Our People > Aidar Borangaziyev

Contributor

Aidar Borangaziev is a Kazakhstani expert specializing in regional security and transport-logistics connectivity between Central and South Asia. His research focuses on Afghanistan, the trans-regional connectivity of Central Asia, the development of transport corridors, and the impact of regional political and economic processes on the security architecture. He has experience in diplomatic service in Afghanistan and Iran. He is the founder and president of the private think tank Open World Policy Lab in Astana.

Articles

Geopolitics

Central Asia’s Road to the Southern Seas: A Search for Stability

India has confirmed that it received a six-month sanctions waiver from the United States for its involvement in developing Iran’s Chabahar port. According to The Times of India, the decision followed intensive diplomacy by New Delhi, which convinced Washington that Chabahar provides India’s only practical overland access to Central Asia that avoids Pakistan. Through Chabahar, India is building a land-based counterpart to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, creating an alternative axis linking the Indian Ocean with Eurasia while bypassing Islamabad and Beijing. The exemption, valid until April 2026, gives India room to negotiate with Washington. For Central Asia, the episode reflects a broader challenge: choosing viable routes to the southern seas. Current debates about “Afghan transit” focus largely on the Trans-Afghan Railway and the so-called Kabul corridor connecting northern Afghanistan with Pakistan’s ports. Yet Afghanistan’s transport network is forming along multiple lines. Alongside the eastern route, a western corridor from Herat to Kandahar and Spin Boldak is also developing, offering access both to Pakistan and to Chabahar. The integration of western Afghanistan’s infrastructure with Iran’s transport network makes this corridor more reliable under today’s political and security conditions. It aligns with projects pursued by Iran, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan and positions Herat as a major hub. It is also close to the North–South Transport Corridor, the Lapis Lazuli and Middle Corridors, and the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions. The planned Mazar-i-Sharif–Herat line fits the logic of the Five Nations Railway Corridor, potentially giving Tajikistan and Uzbekistan access to Chabahar and, if stability improves, to Pakistan’s ports as well. By contrast, the eastern route will remain constrained by the unstable Afghan–Pakistani border and the volatile relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Afghanistan’s own priorities also differ from outside assumptions: the Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak line primarily serves as an internal transport spine linking the west and south. For Kabul, the route to Gwadar is more a political gesture than a practical goal. Some analysts note that developing the western corridor also helps rebalance the country’s economic geography toward its more diverse western regions. These dynamics strengthen the western route’s appeal. The Taliban leadership has even urged Afghan businesses to reduce reliance on Pakistani ports, signaling a structural shift in trade orientation. Both Chabahar and Gwadar face political risks. Pakistan’s transit routes pass through areas affected by insurgency, including Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the broader narcotics routes of the Golden Crescent. The greatest uncertainty remains the fluctuating relationship between Kabul and Islamabad. Gwadar, while technologically superior, is undermined by chronic instability. Chabahar’s capacity is more modest, but its integration with Iran’s road and rail network provides reliability. The United States adds another layer of complexity. The waiver suggests Washington is balancing its Iran sanctions regime with its strategic partnership with India. The United States is not directly involved in regional infrastructure but retains enough influence to shift the balance between the western and eastern routes. Under certain conditions, Gwadar may appear less problematic for Washington than Chabahar. At the same time, selective sanctions exemptions...

11 months ago

Afghanistan

Border Violence Between Afghanistan and Pakistan: A New Risk for Central Asia

The escalating tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan are forcing a reassessment of Afghanistan’s viability as a “partner space.” With cross-border clashes increasingly resembling a prolonged pattern rather than isolated incidents, and with both sides showing little willingness to compromise, the question grows more urgent: Can Afghanistan realistically become a partner for Central Asian countries, or is it destined to remain a persistent source of regional instability? This confrontation is deeply unsettling for the countries of Central Asia. Still in the early stages of formulating coherent policies toward Afghanistan, they have tentatively linked their development strategies to the hope of having a stable neighbor to the south – one that might serve as a bridge to South Asia. Against this backdrop, deteriorating Afghan-Pakistani relations breed more frustration and anxiety than hope. No country in the world, except Russia, has recognized the Taliban regime de jure. This broad reluctance reflects deep skepticism; few are willing to assume legal obligations or share responsibility for Kabul’s actions. Yet, Afghanistan remains far from isolated. Its geographic centrality makes it impossible to ignore. Accordingly, Central Asia has developed a distinct approach to dealing with its southern neighbor. It can be summarized as: We do not recognize, but we cooperate; we do not trust, but we verify; we do not agree, but we engage. In essence, Afghanistan’s neighbors, particularly the ones in Central Asia, have adopted a pragmatic, long-term strategy: engage without illusions or formal recognition, while maintaining the flexibility to adjust based on Kabul’s behavior. For these countries, Afghanistan does not stand as an independent priority. Its role is evaluated solely within the broader regional framework. In the most favorable scenario, Afghanistan serves as a transit corridor linking South and Central Asia. Yet even this utility is not indispensable; viable alternatives through Iran, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and China already exist and are expanding. Looking ahead, three broad scenarios can be envisioned: Optimistic: The Taliban demonstrate readiness for responsible engagement. This would enable Afghanistan’s gradual integration into trade and transport initiatives, expansion of economic ties, and a firm establishment as a bridge between Central and South Asia. Pessimistic: Afghanistan remains a chronic risk factor and flashpoint for regional crises. The ongoing Afghan-Pakistani confrontation, no longer a fleeting episode but an entrenched conflict, is a clear warning sign. If this becomes the norm, it will deter serious investment, no stakeholder will commit to a country that cannot guarantee peace with its neighbors. Inertia: Central Asian states continue their cautious balancing act under the logic that “a bad peace is better than a good war.” While cooperation continues at a minimal level, countries prioritize alternative routes and avoid deep commitments. Under this status quo, ambitious projects like the Trans-Afghanistan Railway and the TAPI pipeline are unlikely to materialize. The former risks losing the “trans” prefix; the latter may, for now, become little more than a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan venture. Nonetheless, there remains a window for diplomacy. Pressured by Turkey and Qatar, Kabul and Islamabad have agreed to resume negotiations aimed...

12 months ago

Afghanistan

Kazakhstan Responds to Claims It Has Abandoned Ethnic Kazakhs in Afghanistan

Recent claims circulating on social media have accused the Kazakh government of abandoning ethnic Kazakhs in Afghanistan, with posts often alleging that thousands of Kazakhs have been left to fend for themselves, painting an emotionally charged but factually questionable picture. The Times of Central Asia set out to verify these claims and found a far more complex reality. Historical Background Kazakh migration to Afghanistan dates back over a century. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, some groups of Kazakhs arrived via Xinjiang, China. Later waves followed during the 1930s, prompted by famine and Stalinist repression in the USSR. Some speculate that early migrants may have included supporters of Kenesary Khan, but this remains the subject of academic debate. While there are no official Afghan census records, estimates suggest that by the mid-20th century, the number of Kazakhs in Afghanistan may have reached 20,000-24,000. However, the repatriation programs of the 1990s drastically reduced these numbers. Since Kazakhstan’s independence, approximately 13,000 Kazakhs have returned from Afghanistan, part of a broader national effort that has repatriated over 1.15 million ethnic Kazakhs from abroad. Even after the Taliban takeover, repatriation efforts continued. In September 2021, for example, 35 ethnic Kazakhs were airlifted to Kazakhstan on a specially arranged flight. Disputed Numbers According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry and as confirmed by its embassy in Kabul, the number of ethnic Kazakhs remaining in Afghanistan is about 200 people, or roughly 15 families. In contrast, some self-proclaimed “cultural centers” and online activists claim there are “thousands” of families, with some estimates as high as 3,600 people. These figures are not substantiated by either official data or independent research. Verifying Ethnic Identity The Kazakh embassy in Kabul maintains contact with community representatives to track and verify the status of ethnic Kazakhs. Yet, confirming identities is a serious challenge in Afghanistan due to the absence of a comprehensive population registry. Since 2018, Afghan identity cards (e-Tazkira) have included a “nationality” field, but filling it is optional and based primarily on self-declaration or statements by local elders. This system is vulnerable to manipulation. The embassy reports cases where individuals from other ethnic backgrounds have falsely identified as Kazakh in the hope of qualifying for repatriation programs. Additional complications include limited access to remote provinces, weak administrative oversight, and security concerns. The embassy thus relies on field visits, trusted local contacts, and cautious verification to produce its population estimates. Mixed Marriages and Assimilation One of the biggest challenges in identification is interethnic marriage. Over the decades, many Kazakhs in Afghanistan have assimilated into surrounding Uzbek, Turkmen, or Tajik communities. Many no longer speak Kazakh, and identity is maintained through fragmentary knowledge of family genealogies (shezhire), often insufficient for verification. The embassy also raised concerns about “disputed applicants”, individuals attempting to exploit Kazakhstan’s earlier, more lenient kandastar (ethnic repatriation) policy. In the absence of rigorous documentation, ethnicity in Afghanistan has often been based on verbal claims, creating openings for abuse and corruption. Why Not Use DNA? Some social media users...

12 months ago

Afghanistan

Herat Tribal Peace Paves Way for Central Asian Connectivity Projects

In Herat province, a long-standing conflict between the Timuri and Achakzai tribal communities has officially ended. With the mediation of local authorities, religious scholars (ulemas), and community elders, peace was sealed by a public handshake. While the event may seem local in scope, it carries wider significance for Afghanistan and the broader Central Asian region. The Timuri-Achakzai feud is emblematic of a broader pattern across Afghanistan’s periphery: limited resources and the absence of effective distribution mechanisms. Disputes over land and water, exacerbated by droughts, shifting river courses, and inadequate irrigation infrastructure, had long fueled tensions over pastures and access to irrigation ditches. Compounding the problem, the disputed areas serve as a critical logistical junction, with both groups vying for control over transit routes. By the early 2020s, the conflict had calcified into a cycle of blood feuds. Traditional mediation efforts had collapsed, and the return of refugees from Iran, along with internal migration, further inflamed tensions as undocumented land claims surged. Weak central governance and legal ambiguity deepened the divide. A turning point came in 2023-2024, when Herat’s provincial leadership, working with ulemas and tribal elders, revived dialogue. The key to de-escalation was the realization of mutual dependence. Both groups faced declining agricultural yields, shrinking incomes, and reduced access to state and international aid. Their shared losses laid the groundwork for a symbolic public reconciliation, restoring a platform of trust. This reconciliation has practical implications for Central Asia. The proposed Turgundi, Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak railway, a critical trans-Afghan infrastructure project, passes through Timuri and Achakzai territories. Until recently, their rivalry posed a major risk from land disputes to construction security. Now, with both communities demonstrating their readiness to cooperate, political and transactional risks are receding. Herat’s peace agreement offers lessons for regional stakeholders invested in trans-Afghan corridors. First, infrastructure projects in Afghanistan require social engagement. Tribal structures must be included at every stage. Second, economic interdependence can be a catalyst for peace. When communities understand the tangible benefits of cooperation, they are more inclined to compromise. Third, local reconciliation creates what might be called a “social corridor.” The Achakzai and their related kin are present not only in Herat but also in Kandahar and Spin Boldak, spanning the planned railway’s route. Their buy-in transforms the line from a logistical corridor into a corridor of trust. This development is a strategic signal for the region. Localized Afghan conflicts can either block or enable integration efforts. Every grassroots peacebuilding success strengthens the region’s broader architecture of stability. Uzbekistan is eyeing the Trans-Afghan Highway. Turkmenistan is seeking to develop its connection through Turgundi. Kazakhstan is exploring how to link its rail networks with South Asia. All of these initiatives depend on the stability and cooperation of Afghan communities along the routes. The reconciliation between the Timuri and Achakzai should not be dismissed as a minor episode. It sets a precedent. Transitioning from high-level political declarations to the technical implementation of cross-border transit projects becomes more plausible when social dynamics are respected. If Central Asian...

1 year ago

Afghanistan

Opinion: The Contact Group on Afghanistan – Central Asia Formulates a Regional Position

On August 26, special representatives on Afghanistan from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met for the first time in Tashkent. The meeting resulted in the creation of a permanent regional platform: the Contact Group on Afghanistan. This gathering was not only a continuation of commitments outlined in the joint statement from the most recent Consultative Summit of Central Asian heads of state, but also a step toward preparing for the next high-level format, scheduled for November in Tashkent. Formally, Turkmenistan was absent. Available information suggests the reasons were purely technical. Ashgabat was ready to join and expressed support for the results through its foreign ministry channels. The key outcome is that Central Asian states have, for the first time, shown their readiness to speak with one voice on an issue long shaped by competing external interests. This is not the start of forming a common position; that had already developed de facto in recent years. All Central Asian countries have supported trade and transit with Afghanistan, continued supplying electricity and food, and maintained working contacts with the Taliban, while avoiding extremes. The Tashkent meeting institutionalized this approach: parallel tracks have now shifted, cautiously, toward coordination. Informal unity has been formalized into a tool. Unlike external players, who often cloak interests in grand rhetoric, Central Asia acts openly and pragmatically. The logic is simple: whatever is done for Afghanistan is, in fact, done for oneself. That is the distinctive feature of the regional approach - no ideological cover, no attempts to reshape Afghanistan. Examples are straightforward. Electricity continues to flow even when payments are delayed - not as charity, but as an investment in security. A blackout in Afghanistan could trigger refugee flows and threats heading north. Exports of flour and fuel sustain Afghan markets but also expand outlets for Central Asian producers. Participation in trans-Afghan corridors is not a gift to Kabul but an opportunity for Central Asia to anchor itself in southern logistics routes. Ultimately, every step “for Afghanistan” is primarily for the region itself. If Kabul ignores basic rules, cooperation will simply stop. In politics, there are no eternal friends, only eternal interests. The new format does not yet imply collective pressure on the Taliban. Rather, it creates conditions for each country to conduct more substantive bilateral dialogue, but grounded in a shared position. Until now, Central Asia has mainly spoken to the Taliban about trade, transit, and infrastructure. The Contact Group now makes it possible to add another dimension: clarifying boundaries of what is acceptable on issues like extremism, border escalation, or water pressure. For now, “red lines” are unlikely, since the Taliban have not crossed them. The situation remains manageable, leaving room for constructive dialogue. Equally important, the Contact Group is not a threat or ultimatum. Coordination is meant to expand opportunities for dialogue, not limit them. In the long run, this could evolve into a sustainable C5+A format. Afghanistan would then be integrated into regional frameworks not as a problem to be managed, but as...

1 year ago

Afghanistan

Recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: Between Law, Diplomacy, and Pragmatism

After the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, the question of recognizing the new Afghan regime became one of the key issues in regional and global politics. Although no country has granted de jure recognition to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), international engagement with the de facto authorities is becoming increasingly institutionalized. This article attempts to systematize and provisionally classify countries based on their stance toward the IEA. This is not a formal legal typology but rather an analytical tool meant to identify "stable patterns of behavior" in the context of interactions with the de facto authorities in Kabul. This approach does not aim for exhaustive academic precision but provides a basis for further discussion and analysis. To begin, we must clarify some basic principles, first and foremost, the institution of recognition. In international legal doctrine, the recognition of a new state or government is a unilateral act by a state and does not require the approval of international organizations. The UN, including the Security Council, does not formally conduct acts of recognition, but its approval is required for admitting authorities to the UN General Assembly, which constitutes formal recognition of international legitimacy and a willingness by the global community to work with them. The key mechanism here is the UN Credentials Committee. This is a special committee of the UN General Assembly consisting of nine member states, which change on a rotating basis. It annually reviews the lists of delegations accredited to participate in UN General Assembly sessions. Between 2021 and 2024, the committee decided to reject the recognition of seats for the Taliban government. In effect, this constitutes a denial of international recognition at the UN level. While the decision of the Credentials Committee has no formal legal significance as an act of recognition or non-recognition, politically it sends a strong signal to other states: the UN still does not regard the IEA as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. In other words, the Credentials Committee acts as a kind of beacon: until it is "lit," a wave of de jure recognition from other states is highly unlikely. Many countries, especially those following a policy of collective decision-making, will take their cue from the UN. For now, the signal remains unchanged: the international community maintains a cautious distance from legitimizing the Taliban regime. As is well known, there are two types of recognition: de jure recognition, which is complete and official and involves the establishment of diplomatic relations, and de facto recognition, which is limited and does not imply full legitimization of the regime. Removing the Taliban from national terrorist lists (as Kazakhstan and Russia have done) does not constitute legal recognition, even though some may portray it as such. The UN itself uses the term "de facto authorities" to describe the Taliban. At the same time, the UN Security Council sanctions regime on Afghanistan (under Resolution 2255) provides for the application of sanctions on an individual basis, without qualifying the regime as a terrorist regime. The...

1 year ago

Regional Security

Afghanistan and Central Asia: Pragmatism Instead of Illusions

“When the winds of change blow, some build walls, others build windmills.” — Chinese proverb Afghanistan remains one of the most complex and controversial spots on the map of Eurasia. After the Taliban came to power in 2021, it seemed the countries of Central Asia were faced with a choice: to distance themselves from the new regime or cautiously engage with it. However, it appears they have chosen a third path - pragmatic cooperation free from political intentions. Today, a window of opportunity is opening for the Central Asian states to reconsider their relationship with Afghanistan, not as a buffer zone or a source of instability, but as a potential element of a new regional architecture. At the same time, these countries are in no hurry to establish close political ties with Kabul. They avoid making declarations about "integrating" Afghanistan into Central Asia as a geopolitical region. Instead, the focus is on practical, rather than political or ideological, cooperation in areas such as transportation, trade, energy, food security, and humanitarian engagement. This pragmatic approach is shaping a new style of regional diplomacy, which is restrained yet determined. Against this backdrop, two key questions emerge: What role can Afghanistan play in regional development scenarios, and what steps are needed to minimize risks and maximize mutual benefit? Afghanistan After 2021: Between Stability and Dependency Since the end of the war and the Taliban’s return to power, Afghanistan has experienced a degree of relative order. However, the country remains economically and institutionally dependent on external assistance. Historically, Afghanistan has survived through subsidies and involvement in external conflicts, from the “Great Game” to the fight against international terrorism. Today, new actors, such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the Arab states, are stepping onto the stage alongside Russia, the United States, and the broader West. In the context of current geopolitical realities after the fall of its “democratic” regime, Afghanistan has found itself in a gap between the experiences of the past and a yet undetermined future. It has a unique opportunity to transcend its reputation as the “graveyard of empires” and determine its fate while simultaneously integrating into the international community. How the de facto authorities in Afghanistan handle this opportunity will not only shape the Afghan people's and the region's future but also influence the development of the entire global security paradigm. In parallel, the countries of Central Asian are building bilateral relations with Kabul on strictly pragmatic terms: participation in infrastructure and energy projects, food supply, and humanitarian aid. All of these steps have been taken without political commitments and without recognizing the regime. [caption id="attachment_30841" align="aligncenter" width="1062"] The border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan near Khorog, GBAO; image: TCA, Stephen M. Bland[/caption] Geo-Economics and Logistics: Afghanistan as a Strategic Hub The regional reality in Central Asia is increasingly taking on a geo-economic dimension. The region is not only an arena for the interests of external powers but also a zone for developing transport, logistics, and energy networks in which Afghanistan is playing an...

2 years ago

Women's rights

Opinion: Balancing Rights and Realities – Engaging Afghanistan for Change

The attention of the international community has once again turned to human rights in Afghanistan following the latest report by Richard Bennett, the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan. In his report, Bennett recommended that member states consider the concept of gender apartheid and support its codification, noting that Afghan women regard this term as the most accurate description of their situation. This initiative emerged in response to the tightening restrictions on women and girls imposed by the Taliban. The renewed focus on gender issues is not exactly what Central Asian countries expect in the context of Afghan settlement. For them, it is far more important to address pressing issues of security, economic cooperation, and control of migration flows, which directly affect regional stability. Therefore, Central Asian states prefer to concentrate on practical steps and avoid over-politicizing issues that could complicate dialogue with the Taliban and exacerbate the situation in neighboring Afghanistan. Today, women’s rights have become a cornerstone in the international community’s attempts to establish dialogue with the Taliban. The rights of women in Afghanistan have been a journey, with different periods bringing different challenges. Back in the 1920s, Amanullah Khan was a real game-changer, giving Afghan women the official equal status they deserved. But then things changed a bit during King Zahir Shah's reign (1933–1973) when education became a priority, and girls started going to school. By 1973, a heartening number of 150,000 girls were proudly enrolled in schools across the country. And let's not forget the momentous step of Kabul University opening its doors to women in 1947. Since the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, women’s rights in Afghanistan have been significantly curtailed. Women are banned from attending educational institutions, working in most sectors, traveling without a male escort, and participating in public life. These measures have already received widespread international condemnation — rightfully so — but the official recognition of "gender apartheid" as a crime against humanity could give this issue a new legal status and increase pressure on the Islamic Emirate. The question is: How productive is this approach? The politicization of Afghan settlement, especially through the lens of women’s rights, may only worsen the situation. Making gender issues a precondition for dialogue severely limits the space for negotiations with the Taliban regime. In the United Nations itself, the Taliban are considered the "de facto authorities" of Afghanistan, and dialogue with them takes place at various bilateral and multilateral levels. In this context, strict demands on women’s rights could delay or even halt the process of engagement. This is because the Taliban perceives such conditions as interference in their internal affairs and cultural norms. Dialogue at an Impasse: Is an Inclusive Government Being Set Aside? The international community — primarily its Western segment — and the Islamic Emirate have taken extremely rigid positions. For international actors, women’s and girls’ rights have become the top priority, while the issue of forming an inclusive government in Afghanistan has receded into the background....

2 years ago

Afghanistan

Afghanistan: Rentier State or Hostage to Foreign Aid?

The current geopolitical turbulence presents Afghanistan and the countries of Central Asia with serious challenges. After the Taliban's return to power in 2021, Afghanistan found itself in a state of deep economic crisis, and its continued stability once again depends on external assistance. However, with the shifting global order, traditional donors such as the U.S. and the European Union are scaling back their involvement in Afghan affairs, while new sources of support remain uncertain. This creates significant risks for the countries of the region, which must find ways to minimize the consequences of Afghanistan’s crisis and ensure their own security. Historical context: dependence through the ages Afghanistan has always been dependent on external sources of income. This historical context was explored by Ali Nuriyev (historian, blogger, and researcher of the Ottoman world) in his article for TRT, "Afghanistan: The Graveyard of Empires or a Rentier State?" “As flattering as it may be for Afghans to have a reputation as [a nation that has kept its independence despite incursions from Great Powers], everything comes at a price, including Afghanistan’s independence”. Nuriyev provides a detailed analysis showing that since the founding of modern Afghanistan in the 18th century by Ahmad Shah Durrani, the country has built its economy and politics on external sources of income. Durrani financed his campaigns through raids on India, while his successors received subsidies from the British in exchange for maintaining neutrality in the "Great Game" between the British Empire and Russia. Later, in the 20th century, Afghanistan skillfully played on the rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., securing billions of dollars for infrastructure, education, and military modernization. By the 1970s, two-thirds of the country's state budget came from foreign aid. Even after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001, Afghanistan continued to rely on external support. The governments of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani survived primarily due to funding from the United States and its allies. Today, following the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, Afghanistan is once again searching for new sources of income. Sanctions and frozen assets have forced the Taliban to seek support from China, Russia, and other nations, further proving that the country’s reliance on foreign aid remains unchanged. This is the historical reality: Afghanistan is a state that, for centuries, has survived thanks to external resources. Its independence has always been closely tied to its ability to extract benefits from the geopolitical maneuvers of great powers. In the present day, this historical context can be interpreted in different ways. However, one fact remains clear, today’s geopolitical turbulence is already having a negative impact on Afghanistan. Afghanistan's adaptation As the global order shifts, the key players on the "Afghan track" are adjusting their strategies toward Afghanistan, exacerbating the country’s economic crisis. United States – For Afghanistan, the new realities in the U.S. mean reduced aid and frozen assets. The U.S., which had long been Afghanistan’s primary donor, is unlikely to increase financial support soon. Following...

2 years ago

Afghanistan

Central Asia Expands Trade and IT Cooperation with Afghanistan Amid Regional Growth Plans

The Central Asian countries continue to develop their trade relations with Afghanistan, a crucial factor in the region's economic growth and resilience against economic and political challenges. Afghanistan's key trade partners in Central Asia are Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan play a smaller role, they still contribute by exporting electricity and agricultural products to Afghanistan. Afghanistan is Uzbekistan's fifth largest export market. Over the past five years, trade turnover between the two countries has grown by nearly 1.5 times, reaching $866 million in 2023. Currently, 550 enterprises with Afghan investments operate in Uzbekistan, with 443 being fully Afghan-owned. Joint projects span industries such as food production, construction materials, agriculture, tourism, and textiles. Recently, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan signed business agreements worth $4.5 million between their private sectors. For Turkmenistan, the most significant project involving Afghanistan is the TAPI gas pipeline. President Berdimuhamedov recently directed the government to accelerate the development of the Galkynysh Gas Field and expedite the TAPI pipeline's construction. The state company Turkmengas has already completed a 214-kilometer section on Turkmenistan's territory, fully preparing it for operation. This project is a key component of the country's socioeconomic development and investment program for 2025. Additionally, Turkmenistan is poised to become a transport hub for international corridors passing through Kazakhstan, particularly the North-South and Middle corridors, as well as the Lapis Lazuli corridor, which connects Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan. Although Kazakhstan does not share a border with Afghanistan like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it remains an active trade partner. The Times of Central Asia has previously detailed trade relations between Astana and Kabul, highlighting Kazakhstan’s potential not only for expanding trade but also for entering Afghanistan’s IT market. The Afghan news portal AVA Press notes Kazakhstan’s role in regional stability and economic development. It also mentions Kazakhstan’s humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, including earthquake relief in 2023 and food assistance in 2024. The article touches on Afghanistan’s IT sector challenges and Kazakhstan’s potential role in addressing them. Afghanistan lags in IT development and relies on imported technologies, but Kazakhstan, recognized for digital transformation, could be a valuable partner. Kazakhstan’s e-government model, including the eGov platform, serves as an example of how digital services can improve governance and infrastructure. Choosing Kazakhstan as an IT partner is seen as a strategic decision based on the country’s internationally recognized digital achievements, strong economic ties, and mutual trust.

2 years ago

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