Our People > Aidar Borangaziyev

Contributor

Aidar Borangaziev is a Kazakhstani expert specializing in regional security and transport-logistics connectivity between Central and South Asia. His research focuses on Afghanistan, the trans-regional connectivity of Central Asia, the development of transport corridors, and the impact of regional political and economic processes on the security architecture. He has experience in diplomatic service in Afghanistan and Iran. He is the founder and president of the private think tank Open World Policy Lab in Astana.

Articles

Security

Without Security, There Can Be No Development in Afghanistan

Indian author Arundhati Roy once said, “Either way, change will come. It could be bloody, or it could be beautiful. It depends on us.” Almost three years after Taliban’s resurgence to power in Afghanistan, there are practically no developments to highlight in its relations with the outside world. The situation remains at a dead end as the international community and the authorities in Kabul are stuck on intransigent issues, and as Afghanistan continues to face a humanitarian crisis. In the context of current geopolitical realities after the recent fall of its “democratic” regime, Afghanistan finds itself in a gap between the experiences of the past and a yet undetermined future. It has a unique opportunity to transcend its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” and determine its own fate while simultaneously integrating into the international community. How the de facto authorities in Afghanistan handle this opportunity will not only shape the future of the Afghan people and the region, but also influence the development of the entire global security paradigm. Currently, the Taliban have every opportunity to lay the foundation for a new model of regional and international security, which would allow them to create conditions for the return of Afghanistan to the system of normal international relations. But they need to act quickly. Rising tensions in the Middle East engage almost every global and regional power, and further escalation there will negatively affect the situation around Afghanistan. In this unpredictable geopolitical environment, the Taliban can either take the lead on new security arrangements or once again experience an undesirable worsening of the security situation that goes beyond their control. A path forward is possible with the Taliban acting responsibly at the helm It seems that since the Anglo-Afghan wars of the 19th century, the world has become accustomed to seeing Afghanistan as a place where global geopolitical steam can be let off. But the Afghan people deserve progress, and various outside actors have offered different proposals. What the Taliban need is a chance at a breakthrough where they are the key player and can take full responsibility. The international community needs to allow such an opportunity to serve as a “maturity test” with which it can gauge the Taliban. At this important juncture, the international community must support Afghanistan in determining its own future. If external actors continue to promote political blueprints, Afghanistan will once again become a site for proxy wars, an arena of rivalry and a fertile ground for old narratives about international terrorism and other threats. Slamming the Taliban for their democratic failings, on which they clearly do not share the outsiders’ perspectives, will not yield productive results. For its part, if Kabul is really seeking to be a key player in Asia and a regular participant in international affairs, and if it seeks to realize its significant geographic and economic potential, then it must start implementing practical initiatives involving regional countries and international organizations in a dialogue on security. Maintaining internal security and stability...

2 years ago

Central Asia

The Taliban and its Neighbors: An Outsider’s Perspective

This is part two of a piece of which part one was published here. The topic of a regional approach to solving Afghanistan's problems is increasingly being discussed in various expert and diplomatic circles. The International Crisis Group (ICG), a reputable think tank whose opinion is extremely interesting as part of an "insider vs outsider" set of viewpoints, writes about this in particular. A report from ICG entitled "Taliban's Neighbors: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan" is one of the first works to summarize the role and place of the region as regards the situation around Afghanistan. In the voluminous work, the authors touch upon almost all aspects - issues of diplomatic recognition, security, terrorist activity, trade and economic relations within the region, water issues and others. In their conclusions, ICG analysts point out that many steps towards regional cooperation aren't related to Western donors, but European countries should nevertheless be interested. Europeans in particular would benefit from a stable, self-sufficient region that isn't a major source of illegal drugs, migrants or terrorism. But sanctions and other Western measures designed to show disapproval of the Taliban are obstacles to a more functional relationship between Kabul and the countries of the region. Significant progress depends on Western support - or at least tacit acquiescence. While such practical steps need not lead to recognition of the Taliban regime, they will contribute to regional peace and security. However, experts are concerned that the emerging regional consensus is directly dependent on security and stability issues in Afghanistan - if regional neighbors feel that the government cannot restore order within Afghanistan's borders and contain transnational threats, the consensus may well collapse. If that happens, regional countries may be tempted to choose sides in another intra-Afghan civil conflict, repeating the destructive pattern of past decades. At the same time, experts believe that the first step toward improving regional security cooperation would be to cool down the rhetoric on all sides and get regional players to agree on security issues, even if they have different priorities. Security information sharing within the region also suffers because the Taliban have yet to build a trusted dialog. They lack credibility because of their complete denial of certain threats. Meanwhile, countries in the region and the world are guided by inflated estimates of militant numbers. The ICG's assessments of the security threats posed by Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) are broadly in line with the consensus - in some ways, the growing concern about ISKP is paradoxical due to the fact that the overall level of violence associated with the group has declined over the past two years. The question of whether ISKP could become a more potent transnational threat in the future remains open. So far, its operations outside of its original territory near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have been limited. On the other hand, ISKP continues to attract recruits from different parts of Central and South Asia and encourages attacks outside Afghanistan - arguably making it the most dangerous armed group in...

3 years ago

Central Asia

Islamic State – Khorasan Province: An Element of Geopolitical Rivalry?

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack in Moscow, the media has once again been saturated with discussions about the terrorist group Islamic State – Khorasan Province (ISKP), also known as ISIS-Khorasan and “Wilayat Khorasan.” At this point, most of the coverage has focused on the Afghan wing of Islamic State, and not its other “wilayats,” such as on the Arabian Peninsula, “Wilayat Sinai” (Islamic State – Sinai Province) or “Wilayat Caucasus” (Islamic State – Caucasus Province). The international media covering the ISKP attack in Moscow, including journalists from Russia, widely speculated that the terrorist group is looking at Central Asia as its next base. Such media coverage included a variety of sentiments indicating that Central Asia should be worried. Reports have suggested that the alliance of Central Asian leaders with Moscow makes them look weak in the eyes of ISKP and that the terrorist threat emanating from Central Asia has become a point of weakness for the Putin regime. It has also been suggested that Islamic terrorism in Central Asia remains a real problem for the FSB, and even though the FSB has extensive experience in fighting extremists in the Caucasus, having committed enormous resources to the issue, Central Asia is a blind spot. Alarm bells sounded that regional jihadist groups have become more powerful. Thus, the terrorist attack in Moscow significantly increased media attention on ISKP in the context of Central Asia. Overall, the ISKP theme fits into existing narratives regarding threats to the southern border of the CIS. Sanaullah Ghafari, Emir of ISIS-K; image: rewardsforjustice.net The more likely reality is that in Central Asia, ISKP has been more of a challenge to regional security than an existential threat. In recent years, the region has been broadly successful in dealing with threats from Afghanistan. How real of a threat is the ISKP? A very narrow circle of experts can give a truly objective assessment of ISKP. Information about ISKP membership is contradictory and seemingly based on political considerations. As such, it is difficult to back these up with statistics. The number of fighters reported vary greatly from 2,000 to several tens of thousands. What remains indisputable are two facts: 1. Despite measures declared by the Taliban to eliminate the ISKP, terrorist acts by the group are still recorded throughout Afghanistan, and 2. The group lacks a serious infrastructure in Afghanistan. The activity of ISKP in Afghanistan consists of carrying out targeted, low-level terrorist acts, mainly against local Hazara Shiites. Based on the assessments of the UN Afghanistan monitoring team, the potential of ISKP success looks dubious. In its reports, UN experts point to a decrease in ISKP activity in Afghanistan. Recently, the UN has avoided estimating the size of the group, but previous estimates put it at 1,500-2,200 fighters. At the same time, according to a UN report in January, “ISKP adopted a more inclusive recruitment strategy, including by focusing on attracting disillusioned Taliban and foreign fighters.” Taliban officials, meanwhile, tend to play down the situation....

3 years ago

Afghanistan

Taliban and its Neighbors: A Regional Format for Overcoming Challenges in Afghanistan and Beyond

The process of making Afghanistan an independent economic entity that can work constructively within globally accepted economic standards and formats will require addressing pressing security issues as well as strengthening regional partnerships and cooperation. In the long term, this will not only benefit the people of Afghanistan but also its neighbors, as well as the Central Asian republics, who still need to realize their full transit and transport potential to best respond to the world’s changing needs in a new geopolitical environment. While there is currently emphasis on increasing bilateral trade, this in itself will not cure the economic and other problems ailing Afghanistan. Strategic infrastructure projects, in particular, will play a key role in ensuring the long-term economic stability of this country. The Taliban Government is already reaching out to regional neighbors in a new way since it regained power in 2021. Some of the existing regional cooperation structures can be molded to provide a platform for dialogue and collaboration with Afghanistan. Modern realities dictate to the region the need to quickly overcome existing differences in intra-regional relations and create a new model. To this end, the states in the region surrounding Afghanistan should build a system of coordinated and cohesive measures and approaches with security as a key consideration, bringing Afghanistan into the fold to serve mutual interests through regional development. Rapprochement or a de facto relationship with regional states? Recently, the Taliban Government in Afghanistan has been fairly successful in developing cooperation with neighboring countries. It seems that, as opposed to focusing solely on isolation from the West, the current regime has chosen to start actively establishing ties with states in the region, placing the main emphasis of their foreign policy on regional governments who are more interested in pragmatism than ideological prerequisites when it comes to their affairs with Afghanistan. If, for Pakistan and Iran, various forms of cooperation with Afghanistan are historically understandable, then for the Central Asian republics, the Taliban’s openness to broader dialogue, along with the promotion of mutual economic interests, allows for the prospect of transforming the whole region into a fully-fledged, self-sufficient collective unit within the larger global system. To achieve this, Central Asian countries must still overcome narratives of the past, develop common approaches (including through regional formats), and practically see Afghanistan as a genuine partner. In the meantime, states in the region are largely acting intuitively rather than with a calculated strategic depth, or strictly weighing the benefits of building trade relations with Afghanistan’s new authorities. That said, regional players still follow different vectors and act according to their own circumstances despite a common desire to see a stable neighbor in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, for instance, the main trigger in relations with Kabul is the Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP. Tehran, on the other hand, seeks to protect the Shiite minority in Afghanistan and see their participation in an inclusive government, but at the same time, builds dialogue with the Taliban, including on border security...

3 years ago

Afghanistan

The Priority of Maintaining a United and Stable Afghanistan

The issue of inter-ethnic relations in Afghanistan affects not only the country itself but also its surrounding region. Recent history has placed a heightened importance on the “nation” question in Afghanistan in terms of the country’s political and social stability. Since regaining power in 2021, the de facto Taliban authorities have focused primarily on social policies to respond to the people’s immediate needs as well as on implementing trade and economic cooperation with regional countries to realize the geo-economic potential of the country. To a large degree, they have been successful in these endeavors. The important question now is how the Taliban will work to synthesize various ethnic groups into a society that has a strong identity as a nation while preserving the Pashtun status quo and the legacy of Durrani statehood. Afghanistan in its current state is not ready for a federal structure, and outside actors pushing this now could possibly undermine its stability. On the other hand, the country and the wider region have a long history of diverse ethnic and national groups managing to find a way to coexist and function effectively. As the Afghan people try to overcome humanitarian crises and focus on their economic and social recovery, the Taliban’s strategy will likely continue to be based on the consolidation of ethnic groups around itself and under the umbrella of Islam, supported by measures of assimilation and expansion, as Pashtun rulers did in the country’s history. Understanding the historical role of ethnicity and nationality in Afghanistan So far, no modern regime in Afghanistan has been able to significantly advance the idea of “Afghan nationalism,” reflecting the national unity of the country’s people. Slogans about “one nation” have always been promoted by the capital, but did not necessarily reflect realities on the ground. The latest (2004) republican constitution states in its Article 4 that the Afghan nation consists of “Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Pashais, Nuristans, Aimaks, Arabs, Kyrgyz, Qizilbash, Gujars, Brahuis and other tribes,” and that the word “Afghan” applies to every citizen of Afghanistan. This multinational state has so far shown stability in its ethnic groups, but cannot demonstrate their synthesis into a society with a strong self-identification as the Afghan nation, and the term “Afghan” continues to serve as an exonym, a general name for the inhabitants of the country. After regaining power in 2021, the Taliban worked to stop a bloody civil war that had begun in 1978, but faced a set of problems including the big “national question.” Against the backdrop of demands from the international community to ensure an inclusive government, the idea of federalism is once again being brought up in information spheres, which, according to its few supporters, presents the only way to ensure long-term peace in this diverse country. Discussions about federalism in Afghanistan are not new and are largely connected to events in recent history, primarily the civil war that began in 1978 with the “April Revolution.” That said, there has not been enough technical analysis...

3 years ago

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