Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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Economic Cooperation

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan Implement Free Trade Agreement

On February 25, 2025, the free trade agreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan officially came into effect, eliminating customs duties on most goods produced in both countries, with certain exceptions. This landmark move aims to strengthen trade and economic ties between the two neighbors. The announcement was made by Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Investments, Industry, and Trade on March 7, following the completion of all legal procedures for the Protocol on Exceptions to the Free Trade Regime, signed on July 16, 2024. The protocol had been approved earlier by Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev through Resolution No. 29 on January 27, 2025. Key Provisions and Economic Sectors Under the new trade rules, Turkmenistan has removed customs duties on a range of key Uzbek exports, including the following items with their previous tariffs or taxes noted: Cement (100%) Textiles (50%) Furniture (50%) Glass containers (50%) Water heating boilers (15%) Plastic and polypropylene products (10%) Sausages and meat products ($2 per kg) Cottonseed oil ($1 per kg) Officials anticipate that the free trade system will boost economic activity between the two countries by facilitating business operations and encouraging investment. The Uzbek Ministry of Investments, Industry, and Trade, along with other government bodies, is working to help Uzbek businesses maximize the benefits of the new trade framework, whilst both governments expect the deal to accelerate industrial cooperation across sectors such as construction, agriculture, and manufacturing. Growing Trade Volume or a One-Way Street? The agreement reflects already expanding trade dynamics. According to TurkmenPortal, trade turnover between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan increased by 23% in the first quarter of 2024 compared to the same period in 2023, reaching $455 million. Turkmen exports to Uzbekistan surged by 36%, totaling $407 million. Turkmenistan's imports from Uzbekistan experienced a 30% decline, however, dropping from $69.2 million to $48 million during the January- May period compared to the same timeframe in 2023. Strengthened Bilateral Relations and Regional Impact Nevertheless, the agreement represents more than economic policy and could underscore a new era of trust and cooperation. Both countries have worked to improve their relationship through proactive diplomacy, with recent high-level meetings - including those between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov - emphasizing the shared goal of collaborating across trade, cultural, and political spheres. The free trade regime sets a benchmark for greater economic collaboration within Central Asia, whilst the elimination of tariffs and smoother trade between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan could inspire similar agreements among neighboring countries. While challenges such as infrastructure harmonization and policy alignment remain, the benefits of this agreement showcase the potential for regional integration.

Civil Aviation

Wizz Air to Offer Uzbek-Language Service After Passenger Complaint

Uzbekistan’s Competition Committee has investigated a passenger complaint against Wizz Air and taken action to improve service for Uzbek travelers. As a result, the airline will now provide Uzbek-language assistance on flights to Uzbekistan. The Complaint The issue came to public attention when Rasul Kusherbayev, a former deputy and adviser to the Minister of Ecology, encountered a language barrier on a Wizz Air flight from Samarkand to Abu Dhabi. Kusherbayev, who was seated near the emergency exit, was given safety instructions in English. Since he did not understand English, he requested an explanation in Uzbek or Russian. However, instead of accommodating his request, a crew member asked him to leave the plane. Kusherbayev refused, and upon arrival in Abu Dhabi, the airline contacted local police. Authorities advised both sides to resolve the matter amicably. Wizz Air staff later informed Kusherbayev that he was banned from using the airline’s services in the future. The incident led Kusherbayev to publicly criticize Wizz Air for failing to provide information in Uzbekistan’s state language. Government Response and Airline Commitment Following the complaint, Uzbekistan’s Competition Committee launched an investigation. The committee emphasized that all passengers must clearly understand safety instructions and that providing them exclusively in a foreign language could create risks and misunderstandings. As a result of the probe, the committee took action against the airline employees involved. Wizz Air also introduced new training programs for its crew on flight safety, etiquette, and passenger rights. The airline has committed to ensuring that by 2025, flight attendants and service personnel on Uzbekistan-bound flights will be able to communicate in Uzbek.

Trade War

How Trump’s Trade War on China Affects Central Asia

When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to impose tariffs on China and the European Union could have severe consequences not only for Brussels and Beijing, but also for economies around the world. Central Asia is no exception, as it could easily be caught in the crossfire. Although no country in Central Asia sees the United States as its major economic partner, Trump’s trade war with the EU and China is expected to impact all Central Asian nations in one way or another. Their strong economic ties with China and the growing EU presence in the region were once seen as a strategic advantage. Now, it seems to represent a double-edged sword. As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, all Central Asian states have sought to strengthen economic relations with Beijing and Brussels. Their partnerships with China and the EU have grown through trade and investments, but Washington’s tariffs on Chinese and European goods could result in a reduction in demand for various items in Central Asia. Trump’s tariff policy could also give Beijing certain leverage over Washington in the strategically important region. According to Mark Temnycky, Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council Eurasia Center, as a way to counter the impact of U.S. tariffs, the Chinese could increase their trade and energy relations with the countries of Central Asia. “This would further accelerate China’s relationship with Central Asia, and it could result in the regional states becoming more dependent on the Chinese for trade. Given the proximity of China to Central Asia, this may also result in the regional nations reducing their trade relations with the European Union as well as with the United States, as they favor Chinese prices,” Temnycky told The Times of Central Asia in an interview. U.S. bilateral trade in the region has never been particularly strong. The exception is Kazakhstan – the region’s largest economy – which is the only country in Central Asia whose trade with the U.S. exceeds one billion dollars. According to official statistics, in 2024 America’s total goods trade with Kazakhstan was estimated at $3.4 billion. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan combined have a lower trade volume with the United States than Kazakhstan. But all that is just a drop in the ocean compared to the $89.4 billion trade China reached with Central Asian in 2023. “Trump’s tariff policy could lead to an even greater Central Asian states’ dependency on China, potentially creating a Chinese monopoly on Central Asian trade and energy. In other words, regional countries would no longer have a diversified economy and market, thus tightening China's control over the area,” Temnycky stressed. That, however, does not necessarily mean that Beijing will, in the long term, benefit from Washington’s tariff policy. According to Tyler Schipper, an economist and Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas, China is “arguably at one of its economically weakest points in the last several decades,” which means that any trade war with the...

Middle Corridor

Opinion: Washington Needs a Stronger Policy for the Middle Corridor

The inauguration of President Donald Trump marks a new phase in U.S. foreign policy with direct implications for the Middle Corridor, a key trade route linking China to Europe via Central Asia and the South Caucasus. This corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), has been gaining increasing strategic importance as global trade patterns shift and great-power competition intensifies. During Trump’s first term, U.S. engagement in the region was sporadic and lacked a comprehensive strategy. While some policy initiatives were undertaken to counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence in Eurasia, these efforts remained piecemeal. The Biden administration attempted to address this gap by allocating limited funding for infrastructure development and engaging in regional negotiations aimed at fostering greater connectivity. However, Biden’s approach ultimately fell short of a coherent, long-term policy, allowing Moscow and Beijing to consolidate their positions in the region. The significance of the Middle Corridor has been underscored by increased international investment. Beyond economic concerns, the Middle Corridor plays a critical role in Europe’s energy security. The corridor facilitates the westward flow of Caspian resources, providing an alternative to Russian energy exports. The development of the Middle Corridor offers a strategic means of achieving this goal, reinforcing the EU’s energy independence while simultaneously strengthening economic ties with the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan has emerged as a central player in the development of the Middle Corridor. As a crucial transit country, Baku has actively pursued infrastructure investments to bolster the corridor’s efficiency. Azerbaijan’s role is further magnified by its growing energy exports to Europe, solidifying its position as a strategic partner in regional energy security. The Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, a vital component of the corridor, has received continued investment, underscoring Azerbaijan’s commitment to enhancing trade and transit connectivity. However, Azerbaijan’s increasing importance also intersects with ongoing geopolitical complexities, particularly its relationship with Armenia. The absence of Armenian participation in the Middle Corridor remains a notable gap, one that is directly tied to the resolution of long-standing territorial disputes. The prospect of an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace treaty has gained traction in recent years, supported by Western diplomatic efforts. U.S. policymakers have recognized that sustainable peace between the two nations would not only stabilize the South Caucasus but also unlock Armenia’s potential role in the corridor. Armenia’s geopolitical realignment presents both opportunities and challenges. While Yerevan has signaled its interest in deepening ties with the West, it remains economically dependent on Russia, particularly in energy and financial sectors. Increased Armenian exports to Russia, some of which analysts suspect may involve re-exports of sanctioned goods, further complicate efforts to shift its economic orientation. Recent discussions within U.S. policy circles indicate a growing recognition of the Middle Corridor’s strategic importance. American policymakers have begun exploring ways to expand support for infrastructure development in the region, recognizing that a proactive approach could yield multiple geopolitical and economic benefits. By investing in the Middle Corridor, the U.S. has an opportunity to enhance regional stability, strengthen economic ties with key partners, and counterbalance Russian...

Economic Cooperation

Uzbekistan and Pakistan Agree to Increase Trade Volume by $2 Billion

Uzbekistan and Pakistan have agreed to expand trade, transport, and cultural cooperation, following talks between Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Tashkent on February 26. During the meeting, both leaders expressed satisfaction with the growing bilateral relationship. In 2024, trade volume between the two countries exceeded $400 million, and the number of joint ventures reached 130. Additionally, direct flights between Tashkent and Lahore have been resumed. The two sides discussed plans to boost trade to $2 billion and simplify customs procedures under a recently adopted roadmap. Key areas of cooperation include pharmaceuticals, agriculture, mining, and textiles. Transport connectivity was a major focus of the discussions. Freight traffic through the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor has increased fivefold in recent years, and the two countries agreed to establish a joint transport and logistics company. They also pledged to advance the Trans-Afghanistan railway project, which aims to enhance regional trade routes. The two governments also committed to expanding cultural and educational exchanges. Agreements were reached on mutual cultural weeks, tourism development, and cooperation in science, technology, youth policy, and security. To strengthen long-term cooperation, Uzbekistan and Pakistan will establish a High Council for Strategic Partnership, with its first meeting scheduled for next year.

Bilateral Relations

Uzbekistan Sees Opportunities in Afghanistan

Uzbekistan’s business relations with neighboring Afghanistan are booming. In 2024, Uzbek-Afghan trade came to some $1.1 billion, and more than $1 billion of that was Uzbek exports to Afghanistan. It seems after the February 22-23 visit of Taliban acting Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Abdul Ghani Baradar to Uzbekistan, that figure is likely to continue climbing. Baradar met with Uzbek Prime Minister Abdullo Aripov and Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khojayev to discuss trade and investment, which is essentially the basis of Uzbekistan’s relations with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. The immediate results of these talks were modest, but projects due to start in the near future offer substantial profits for both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan agreed to lift restrictions on imports of Afghan agricultural goods, which facilitated another agreement establishing a free economic zone in Uzbekistan’s border area that would have factories for processing pine nuts and cotton from Afghanistan. Agricultural goods are the bulk of Afghanistan’s exports to Uzbekistan, which is not surprising since more than 40 years of war have prevented Afghanistan from building many plants and factories for producing finished goods. A report from November 2024 said in the first ten months of the year, Uzbekistan’s exports to Afghanistan came to some $855.9 million, while Afghan exports to Uzbekistan amounted to only some $28.3 million. Power On Uzbekistan is the leading exporter of electricity to Afghanistan, supplying nearly 60% of Afghanistan’s electricity imports, and that amount could increase soon. Baradar’s delegation discussed progress on the 500 kV transmission line from Uzbekistan’s Surkhan region to Dashti-Alvan, near the Baghlan provincial capital Pul-e-Khumri, which will increase Uzbekistan’s electricity exports to Afghanistan by some 70%. Construction of the 260-kilometer transmission line started in 2018 and has been repeatedly delayed. Baradar said Uzbek officials agreed to cut the cost of building the transmission line from $252 million to $222 million. Turkmenistan is also considering building a 500 kV transmission line to Dashti-Alvan. Uzbek Deputy Prime Minister Khojayev and Baradar reviewed progress at Afghanistan’s Toti-Mardan gas field, just south of the border with Turkmenistan, which is believed to contain vast reserves of natural gas. In November 2024, Uzbekistan signed a ten-year contract to develop the gas field, pledging to invest $100 million in the project each year. According to reports about Baradar’s recent visit, drilling at the site is expected to begin soon. Prime Minister Aripov said Uzbek investors were already preparing to start construction of a cement plant in Afghanistan’s Samangan Province. Taliban officials have been offering Uzbek companies opportunities in Afghanistan’s mining sector for months. The Taliban acting minister of mines and petroleum, Hidayatullah Badri, was part of Baradar’s delegation and he met with Uzbek officials to discuss cooperation in developing Afghanistan’s mineral resources. The Afghan delegation again proposed Uzbek participation in developing mining sites, but there was no word in reports on any agreements. Aripov mentioned Uzbekistan was interested in the exploration and extraction of oil and gas, both of which Uzbekistan needs for domestic consumption, but did not mention mining....