize drip, sprinkler systems, canal improvement, land levelling, efficient pumps, and even solar-powered irrigation. These investments reduce water losses while increasing yields only if their rebound effect, such as further expansion of agriculture, is controlled. The same approach could be applied in the northern provinces of Afghanistan, including in the area under the Qosh Tepa Canal. With similar financial support and technical guidance, Afghan...