Our People > Andrei Matveev

Journalist

Andrei Matveev is a journalist from Kazakhstan.

Articles

Iran

The Trump Factor: Why Central Asia Has Remained Silent on Iran’s Protests

The wave of protests that erupted in Iran in late December and spread to at least 27 of the country’s 31 provinces has become the largest since 2022, when mass demonstrations followed the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini in the custody of Iran’s morality police. The unrest has raised new concerns across the region about political stability, energy markets, and the risk of external intervention. Rights monitors say protests have been reported in hundreds of locations nationwide, with death and detention tolls still contested. Human rights groups and independent monitoring organizations estimate that dozens of people have been killed and more than 2,000 detained, while Iranian officials have offered varying accounts and blamed violence on what they describe as “rioters.” In Kazakhstan, observers are drawing comparisons to the country’s own January 2022 unrest, officially labeled an attempted coup that ended in a violent crackdown. But beyond the parallels with Kazakhstan’s ‘Qantar’ events, analysts are focusing on the wider implications, particularly the potential impact of Iran’s domestic turmoil on global oil markets. For Kazakhstan, the stakes are heightened by the country’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports and the sensitivity of global energy markets to supply shocks. Any sharp change in Iranian output, even if temporary, could place downward pressure on prices and complicate budget planning for oil-dependent economies across Central Asia. Kazakh financial analyst Rasul Rysmambetov has voiced concern that unrest in Iran could trigger a surge in oil production aimed at funding social spending, a move that could drive down global oil prices and harm Kazakhstan’s oil-dependent economy. “Iran could add half a million barrels a day within six months and cause oil prices to collapse, but it would not do so casually. The Middle East is very sensitive and knows how to negotiate. Still, if the protests persist, Tehran might ramp up production to finance social needs. [This would be] painful for Kazakhstan. If Venezuela is a bear cub, then Iran is a grizzly bear in the bushes with its oil,” Rysmambetov warned on his Telegram channel. While political unrest typically raises oil prices by increasing supply risk, analysts note that Iran’s response could be atypical. Faced with fiscal pressure, Tehran may opt to increase production to stabilize revenues, a move that would push prices lower despite heightened instability. Iran’s chronic social issues, exacerbated by inflation and the collapse of the national currency, have fueled public discontent for more than a decade. While the Iranian authorities acknowledge the severity of the economic crisis and have conceded that some demands are legitimate, they have also warned of further hardships. On January 5, the judiciary announced that no leniency would be shown toward those detained during the protests. Russian experts, meanwhile, have framed the unrest in geopolitical terms. Irina Fedorova of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies cited renewed sanctions, critical shortages of water and electricity, and foreign interference as the root causes. However, she dismissed the likelihood of regime change, pointing to disunity among opposition factions. “The difference...

2 days ago

Venezuela

The Venezuela Effect: Oil, Sanctions, and Kazakhstan’s Strategic Dilemma

The start of 2026 was marked by political upheaval across two continents: fresh protests in Iran drawing comparisons among some Kazakh analysts to the country’s own Bloody January of 2022, and a U.S. military operation described by Washington as a law-enforcement action in Venezuela. The latter led to the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and what some analysts are describing as a move toward far greater U.S. influence over Venezuela’s oil sector. Beyond its immediate implications for global oil supply and pricing, the geopolitical symbolism of the Venezuela operation is resonating in unexpected places, including Central Asia. Contrary to some early reports, the American intervention in Caracas was not bloodless. At least 40 Venezuelan security and military personnel were reportedly killed during the rapid offensive. Still, Kazakh political scientist Marat Shibutov argues that the perception of a swift and decisive U.S. action, especially in contrast to Russia’s grinding war in Ukraine, is symbolically damaging for Moscow. “This comparison with Russia’s prolonged conflict is not flattering,” Shibutov noted. “It creates a sensitive political backdrop for the Kremlin.” In Kazakhstan, where debates over foreign energy contracts have been simmering for years, the events in Venezuela are being closely watched. Political analyst Daniyar Ashimbayev referenced Astana’s past discussions about reviewing oil agreements with Western companies. “The topic of revising oil contracts is becoming less and less popular. At this rate, it could even be equated with extremism,” he commented ironically, underscoring how sensitive the issue has become. Some experts are also concerned that political shifts in Venezuela and Iran could destabilize the oil market in ways that would hit Kazakhstan’s economy hard. Kazakhstan derives a substantial share of its state budget revenues from the oil sector, making sustained price declines a direct fiscal risk rather than a purely market concern, analysts note. Energy analyst Olzhas Baidildinov points out that Venezuela holds the largest proven oil reserves in the world, approximately 300 billion barrels, more than 30 times Kazakhstan’s profitable reserves. “If liberal or Western-friendly governments come to power simultaneously in Venezuela and Iran, they could supply an additional 2-3 million barrels per day to the global market within the next 3-4 years,” he warned. Even without full regime change, he noted, easing sanctions or the return of “shadow exports” could push global prices down to $50-70 per barrel. “At such prices, it will be difficult to demonstrate economic growth and maintain momentum in Kazakhstan’s oil sector,” Baidildinov added. Financial analyst Arman Beisembayev offered a more bearish view. “If production volumes increase and the U.S. begins releasing more oil onto the market, including from Venezuela, then I’m afraid prices won’t stay at $60 per barrel. The base case is a drop to $50. A worst-case scenario could see prices at $40, or even lower.” But not everyone believes Venezuela can upend the market. Askar Ismailov, a Geneva-based advisor on Central Asia at the Global Gas Centre, remains skeptical. “Venezuelan crude is extremely heavy, difficult to extract, and expensive to transport. Historically, it depended on a...

4 days ago

Tax Reform

Are Kazakhstan’s Small Businesses Really Leaving Over Taxes?

As Kazakhstan prepares for tax reforms set to take effect in 2026, a new wave of panic has surfaced in the national discourse, one suggesting that small businesses are facing a stark choice: shut down or relocate to neighboring countries promising more favorable tax environments. This narrative has gained traction twice in the second half of 2025. The first wave came in mid-autumn, triggered by reports suggesting that Kazakhstani entrepreneurs were looking to move operations to Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan. These claims quickly spread across Kazakh social networks, particularly Threads. However, early signs indicated that the alarm was not being sounded by small businesses themselves, but by representatives of the B2B services sector, especially consultants and accountants. Media outlets amplified comments that stirred fear, reinforcing what increasingly appeared to be media-driven panic. One such moment came in late September when the Kazakhstan Association of Tax Consultants hosted a presentation by its chairman, Saken Karin, titled “Tax Reality 2026: Opportunities and Risks.” Karin warned that the proposed reforms would “tear apart the B2B and B2C sectors,” criticizing state approaches to tax administration. Even then, experts argued that large-scale relocation of Kazakhstani businesses made little practical sense. “Which Kazakhstani businesses can realistically relocate to Kyrgyzstan? Probably only IT companies, which are location-independent. Most SMEs in Almaty rely on the quasi-public sector or the domestic market, which is considerably larger and wealthier than that of our neighbors,” said financier Rassul Rysmambetov. The numbers back this up: in 2024, the economy of Almaty alone reached $60 billion, compared to Kyrgyzstan’s national GDP of approximately $17.5 billion. Despite this, a second wave of panic is now gaining momentum, this time shifting focus to Uzbekistan as a destination for potential business migration. Once again, social networks, particularly Threads, are amplifying the noise, citing interviews such as one with tax expert Maxim Baryshev, who praised the tax systems of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Baryshev represents the professional accounting organization Uchet.kz. His colleague, Uchet.kz manager Timur Abiev, has previously spoken out against what he views as unfounded panic surrounding tax reform. Despite growing anxiety on social media, government officials have yet to launch a strong counter-narrative. This lack of response reinforces the idea that panic is being stoked by peripheral sectors rather than the business community itself. When Finance Minister Madi Takiev was asked about claims of a mass relocation of small businesses to neighboring countries, he dismissed them as unfounded. He argued that tax thresholds and turnover requirements in those countries are broadly comparable to Kazakhstan’s and noted that businesses relocating abroad would still be subject to domestic taxation if their economic center of interest remained in Kazakhstan, making such moves economically unviable. As for the accounting industry, its vocal opposition to reform may be tied to structural weaknesses. Kazakhstan’s accounting sector has been slow to adapt to changing demands and is struggling to train enough professionals to meet market needs. The number of established training institutions remains small. A recent government meeting focused on SME support included plans...

2 weeks ago

Sports

Kazakhstan vs. Uzbekistan: A Footballing Derby with an Uncertain Outcome

The Uzbekistan national football team has qualified for the 2026 World Cup, which will take place across three North American countries: the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Meanwhile, one of Kazakhstan’s leading clubs, FC Kairat Almaty, continues to gain experience competing in the UEFA Champions League. Football in Central Asia has become a mirror of the region’s growing economic and political ambitions, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan at the forefront. Their rivalry, which dates back to the Soviet era, has adapted to this new chapter. Kazakhstan and the Road to Europe Matches between Almaty's Kairat and Tashkent's Pakhtakor were once marquee events during the Soviet era, filling stadiums and energizing fans across the republics. Following the collapse of the USSR, however, the footballing paths of these two historical rivals began to diverge. Initially, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan joined the Asian Football Confederation (AFC), which includes countries from across Asia and parts of the Pacific, including former Oceania Football Confederation members such as Australia and Guam. Kazakhstan became a full member of the AFC in 1992, followed by Uzbekistan in 1994. However, Kazakhstan soon grew disillusioned with the level of competition within the AFC and began to explore other avenues. Its early attempts to join UEFA were rebuffed in the mid-1990s. Rakhat Aliyev, then head of the Football Union of Kazakhstan and son-in-law of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, later described the process as being dismissed “without really getting to the heart of the matter.” Despite this, both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan quickly showed they were a cut above most AFC members at the time. Kazakhstan won the inaugural Central Asian Cup in 1992, while Uzbekistan claimed gold at the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, defeating China 4-2 in the final. Eventually, Kazakhstan succeeded in joining UEFA. Spearheaded by Aliyev, the Football Union of Kazakhstan (FSC) lobbied hard for admission, culminating in meetings with FIFA and UEFA presidents Lennart Johansson and Joseph Blatter in Moscow in late 2000 and early 2001. The AFC issued a statement on May 10, 2001, allowing Kazakhstan to make its own decision, and five days later Johansson confirmed that UEFA would welcome Kazakhstan as its 52nd member. "Joining UEFA has given all of us who work in football a powerful boost," Aliyev said at the time. "We will strive to use this momentum to raise the level of our national football." Uzbekistan and the Central Asian Football Association Unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan chose to remain in the AFC, where it has steadily risen in prominence. In 2014, it became a founding member of the Central Asian Football Association (CAFA), a regional sub-group within the AFC. Officially operational since 2015, CAFA also includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The organization is currently chaired by Rustam Emomali, son of Tajik President Emomali Rahmon. Uzbekistan is ranked second in the CAFA, behind Iran, and has consistently reached the quarterfinals of the AFC Asian Cup in 2004, 2007, 2015, and 2023. Much of this success is due to sustained investment in youth development, training...

2 weeks ago

Politics

Kazakh MP Sarym Proposes Legal Measures Over Social Media Posts on Pipeline Strike

A Kazakhstani lawmaker has proposed criminal liability for social media posts that express support for attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. During a recent session of the Mazhilis (lower house of parliament), MP Aidos Sarym called for posts endorsing Ukrainian military strikes on oil infrastructure to be examined under existing laws on terrorism and high treason. The proposal follows a November 29 incident in which Ukraine’s armed forces reportedly targeted the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal in Novorossiysk, Russia. The attack damaged the CPC’s VPU-2 offshore loading terminal and temporarily halted operations. Addressing Prosecutor General Berik Asylov and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Culture and Information Aida Balaeva, Sarym said the incident had sparked public commentary online that he believes exceeds the boundaries of protected speech. He called for investigations into such posts and suggested they may warrant legal action. “Such actions clearly go beyond the constitutional right to freedom of speech and directly harm national interests,” Sarym said, proposing that the government also launch an information campaign to discourage rhetoric supporting violence against critical infrastructure. The initiative coincides with broader debates in Kazakhstan over how to manage public discourse surrounding the war in Ukraine, amid concerns that expressions of support for either side could have diplomatic implications. Kazakhstan maintains relations with both Ukraine and Russia and has sought to preserve a neutral stance throughout the conflict. Sarym’s remarks were interpreted by some political analysts as a broader signal to members of parliament, following earlier comments by fellow deputy Yermurat Bapi. Bapi had previously characterized Ukrainian strikes on CPC facilities as part of a legitimate military strategy, a position that Sarym suggested could fall under legal review. Energy Minister Yerlan Akkenzhenov noted that approximately 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports transit through the CPC. While the pipeline includes Russian ownership, most shares belong to companies based in Kazakhstan, Europe, and the U.S., he said, countering claims that the CPC is solely a Russian asset. Kazakhstan is accelerating the repair of the VPU-2 terminal, now aiming for completion by January 2026. The Ministry of National Economy is currently assessing the economic impact of the disruption. Oil and gas analyst Olzhas Baidildinov estimated the production loss at 480,000 tons, equating to about $210 million in revenue over two weeks. He forecast monthly losses exceeding $400 million, including an estimated $150 million shortfall in budgetary revenue. Baidildinov expressed support for Sarym’s proposal, describing it as part of efforts to safeguard internal stability amid external geopolitical uncertainty. The proposal has not yet led to formal legislative action, and no prosecutions have been reported. Further discussion on the issue is expected as part of Kazakhstan’s broader approach to managing public discourse and national security in the context of the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine.

3 weeks ago