Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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C5+South Korea

South Korea Steps Up Central Asia Critical Minerals Push

The first South Korea–Central Asia summit, held in Seoul on September 16, capped three days of bilateral meetings that produced more than 70 agreements and memorandums. The leaders agreed to meet every two years, a separate C5+1 forum for industry ministers was established, and critical minerals took a central place on the new agenda. The main question now is how many of those documents will translate into mines, processing plants, and long-term contracts. South Korea needs reliable supplies of metals for its automotive, electronics, battery, and energy industries. Central Asia wants to use that demand to develop domestic processing and reduce its reliance on raw material exports. Seoul proposed combining the region’s resources with its own exploration, mineral processing, and manufacturing technologies. President Lee Jae Myung spoke of cooperation across the production chain, from identifying deposits to manufacturing finished products. Rare metals centers being established at key locations in Central Asia are intended to support joint research and specialist training. Until now, South Korea has worked with the region’s countries largely through bilateral ties. The new C5+1 format adds a regional mechanism to those relationships. Kazakhstan will host the next summit in 2028. Kazakh financier and analyst Rasul Rysmambetov believes the value of the new format will depend on the region’s ability to secure tangible industrial results. He sees South Korea as an attractive partner because of its experience with rapid industrialization and its strengths in building industrial facilities. “The priority for Central Asia is to stop selling raw materials. We need to establish processing in the region. The heads of state’s visit to Seoul was highly productive. In fact, all summits in similar formats have been productive. The main question now is how to move away from exporting raw materials and toward joint industrialization,” Rysmambetov told The Times of Central Asia. Uzbekistan put forward a broader regional proposal. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev called for an investment alliance for critical minerals, with processing clusters bringing together exploration, mining, and the production of high-value goods. Uzbekistan and South Korea are already developing a joint rare metals center and have agreed to strengthen cooperation throughout the production chain. Kazakhstan offered Korean businesses a broader package covering rare metals, nuclear and clean energy, and artificial intelligence. Urban development was also part of the talks, including the Alatau Smart City project near Almaty. The countries upgraded their ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a memorandum on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The energy agreements also cover conventional resources. In April, South Korea said it had secured 18 million barrels of Kazakh crude oil. In Kyrgyzstan, Korean organizations are working with their Kyrgyz counterparts to identify possible antimony and tungsten projects and strengthen exploration capacity. Tajikistan is also offering cooperation on antimony, as well as precious metals, building on the first Korea–Tajikistan Minerals Forum, which took place in August. The minerals agenda is complemented by Korean willingness to invest in transport and infrastructure. South Korea and Uzbekistan agreed to expand Korean participation in...

Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

Central Asia’s First Korea Summit Produces Different Deals for Each Country

The first Central Asia-Republic of Korea Summit brought five countries to Seoul with very different records of working with Korean capital. Kazakhstan arrived with commercial agreements worth about $19 billion, while Uzbekistan is discussing multibillion-dollar financing through the state-owned Export-Import Bank of Korea. In Turkmenistan, Korean companies are expanding beyond their traditional role in the gas-chemical industry; Tajikistan is offering mineral resources; and Kyrgyzstan is establishing a dedicated government contact point to help attract Korean businesses. On September 16, the presidents of all five Central Asian states met South Korean President Lee Jae Myung together for the first time. Until now, the Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum, established in 2007, had operated mainly at a ministerial level. A permanent secretariat was established in 2017, and in 2020 the meetings were elevated to the level of foreign ministers. The leaders adopted the Seoul Declaration, agreeing to hold summits every two years, with Kazakhstan set to host the next in 2028. Ministerial meetings in the intervening years will review implementation and prepare the next summit’s agenda. The declaration also envisages Korea Desks across the five Central Asian countries to help businesses address administrative obstacles. The leaders expressed interest in combining Central Asian minerals with Korean technology to build joint production networks, and agreed to pursue measures to reduce non-tariff barriers. Seoul also sees Central Asia as part of its own industrial strategy. South Korea, one of the world’s leading producers of automobiles, electronics, batteries, and ships, needs stable supplies of energy and raw materials. Opening the summit, Lee spoke of combining the region’s resources with Korean exploration and processing technologies. Critical minerals, energy, and supply-chain resilience were among the main issues at the meeting. In 2025, South Korea’s trade with the five countries reached $10 billion for the first time: Korean exports totaled $8.67 billion, while imports from Central Asia amounted to $1.39 billion. Cumulative Korean investment in the region reached $6.48 billion. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan continue to account for most of this trade and investment. The talks in Seoul showed how different the next step could look in each of the five countries. [caption id="attachment_56323" align="aligncenter" width="1774"] Image: Akorda[/caption] Kazakhstan: $19 Billion in Agreements and Large-Scale Industry Kazakhstan arrived at the summit with the largest announced commercial package. On September 15, a day before the regional summit, Kazakhstan and South Korea signed around 80 agreements worth approximately $19 billion through the Kazakhstan-Korea Business Council in Seoul. About $11 billion is associated with projects involving Samruk-Kazyna, Kazakhstan’s sovereign wealth fund, which controls major state assets in oil and gas, energy, transport, telecommunications, and uranium mining. The $19 billion figure represents the value of signed agreements and announced projects at different stages of development. Behind the headline figure are several major industrial projects. QazaqGaz and Hyundai Engineering agreed to implement a gas processing plant at Karachaganak with an annual capacity of 5 billion cubic meters. KazMunayGas and Samsung E&A signed an agreement on expanding the Pavlodar refinery’s capacity to 9 million metric tons a...

Migration

Nearly 100,000 Uzbeks Return From Russia as Labor Migration Slows

Nearly 100,000 Uzbek citizens returned from Russia between August 25 and September 5, as broader figures point to a decline in labor migration from Uzbekistan to Russia amid rising costs and tighter migration controls. According to Uzbekistan’s Migration Agency, 96,415 people returned during the ten-day period. The agency has not published comparable figures for last year or explained why most of them came home, meaning the figure alone cannot be taken as evidence of a mass exodus. There is, however, evidence of a broader slowdown. Between January and June, Uzbek citizens made more than 1.1 million entries into Russia declaring “work” as the purpose of their trip, down 13.2% year-on-year. Across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, work-related entries fell by about 15%, from more than 2.3 million to 1.9 million. The figures count border crossings rather than individual workers, meaning the same person may appear more than once. But unlike the ten-day return figure, they show a decline sustained over the first half of the year. Alexander Safonov, a professor at Russia’s Financial University, told Vedomosti that “tighter migration policy and the rising cost of work patents” were among the factors behind the decline. Uzbek and Tajik citizens need patents to work legally in Russia. Safonov also pointed to the cost of medical examinations, housing, and travel, which reduce the amount migrants can save or send home. At the same time, Russia has tightened migration controls. Since February 2025, foreign nationals who no longer have legal grounds to remain in the country have been placed on a register of controlled persons. Those listed face restrictions on certain banking transactions, registering property and vehicles, and other activities. Moscow and the Moscow Region have introduced additional controls. Some visa-free foreign workers are required to use the Amina mobile application for migration registration and to provide information about their location. From September 1, 2026, the system was expanded to other categories of adult foreign nationals from visa-free countries staying in the capital region for more than 90 days. The treatment of Uzbek migrants has also become an issue in relations between Tashkent and Moscow. In late August, Uzbek representatives discussed migration checks, the situation of citizens placed on the register of controlled persons, and the possibility of regularizing the status of some foreign nationals with Russia’s Interior Ministry, Prosecutor General’s Office, and Foreign Ministry. Some Uzbek workers who have already left Russia describe a similar calculation. In the spring, Azattyq Asia spoke with Uzbeks who had worked in Russia and returned home. They cited rising living costs, tougher migration rules, inspections, and concerns about their safety. Said, from Samarkand, had worked in Russia for several years before returning and finding a job at home. He said that Russian wages appeared less attractive once rent and the cost of a work patent were taken into account. Human rights advocate Valentina Chupik told the outlet that the return trend had begun before this year. She cited the ruble exchange rate, the war in Ukraine, and concerns...

Central Asia-South Korea Summit 2026

South Korea and ADB Expand Central Asia Critical Minerals Push

Two days before South Korea hosts its first summit with all five Central Asian countries on September 16, Seoul held a series of talks with the Asian Development Bank over how Korean technology and financing could be used in critical-mineral projects in the region. On September 14, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met ADB President Masato Kanda in Seoul, where they agreed to work more closely on critical-mineral supply chains, artificial intelligence, and energy. Kanda later held separate talks with South Korean Finance Minister Koo Yun-cheol. More specifically, the two discussed combining ADB financing with the technology and expertise of South Korean companies for projects in Central Asia. The talks build on a financing mechanism that was already in place. ADB formally launched its Critical Minerals-to-Manufacturing Financing Partnership Facility at its annual meeting in Samarkand in May. It is designed to support critical-mineral supply chains across ADB’s developing member countries in Asia and the Pacific. The facility has two components. The first is a grant window that pays for early-stage work, including feasibility studies, environmental and social assessments, and technical assistance. At its launch, ADB announced a $20 million contribution from Japan and $1.6 million from the United Kingdom to this part of the facility. The second is designed to mobilize additional capital and share risk. This is where South Korea comes in. Korea Eximbank and Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE) each signed a memorandum covering up to $500 million in potential financing, giving the two South Korean institutions a combined potential cofinancing commitment of up to $1 billion. The facility is intended to support projects across the value chain, from mining and processing to manufacturing and recycling. ADB is already working on critical-minerals initiatives in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, the bank is supporting the development of a critical-minerals strategy, while in Uzbekistan it is working on AI-driven critical-metals production and circular approaches to raw materials. At an ADB seminar launching the facility during the bank’s annual meeting in Samarkand, Kanda said the aim was to ensure mineral-producing countries benefited from more than extraction. “Asia and the Pacific should be more than a source of raw materials. The region should also capture the jobs, technology, and value these minerals provide,” Kanda said. Central Asia's Critical Minerals Play Kazakhstan is already a major producer of uranium and chromite and also produces or processes titanium, beryllium, tantalum, zinc, and other strategic materials. In July, Kazakhstan and South Korea began establishing a joint research center for rare and rare-earth metals at Satbayev University in Almaty. The center is expected to work on processing technologies and specialist training. Ahead of the summit, Kazakhstan said it wanted to expand cooperation with South Korea beyond the already established automotive industry into AI, advanced technologies, and critical minerals. Astana is interested in deeper processing of raw materials and producing higher-value-added goods. Uzbekistan is moving in the same direction. The country has a $4.2 billion critical-minerals program for 2026–2030 comprising 120 projects. Tashkent plans to increase industry...

Women in Media

Central Asian Women Journalists Set Regional Priorities Through 2029

The Coalition of Women Journalists of Central Asia is preparing a multi-year program. At a conference that opened in Tashkent on September 14, more than 100 media professionals from across Central Asia are discussing common priorities through 2029 and developing a regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. For the coalition, the program is an attempt to move from periodic conferences toward a permanent professional network. The Second Central Asian International Conference of Women Media Professionals runs from September 14 to 15 under the theme “Regional Solidarity, Digital Security and an Inclusive Future for Journalism.” The event is organized by Uzbekistan’s Modern Journalism Development Center, with the National Coalition of Women Journalists of Tajikistan serving as its regional partner. The coalition emerged after the first such meeting in Dushanbe. On May 3, 2024, participants signed a memorandum establishing it. A planned follow-up conference in Dushanbe in May 2025 was abruptly canceled after two venues declined to host it. No official explanation was given. Participants are now discussing a program for 2026–2029 covering mutual support and exchanges of experience. It would also provide for coordinated responses to threats against journalism. Digital security is a major focus of the Tashkent program. The agenda covers online harassment and how deepfakes are used to spread disinformation. Separate sessions address the psychological toll on journalists and ways to protect personal data and newsroom systems during a digital attack. Those concerns reflect a wider problem for women working in journalism. According to a report published by UNESCO in May 2026, 45% of surveyed women journalists and other media workers said they self-censored on social media because of online violence, up from 30% in 2020. About 22% reported self-censorship in their professional work. Roughly a quarter had been diagnosed with or treated for anxiety or depression linked to online violence, while 13% reported post-traumatic stress disorder. Regional newsrooms are also working to improve reporting on violence against women. On September 8–9, just days before the Tashkent conference, journalists from across Central Asia gathered in Almaty for training on ethical reporting of gender-based violence. The event, held with the participation of UN Women, focused on professional and ethical standards for covering such cases. The Tashkent meeting is also intended to make regional solidarity more practical. Participants are discussing ways to provide rapid professional support when journalists face online attacks or other pressure. Another expected outcome is a unified regional guide to gender-sensitive journalism. It is intended to bring together recommendations for reporting on gender-related issues in a responsible and balanced way. Tashkent will also host the Women Media Awards Central Asia, a regional award for women working in the media. The program includes an audiovisual performance, “Echo: The Power of Invisible Voices,” addressing hate speech and digital attacks involving bots and deepfakes. After Tashkent, the test will be whether the network works between conferences, when journalists are separated by national borders and a colleague may need help that same day.

CSTO

For the CSTO, Afghanistan Might Be the Last Credible Threat

The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization is conducting its “Rubezh (Frontier) 2026” military exercises from September 12-19. Those exercises are designed with Afghanistan in mind, a country that the CSTO has been talking about frequently in 2026, and also one where militant groups pose a shared threat to its members. And even the Taliban are no longer viewed as the threat they once were. Frontier 2026 The Frontier 2026 exercises are taking place at the Koktal training ground in southeastern Kazakhstan’s Zhetysu Province. The CSTO’s Rapid Deployment Force is practicing to repel cross-border incursions in mountain and desert terrain. The exercises come this time as concerns about infiltration by militants in Afghanistan into CIS territory are increasing. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov said on September 8 that Russia is paying special attention to strengthening Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan. The Tajik authorities have been calling for additional aid for the country’s border forces since a series of attacks from Afghanistan in November 2025 left five Chinese workers in southern Tajikistan dead, followed by an attack in December that killed two Tajik border guards. Tajikistan has regularly asked for international help in guarding its frontier with Afghanistan since independence in 1991. But after the violence at the end of 2025, the Tajik government appealed especially to its fellow members in the CSTO for increased assistance. CSTO Secretary General Taalatbek Masadykov said at the end of August that the first shipment of weapons and equipment would be sent to Tajikistan this autumn. Raison D’être The Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in 1992 by representatives from Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Georgia joined. The purpose was simple. If any of the member states was attacked by an external enemy, that state could request aid, including military assistance, from the other members. In the early 1990s, there were potential enemies for the Treaty members in practically every direction. The Soviet Union had collapsed in late 1991. There were questions about how the former Communist Bloc countries and their new Western allies might act. The theocratic regime in Iran was a possible threat to the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and the latter region had unstable Afghanistan to worry about also. China was a concern for Central Asia and Russia. Back then, banding together made sense for the nine newly independent states that signed the treaty. When Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan dropped out in 1999, it appeared the Collective Security Treaty was on the brink of becoming irrelevant. After Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, he put a new emphasis on a security bloc within the CIS, and in 2002, the remaining six treaty members signed a new charter. However, now, in 2026, the list of the CSTO’s potential external threats is greatly reduced. Far from being a security concern, China is now a leading trade partner for Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and provides military assistance to all four countries. Iran’s relations with the West remain...