Turkmenistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Middle Corridor

Central Asia and Azerbaijan Extend Cooperation Across the Caspian

Central Asia’s presidential forum now spans both shores of the Caspian. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan anchor the principal Caspian crossing at the center of the Middle Corridor, the rail-and-sea network linking Central Asia to European markets through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye. Azerbaijan’s full participation brings the corridor’s eastern and western Caspian gateways into the same regular political setting. The six governments can use it to coordinate the transport, energy, digital, and investment links already developing across the Caspian, even though Georgia and Türkiye remain essential to the route’s westward operation. On July 31, 2026, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan signed the Cholpon-Ata Declaration at an informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan in Kyrgyzstan. The Declaration gave formal political expression to cooperation that had already been developing. Official accounts said the leaders emphasized expanded regional cooperation, including trade, transport and logistics, and energy. The full text has not been released, so those priorities come from official accounts rather than the declaration itself. Proposed by Uzbekistani President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in 2017 and first convened in Astana in March 2018, the Consultative Meetings brought together the five Central Asian states in an informal presidential format. They expanded in November 2025 with Azerbaijan’s admission as a full-fledged participant, while retaining their consultative character. Azerbaijan attended in 2023 and 2024 as a guest; Cholpon-Ata was its first informal meeting in the new capacity. Official documents continue to call the format “Central Asia and Azerbaijan.” C6 is analytical shorthand for the enlargement, not the name of a new bloc or formal organization. Azerbaijan’s admission follows several years of practical cooperation. At a ministerial meeting in Aktau on November 25, 2022, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye signed a 2022–2027 roadmap for the simultaneous elimination of bottlenecks and development of the Middle Corridor. At its 2023 Baku summit, the UN Special Programme for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) adopted a digitalization roadmap and established a multi-partner trust fund, followed by work on digital data exchange and port-to-port cooperation. The transport roadmap includes Georgia and Türkiye, while SPECA also includes Afghanistan; neither is institutionally identical to C6. The enlarged format gives the six governments a regular political setting in which to coordinate existing transport, digital, and investment mechanisms. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route Association reports that freight through the seaports of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan reached 3.3 million tons in 2024, 20% above the 2023 level, while container traffic within the same scope rose 176% to 56,500 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). Freight remains the principal basis of integration. Oil transit, prospective electricity links, and joint investment instruments are extending cooperation into adjacent sectors. Kazakhstan's use of the route for oil exports is also rising: according to KazMunayGas reports, Kazakhstani oil shipments from Aktau through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan route increased by 34% to 1.4 million tons in 2024. At COP29 in Baku on November 13, 2024, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan signed a strategic-partnership agreement on producing and transmitting green energy,...

Neutrality

Turkmenistan’s Neutrality: Diplomatic Space, Economic Limits

Permanent neutrality has shaped Turkmenistan’s foreign policy for more than three decades. It has given Ashgabat a distinct diplomatic identity and helped it maintain relations with competing regional powers. Its economic benefits, however, have been more limited. On December 12, 1995, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution without a vote that recognized and supported Turkmenistan’s declared permanent neutrality. The Assembly adopted a further resolution in 2015 and reaffirmed its support for a third time on March 21, 2025. The UN reinforced a policy declared by Ashgabat. It did not create the status or guarantee Turkmenistan influence beyond its borders. The strongest evidence of neutrality’s diplomatic value came during the civil war in Tajikistan. Turkmenistan hosted UN-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks in Ashgabat during the 1990s. The negotiations contributed to the process that produced the 1997 peace agreement. Hosting those talks did not make Turkmenistan the principal mediator. The UN and regional governments played larger roles. Ashgabat nevertheless provided a venue considered acceptable by the opposing sides. Turkmenistan has followed a similar policy toward Afghanistan. It has maintained contacts with successive authorities in Kabul while supplying electricity and pursuing transport and energy projects across the border. Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, Ashgabat has continued its economic engagement without making its relationship dependent on formal political alignment. Neutrality helps Turkmenistan keep diplomatic channels open, but it is not the only explanation for this policy. The two countries share a long border, and Afghanistan is central to several planned export and transit routes. Energy provides a clearer measure of what neutrality can and cannot deliver. Turkmenistan has sought buyers in Russia, China, Iran, Türkiye, South Asia, and Europe. Its ability to reach those markets has depended mainly on pipelines, financing, and relations with transit countries. China became Turkmenistan’s main gas customer after the Central Asia-China pipeline opened in 2009. By 2026, Turkmenistan was exporting around 30 billion cubic meters of gas to China each year. A new agreement signed in April 2026 to expand the Galkynysh gas field could support another 10 billion cubic meters of annual production, further deepening the energy relationship with Beijing. Turkmenistan’s experience with other buyers has been less stable. Russia’s Gazprom stopped purchasing Turkmen gas in 2016 before resuming much smaller imports in 2019. Supplies to Iran ended in 2017 during a dispute over unpaid bills. Ashgabat secured a modest new outlet in March 2025, when Turkmen gas began flowing to Türkiye under a swap arrangement through Iran. The one-year agreement covered about 1.3 billion cubic meters, with officials discussing possible annual supplies of up to 2 billion cubic meters. The Türkiye deal showed that Ashgabat could find new customers, but the volume remained small beside exports to China. The route also depended on Iranian infrastructure. Turkmenistan’s larger diversification projects remain incomplete. Construction has advanced on the Afghan section of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, known as TAPI. Turkmen officials expect the first Afghan section to reach Herat by the end of 2026, but plans for extending...

U.S. Visa Bond

U.S. Makes Visa Bond Program Permanent, Raises Maximum to $20,000

The United States has made its Visa Bond Program permanent, raising the maximum refundable deposit to $20,000 for certain business and tourist visa applicants from 50 countries, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The final rule took effect on August 3, replacing a 12-month pilot launched in August 2025. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain outside the program. The requirement applies to B-1 business visas, B-2 tourist visas and combined B-1/B-2 visas. Applicants from covered countries who are otherwise eligible for a visa must generally post a bond of $10,000, $15,000 or $20,000, with the amount determined by a consular officer. Officers are expected to set most bonds at $15,000. The amount may be reduced to $10,000 when an applicant’s circumstances justify a lower deposit or increased to $20,000 when officials believe a larger bond is needed to ensure that the traveler leaves the country on time. The bond is returned when the traveler complies with the terms of the visa and leaves the United States within the permitted period. It can also be refunded if the visa holder does not travel before the visa expires or is denied admission at the border. No interest is paid on the deposit, and posting a bond does not guarantee that a visa will be issued. Travelers who post a bond must enter and ultimately leave the United States through commercial airports, including U.S. Customs and Border Protection preclearance locations abroad. They cannot use land or sea crossings for their initial entry or final departure. Turkmenistan has been covered by the policy since January 1, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were added on January 21. The Times of Central Asia reported the regional expansion at the time. The broader list includes 50 countries, 30 of them in Africa, as well as countries in Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. The current program began as a pilot on August 20, 2025, initially covering Malawi and Zambia. Under the pilot, bonds were set at $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000. The permanent version removes the $5,000 option and increases the maximum deposit by $5,000. The $20,000 maximum will be adjusted for inflation beginning on October 1, 2027, and every seven years thereafter. An earlier visa bond pilot was announced in 2020 during Donald Trump’s first administration, but it was not implemented because international travel had fallen sharply during the Covid-19 pandemic. The State Department said the policy is intended to address visa overstays, inadequate information sharing, weaknesses in identity and criminal-record verification, and concerns over screening and the security of travel documents. Countries can be added to the list on a rolling basis, while removals can take effect immediately. According to the department, the 50 countries currently covered recorded 45,488 overstays during the 2024 fiscal year. Fewer than 50 overstays were recorded during the first ten months of the pilot, while visa issuance to nationals of the listed countries fell by 83% compared with the same period a year earlier. The department said some eligible applicants appeared to have...

Regional Cooperation

Central Asia and Azerbaijan: What the Region’s Leaders Agreed at Issyk-Kul

The Kyrgyz resort town of Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Lake Issyk-Kul, briefly became Central Asia’s political capital as it hosted a series of high-level meetings, including bilateral talks between the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the state visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, and the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Only a few years ago, such a format would have seemed unlikely. Today, however, regional leaders are discussing joint railway projects, energy security, transport corridors, investment, and foreign-policy coordination rather than managing old disputes. The agreements reached in Cholpon-Ata suggest that the consultative format is gradually evolving from a platform for political dialogue into a mechanism for practical regional cooperation. From Conflict to Alliance Ahead of the informal multilateral meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev held bilateral talks that set the tone for the broader regional meeting. Relations between the two countries now stand in sharp contrast to the situation sixteen years ago. Following the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, relations between Bishkek and Tashkent entered one of their most difficult periods since independence. The agenda between the two neighbors has since changed dramatically. Speaking in Cholpon-Ata, Mirziyoyev said relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had reached “a historic peak.” Bilateral trade has increased almost tenfold in recent years, reaching $1.2 billion last year. The two countries now have around 450 joint ventures, operate a joint Development Fund to support cooperative projects, and have established 15 air routes and five bus services linking their cities. Mirziyoyev described the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway as one of the most important joint initiatives between the two countries, arguing that the project would reshape transport links across Eurasia. “This railway will fundamentally change the geopolitical landscape. Those who understand what it took to make this happen know what a major achievement it is,” Mirziyoyev said. The talks concluded with the signing of a Treaty on Allied Relations between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two sides also exchanged several bilateral documents, including agreements covering sections of their common border and the joint use of the Chashma spring. A Broader Regional Agenda While the Japarov-Mirziyoyev talks focused primarily on bilateral relations, the informal Consultative Meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and Azerbaijan broadened the discussion to regional integration, transport connectivity, energy security, and foreign-policy coordination. Opening the meeting, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov said one of the clearest results of closer regional cooperation had been the Central Asian countries’ growing support for one another on the international stage. As an example, he cited the region’s joint support for Kyrgyzstan’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2027-2028 term. Japarov also revived the idea of introducing a single tourist visa for foreign visitors traveling across Central Asia, proposing that the region’s foreign ministries intensify consultations on the initiative. Azerbaijan’s participation as a full member gave the meeting additional significance. Baku joined the consultative format as a...

Gas Supply

Turkmen Gas Exports to Europe Revived in Romanian Proposal

Romania has proposed reviving a long-standing project to transport Caspian natural gas to Europe through the Black Sea port of Constanța, with Turkmenistan identified as a potential supplier. The proposal was discussed on July 29 during a meeting between Turkmenistan’s ambassador to Romania, Annamammet Annayev, and Mihai Daraban, president of the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Daraban called for renewed consideration of the Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector, known as AGRI. The project envisages transporting gas to Georgia’s Black Sea coast, converting it into liquefied natural gas, and shipping it to a terminal at Constanța for onward delivery through Romania’s gas network. Originally developed to carry Azerbaijani gas, AGRI was established by companies from Azerbaijan, Georgia, Romania, and Hungary. A feasibility study was approved in 2015, but the project has made little visible progress since then. According to the Romanian publication Capital, Daraban suggested that gas from Turkmenistan could reach Europe through infrastructure in Azerbaijan and Georgia before entering Romania’s network and the BRUA pipeline, which connects Romania and Hungary. No agreement was announced, however, and significant questions remain over how Turkmen gas would cross the Caspian Sea. The proposed Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline has been discussed for decades but has yet to be built because of Russian and Iranian opposition and uncertainty over who would finance the project and commit to buying the gas. The meeting also covered closer cooperation between the ports of Turkmenbashi and Constanța. Annayev proposed establishing a regional distribution center at Constanța for Turkmen products, while the two sides discussed maritime transport and container logistics. Constanța is Romania’s largest seaport, and Bucharest has sought to position it as a European terminus for the Middle Corridor, the trade route linking Central Asia with Europe through the Caspian Sea and the South Caucasus. The Times of Central Asia previously reported that Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan have expanded cooperation in transport, logistics, and energy. Improved links between their Caspian ports could support growing cargo traffic, although a separate and substantially more expensive infrastructure project would be required to export Turkmen gas through the AGRI route.

Caspian Sea

As Two Wars Reach the Caspian, Central Asia’s Middle Corridor Holds

On July 25, two wars met in waters that Central Asian governments had tried to keep apart. Ukraine reported successful long-range strikes in the Caspian Sea. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said the targets included vessels involved in carrying military cargo from Iran and a warship. Tehran said an Iranian commercial vessel had been struck, killing one sailor and injuring another, and accused Kyiv of trying to widen the war. It remains unclear whether the vessel identified by Iran was among the targets described by Zelenskyy. Diplomacy produced a limited off-ramp. On July 28, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araqchi, that the strike on the Iranian ship was unintended. Both governments said they wanted to avoid further escalation. The call reduced the immediate risk of retaliation, but it did not remove the new danger. The Caspian is now one of the places where Russia’s war against Ukraine and the war involving Iran, Israel, and the United States intersect. Central Asia is exposed through the infrastructure and trade routes linking them. A “Sea of Peace” Under Pressure Turkmenistan responded to the incident with unusually direct language. Its Foreign Ministry called attacks on vessels in the Caspian “inadmissible” and described the waterway as a “sea of peace, harmony and good-neighborliness.” Ashgabat did not name Ukraine or endorse Iran’s account. Its restraint was characteristic, but the public criticism was unusual. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality normally produces guarded statements during external conflicts. The intervention showed that Ashgabat viewed the attack as a challenge to the regional order. Turkmenistan faces Iran across a 1,148-kilometer land border and the southern Caspian. Turkmenbashi port is also central to its plans for a larger role in Eurasian trade. The principle is set out in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau in 2018. Its text calls for the peaceful use of the sea, prohibits the use or threat of force, and bars armed forces belonging to non-Caspian states. The convention has not entered into force because Iran has not ratified it. Its provisions were designed to govern relations among the five littoral states. They do not address a long-range strike carried out by a non-littoral state. But modern drones can cross distances that once provided strategic shelter. A landlocked sea can no longer be assumed to sit beyond the reach of surrounding wars. The Iran-Russia Link Ukraine has clear military reasons to look toward the Caspian. Iran has supplied Russia with drone technology used against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure. The sea also provides a direct commercial route between Iranian ports and Russia’s Volga region. Kyiv now treats vessels on that route carrying military cargo as part of Russia’s military logistics. Iran described the vessel struck on July 25 as civilian. The dispute over the ship’s cargo is central because commercial and military supply chains can overlap. A vessel may be civilian by flag and registration while carrying goods that Ukraine considers part of Russia’s war effort. That uncertainty reaches beyond...