Uzbekistan International Affairs - The Times Of Central Asia

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SCO Summit

Kyrgyzstan Hosts SCO Summit as Bloc Marks 25 Years

Leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's ten member states are due in Bishkek on September 1 for the final summit of Kyrgyzstan's 2025-2026 chairmanship. The meeting is expected to produce a Bishkek Declaration marking the SCO's 25th anniversary, alongside thematic statements and other decisions. For Kyrgyzstan, the gathering is more than a turn in the organization's rotating chairmanship. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in the country during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. The summit coincides with Kyrgyzstan's Independence Day and the August 31 opening of the World Nomad Games. The member-state session will bring together Belarus, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with President Sadyr Japarov as host. Chinese President Xi Jinping will also make a state visit, giving the summit a substantial bilateral program alongside the formal meetings. Kyrgyzstan's Diplomatic Week The summit comes less than three months after Kyrgyzstan was elected to the UN Security Council for 2027-2028, its first term on the body. Hosting the SCO gives Japarov an opportunity to reinforce that diplomatic profile before the Security Council term begins in January. The SCO's foreign ministers reiterated in July that Central Asia is the organization's core and backed a larger role for it in the region's security and economic development. Their statement also praised Kyrgyzstan's chairmanship and confirmed that the Council of Heads of State and SCO Plus meetings would take place in Bishkek on August 31 and September 1. What Cholpon Ata Already Settled At their July 24 meeting in Cholpon Ata, SCO foreign ministers approved the draft declaration and accompanying documents as a basis for the summit. The language is therefore largely negotiated before the leaders arrive, although the final package can still change. The ministerial statement gives a clearer indication of the political agenda, supporting a multipolar world order and rejecting unilateral sanctions. It also calls for more intra-SCO trade. Terrorism, separatism, extremism, drug trafficking, and transnational organized crime remain its stated security priorities. The statement says the SCO is entering a period of institutional reform, including changes to its legal framework and cooperation procedures. A Development Bank Still Taking Shape Economic cooperation will occupy a significant part of the summit. In Tianjin last year, interested member states reached political consensus to establish an SCO Development Bank. The institution is not yet operational. At the fourth consultation meeting in Shenzhen in June, delegates discussed its key elements and the next stage of negotiations. A timetable or capital commitments announced in Bishkek would move the proposal beyond its current design stage. The bank could eventually provide another source of finance for infrastructure, but its structure and membership remain unsettled. Currency diversification will also remain part of the discussion. The 2024 Astana Declaration called for gradual growth in the use of national currencies for settlements among interested members. Sanctions on Russia and Iran have increased the political importance of that effort, although the SCO has not created a common payment system. SCO Plus, but Not...

SCO Summit

Xi Jinping Heads to Bishkek as Kyrgyzstan Prepares to Host 21 Heads of State

Chinese President Xi Jinping will attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek and make a state visit to Kyrgyzstan, Beijing has confirmed. The trip, which also includes a state visit to Egypt, will run from August 30 to September 3. The formal meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State is scheduled for September 1. As many as 21 heads of state are expected in Kyrgyzstan during the week, according to presidential spokesman Askat Alagozov. Xi had long been expected to be among the leaders traveling to the Kyrgyz capital, but the formal confirmation turns attention from the guest list to the business that may be conducted around the main session. For Kyrgyzstan, the most consequential part of the visit may come in Xi's talks with President Sadyr Japarov rather than in the summit hall. The Times of Central Asia will be reporting from Bishkek as the delegations arrive, and from the opening ceremony of the World Nomad Games on August 31. Several visiting heads of state are expected to attend the ceremony, which will bring summit diplomacy and Kyrgyzstan’s biggest cultural showcase together on the eve of the SCO meeting. Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has already confirmed that he will be there. The spectacle will be considerable, but the substance is likely to emerge in the bilateral meetings, signed agreements, and final documents released around the September 1 summit. The State Visit and the Railway The state visit format gives Xi and Japarov a bilateral program alongside the summit. The most prominent economic issue is likely to be the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, a project discussed for decades that is now under construction across some of Kyrgyzstan's most difficult terrain. The Kyrgyz authorities put the railway’s construction cost at about $4.7 billion. China holds 51% of China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Railway Company LLC, while Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan each hold 24.5%. Roughly half of the cost is being financed through a 35-year Chinese loan to the company. The summit could bring clearer evidence of how quickly construction is progressing. Any new financing, contracts, or cross-border arrangements would be more significant than another general statement of political support. The railway also places Kyrgyzstan inside a larger shift in regional trade. Commerce between China and the five Central Asian states passed $100 billion in 2025. Bishkek wants a larger share of that traffic and more of the value created along transit routes. Xi's visit offers Japarov an opportunity to press the case for logistics hubs, local employment and supporting roads rather than transit alone. The Documents Behind the Ceremony The SCO's national coordinators have been finalizing the outcome documents in the weeks leading up to the summit. Under Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship, the SCO has emphasized regional stability and economic cooperation, alongside digital transformation, cyber threats, environmental policy, and cultural exchange. SCO decisions require consensus, which tends to soften disagreements in final communiqués. Any agreements that specify funding, deadlines, or responsibility would give the Bishkek package more weight. Bilateral Meetings Around the Summit The summit will bring...

TCA Interviews JICA

JICA’s Sota Tosaka on Afghanistan’s Economic Ties With Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan is deepening trade and transport ties with Afghanistan despite continuing political and humanitarian concerns, drawing its southern neighbor closer to Central Asian markets. In an interview with The Times of Central Asia, Sota Tosaka, chief representative of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for Afghanistan, described that engagement as part of a practical regional approach. Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries, he said, are seeking areas where economic cooperation can continue. Tosaka, who previously worked at JICA headquarters overseeing Central Asia and the Caucasus, has also visited Uzbekistan several times, including Termez. He said his current position gives him a different perspective on the relationship between Afghanistan and its northern neighbors. “I previously visited Termez in 2019 when I was overseeing the Central Asia and Caucasus region at JICA headquarters,” Tosaka told The Times of Central Asia. “At that time, the free trade zone aimed at facilitating business with Afghanistan did not exist yet. Returning to Termez recently, I was genuinely surprised to see how much progress has been made and how actively various cross-border initiatives are now being explored and implemented through Termez to connect Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.” Since taking charge of JICA’s Afghanistan operations, his work has focused on supporting Afghan people through international organizations. Tosaka noted that JICA’s primary focus remains on addressing the immediate needs of the Afghan population. To ensure that assistance directly reaches local communities and vulnerable groups, the agency coordinates its support through United Nations agencies and international partners. “Our priority is to deliver tangible support directly to the people of Afghanistan,” he said. “Working alongside UN partners allows us to effectively implement humanitarian activities that address daily challenges on the ground.” “Although the geopolitical environment surrounding Afghanistan has shifted significantly, Central Asian nations are actively pursuing opportunities to expand economic ties from their respective strategic viewpoints,” Tosaka continued. “Recognizing the importance of regional stability, countries like Uzbekistan are taking pragmatic steps to foster trade and commercial cooperation that serve mutual interests.” In particular, Uzbekistan’s proactive approach to encouraging business initiatives reflects a broader regional trend aimed at maintaining essential economic linkages. For Uzbekistan, the economic relationship has already become significant. Deputy Prime Minister Jamshid Khodjaev said in February that bilateral trade between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan has increased 2.5 times over the past five years, from $653 million in 2021 to $1.7 billion in 2025. The two countries have set a goal of raising annual trade to $5 billion. Tosaka noted that this economic orientation may become increasingly crucial given the diplomatic and logistical constraints Afghanistan faces on its eastern and western borders. “Complex relations with Pakistan and the geopolitical situation involving Iran present significant challenges for Afghanistan,” he explained. “Consequently, deepening economic ties with its northern neighbors becomes a vital strategic alternative. In this context, Central Asian nations serve as indispensable partners, creating mutually beneficial opportunities for sustainable regional development.” In parallel with these macro-economic trends, JICA is dedicated to strengthening grassroots economic resilience by empowering Afghan entrepreneurs, particularly women, in...

Military Defense

Uzbekistan’s Reported Chinese Jet Deal in a Changing Arms Market

China’s J-10CE could become Uzbekistan’s first new combat fighter in decades that was designed neither in Russia nor the Soviet Union. This summer, defense publications and analysts reported that Tashkent had allegedly already received the first aircraft and could eventually acquire 24 jets. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has confirmed the deal. If the reports prove accurate, the purchase would mark a notable shift for a region whose armed forces still rely heavily on Soviet- and Russian-made equipment. For decades, Russia was the natural source of new weapons, spare parts and maintenance. Its position is no longer unchallenged. China can offer combat aircraft and air-defense systems, Turkey has established itself in the drone market, while Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are developing their own defense industries. Whether or not the reports prove accurate, they point to two broader trends: Central Asian countries are increasingly looking beyond Russia for newer military technology, while some are also trying to produce more equipment at home. Shadow Purchase In July, reports emerged of the alleged delivery of four J-10CEs to Uzbekistan. The aircraft is the export version of the Chinese J-10C multirole fighter manufactured by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. Its export variant has already been purchased by Pakistan. Subsequent reports spoke of a possible contract for 24 aircraft and of Uzbek pilots undergoing training in China. Uzbek news outlet Kun.uz attempted to verify the claims and contacted the country’s Ministry of Defense. The ministry responded that it had no information it could provide on the matter. Chinese authorities and manufacturers have also made no public announcement of a sale. Nevertheless, throughout the summer, reports of Uzbekistan purchasing J-10CEs have refused to die down. Russian Weapons Remain the Backbone of Existing Arsenals Uzbekistan inherited a combat aircraft fleet from the Soviet Union built primarily around MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters. These aircraft were developed in the Soviet era, and after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remained the main source of compatible spare parts, weapons, repairs, and upgrades. The reports about the J-10CE challenge this established model. A new fighter comes with a different weapons, maintenance and training ecosystem. Over time, this creates dependence on a new supplier. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Russian exports of major arms in 2021–2025 were 64% lower than during the previous five-year period. Russia’s share of global arms exports fell from 21% to 6.8%, leaving it the world’s third-largest supplier after the United States and France. Those figures do not mean that China has replaced Russia as Central Asia’s dominant arms supplier. Russia retains a strong position, above all because of the equipment Central Asian militaries already operate. Kazakhstan is perhaps the clearest example. According to SIPRI data for 2021–2025, Russia accounted for 83% of Kazakhstan’s imports of major arms. Spain accounted for 7.9% and France for 3.6%. Kazakhstan operates Russian Su-30SM fighters, as well as helicopters, armored vehicles and air-defense systems. Any abrupt change in procurement policy would raise questions over the compatibility of ammunition, communications systems, maintenance, and the training of crews...

Nuclear Power

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan Coordinate on Nuclear Plant Safety

Uzbekistan is building its first nuclear power plant and preparing a second, while Kazakhstan intends to build at least three. Central Asia’s two largest economies are entering nuclear power at almost the same time. Even before their first reactors come online, the two countries are beginning to coordinate on safety and environmental monitoring, including potential transboundary impacts. On August 21, representatives of the two countries met in Tashkent and agreed on the main areas of further cooperation, including a road map and follow-up steps. The meeting came four days after a new announcement by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. On August 17, he said preparations were under way for a second nuclear power plant, although the country’s first nuclear complex in the Jizzakh region is only at the initial stage of construction. The location, capacity, timetable, and technology partner for the new plant have yet to be announced. Uzbekistan’s nuclear project has expanded considerably over the past two years. In 2024, Tashkent and Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom agreed to build a small nuclear power plant with six 55 MW RITM-200N reactors. The configuration was later revised to an integrated plant in the Forish district of the Jizzakh region, comprising two large VVER-1000 units and two small RITM-200N reactors. The complex will have a total capacity of about 2.1 GW. Construction formally began on June 4, 2026, when concrete was poured for the first reactor unit. A technical launch of the first small reactor is planned for late 2029, while the first large unit is expected to begin operating in 2033. The entire complex is expected to be operational by 2035. Official projections of annual generation range from about 15.4 billion to 17.2 billion kWh. Rapidly growing electricity demand is driving discussion of a second plant. Uzbekistan needs more generating capacity as industry and new urban projects grow and the population approaches 40 million. Natural gas remains the backbone of power generation, but the government is also expanding solar and wind energy. Nuclear power is intended to provide baseload electricity around the clock, regardless of weather conditions. Kazakhstan is the world’s largest uranium producer and has the world’s second-largest uranium reserves, but it currently has no operating commercial nuclear power reactors. In a nationwide referendum in October 2024, voters approved the construction of a nuclear power plant. The country’s first plant is planned near the village of Ulken on the shore of Lake Balkhash, with Rosatom selected to lead the international consortium for the project. A nuclear industry development strategy approved in April 2026 calls for Kazakhstan to have at least three nuclear power plants by 2050. It also covers nuclear science and workforce training, along with the management of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. China National Nuclear Corporation has been selected to build Kazakhstan’s second plant; in July 2025, Roman Sklyar, then the country’s first deputy prime minister, said China would also build the third. The April 2026 strategy is less specific, however, and lists small modular...

Border Security

Badakhshan Fighting Raises Risks for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

In Nusay district, Badakhshan province (northeast Afghanistan), fighting began around August 11 between Taliban forces and followers of Juma Khan Fateh, a local Taliban commander of ethnic Tajik origin who had resisted efforts to disarm his network. The Armed Conflict Location and Events Data Project (ACLED) identifies the immediate trigger as an attempt to remove military equipment and vehicles from areas under Fateh’s control, amid longer-running tensions over disarmament, local authority, and control of gold mining. Similar disputes over gold mines have repeatedly produced clashes between local commanders and Taliban forces since 2021. Fateh surrendered on August 17 after nearly a week of fighting. By August 22, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said his case was being prepared for trial. Post-surrender reporting also indicated weapons seizures and disarmament activity around Fateh-linked sites and associates, although the scale of the reported seizures and disarmament remained incompletely verified. The Fateh episode came amid a broader increase in armed instability in Badakhshan during 2026. ACLED recorded 22 anti-Taliban armed-opposition events in the province from January through July, compared with four from June through December 2025. In July, one opposition group temporarily seized the Yaftal-e Sufla district headquarters, while the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) reportedly fought Taliban forces in Zebak. The Yaftal-e Sufla and Zebak operations were separate from the Fateh confrontation, and there is no credible evidence of coordination with Fateh’s network. Fateh’s surrender ended the immediate confrontation, while separate armed-opposition activity in Badakhshan continued. The fighting has already had a direct cross-border consequence for Tajikistan. Nusay lies opposite Tajikistan’s Darvoz district. On August 13, gunfire from the Afghan side crossed into Darvoz, killing a 21-year-old woman inside her home and damaging residential property. Tajikistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a formal protest, saying the fighting had violated the country’s airspace and demanding respect for the state border and measures to prevent a recurrence. The Afghan Foreign Ministry acknowledged the death and expressed regret while blaming “disruptive and opportunistic elements.” The one confirmed limited incident does not show that the conflict has extended into Tajikistan on a sustained basis, but it makes the cross-border dimension more than hypothetical. Tajikistan shares a 1,374-kilometer frontier with Afghanistan, much of it facing Afghan Badakhshan. Dushanbe had already treated this border as a persistent security problem. In late November 2025, two attacks launched from Afghanistan’s territory killed five Chinese nationals and wounded five others in Tajikistan, which then instituted tighter border measures, while the Taliban pledged to cooperate on security and investigations. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is also implementing a program to strengthen the Tajik-Afghan frontier with weapons, equipment, and other border-protection means. Its 2026–27 implementation phase antedates the present fighting. A 2026 Security Council monitoring report said Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was active mainly in northern Afghanistan, particularly Badakhshan, and was developing cells capable of projecting a regional threat, with Central Asia remaining a key focus. It also reported concern in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan over the role of their nationals in the organization and the possible...